INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

USC^^f^^^OMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAKY

w ''' UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 7

JANUARY 31, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1952

I'rinted for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

""^^^-^^^^ij^^

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1952

PUBLIC

^.•C Ant) fy^l'

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey

J. G. SouRWiNB, Counsel

Internal Security Subcommittee

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah

Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan

Robert Morris, Special Counsel Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research U

CONTENTS

Testimony of— P&tt

Blenman, Commander William 2180

Stufflebeam, Robert E 2121

Vincent, John Carter 1997-2286

Appendix I :

Correspondence from the President to the Vice President of September 22, 1951, and attachments thereto regarding former Vice President

Henry A. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944 2286

Letter to Hon. John E. Peurifoy from John Carter Vincent, dated

March 7, 1950 2294

State Department press release of January 6, 1947 22{©

State Department press release of October 5, 1945 2296

Appendix II (printed as pt. 7A) 2305-2474

ni

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1953

United States Senate, Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met at 9 : 45 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran (chairman), Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also Present : Senators Hayden, Knowland, and Welker ; J. G. Sour- wine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY, WASHINGTON, D. C, AND HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, at the conclusion of the hearing yester- day we were up to the period of about December 1942.

Mr. Vincent. You mean in reading over my — yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. To the extent that we were taking things chrono- logically we had about reached that point.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. You may remember that during the afternoon ses- sion yesterday afternoon there was some questioning about your ap- proval of a talk which was made by Mr. Service before the IPR or before a group of IPR people.

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I remember that.

Mr. Sourwine. Am I correct that it was your testimony that you remembered nothing about having authorized such a talk?

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I had no recollection of that, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, this is the State Department em- ployee loyalty investigation hearings before a subcommittee of the Ccrtnmittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate of the Eighty-first Congress, second session, part 2, appendix. On page 2234 appears the text of a document which was apparently entitled '"Personal Statement of John S. Service — Part 2." I read this paragraph, Mr. Vincent, and ask if it refreshes your memory in that regard.

Shortly after my arrival —

1997

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and lie is referring then to his return to the Department in April of 1945.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sour WINE (reading) :

I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis with ttie research staff of the IPR in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting. This meeting with the IPR took place on April 25. I believe that there were 10 or 12 people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bisson, Laurence Rosinger, and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give a prepared talk, and most of the time was spent in answering questions and in general discussion.

Did you know anything about that at the time?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not.

Mr. SouEwiNE. Were you Chief of the Division at the time ?

Mr. Vincent. I was Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ; yes, sir. What was the date of that ?

Mr. SouRwiNE. That was 1945, sir.

Mr. Vincent. I mean the month.

Mr. SouRwiNE. That would have been in April.

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten the exact date, but I left for San Francisco about the middle of April.

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.)

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there an earlier occasion on which you per- sonally had approved Mr. Service's appearance before an IPR group ?

Mr. Vincent. I have said, sir, that I just don't recall any instance pf that kind.

(Senator McCarran took the chair.)

Mr. SouRWiNE. Reading from the same hearings, Mr. Chairman, from the transcript of proceedings before the State Department Loyalty Board, page 2051 of the hearings. This is Mr. Service talking :

The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come over and give an informal off-tbe-record talk to some of their i>eople in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all right with me.

Question : In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR?

"Answer. That is right.

"Question. And authorized by the Department?

"Answer. That is correct, and it was quite a customary thing. We had a great many officers who did exactly the same when they came back from the field and had news, information of interest. I believe that Mr. Oliver Edmund Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from Sinkiang. I know that Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to give a talk when he also returned from China in June, 1945. and I am sure that there are many other instances of Foreign Service officers being authorized by the Department to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record background sessions."

What would be your comments on that Mr. Vincent ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, Mr. Service apparently refreshed his memory. I don't recall these people going regularly over to the IPR. What Mr. Service says there is no doubt correct, that the people did talk to the IPR.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any doubt now, having heard this, that you did receive a request from the IPR with regard to Mr. Service and passed it on to him and told him it was all right to go ?

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Mr. Vincent. No; I have no doubt that Service was testifying correctly.

The Chairman, What is that answer, please ?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I originally said I had no recollection of this incident, but the question there is whether or not now, having heard this, I still have no recollection of that specific incident, but I am not doubting the fact that it occurred.

The Chairman. My understanding is that the question primarily was whether you had engaged in the discussion, is that right?

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is right.

The Chairman. Now you have no doubt that you did ?

Mr. Vincent. According to that testimony now, I have no doubt that that incident occurred because Service remembers it better than I have.

The Chairman. I just wanted to get your testimony.

Mr. Sourwine. On December 15, 1945, sir, you were

Mr. Vincent. Excuse me. Would you repeat that ?

Mr. Sourwine. On December 15, 1942, you were named counselor to the Department of State ?

Mr. Vincent. There is no such title.

Mr. Sourwine. Counselor of Embassy, perhaps ?

Mr. Vincent. Counselor of Embassy in Chungking in 1942.

Mr. Sourwine. Is that what it was ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; if that was the date.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you back in the United States in 1943 ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you not know Jack Stachel ?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he is ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. How do you know that ?

Mr. Vincent. From reading the hearings of this committee. I don't know his precise work even now from memory.

Mr. Sourwine. All you know about him is what you have read in the hearings of this committee ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether you ever ate lunch in the Tally-Ho Restaurant in Washington ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember eating there, but I could have eaten there. I don't remember any instance of eating there.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember having lunch there one day in April of 1943 with Mr. John Stewart Service and one or two other persons ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that instance. I have heard it re- ferred to, but I still don't recall it. I may say there that I ate lunch every day with various and sundry people and I don't recall that luncheon that has been referred to here.

Mr. Sourwine. You did have lunch on at least one occasion in there with Mr. Service, did you say ?

Mr. Vincent. I mean I might have had lunch. I do not recall eating in the Tally-Ho with Mr. Service. I might have eaten else- where with him.

Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory of any time when you did?

Mr. Vincent. Not that particular one.

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Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say whether on the occasion referred to in April of 1943 or on any other occasion about that time you dis- cussed with Mr. Service and one or two others ways and means of getting rid of Ambassador Hurley as Ambassador to China?

Mr. Vincent. I do not have any recollection of discussing getting rid of Ambassador Hurley at that time. As a matter of fact, I think, sir, that you will have to correct the date there because you said 1943.

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right.

Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Hurley was not made Ambassador until the fall of 1944.

Mr. SouRwiNE. That would be a good reason for stating that you did not discuss it on this date, wouldn't it?

Mr. Vincent. It certainly would.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you now so state ?

Mr. Vincent. I now so state.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember on the occasion of such a lunch- eon or a luncheon about that time discussing Mr. Hurley in any way ?

Mr. Vincent. Are you still using that date of April 1943 ?

Mr. Sourwine. Still referring to April 1943.

Mr. Vincent. April 1943?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.

Mr. Vincent. No, I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you did or did not?

Mr. Vincent. I certainly did not. I didn't even know Ambassador Hurley and he wasn't Ambassador.

Mr. Sourwine. Now we are talking simply about Mr. Hurley, whether he was discussed. Did you on the occasion of such a luncheon state that the up-and-coming political group in China was the Com- munist Party ?

Mr. Vincent, I have no recollection of making any such statement and don't think I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you ever could have made such a statement ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in June of 1943 or about that time while you were counselor to the American Embassy in China — ^were you counselor of the American Embassy in China in June of 1943 ?

Mr. Vincent. No, I had already left Chungking.

Mr. Sourwine. When did you leave Chungking?

Mr. Vincent. I left Chungking the latter part of May 1943, or the middle of May. I don't recall the exact date.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in the spring of 1943, while you were counselor to the American Embassy in China, cable to the Depart- ment of State with respect to an interview which you had had with Chou En-lai?

Mr. Vincent. I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that cable quote Chou as having said :

Japan anrl Russia will not clash for the time being, but in the future will Inevitably fight. Therefore, we welcome American forces to help our guerrillas in north China to prepare for joint opposition against Japan in the future. Now they, the guerrillas, have been dispatched to occupied territory for intense ac- tivity. It is hoped that the American leaders will adopt positive action and send an observer to North China.

Mr. Vincent, I couldn't testify that that is the exact language of the telegram.

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Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that the substance ?

Mr. Vincent. A telegram was sent, and I would have to refresh my memory on the telegram, sir, to be able to say whether that was what was actually said.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that the substance?

Mr. Vincent. That was certainly what Chou would have said, 1 think, that he would have wanted somebody to be dispatched to North China.

Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you remembered that you had sent such a telegram.

Mr. Vincent. I remember such a telegram. I don't remember the substance of the telegram.

Mr. SouR^VINE. You do not remember even the substance of the telegi-am? Do you remember whether in that cable you stated "The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist lean- ings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will be approved."

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of saying that.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you did say that?

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I did say that.

Senator Ferguson. Would that have been a fact ?

Mr. Vincent. He would have to read that again. You mean the fellow who sent that should be pro-Nationalist in order

Senator Ferguson. No ; to get the Nationalists to do it, to consent to it. Read it.

Mr. Sour^vine (reading) :

The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to dis- parage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will be approved.

Mr. Vincent. Now your question is could that

Senator Ferguson. No. Was that a fact?

Mr. Vincent. It is a fact that certainly the Nationalist Govern- ment was very much anti-Communist and would have disliked any pro-Communist who was sent up there.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and if you had wanted to do it and have it approved you would have had to make it appear that he was pro- Nationalist.

Mr. Vincent. I don't think you would have had to do that kind of subterfuge. What you would have had done is send a man up there who was just a factual reporter on the situation.

Senator Ferguson. Then that was not a fact ?

Mr. Vincent. This statement here would be a fact, if it existed, that you would not send a pro-Communist to North China.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever send anyone up ?

Mr. Vincent. I didn't, but they were sent there in 1944, after I left China.

Senator Ferguson. Was that person pro-Nationalist?

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten who was sent up there. There was an Army group sent up there in 1944, and then various and sundry other people from the State Department were sent up there in 1944, I mean people with Stilwell's headquarters.

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Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you now testify that you did not make such a report ?

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not recall the substance of my telegram. I recall that a telegram was sent on the basis of Chou En-lai coming in and calling on me before I left Chungking in 1943.

Senator Ferguson. That is why I was trying to find out if that was the fact and that could have been in the telegram. You see, this committee is handicapped that they can't get records, and they have to reply upon testimony.

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would have to refresh my memory by seeing the telegram before I could testify that that was in that tele- gram.

Mr. SouRwiNE. That telegram is one of the papers which the State Department has declined to give us and which the President has de- clined to permit the committee to have, is it not ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether the committee asked for it or not

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know that it falls in that category of papers ?

Mr. Vincent. It would, I think, fall in that category.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think that you would be able to see it and refresh your memory from it and come back and testify to the com- mittee with regard to it?

Mr. Vincent. I think I could ; yes, sir.

The Chairman. And you can see it in the State Department, can you not?

Mr. Vincent. I can ask to see it.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you try to do that, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us anything else about that conference with Chou En-lai ?

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't haA^e any other recollection except he called before I left to talk with me and to see Acheson, to meet Acheson for the first time.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you become Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943?

Mr. Vincent. It was about that time ; yes, sir.

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were detailed to the office of the Foreign Eco- nomic Administration as special assistant to the Administrator Octo- ber 25, 1943?

Mr. Vincent. That is correct, according to this thing.

Mr. SouRwiNE. You stayed there until February 25, 1944; is that right?

Mr. Vincent. About that time ; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. While you were in the FEA office on detail, who was the Administrator?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Crowley.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you work in his office ?

Mr. Vincent. No ; he maintained an office up on Fourteenth Street, and I worked down in the temporary T or U Building on Constitu- tion Avenue.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Currie with FEA at that time?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Currie was Deputy Director.

Mr. Sourwine. Where did he maintain offices ?

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Mr. Vincent. He maintained his office in temporary U or T, down on Constitution Avenue.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was your work then closely associated with his ?

Mr. Vincent. Wliat work I did ; yes. It was not closely associated with his because I just did odd jobs down there for the time. I never took any active part in running FEA.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was your office close to Mr. Currie's office ?

Mr. Vincent. Across and down the hall.

Mr. Sourwine. The same floor ?

Mr. Vincent. The same floor, I think.

Mr. SouRwiNE. At that time, sir, was Mr. John Stewart Service in China?

ISIr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this. He was assigned to China. Whether he had come home on leave I don't know. I think he was.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden was?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether Ludden was still in China or not. I would assume he was. If you will let me refer to this I will find out, but I would say he was still in Kumning or Chungking.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Davies, John Paton Davies, Jr., was also in Chungking at that time ; wasn't he ?

Mr. Vincent. He was either in Chungking or New Delhi. He spent a great deal of time in New Delhi, India.

Mr. SouRAviNE. And Mr. John K. Emmerson was second secretary at Chungking in 1942 ?

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this, but he arrived after I left Chungking and must have been there.

Mr. SouRwiNE. And Mr. Lattimore was Deputy Director of Pacific Operations, OWI?

Mr. Vincent. In 1943 ?

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir.

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall when Mr. Lattimore took on the job.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he in Washington at that time ?

Mr. Vincent. If he was Deputy Director of OWI, he would have been in Washington.

Mr. SouRwiNE. "^Vliile you were with the FEA, sir, can you tell the committee just what functions or duties you did perform? Wliat did you do over there ?

Mr. Vincent. That would be very difficult to say because I never had any definite functions. I can tell you what one of the principal things was, because I went up for Mr. Crowley to the UNRRA con- ference, simply as an observer at the UNRRA conference. That took, I should say, the better part of a month of this time. Otherwise, it was a matter of the area directors and what not in FEA coming in from time to time and asking me specific questions as to factual conditions. I was used more or less as a person to be consulted with on conditions in China for the brief period I was there.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say you were there as an expert, or were you there as an adviser and consultant ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I was there to be consulted by the FEA people as they might wish to on conditions in China, from which I had just returned.

Mr. Sourwine. And you were consulted?.

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Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Who was your immediate superior while you were withFEA?

Mr. Vincent. My immediate superior would have been Currie in the position I held.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Who were your principal associates over at FEA?

Mr. Vincent. I would have to think who was over there. You see, I was there such a short time. There was a man named Riley, I recall his name, who worked with Crowley. I saw him from time to time at conference meetings. There was Oscar Cox, who was I think legal counsel for the FEA; I just don't recall the others who were over there to any great extent. I was trying to think of the area director, but I can't place him now.

Mr. SoURWiNE. You have already explained to the committee, have you not, how your detail to FEA was brought about by Mr. Currie ?

Mr. Vincent. I said Mr. Currie asked me to come over and the State Department detailed me.

Mr. SouRWiNE. So far as you know it was initiated by Mr. Currie?

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know.

Mr. SouRWiNE. You have already testified in executive session about your acquaintanceship with Mr. Lawrence Eosinger. You did know him, did you not?

Mr. Vincent. The only distinct recollection I have of meeting him, as I think I said, was at the IPR conference in 1945. He was there, as I recall it.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know him well at all ?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know him socially ?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr, SouRWiNE. Did you ever have business dealings with him ?

Mr. Vincent. I never recall having any business dealings with him.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was he in your office in connection with your offi- cial duties?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall a call from him.

Mr. Sourwine. Outside of the one meeting you have mentioned did you ever attend any meetings with him ?

Mr. Vincent. He may have been present at this meeting the nature of which I do not recall very clearly, of the American delegation to the conference which met some time in the late autumn of 1944 before the conference.

Mr. Sourwine. Here in Washington?

Mr. Vincent. I think it met here in Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. That was the whole delegation ?

Mr. Vincent. That was the delegation ; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever attend any meetings of the IPR or functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. Vincent. I have testified, sir, that T did attend a meeting or that I don't have any recollection, but I probably did attend a meet- ing in 1938 if Mr. Rosinger was there — I have no recollection of his being there.

Mr. Sourwine. Then aside from tlie two meetin^is you have men- tioned,- one in 1945, the conference, and one in 1938, and the further

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possibility that lie might have been at a meetiiipr of the delegates to the 1945 conference, is it your testimony that otherwise you never attended a meeting with Mr. Rosinger ?

]Mr, Vincent. I have no recollection of attending meetings with Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you read his book, War Time Politics in China ?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection distinctly of reading that book. I have seen the testimony that it was sent to me, and I apparently re- tained the manuscript and was asked by Mr. Bisson to send it back. That is in the testimony before this committee. I don't have any recollection of whether I read the book in manuscript or not.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have the book in manuscript form?

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that I did. 1 would not have recalled it had I not noticed that — I mean I would not have known it or re- membered it had I not noticed this letter from Bisson to me asking me to send it back. Therefore, I must have had it.

Mr. Sourwine. You have no independent recollection of it now ?

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how that manuscript came to you?

Mr. Vincent. No. Whether it was mailed to me, handed to me, I just don't recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it sent to you for criticism by the Institute of Pacific Relations or some official of that organization?

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that the fact that he sent it to me in manuscript was for me to look it over and see if it had factual mist;ikes in it or something else. I don't recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you well acquainted with New York City ?

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not say I am.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you been there a number of times ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I have been there a number of times.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether the Seville Hotel is locjjted in New York City?

Mr. Vincent. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Twenty-ninth and Madison would be in New York City ?

Mr. Vincent. No. I mean I would know

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you have ever been to the Seville Hotel?

Mr. Vincent. I would say that I don't ever recall having been at the Seville Hotel. It makes no impression on my memory at all.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you have ever stayed over- night there ?

Mr. Vincent. At the Seville?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. I would say almost positively I never have stayed overnight at the Seville.

]Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet anyone there?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet Agnes Smedley there?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. SouRAviNE. Did you ever meet Louis Gibarti there ?

Mr. Vincent. No. I don't know who Louis Gibarti is, but I didnt meet him there.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that name before?

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Mr. Vincent. No ; I haven't heard the name of Louis Gibarti.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did anyone every tell you to go to the Seville Hotel?

Mr. Vincent. Not that I can recall.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever arrange to meet anyone there?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I never arranged to meet anyone there.

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. You became Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs January 15, 1944?

Mr. Vincent. I was appointed to it. I see there is a conflict there. This would say that I left FEA in February. I became Chief of the Division about that time. It says I was with FEA until February, but it says I was appointed Chief of the China Division in February.

Mr. SoTJRWiNE, Is that impossible?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr, Sourwine. You could have had the title and rank and still be on detail, could you not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Raymond Dennett, the Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, the question of Amer- ican policy in the Far East?

Mr, Vincent. I have no recollection now of discussing it with him, but I would say it would be logical that Dennett as secretary would come down and discuss matters in China with me.

Mr. Sourwine, Why would you discuss American policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. Vincent. I didn't say, sir, that I discussed American policy. I might have discussed matters concerning China, factually or other- wise, with Dennett.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean to deny that you did discuss American policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett ?

Mr, Vincent. I don't have any distinct recollection of discussing policy with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have discussed policy with Mr. Dennett ?

Mr. Vincent. I would not have discussed policy which was policy that should not be discussed with someone on the outside, but policy which was adopted I would have and it would have been carried out.

Mr. Sourwine. Specifically did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the so-called least common denominator of American policy in the Far East, that is, what could safely be said to be the minimum that the United States would demand'?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing the least — or in those terms.

Mr. Sourwine. Would that be the kind of policy that had been made and could properly be discussed with an outsider ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, you would have to be more precise, I think, as to what would be called a least common denominator of American foreign policy with regard to China,

Mr. Sourwine. You would have an opinion about that phrase; wouldn't you ?

Mr. Vincent. Just at this moment the meaning of the least com- mon denominator doesn't even arouse in me any recollection of such an idea as a least common denominator.

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Mr. SouRWiNE. The question of what could safely be said to be the minimum that the United States would demand in its Far East policy — would that be a matter that could properly be discussed outside the Department ?

Mr. Vincent, It could be discussed speculatively with Mr. Dennett. To demand of whom? I am just trying to clarify that question.

JNIr. SouRwiNE. I am trying to keep the questions reasonably short. Demand in general, or of particular nations, or in regard to particular situations. Does that clarification change your answer in any way?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett specifically the alternative policies Avhich branched out from the so-called common denominator, which were being seriously considered by the State Department ?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. but as I say Mr. Den- nett was a man whom I knew, not too well, but a man whom I knew and thought was a very intelligent man, and I may easily have dis- cussed them with him in the matter of trying to get his views and benefit by them if he had any views on that.

JNIr. Sourwine. That would not be a matter of fixed policy or mat- ters of policy that had been established; would it?

INIr. Vincent. No ; because I think from what you are saying here, this was looking into the future.

Mr. Sourwine. These were matters which were being seriously con- sidered by the State Department?

Mr. Vincent. Foreign policy with regard to the future in China was being considered seriously by the State Department, I should say, at all times.

Mr. Sourwine. You think it would have been entirely proper for you to have discussed with Mr. Dennett alternative policies which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. Vincent. If they were not matters of secrecy.

Mr, Sourwine. Did you ever tell Mr. Dennett or imply to him that American policy in the Far East might grow out of Navy demands rather than being founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands would be integrated and by which Navy demands would be limited ?

Mv. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say whether I discussed that thing with him or not. That seems to be a very involved matter. I imagine that you are referring to a memorandum or something that Mr. Dennett himself may have prepared as a result of a conversation with me. People came in and out quite frequently. I suppose they went out and said they had had a conversation with me ; but I have no recollection of discussing a particular problem of that kind with Mr. Dennett.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of such a problem ?

Mr, Vincent. I don't even recall having in mind such a problem of the Navy and discussing the matter of policy with relation to the Navy in the Far East.

Senator Ferguson, Had you ever heard that there was a problem of Navy there ?

Mr. Vincent. There was a problem of the Navy in the postwar period, of what the position of the Navy was, but it was not one with which I was familiar.

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Senator Ferguson, How could you, as the head of this Division, pass on these questions if you weren't familiar with all the ramifications ?

Mr, Vincent. Senator

Senator Ferguson. How could you help to make policy if you didn't know?

Mr, Vincent, I had a general idea of what was the policy and what we wanted out of the war, but as far as

Senator Ferguson. You mean you were making policy on just gen- eral ideas?

Mr, Vincent. I wasn't making policy.

Senator Ferguson. Were you helping to make policy ?

Mr, Vincent. I was helping to make policy.

Senator Ferguson, How could you do it on general ideas ? Didn't you lead this committee to believe that you didn't have all the facts?

Mr, Vincent, It was the whole accumulated experience in the Far East on which I was depending, but I am not setting myself up here as an expert on naval relations in the Far East,

Senator Ferguson. But if the Navy relations had something to do with the question you would have to consider that in order to advise on the policy ?

Mr. Vincent. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson, Can you give this committee any idea as to what the facts were about this Navy entering into this decision ?

Mr, Vincent. I cannot from the reading of this question that we have here, and can't recall from recollection discussing with Mr. Dennett.

Senator Ferguson. Or with anyone ? I am not talking about Den- nett now. I am talking about the facts.

Mr. Vincent. He would have to read that question again.

Senator Ferguson. Kead it again.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Could I ask a different question, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, early in 1944 were the views and needs and pressures of the Navy an important factor with regard to United States policy in the Far East ?

Mr, Vincent, They certainly would have been; yes, sir. You are speaking now of the postwar period ? You are speaking of the needs of the Navy in China at that particular time or with relation to the Far East?

Mr. Sourwine. I will leave that to your definition. I believe my question is clear.

Mr. Vincent. It certainly would have been of entirely different character while we were prosecuting the war, that is, for the next year, if this was in 1944 ; but in the postwar period certainly the position of the Navy in the Far East had to be given consideration.

Mr. Sourwine. Did that help at all, Senator ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. Vincent, Mr. Sourwine, you are again asking me to remember what I said to an individual that long ago, and I just do not recall the conversation with Mr, Dennett.

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Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you miglit have so stated or inti- mated ?

Mr. Vincent. That China could not be considered a stabilizing power ?

Mr. SouRwiNE. That you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think that I said that.

Mr. SouKwiNE. Did you hold that view at that time?

Mr. Vincent. I held the view at that time, now that I recall it, wliich may have been misinterpreted here, which was that I did not think too much confidence could be placed or too much weight could be placed on China becoming the stabilizing influence in the Far East, that we would have to look to other means of having stabilization there because China was coming out of the war rather weakened.

Mr. SoTTRWiNE. In other words, you held the view substantially which you say you think you did not give to Mr. Dennett?

Mr. Vincent. That it would be a mistake to count too much on China being a stabilizing influence in the Far East at the end of the war ?

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether I expressed it to Mr. Dennett or not.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you want us to understand that you think you did not express it to him ?

Mr. Vincent. I could easily have expressed it to him.

The Chairman. What is that answer, please ?

Mr. Vincent. I say I could have expressed that opinion to him.

Mr. SouEWiNE. What is the difference between that opinion and the statement that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin ?

INIr. Vincent. Because the statement taken like that out of context would mean that I had no confidence in China. This was, in the broad picture of China, that it would be a mistake in our policy to place too much confidence in China being the stabilizing influence, and I am accenting "the" because I just remember having held the view that China was coming out weakened from the war and that we could not count too much on China. Let's go back to history a little bit. There was entirely, it seemed to me, too much weight being placed on China for China's own good, that China was being ushered in as one of the great powers and that China was going to come out of the war in a weakened condition and we would have to do a great deal ourselves toward building up China.

Senator Watkins. May I ask a question at that point. That didn't happen to be the view of Mr. Koosevelt, did it? He felt that China was to be one of the great powers and seemed to emphasize China's importance and her ability to carry on.

Mr. Sourwine. That was Mr. Roosevelt's policy, to build China up as a great power.

Senator Watkins. As I recall something hns been said recently by Mr. Churchill or someone to the effect that they felt Mr. Roosevelt had placed too much faith in the ability of China.

Mr. Vincent. I didn't read Mr. Churchill's statement, but probably to come out of the war as the stabilizing influence in the Far East.

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Senator Ferguson. If China wasn't to be, what was to be the sta- bilizing influence in the Far East ?

Mr. Vincent. We would liave to be the stabilizing influence in the Far East in combination with China.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you think we carried that policy out? .

Mr. Vincent. Of trying to be the stabilizing force ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. I think we did.

Senator Ferguson. With what we did with Nationalist China?

Mr. Vincent. We tried to support the Nationalist Government of China.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the Marshall mission ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that was support of the Na- tionalist Government of China?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. The whole intent of that mission certainly was to support the Nationalist Government of China by bringing about a cessation of civil war and bringing into the Government all of the dissident elements, including the Communists, but under the Nationalist Government of China and under Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you do about communism, do you think you could stabilize any government by taking the Commies into it?

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified before it was a matter of alternatives, and I thought and the President thought and the Secre- tary of State thought that the best alternative was to try to bring about a cessation of civil war through the matter of some kind of political settlement under a constitutional government arranged by the Chinese which would have representation in it of the various non-Kuomintang policies.

Senator Ferguson. Then it is your contention now, you, knowing what communism is, that you can stabilize a government by putting the Commies in it?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, it wasn't stabilizing a government. It was stabilizing a situation, sir. Let me answer, please, sir. It was sta- bilizing a situation where your alternatives were civil war or trying to bring about some kind of political agreement. The Chinese them- selves, the National Government, was trying to do just that.

Senator Ferguson. Will you cite a case in history where Commu- nists have been taken into a government and that that has stabilized conditions and tliat they didn't take it over or they had to kick them out ; one of the two ?

Mr. Vincent. I have testified here, sir, that it was in the back part

Senator Ferguson. No, no. My question is, you state a situation in past history where they were.

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that in the French Govern- ment

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking about what you have already testified.

Mr. Vincent. I say now, then, that an analogous situation is that the Communists came into the Government of France at the end of

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the war, that the Communists came into Government of Italy, and were eventually kicked out.

Senator Ferguson. All right. You had in mind, then, that either you would have to kick them out or you can't stabilize the situation or they would take it over.

Mr. Vincent. That would have depended entirely on how the Communists conducted themselves in the government.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a case where they did conduct themselves such that you could stabilize the situation and not kick them out or they not take it over ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you think that it could be done in China?

Mr. Vincent. Because it was an alternative to civil war in China and

Senator Ferguson. That wasn't my question. Why did you think it could be done in China, that you could stabilize it, and not kick them out or they not take it over?

Mr. Vincent. Because you could stabilize the situation by the avoidance of civil war, by taking them in on a minority basis with the Kuomintang and the major parties maintaining control of the government. That would have been stabilization of a situation inso- far as the avoidance of civil war was concerned.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think the Chinese Communists would €ver have given up their position in the civil war on any philosophy such as you now say : that you would take them in and they would he in such a weakened condition that you could kick them out?

Mr. Vincent. I not only thought that, sir

Senator Ferguson. And lose their position in their civil war.

Mr. Vincent. I not only thought that, sir, but General Marshall thought it. It has turned out not to have been the case.

Senator Ferguson. It turned out not to be true.

Mr. Vincent. It turned out the Chinese Communists were not prepared to come into the government on a minority basis.

Senator Ferguson. And on a basis that you could take over their position in the civil war and then kick them out.

Mr. Vincent. But I will say this: that the Chinese Communists themselves had joined in these conferences with just that idea in mind, because, as I have repeated before, the conferences were going on among the various parties, including the Communists, before General Marshall ever reached China.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, don't you know that when the Chinese were negotiating, as you now say they were, they were nego- tiating to better their position in the civil war and to kick the Nation- alists out, and not for the purpose that you and General Marshall were trying to have it done ?

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact information as to what were the ideas at that time of the Communists. I would say, from what I know now, that the Communists never intended to come in and let themselves be subordinated, because their very actions show they would not be subordinated to tlie Kuomintang.

The Chairman. Past history had proven at that time that that would be the verv result that would follow.

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Senator Jenner. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right, Senator.

Senator Jenner. Taking that position and that attitude and that policy toward China, when General Marshall returned and made his report and that program had failed, then what was the next policy or position of the Far Eastern Division and our Government toward China or Marshall's report back that his mission had failed?

Mr. Vincent. T]ie next position of the Government toward China was to help the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator Jenner. All right, then, I want to ask you if it is not a fact that, although Congress had appropriated the money for military aid to Chiang Kai-shek, for the next 15 months after Marshall made his report, although the money was appropriated, this Government didn't do a single thing for Chiang Kai-shek ?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, you are speaking of a period when I was not in America. I have no first-hand knowledge of that appropriation. I left in 1947. But I do know that arms were turned over to China, airplanes.

Senator Jenner. Following the Marshall mission ?

Mr. Vincent. In 1947, a considerable amount of arms.

Senator Jenner. When did Marshall return from China ?

Mr. Vincent. Marshall returned from China in January 1947.

Senator Jenner. And for the next 15 months we went ahead arming Chiang Kai-shek and giving him aid and support? You state that as a fact?

Mr. Vincent. I can state as a fact that specific instances occur to me during the time I was still here, during half of 1947.

Senator Jenner. All right. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. I think you testified — didn't you, Mr. Vincent, in the executive sessions — that the War Department, for General Marshall, made up the directive under which he went to China ?

Mr. Vincent. That directive was prepared over in the War De- partment.

Senator Jenner. In the War Department? General Marshall brought it to you made up ?

Mr. Vincent. I have described it. Do you want me to describe the various steps in that again ?

Senator Ferguson. Have you already in the open hearing described it?

Mr. Vincent. No ; we haven't discussed it in the open hearings.

Mr. SouRwiNE. We have quite a series of questions on that a little later, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Jenner. I would like to return, Mr. Chairman, to one ques- tion. I would like to know what was done following Marshall's re- turn from China and reporting that his mission had been a failure; that Chianc: Kai-shek refused to take the Communists into his gov- ernment. Wliat did we then do to aid Chiang Kai-shek ?

Mr. Vincent. I am working on memory here. One, there was a large amount of ammunition at Tsingtao in China.

Senator Jenner. What kind of ammunition ?

Mr. Vincent. Rifle ammunition, which was there and was surveyed and turned over to the Nationalist Government troops in the Province of Shantung.

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Senator Jenner. Did they have rifles to shoot that ammunition with?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, I think I testified yesterday, Senator, tliat people with much better knowledge of the situation in China have testified or stated that Chiang Kai-shek did not lack the military equipment in the year 1947 to carry on his campaign ; that, as a matter of fact, during that year he was more successful than he had been at any time before or after in consolidating his position.

Senator Jenner. Who in the State Department could give us better information about what we did to aid China ?

Mr. Vincent. In the period 19

Senator Jenner. Following the Marshall report back that it was a failure and that we would wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and that it was impossible.

Mr. Vincent. I would say the Secretary of State could do that.

Senator Jenner. The Secretary of State. You know we had the same situation paralleled in Korea. We said we gave them aid, and I believe it came out in the evidence in some of the hearings that we did give them aid. We sent them some baling wire, I just wonder if that was the same policy followed in China, It is the fact that follow- ing that 15 months' lull there, during that period, the Chinese Com- munists organized in Manchuria and marched down and took over the Government, Isn't that right ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Senator Jenner. That is the result ?

Mr. Vincent. During 1948.

Senator Jenner, That is right.

Senator Watkins. Let me ask a question with respect to this am- munition. Were you referring to what I think one of the witnesses testified to, an incident in which the ammunition v, as placed out in a dump somewhere and indirectly or by some other means Chiang and his group were told it was there and they went and helped themselves to it,

Mr. Vincent. That is one of the instances which I was speaking of.

Senator Watkins. We had a witness as I recall.

Mr. Morris. That was Admiral Cooke's testimony, sir.

Senator Watkins. Admiral Cooke said that is what happened. I think he also testified or someone testified on that point before this committee that they were short of ammunition in this period of time; that they didn't have more than about 2 rounds to fight with.

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that testimony. Senator.

Senator Watkins. Have you gone over the testimony before this committee ?

Mr. Vincent. Some of it. I haven't gone over all of it.

Senator Watkins. I may be mistaken on that, but that is my memory.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. ]\Ir. Vincent, did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States, with the tacit approval of Great Britain, and with the active support of Australia and New Zealand, would be the stabilizing power upon the Eastern Asian Continent?

Mr. Vincent. I will have to testify again that I cannot recall a conversation with Mr. Dennett on that specific subject, but I would

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say that that would seem to me to have been a logical position to take ;. that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia could stabilize conditions in the Far East.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States needed to be prepared for what its prospective course of action in or with respect to Eastern Asia would cost ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall stating that to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States needed work on the development of a formula for the problems of the independent areas in Southeast Asia ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall stating that to him.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Might you have stated that to him ?

Mr. Vincent. I might have stated that to him. We were very much preoccupied at that time with the postwar status of such areas as French Indochina, Indonesia.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you think the IPR might be an organization which would be a good one td assist in the formulation of that formula ?

Mr. Vincent. I was not thinking in terms of the IPR, If I wa& speaking to Mr. Dennett, I was speaking to a man who I considered to be intelligent and was discussing the matters with him. The idea of the IPR, with which my relations were not close except that one year, did not enter my mind as an instrument for bringing about that policy.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Don't you remember talking with Mr. Dennett at a time when he was about to take a job with the American Council of the IPR and he said he needed to know what the outlook was, what the future of American policy was going to be, to decide what he was going to do ?

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of that.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell the committee whether you ever stated or intimated to Mr. Dennett that you did not think Russia was a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?

Mr. Vincent. I do not remember that.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have been likely to have made such a statement ?

Mr. Vincent. It would sound most unlikely that I would say that Russia was not going to be a large factor. It w^ould have to be con- sidered in connection with the situation that might be described. I never in my life thought that Russia was not going to be a factor in the Far East.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in January of 1944 hold the view that Russia was not a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall holding such a view or stating it to him.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that in your opinion Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe anci would probably not interfere to upset the status quo in China?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall making such a statement to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you could have made such a state- ment?

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't believe I could.

Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact ?

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Mr. Vincent. No ; it was not a fact.

Mr. SocKwiNE. You did not hold that view yourself?

(No response.)

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Mr. Mandel, who has been sworn for the purpose of all of these hearings, if he can identify that as a photostat of a document taken from the IPR files.

Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a document from the IPR files.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you identify it by the heading ?

Mr. Mandel. The heading is "Confidential," marked "R. Dennett^ January 18, 1944, memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, this memorandum of a conversa- tion, as Mr. Vincent surmised, is the basis for the line of questions that have just been completed. I don't think it is necessaiy to take the time of the committee to read all of it. I would like to read from the last page five short paragraphs which are marked "Conclusions" and then ask that the entire document be placed in the record at this point.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Sourwine. Conclusions:

(1) Vincent certainly implied tliat American policy in the Far East may grow- out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of prin- ciples into which Navy demands will be integrated or limited.

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin, and questions its stabilizing influences upon the eastern Asiatic Continent.

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing power.

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for the problems of the dei>endent areas in the southeast Asia country.

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture: Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would un- doubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.

The Chairman. You want this instrument inserted in the record in toto ? Mr. Sourwine. If the chairman please. The Chairman. Very well. (The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 380" is as follows :)

Confidential R. Dennett. January 18, 1944..

Exhibit No. 380

Memorandum of Conveksation With John Cartee Vincent

I explained to Mr. Vincent that I was considering a job with the American' Council of the IPR, and that I thought it highly desirable to get some inkling: of American policy in the Far East with a view to determining (1) the least common denominator of that policy — what, that is, everyone was agreed to as the minimum that the United States would demand, and (2) the alternative policies which branched out from the common denominator which were being seriou.sly considered. My purpose, I explained, was to see what the minimum was which the American people would be called upon to support, so that I couldi

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get a line on what educational work the American Council should be concerned with in the next few years, and to see, on possible future policy, what alternative proposals were being seriously considered so that IPR research could be geared as close to reality as possible. Mr. Vincent indicated the following:

(1) Consideration of American policy in the Far East is definitely "second drawer" and is the concern at the present time of relatively few people in the American Government. He personally, and he thought others in the Govern- ment, would welcome the publication of material which pointed out just what the situation was. Ed Snow has an article on southeast Asia which he cannot get published now because of the fear that it will give aid and comfort to the •enemy. What Snow says in effect is that Japanese propaganda on increased na- tionalism is catching on in Burma and other areas. Vincent thinks that, through a slight feeling of guilt, Americans have been building up China in the past few years and are still a little ashamed of the small amount of aid going to that country. There is a vast difference, he feels, between having a feeling of this sort and allowing this feeling to keep (handwritten insert maybe us, not clear) from telling the American people what they ought to know.

(2) There seems to be a general agreement, undertaken at the instigation of the British, that dependent areas in southeast Asia will remain undisturbed after liberation, and that their future will be worked out at a later date. Vin- cent thinks that unless the United States gets on the ball and makes some defi- nite suggestiorua for the record pretty soon, it may be too late as no one will have notice of what American policy might be.

(3) Vincent thinks that the first determinative on American policy will be the demands of the American Navy for what it considers it needs on the Pacific area in the way of bases for defensive purposes. He believes that they will "want considerably more than they had before and that, in view of what hap- pened in 1941, they will get a receptive hearing on the Hill. The result of their demands will be to bring out several consequential questions :

(a) Granted that the Navy gets what it wants, the first problem facing the United States will be to utilize those bases for other than purely negative in- fluence of defense of the United States. Vincent believes that the demands of the Navy, when met will actually make the United States the "stabilizing power" in the Far East. We will be there, and we will have the power.

(ft) So far as China is concerned, the problem of the United States far from being that of building up China to become the stabilizing power, will be to keep China from disintegrating. China cannot become industriaized in the modern sense unless the United States will literally give her the heavy capital machinery; it would, he believes, be possible to increase Chinese purchasing power through agrarian reform and improved communications to a point where China could support a light industrial economy which would assist in keeping her from disintegration. Whether the things that need to be done will be done by the conservative Kuomintang is doubtful. In essence, therefore, this means the development in China of a "welfare economy" rather than an "industrial economy."

(4) Vincent believed that the British would have no serious objection to the implication behind the probable United States Navy demands, that the primary interest of Britain would continue to be Western Europe, and that she was not prepared to equip and to maintain an adequate force in the Pacific to he tbe "sta- bilizing power," and that they would certainly prefer the United States in that position than China. This would, of course, mean that Australia and New Zealand would gravitate toward the United States in political interest.

(5) I raised the question as to where British and American interests might, in the outline he had presented, come to disagreement. I pointed out that the line between a stabilizing power and a dominating power was thin, and that if the United States failed to make some provision for dependent areas, or at- tempted by the possession of adequate power plus assistance from Australia and New Zealand to put the stopper on the development of nationalistic feeling in any of the far-eastern areas, the position of the United States as a stabilizing power changed to that of a dominating power. This, I suggested, Britain might not be opposed to. On the other hand, if the United States did take a lead in developing a formula providing expression for nationalistic feelings in southeast Asia, I wondered whether the United States and Great Britain might not fall out over India, which would, in this situation, certainly attempt to line up as a far-eastern nation in order to come under whatever formula the United States developed for other parts of southeast Asia.

Vincent stated that this was precisely the point at which he thought intelligent work was needed. It is very apparent that Britian is as unwilling to talk about

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India as Russia is to talk about Poland — in fact the reason William Phillips is still in this country because the British convinced him of the validity of their position. Vincent felt that the Indian question might very well be the point of major disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.

(6) I raised the question whether, at this point in the line of reasoning so far pursued, it did not become apparent that some mechanism was needed in the form of a regional council at the very least, through which the pressures developed by nationalistic feelings could be siphoned oft' into discussion and open examination, and what the prevailing attitude, if any, was toward the British regional ideas.

At this point Vincent became vague. He indicated that few people other than Hornbeck and Blakeslee had done much thinking on the subject, and that Blakeslee was all in favor of some sort of international political machinery. The implication was that Hornbeck and he had their doubts. He did say that Hull was very sympathetic about the problem of dependent areas and thought that something should be done, but left the impression that very little had in fact been done. He thought that the British were, in all probability, throuuh in Hong Kong, and that, although they had little enthusiasm for Hong Kong as a base, they might definitely want it developed to a free port. He thought that the question of face could be handled by letting British troops retake Hong Kong, although he admitted quite a situation would arise if, by any chance, the Chinese recaptured the area.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of prin- ciples into which Navy demands will be integrated and limited.

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific Basin, and questions its stabilizing influence upon the eastern Atlantic continent.

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing power.

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country.

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture : Rus- sia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you or do you know Maxwell S. Stewart ?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever meeting Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you ever read any of his writings?

Mr, Vincent. I do not recall reading any of his writings.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever read in manuscript form anything that Mr. Stewart wrote?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of reading in manuscript form.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say that a manuscript written by Mr. Stew- art was not transmitted to you by Miriam S. Farley, of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of the incident.

The Chairman. Going back to this exhibit, Mr. Sourwine, should it not be further identified as to its date ? It is dated January 18, 1944, headed "Memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."

Mr. Sourwine. The Chairman is correct.

You recall this incident was referred to yesterday by Mr. Morris.

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; at which time I said I couldn't recall the inci- dent.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you want your testimony to imply that you find the incident incredible, or that you are willing to accept the possibility that this manuscript may have been transmitted to you, that you may

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have read it and that you may have expressed an opinion with regard to it?

Mr. Vincent. I would like my testimony to be that I have no recol- lection of the incident as it occurred.

The Chairman. You are speaking now of what? You used the term "manuscript."

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, there is in the record of the hearings as exhibit No. 176 (page 629, part 2,) a memorandum to W. L. H. from M. S. F., presumably to Mr. Holland from Miriam Farley, which reads :

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on point of detail.

Then there is more to it, all of which is in our record. It was men- tioned at yesterday's hearing. Mr. Morris asked some questions about it, and I was endeavoring to find out, thinking it over overnight, if there had been any recollection come to Mr. Vincent about it at all.

The Chairman. Do I understand the witness to testify that he does not recall at all having the manuscript or going over it ?

Mr. Vincent. No ; that is my testimony, sir.

Senator Watkins. Would you go so far as to deny that you had such a manuscript?

Mr. Vincent. I just said I do not consider it incredible that I might have.

Mr. Morris. Was it a habit on the part of IPR people to send manu- scripts to you for criticism and approval ?

Mr. Vincent. I would not call it a habit. I do not recall other manuscripts.

The Chairman. What do you mean, you would not call it a habit ?

Mr. Vincent. One would have to define habit.

The Chairman. Was it customary?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have to say I do not recall other manu- scripts being sent to me. Apparently the Rosinger manuscript was sent to me.

The Chairman. Do you recall that?

Mr. Vincent. Now that this thing has been read, I don't recall the incident, but as I say, there was a letter written to me asking me to return it, and I have no reason to deny it.

Senator Ferguson. You were in a position to make policy as far as the Far East was concerned ?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have said many times I was in a position to suggest courses of action or policy to my superiors.

Senator Ferguson. And you knew that the IPE, was interested in the Far East?

Mr. Vincent. It was interested in the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. What their people were writing for consumption here in America would be of interest to you as a foreign officer.

Mr. Vincent. It would be. I never followed the IPR too closely.

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Senator Ferguson. You thought it was of interest because you be- came a trustee in the organization ; is that not true?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The fact that there is evidence in the files that they sent you these before they were published would indicate to you that they had been sent to you ?

Mr. Vincent. It would indicate that they had been sent to me. I so testified.

Senator Ferguson. And you believe that they were valuable, their works, in forming public opinion ; is that right ?

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't use the word "valuable," no; but I think they were of use in forming the public opinion.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that was of greater value in forming public opinion than these documents and books and papers being written by the IPR ?

Mr. Vincent. What I would say offhand is that the IPR did not have too wide a circulation. Therefore, I would say that what was reported in the national press would probably have had a greater in- fluence on public opinion with regard to the Far East than the IPE, publications.

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that some of these publications, and the speeches made from them, were getting into the public press?

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say whether they were getting in the public press or not. It would certainly be logical to say they were.

Senator Ferguson. Were not you watching the public press also for public opinion?

Mr. Vincent. Yes; but Senator, I could not now say whether I can recall whether the IPR was covered in the public press to any great extent. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Does it not sound reasonable that if a publica- tion came to your desk that could have some effect upon public opin- ion in manuscript form for your criticism that you would have read it or had somebody read it to report to you so that you could judge whether or not it was accurate and you felt that that should be used as a molder of public opinion ? Does that not sound reasonable ?

Mr. Vincent. That sounds reasonable to me.

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you explain where the other facts and testimony show that you were submitted these papers that you did not so act ? Is it one of neglect ? Is that what you are telling us ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't understand your question, Senator. One of neglect if I had not read them ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and did not have somebody read them to report to you. Would it not show now neglect on your part?

Mr. Vincent. Not to have read them ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, or have somebody read them.

Mr. Vincent. I would not call it neglect. It would depend on whether you had time to read them or not. I have already testified that I possibly read these publications. It is not incredible. But I have no recollection of reading them.

Senator Ferguson. Then you do not swear now that you did not read them ?

Mr. Vincent. What ?

Senator Ferguson. You do not swear now that you did not read them?

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Mr. Vincent. I would not swear now that I did not read them.

Senator Fekguson. All right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever have any connection with the China Aid Council ?

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you or do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter, former president of the China Aid Council ?

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I have no recollection of meet- ing Mrs. Carter, but that I probably did meet her at the IPR confer- ence if she was there.

Mr. SouR^viNE. Was the Mrs. E. C. Carter, who was at one time president of the China Aid Council, the same Mrs. E. C. Carter who was the wife of E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify on that, sir.

Mr. Soitrwtne. Did you ever ask Mrs. E. C. Carter to send your regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen ?

Mr. Vincent. You have made that question before and I have said I have no recollection of asking her to send it to her.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, I show you a publication headed "China Aid Council Newsletter," June 1944, and I ask you to look at the marked paragraph in the second column.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you see there a reference to yourself ?

Mr. Vincent. I do.

Mr. SouRWTNE. Would you read that paragraph, sir?

Mr. Vincent (reading) :

John Carter Vincent, in charge of Chinese affairs for our State Department,, asked Mrs. Carter to send his regards to Mme. Sun since he knew her well in Chungking, and both liked and respected her.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Does that refresh your recollection in any way?

Mr. Vincent. It does not refresh my recollection, but I don't find it incredible that I would have sent my regards to Mme. Sun.

The Chairman. Wliat is the last part of your answer?

Mr. Vincent. That I might have sent such a letter of Mme. Sun.

Mr. Sourwine. How would you have communicated to Mrs. Carter your request that she give your regards to Mme. Sun ?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I have no recollection of how I might have communicated that to her. I have already testified that the incident on my own memory, relying on it, I had no recollection of the incident. Therefore, I have no recollection of how I might have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun.

Mr. Sourwine. I understood you, sir, in your answer to that ques- tion the first time to indicate that the only occasion on which you could have met Mrs. Carter was this IPE. conference you attended.

Mr. Vincent. I said that was the only occasion I had a recollection of meeting Mrs. Carter.

Mr. Sourwine. You did have a recollection of meeting her there?

Mr. Vincent. It was the only one I had any recollection of meeting her, at the IPR conference.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recollect that you did meet her at the IPR conference ?

Mr. Vincent. I have no memory of it.

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Mr. SouRWiNE. Then it is not the only occasion you remember meeting her, because you don't remember meeting her at all, is that right?

Mr. Vincent. That is right. I wouldn't know Mrs. Carter if I saw her today.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you send your greetings to Mme. Sun Yat- sen through someone you never met or saw before ?

Mr. VixGEXT. I say this is an incident I have completely forgotten about. "Wlien I say that I have no reason to doubt that at some time I may have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun, that does not alter my testimony that I don't know Mrs. Carter, or would not know her if I saw her today.

Mr. SouRw^ixE. The fact you have no recollection of her or would not know her if you saw her is not, in my mind, any reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement that you did ask her to give your regards to Mme. Sun.

Mr. VixcEXT. I have said it is possible. I don't recall the incident at all. .

Mr. SotjRWIne. The question was not whether it is possible. Is not the mere fact that you do not remember and would not know her if 3'ou saw her enough in your own mind to make you doubt somewhat the accuracy of this paragraph ? Why do you say you have no doubt about this paragi'aph ?

Mr. Vix'CEXT. I just don't recall the incident at all. As I say, it is not incredible — put it on a matter of doubt — that I sometimes talked with Mrs. Carter, that at some time I met her, which I don't recall, and she may have said she was going to see Madame Sun, and I may have said, "Go ahead, and give her my regards." I say I have no recollection. I am simply speaking with regard to the possible rather than something I myself recall.

Mr. SouRwixE. You have not even entertained the thought that this might be something made out of the whole cloth relating to a com- pletely nonexistent message ?

Mr. VixcEXT. I have not considered it from that angle.

Mr. SouRwiXE. You think that this was in good faith ?

Mr. Vix'^CEXT. I say again this is possible.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire?

The Chairmax. Yes.

Senator Fergusox. Mr. Vincent, do you have the same difficulty m your work in the State Department, advising with other officers, of remembering things that have happened as you have here on the witness stand ?

Mr. Vix'CEXT. If it is a matter of going back •

Senator Fergusox. Are you as uncertain in your work there about what has happened as you are here?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, this all happened 7 or 8 years ago.

Senator Ferguson. Can you answer that question ?

The Chairman. You better answer that question.

Senator Ferguson. It is necessary for a foreign officer and a diplo- mat, such as you are, to remember things for 7 years, is it not ? You have to keep them all in mind ?

Mr. Vincent. These incidents here, as I say, I do not recall.

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Senator Ferguson. But are you in as much doubt in conferring with State officials on things that have happened as you are before this committee ?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, it is a matter of recalling what I would think now as details.

Senator Ferguson. I am asking, Are you usually in as much doubt ?

The Chairman. I think that is a simple question and easily under- stood. Why do 3'ou not answer it ?

Senator !• erguson. Are you in as much doubt in advising on facts with the State olHcials as you are here in this committee?

Mr. Vincent. If they were matters which I considered of as little importance as some of these things brought forward here, I would be in the same degree of doubt. In other words, whether or not I remembered would be a case whether I can remember them.

Senator Ferguson. As to whether or not documents passed through your hands for criticism in manuscript form is not a minor matter, is it?

Mr. Vincent. It is a matter — I do not know whether you call it minor at all. It is a matter which made no impression on me at the time.

Senator Ferguson. That is the only answer you can give to my ques- tion as to whether or not you are as uncertain and lack as much knowl- edge in your advice to State officials as you do at this committee?

Mr. Vincent. That is the answer.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, following up what Senator Fergu- son has said, if we could return for just a moment to the Maxwell Stewart pamphlet, do I correctly understand your testimony with regard to that, that while you do not remember anything about the incident, you think it is possible that the manuscript was submitted to you, that you did read it and you did comment on it as indicated by the Miriam Farley memorandum ?

Mr. Vincent. I think I used your words. I think it was not in- credible that I might have.

Mr. Sourwine. I do not know whether this has been called to your attention before. I think perhaps it may have been. I am reading, Mr. Chairman, from Wartime China by Maxwell Stewart, the pam- phlet referred to in the memorandum which we are discussing. These paragraphs appear:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots, populace move- ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition pai'ty in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Commu- nists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices. In the past the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and ruthlessly with landlords and others who they considered oppressors of the people and expropriated landlord estates in order to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today in the inter- ests of the united front, the Communists have largely abandoned these extreme methods. Their present program is reformist rather than revolutionary. They no longer expropriate the property of landlords except that of traitors. In fact, they welcome the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help fight Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes, and exorbitant interest rates, and encouraged education, cooperatives, and other measures of popular improve- ment. In addition they have developed a rough and ready system of local democracy in the villages under their control. Elected councils have been set up in village, town, and district, and the local executive oflficials are also chosen

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by popular vote. Tax assessment committees made up of local farmers have been set up to assure fair administration of taxation. These measures reflecting the most deep-seated desires of the Communist peasant have given him the feeling of having a stake in the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the peasants for support of the war effort.

Having heard that read, I ask you, sir, does it appeal to you as a. factual statement?

Mr. Vincent. It seems to me to be a statement by Mr. Stewart of his opinion of what was the condition in Communist China.

The Chairman. That is scarcely an answer. That does not answer at all. The question is. Does it appeal to you as a factual statement- Mr. Vincent. It is certainly a statement of the conditions in that area insofar as Mr. Stewart knew them; and I didn't know, and I could not judge.

The Ch.\irman. I do not see why you want to evade the question. "Wliy do you not answer it ? The question is, is that a factual state- ment.

Mr. Vincent. I would not be in a position to testify because I had never been in the area. I didn't know what the conditions were there.

Mr. SouKAViNE. Would you, sir, consider it credible that you would have read that as part of the pamphlet and then reported that it was good and should be published ?

Mr. Vincent. As this man's statement of his opinion of what was liappening in that area, that it could be published.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Would 3'Ou, Mr. Vincent, have read that and then reported that you thought it was good and should be published ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall saying whether it was good and should be published.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you find it credible that you could have read that as part of this j^amphlet, and then reported that you thought it was good and should be published ?

Mr. Vincent. I thought it was good and it should be published in bringing information about Communist China.

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire?

The Chairman. All right. Senator.

Senator Ferguson. What did your counsel say to you ? ■ Mr. Vincent. I didn't hear him.

Mr. Surrey. I don't believe that is the statement as to what he re- members, since he testified he did not remember the incident.

Senator Ferguson. Hearing this statement, you want to say now that as a foreign officer in the State Department, and a former trustee of the IPR, that you would allow to go to the public a statement like that when you did not know whether it was a fact or not ?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, it was not a case of my allowing it to go to the public.

Senator Ferguson. If you were to criticize it in manuscript form be- fore it was printed, were they not asking you in effect, "Do you ap- prove this to be printed and circulated to the public?" Is that not what your criticism was asked for ?

Mr. Vincent. No; not my criticism. They might have completely rejected any criticism.

Senator Ferguson. Surely, but you would have been on record as saying you did not agree with it because you either did not know what the facts were, or did not believe what he was saying. You

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do not think they were submitting it to you just for the English, do you ?

Mr. Vincent. They were submitting it to me as they say there as to wliether it would be good for this to be published. So they say in this memo.

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is exactly it, whether or not it should be handed out to the American public to help crystallize public opin- ion, and here you were, a State official, and now you say that you would pass it because it was his word, and anything he would say you would pass, is that correct? Is that what you want to leave with this committee ?

Mr. Vincent. It was not a case of my passing the thing. It was not my document. It was submitted to me to go over. It could be published whether I approved it or not.

Senator Ferguson. But if you did not say anything to the con- trary, the IPR would take for granted that you were approving it, is that not correct ?

Mr. Vincent. I would not think so.

Senator Ferguson. You would not think so ?

Mr. Vincent. That I was approving it. My approval was not necessary to publish IPR documents.

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not mail it back and say to IPR, "I am not going to criticize your document. Print anything you want to, but I am not going to criticize it. I am not going to say whether it is good, bad, or indifferent''? Wliy did you not tell them that?

Mr. Vincent. As I have just said, the whole matter is one I have no recollection of what attitude I took on it. I said it is not incredible that the incident occurred.

Mr. Sourwine. You have stated that you are willing to accept the fact that it occurred?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. The memo indicates that you have expressed your opinion in confidence. You were advising the IPR but you did not want the fact that you were expressing an opinion to go out. That is the implication of the memo. Does that change your testimony ?

Mr. Vincent. This memo was not written by me. I cannot myself vouch for what my exact attitude was at the time.

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. But you still find nothing incredible in the memorandum?

Mr. Vincent. Except the matter of saying, "I have expressed in confidence" or the language of the thing, the existence.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you deny that you expressed an opinion in con- fidence ?

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not deny that I told them that.

Senator Ferguson. With your present knowledge, Mr. Vincent, having heard this read, do you say now that it accurately sets forth the facts?

Mr. Vincent. I say now, sir, that I did not know the facts as they existed.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now.

Mr. Vincent. Wliether now this was an accurate statement of what was happening ?

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Senator Ferguson. Yes, witli your knowledge now is that or is that not an accurate statement of the facts?

Mr, Vincent, Knowing what I do know about Communist China, I would not say that was a completely accurate statement of the condi- tions in Communist China at that time.

Senator Ferguson, Would you say now with your present knowl- edge that that was a pro-Communist writing?

Mr. Vincent, I would say that it was a writing which had a slant in favor of giving the Communists, I do not think it w^as pro-Com- munist, I don't even know that Stewart expected it to be. Stewart was writing what he considered to be an account of conditions in Communist China,

Senator Ferguson, Why are you defending Stewart in this answer?

Mr, Vincent, I don't even know Stewart,

Senator Ferguson. Knowing it is an inaccurate statement, which you have said, why do you doubt that Stewart was trying to put propa- ganda out in favor of the Communists ?

Mr. Vincent. I would not call — I have no idea of what Stewart's motives were at that time. If he wrote a memorandum, I must assume that he was trying to write what he thought was a factual memo of conditions in Communist China.

Senator Ferguson. Suppose he was a Communist, would you still give that answer ?

Mr. Vincent. If he were a Communist, I would say certainly he was trying to slant it toward a better understanding of what was going on or a sympathetic understanding of what was going on in Communist China,

Senator Ferguson. From that statement, have you any doubt that he was pro-Communist in the statement?

Mr, Vincent, At that time? At the time he made the statement?

Senator Ferguson, No, from what you know now,

Mr. Vincent, I would say now on the basis of that statement that he probably was pro-Communist.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that it is a fair statement to the American people ?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't know whether it was a fair statement because I have to go back again and say I was not familiar with condi- tions

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. Your knowledge of the facts now.

Mr. Vincent. From my knowledge of the facts now, I would say that was a statbment which was slanted or sympathetic toward Com- munists.

The Chairman. You were asked the question, do you regard that as a fair statement to go to the American people.

Senator Ferguson. Is it?

Mr. Vincent. Is it now, or was it then ?

Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you do now, was it a fair state- ment to go to the American people ?

Mr. Vincent, I would say as a statement of Maxwell Stewart, a man who was supposed to learn something about it, that it was not a case of it being a fair statement to go to the American public or not. It was a case of Maxwell Stewart putting out in IPR a statement. And its fairness does not seem to enter into it.

22848— 52— pt. 7 3

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Senator Ferguson. My question is, you as a State official, and a United States Government official, knowing what the facts are now, knowing what he said, was it or was it not a fair statement to the American people ?

Mr. Vincent, It was a statement to the American people which could have misled them as to what conditions were in Communist China.

The Chairman. Therefore, not a fair statement to go to the Amer- ican people ?

Mr. Vincent. I iBnd trouble in saying what is fair when one man wants to report.

The Chairman. If it is misleading, it is not fair ?

Mr. Vincent. The American public, it w^ould seem to me, would have a right to receive anybody's opinion through these kinds of things.

The Chairman. You have stated in answer to Senator Ferguson that it was not a fair statement to go to the American people. Then it w\as misleading the American people, was it not ?

Mr. Vincent. I have so testified that the statement itself, slanted as it was, would have misled the American people at the time as to con- ditions in Communist China.

Mr. Sourwine. By your previous answer

Mr. Vincent. From what I know now.

Mr. Sourwine. By your previous answer, one question ago, do you mean to say that you feel the American people have the inalienable right to be misled as far as the Communist writers want to mislead them ?

Mr. Vincent. I certainly did not. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, was this statement Communist propaganda ?

Mr. Vincent. In my opinion at that time, I did not so consider it.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now.

Mr. Vincent. Now I would say, as I look back on it and know about communism, it would have misled people as to conditions in Communist China. It was painting too rosy a picture of conditions there.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, would you say it was Communist propaganda ?

Mr. Vincent. I would n®t say it was Communist propaganda:, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why not '^

Mr. Sourwine. Was it pro-Communist propaganda ?

Mr. Vincent. I said that the thing was slanted towards the Com- munists and giving an unduly rosy view of what was happening in Communist China as I look back on it now.

Mr. Sourwine. In that regard, it was pro-Communist, was it not?

Mr. Vincent. I find it difficult to define what you mean by pro- Communist.

Mr. Sourwine. That phrase is used in the State Department com- monly. How does the State Department use it ?

]Mr. Vincent. Then it was in that sense. If it gave a rosy view it would be considered to be slanted toM^ard the Communists and pro- Communist.

Mr. Sourwine. It was propaganda ?

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Mr. Vincent. I would not call it propaganda in the sense that Mr. Stewart, as far as I know, was trying to report on the situation as he saw it.

Mr. SouRAViNE. We have defined propaganda once.

Mr. Vincent. Information.

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right, which is put out, which is propa- gated, with a view to creating an impact on the people to whom it is sent. In that sense this certainly was propaganda.

Mr. Vincent. In that sense it was.

Mr. SouiiwiNE. Then it was pro-Communist propaganda, was it not?

Mr. Vincent. Well, it was pro-Communist propaganda.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, do you find as much trouble among State officials as you are having here this morning on the question of pro-Communist propaganda ? Do they all have as much trouble as you have here this morning?

Mr. Vincent. In looking back upon other situations at times, and trying to described what was or was not a pro-Communist situation in 1943 or 1944, 1 couldn't answer that question, sir, whether they would or would not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have trouble at that time in determin- ing what was or ^as not pro-Communist or anti-Communist propa- ganda ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall an instance of having trouble.

Senator Ferguson. You do not feel there was any trouble in de- termining that back in those days?

Mr. Vincent. People may have had difficulties in determining what was Communist and what was pro-Communist or anti-Communist. I don't know that during the war, when they were fighting, that a great deal of emphasis was placed on that particular phase of the thing.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, when you say you had no trouble in distinguishing pro-Communist and non-pro-Communist matter, is that because you had no trouble making the distinction, that is, you were always readily able to make the distinction, or is it because you were not bothered very often trying to make the distinction?

Mr. Vincent. I think trying to get it down to a fine point of what was or was not pro-Communist was not something that occupied one's thoughts too much at that time.

Mr. SouRwiNE. It did not occupy very much of your attention ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. And that means that if it did not occupy your attention, it did not really occupy anyone's attention in the Depart- ment ?

Mr. Vincent. No, that is not so.

Senator Ferguson. Whose job was it to pay attention as to whether or not the people were being misled by Communist propaganda, if it was not yours ?

Mr. Vincent. I didn't say that I was not occupied. I said we were not too much occupied.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Vincent. That you didn't examine every document that passed over your desk to see whether it was pro-Communist or anti-Com- munist.

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Senator Ferguson. Then it would have been a very easy thing for Communists either in or out of the State Department to act with immunity and mislead the American people ?

Mr. Vincent. I can't agree with that, sir, because people were cer- tainly conscious of the threat of communism. I was myself.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, do you not think that the head of a desk in the State Department, the director of a division, should be thoroughly conversant with the Communist objectives in the area under his jurisdiction, so that he would recognize almost instantly Communist propaganda, or their line, if it cropped up in anything that came to him ?

Mr. Vincent. I should think he should be alert to such a situation.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you feel that you were, while you were the Di- rector of the Far Eastern Division, informed and so alerted with re- gard to Communist propaganda and the Communist line in the Far East?

Mr. Vincent. I endeavored to keep myself so.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think, as an alert man, that this state- ment that has been read by Mr. Sourwine would go through your hands with approval?

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that it went through — it did not go through my hands with approval insofar as T recall, but I am perfectly willing to say that the thing went through.

Senator Ferguson. With your approval.

Mr. Vincent. Again, I don't use the word "approval."

Mr. Morris. The memorandum states that you said it was good and worth publishing.

Mr. Vincent. I am not testifying that the report of what I said there is a factual statement of what I said.

Mr. Sourwine. But you do not contest it?

Mr. Vincent. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. And you do not find it incredible ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might turn to another line of questions.

The Chairman. Try to turn to something that the witness. knows something about.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, was Owen Lattimore an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek at the time he accompanied Mr. Wallace to China ?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. He had ceased to be adviser to Chiang Kai-shek some time before that, had he not?

Mr. Vincent. I think he ceased to be adviser to Chiang in the fall of 1942.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in China during the period when he was adviser to Chiang?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. During that period when Mr. Lattimore was ad- viser to Chiang, did he make reports directly to the White House ?

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say with any assurance which way he made his reports.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever consider the possibility that he was making reports directly to the White House ?

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Mr. Vincent. I assumed that he was, since he was sent out by the President.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you eyer discuss this possibility with Am- bassador Gauss ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall discussing it with Ambassador Gauss.

Mr. SouKwiNE. As a matter of fact, is it not true that possibility was a source of irritation to Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. Vincent. I recall that the Ambassador did not like the idea of having two people reporting out of China.

Mr. SouRAViNE. How do you know he didn't like the idea if you never discussed it with him ?

Mr. Vincent. I didn't say I didn't discuss it with Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SouRwiNE. I thought you said you had no memoi-y of dis- cussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was report- ing directly to the White House.

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not say that.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember ever discussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the Wliite House ?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any particular incident, but I do have a recollection that was his attitude at the time.

Mr. SouRwiNE. He was irritated at that possibility?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did it irritate you ?

Mr. Vincent. It did me, too.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did it irritate you ?

Mr. Vincent. Because as Foreign Service officer in the field, it was somewhat difficult for us to have a separate reporting office out of China on conditions there, and not know what was going on in that reporting field.

Mr. SouRWiNE. You would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore had not reported directly to the White House?

Mr. Vincent. I would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore, under directions he had to report to the White House, showed us what he was reporting so we could know as well.

Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not show you any reports that he filed with the White House?

Mr. Vincent. None that I ever recall.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, Mr. Vincent, do anything to condition Mr. Wallace for his mission to China ?

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified that we met not frequently but on several occasions before we started out. I have no distinct recollection of memory that I may have prepared him for the mission, but I may have ; of factual conditions in China as I saw them.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not indicate, in executive session, that you did supply him with material in advance of the trip ?

Mr. Vincent. That is just what I was testifying again now. I testified further that I had no distinct recollection of the exact char- acter of the material.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also testify in executive session that you had consulted with Owen Lattimore to make preliminary arrange- ments for the Wallace trip ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall my exact testimony in executive session, but I think it is quite logical that I would have.

2030 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, did you not say that you had discussed the trip with him before the appointment was announced?

Mr. Vincent. I think I told you, sir, it was quite logical I did, but I can't recall any particular discussions with him. But as I say, it cer- tainly would have been logical for Lattimore and myself, who were going out with him, to have had discussions.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you influenced Mr. Wallace at all on his trip ?

Mr. Vincent. I should hardly see how it would have been impos- sible for me not to influence Mr. Wallace on the trip, since I had been in China for 20 years, with factual information.

Mr. SouRWiNE. You can "hardly see how it would have been im- possible" for you "not to influence"? Straighten that out.

Mr. Vincent. I say it certainly would have been logical for me to have had some influence on Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, you know you did influence him?

Mr. Vincent. What I am trying to say is that I don't recall specific influences I had on him. I am trying to give the question or the answer a geneial character, rather than saying in what particular way I may or may not have influenced him.

Mr. Sourwine. I am perfectly willing to be general, but perhaps you can be a little more specific. Do you really mean that you cannot recall any instances in which you influenced him or might have in- fluenced him ? You do not mean that, do you ?

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall specific instances.

Mr. Sourwine. Furnishing him material in advance of the trip is influencing him, is it not ?

Mr. Vincent. That would be giving information.

Mr. Sourwine. Giving advice throughout the trip would be influenc- ing him, would it not?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Talking with him one evening after having a con- versation with Chiang and suggesting you take a certain line the next day is influencing him, is it not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. You did that, did you not ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. On more than one occasion, did you not?

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to consider specific instances.

Mr. Sourwine. That is a specific instance, is it not ?

Mr. Vincent. I did talk to him and certainly he must have been to some degree influenced by me.

Mr. Sourwine. You know he was, do you not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRW^NE. He changed his line at least on one occasion because you suggested it, did he not ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Breaking in on conversations with Chiang to steer him in particular directions was influencing the mission was it not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. You did that, did you not ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2031

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then there is not any question in your mind that yon did influence Mr. Wallace in the course and direction of his mis- sion, is there ?

Mr. Vincent. There certainly is no question.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you present at all of the talks between Mr. Wallace and General Chiang t

Mr. Vincent. I was present at all except the first and the last.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there anywhere at any time, in any written memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace, any refer- ence to a request by General Chiang for the assignment of General Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt?

Mr. Vincent. I recall no memorandum. It was all oral discussion as far as I can recall.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Wallace ever tell you orally that General Chiang had made a request for the assignment of General Wedemeyer or had indicated that he would like to have General Wedemeyer as- signed as the President's representative to him ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his ever telling me that the General- issimo wanted General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know where the first idea of having Gen- eral Wedemeyer recommended originated?

Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that it originated with Mr. Alsop. I didn't know Wedemeyer, and I think Mr. Wallace stated that he had never known General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SouRwiNE. You and I have been over this, and I realize I am cutting corners on it. I simply wanted to traverse that here for the public record in case Senators who were not present at the executive session might want to ask questions.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also testify that it was Mr. Alsop who had stopped the proposed recommendation of General Chennault for that job?

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of my testimony.

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that he had done so by saying that General Chennault did not want the job ?

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you read Mr. Alsop's testimony before this committee ?

Mr. Vincent. I have not read it carefully; no, sir. I glanced through it.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you discussed that matter at all in recent years with Mr. Alsop ?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. You do not, then, know whether what you have ]ust testified was in any way at odds with what Mr. Alsop said?

Mr. Vincent. No. I do not recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify in executive session that Mr. Lauch- lin Currie played a part in your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Vincent. I testified that it was possible that Lauchlin Currie was the first one to mention to me that Mr. Wallace was going to China. If I could have the testimony I could

Mr. Sourwine. I just asked.

Mr. Vincent. That is true.

2032 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. SouRwiNE. You testified to a fact there. You testified to the same fact here. There cannot be any conflict in your testimony.

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. SouRWiNE. So far as you know, who initiated the request for your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace ?

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know, Mr. Wallace initiated it,

Mr. SoTJRw^iNE. How do you know that Mr. Wallace initiated it ?

Mr. Vincent. Because I testified that we had a conversation one time about conditions in China. He called me and we had this conver- sation regarding going to China.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that before Mr. Currie had mentioned to you the possibility of your going with Mr. Wallace on this mission ?

Mr. Vincent. 1 don't recall the sequence as to whether Mr. Currie mentioned it first or Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one to mention it to you ?

Mr. Vincent. That Mr. Wallace was going to China?

Mr. SouEwiNE. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwt:ne. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one to mention to you that you would go along with Mr. Wallace ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the testimony in executive session, but as I have said, it is possible that Mr. Currie was the first to mention the matter of going.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes?

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to distinguish between a knowledge that there was going to be a Wallace mission

Mr. SouRwiNE. Oh, yes?

Mr. Vincent. And who first initiated the request that I go along. In any formal way Mr. Wallace initiated it insofar as the Secretary of State was concerned.

Mr. SouR-\viNE. When Mr. Wallace talked to you about it, he came to your office, did he not?

Mr. Vincent. He came over to the State Department.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. That meeting was arranged?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. He did not come without an appointment?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. At the time the appointment was arranged you knew what he was going to talk about ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Who arranged that appointment?

Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that I have testified that Mr. Wal- lace called, and I said I would come over to his office, but he came over to the State Department. But Mr. Currie may have arranged the interview.

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know at the time that Mr. Wallace called you on the phone that the thing he wanted to discuss with you was going on the mission ?

Mr. Vincent. I was sure of his going on the mission.

Mr. Sourwine. No ; your going.

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that I was, but as I say, it is logical. I am just trying to be factual in the testimony here. Whether Mr.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2033

Wallace told me he was coming over to talk to me about going on the mission with him or whether he was coming to talk about going on the mission.

Mr. SouRwiNE. As of now, as of this morning, are you able to re- member who first discussed with you the matter of you going on that mission with Mr. Wallace ?

Mr. Vincent. From my memory this morning I would have to re- peat again that Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss with me the mission, but I do not recall whether Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss that I would go on the mission.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did Mr. Hull send you with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace as far as I know because I had had 20 years' experience in China, I had just come back from China, with 2 years' experience there.

Mr. Sourwine. Wliy did he want to send anybody with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Vincent. Putting it this way, that Mr. Wallace was the one wanting someone to be sent with him. I don't know that Mr. Hull wanted somebody to be sent with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember your testimony on this point in executive session ?

Mr. Vincent. I remember my testimony, but you put the question differently here. Why did Mr. Hull want somebody to go. I am saying after Mr. Wallace had asked for somebody to go, and I had been designated by Mr. Hull to go, I referred to a brief conversation which Mr. Hull had with me. I am using the word "want," why did Mr.

Mr. Sourwine. Did not that conversation indicate to you why Mr. Hull wanted you to go ?

Mr. Vincent. I think you are using what Mr. Hull wanted me to be alert to, it already having been decided I was going.

Mr. Sourwine. All right. Tell us about the conversation if you will.

Mr. Vincent. It was a very brief conversation in which Mr. Hull told nie to be careful not to let Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, make promises to the Chinese that we would be unable to fulfill.

Mr. Sourwine. Did that not mean to you that Mr. Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities ?

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified in executive session that there was a feeling, which I had no knowledge of, that Mr. Wallace in his trip to South America the year before had given the impression there that we were going to be of greater help to the South American coun- tries than was possible.

Mr. Sourwine. Tlie answer to my question is what, then, yes or not?

Mr. Vincent. What is your question, sir ?

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. Vincent. I did.

Senator Ferguson (presiding). Did Mr. Wallace make any promises ?

Mr. Vincent. None that I recall.

2034 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Senator Ferguson. Did you on any occasion have to warn him not to make promises?

Mr. Vincent. I never had to warn him that I can recall not to make elaborate promises.

Senator Ferguson. What do you call an elaborate promise ?

Mr. Vincent. I would say promises beyond our own possibility of performance ; the matter of support to China

Senator Ferguson. What did he promise them that you thought was within our capabilities of carrying out?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace made no specific promises insofar as I can recall to General Chiang other than a continuation, and if pos- sible, an augmentation of support for the Chiang Kai-shek govern- ment.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Hull said elaborate promises ?

Mr. Vincent. No. You used that word. He just said don't make promises to the Chinese that we were unable to fulfill.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you know what we would or would not be able to fulfill ? Did Mr. Hull tell you what we could or could not fulfill.

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull was not specific in telling me that.

Senator Ferguson. How could you be of any aid on that ?

Mr. Vincent. I would recognize with my knowledge of China that if Mr. Wallace were to go out there and make promises of support which could not be carried over the hump in the air, or further sup- port of a military nature which was impossible —

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the military situation so that you could advise as to what we could or could not carry over the hump ?

Mr. Vincent. I was familiar enough to know what I would con- sider to be an unreasonable request and if I did, I would also be in touch with the military people in China who could give me any advice that they might wish to.

Senator Ferguson. Then you never had to use this so-called warning ?

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall did I ever have to stop Mr. Wallace from doing something which I thought was going beyond our ability to fulfill.

Senator Ferguson. Did he make any promises at all ?

Mr. Vincent. The only promises I recall he made was that we were going to try to go back and get support for General Chiang's govern- ment continued over the hump insofar as it was practical to send lend-lease.

Senator Ferguson. That is the only promise that he made ?

Mr. Vincent. That is the only promise as I recall he made.

Senator Ferguson. Did he promise to get him a representative — Wedemeyer ?

Mr. Vincent. No, he did not promise him so far as I know unless it took place in a conversation at which I was not present. It was only the fact that the Generalissimo had given Mr. Wallace the distinct impression that he could not get along with Stilwell. What promises he may have made in trying to alter that situation to Chiang Kai-shek, I don't know.

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Senator Ferguson. You did not quite fill your mission for Mr. Hull, did you, when you allowed Mr. Wallace to meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the last occasion without you being present?

Mr. Vincent. Senator, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States then, and Chiang Kai-shek was President of China, and they got in a car and rode to the airport, and I rode in another car. I could hardly have insisted on riding with the Vice President when he did not invite me.

Senator Ferguson. But Mr. Hull had told you that you were going for a specific purpose, and that was to watch Mr. Wallace so that he would not make promises to Chiang Kai-shek, is that not true ?

Mr. Vincent. Not watch him so he would not.

Senator Ferguson. What would you do ?

Mr. Vincent. I could not stay by Mr. Wallace's side all the time because as I say, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States. I do not think Mr. Hull ever intended that I stick to his side in that way.

Senator Ferguson. But at least you did not hear the last con- versation.

Mr. Vincent. I did not hear the last conversation, but Mr. Wallace to my recollection reported it to me going down in the plane.

Senator Ferguson. Did you report to Mr. Hull that you had not been at the last conversation ?

Mr. Vincent. In my memorandum on the thing it shows very clearly I was not at the first or last conference.

Senator Ferguson. You reported that to Mr. Hull ?

Mr. Vincent. I would have to resort to the book, but I am quite sure it shows clearly in my memorandum that in the last conversation General Chiang and Mme. Chiang and Mr. Wallace occupied a car going to the airport, and I was not in the car.

Senator Ferguson. Would you not expect that if any promises were made, they may have been made on the last conversation just before he would leave?

Mr. Vincent. I do not say whether they would be made then or at some other time.

Senator Ferguson. All right, counsel.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever make, other than your original notes and the memoranda which are printed in the white paper, any other memoranda or narrative of the Wallace trip ?

Mr. Vincent. None that I recall, sir. I think I have testified that they were the first notes, which were then transcribed either in writ- ing first and then on the typewriter.

Mr. Sourwine. You kept a copy of what you filed with the Depart- ment in that regard, did you not ?

Mr. Vincent. I kept a copy ?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall keeping a copy. I turned it over to the State Department when I got back here.

Mr. Sourwine. You had access to it subsequently ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not subsequently from those notes prepare in more narrative style a summary somewhat shorter of what took place on the Wallace mission, just a summary record ?

2036 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I told you in executive session that a summary in shortened form was prepared in the State Department. I did not prepare it.

Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you know who did prepare it ?

Mr. Vincent. I can't recalL It was probably Mr. Stanton who prepared it. I could refresh my memory by going up there to see whose initials were on it. Mine was a 20-page running thing. As usual, it was narrowed down to much shorter pages.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who did prepare it if it was not Mr. Stanton ?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I could name half a dozen people there. It was the kind of a thing that Mr. Stanton might have done, it is the kind of thing — who else was in the Division, this was in 1944 — there was a Miss Ruth Bacon there who did that kind of thing quite frequently, of going through things, she had legal training, she would reduce things. I would have to see who the personnel was to guess who put the initials on. I do know it was reduced and summarized for the Secretary.

Mr. Sourwine. It was prepared from your notes ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether a copy of that summary was ever given to Mr. Wallace ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a matter of fact whether the sum- mary was given to Mr. Wallace or not.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it would be given to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Vincent. I think it would be logical that it would be given.

Mr. Sourwine, Do you remember having seen that summary ?

Mr. Vincent. I remember seeing the summary. I did not prepare it myself. It was prepared in the normal procedures of summarizing things.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you recognize that summary if you saw it again ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. I want to ask you, if this, that I show you is in any way to you reminiscent of that summary.

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. It is not ?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, what I have just shown you, does it appear to be a summary of the Vice President's trip ?

Mr. Vincent. No; this is not a summary of the trip insofar as I can see which has anything to do with the memo I wrote, which is a summary of the conversations.

Mr. Sourwine. This that I have showed you refers to the Vice Presi- dent in the third person, just as your notes did ; does it not ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I always referred to him as Mr. Wallace or the Vice President.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. This is Henry Wallace's letter of July 10 to the President.

Mr. Sourwine. How do you know ?

Mr. Vincent. Because I have seen it — I have it right here myself — since it was published. I have never seen it before.

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Mr. SonRWiNE. I want to know how you know it was Henry Wal- lace's letter?

Mr. Vincent. I know only by the fact it was published.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it published as Henry Wallace's letter ?

Mr. Vincent. I haA^e to see what it is.

Mr. SouRWiNE. What you have is a letter. What I have shown you is headed "Summary report of Vice President Wallace's visit in China," is it not ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRWiNE. It is dated the 10th of July 1944,

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. It was transmitted apparently to the President with a note by Mr. Wallace: "Dear Mr. President: I am handing you herewith a report on my trip to the Far East. Sincerely yours, H. A. Wallace."

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. But it does not say it is Henry Wallace's own re- port, does it? He says "a report."

Mr. Vincent. Yes; he does.

Mr. Sourwine. And it is in the third person ?

Mr. Vincent. This ?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. The report refers to Mr. Wallace in the third person ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. As you said you referred to him in the notes?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that report?

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. I did not even know of its existence until this thing was published here, until the last 3 or 4 months. If there is any confusion in your mind about the relationship of that and tlie summarization of the memoranda of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Vice President, this has no relation to that.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you sure?

Mr. Vincent. I am sure.

Mr. Sourwine. How can you be sure?

Mr. Vincent. I can be sure because I have seen the summary of the memorandum that I wrote on the conversations and I have just testified it was prepared by some officer in the Far Eastern Office, and was a two or three page summarization of 20 pages, and it followed much the same lines as my own, that on such and such a day they talked and this was taken up.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you account for the fact, if it was a fact, that Mr. Wallace in reporting to the President on his trip, would refer to himself in the third person?

Mr. Vincent. I cannot.

Mr. Sourwine. He did not do that in the Kunming cables, did he?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Here was the Vice President of the United States reporting to the President of the United States; do you think it is quite the logical thing to do that in a report which he himself had written he would refer to himself in the third person ?

Mr. Vincent. I can't testify on the basis of what the logic of Mr, Wallace was in using the third person.

2038 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. SouEwiNE. On the other hand, if a report had been prepared by someone else as a summary of yonr notes, such a report would have had to refer to Mr. Wallace in the third person, would it not? Mr. Vincent. It would have.

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you from those facts draw any conclusion as to whether the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President was written by himself or prepared by some other person ?

Mr. Vincent. I think the report prepared by Mr. Wallace was written by him. As I say, I cannot testify

Mr. SouRwiNE. Of course, a report prepared by him was written by him. What I want to know is whether you have any conclusion, on the basis of the meager facts now at our joint disposal, as to whether this report, a copy of which you have just seen, a copy of which you have before you, was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace ?

Mr. Vincent. My belief is that it was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SouRwiNE, On what do you base that belief ?

Mr. Vincent. Because Mr. Wallace transmitted it to the President on July 10, so he himself said.

Mr. SouRwiNE. He did not say it was "my report."

Mr. Vincent. He said, "Here is a report."

Mr. SouRWiNE. "Here is a report."

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge that Mr, Wallace him- self prepared the report. My assumption is that Mr. Wallace did prepare the report.

Mr. Sour wine. The heading on that report does not say, "Report by Henry Wallace," does it?

Mr. Vincent. Counsel is just showing me a paragraph out of Mr, Wallace's letter to the President in which Mr. Wallace himself says here

Mr, SouRwiNE, What letter to the President ? Is this what I have been referring to as the report ?

Mr, Vincent. No; this is the letter to President Truman of Sep- tember 19, 1951, which Mr. Wallace says, "I wrote the July report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the Presi- dent."

Mr. SouRwiNE. On that basis you are testifying this was Mr. Wal- lace's report?

Mr. Vincent. I can reach no other assumption. I have no reason why Mr. Wallace should wish to deny or lead to any subterfuge on that.

Mr. SouRWiNE. And it does not seem queer to you that the report was not headed "Report by Henry Wallace," but "Report of the Trip of Henry A. Wallace," and it did not refer to the Vice President in the first person, but in the third person.

Mr, Vincent, It is not a matter of my thinking it is queer or not. Mr. A\'allacc has testified he wrote it. Why he may have used the third person with respect to himself instead of the first person, I don't know,

Mr, SouRwiNE, You cannot account for that?

Mr, Vincent, I can't account for it,

Mr. SouRWiNE, Do you not think it is queer ?

Mr, Vincent. I don't know whether it is queer or not.

Mr. Sourwine, You would not write a rejDort like that?

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2039

Mr. Vincent. I might under certain circumstances write a report like that and not use the first person.

INIr. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. I would like to talk for just a little while about the conversations with General Chiang, using your notes as the basis.

Mr. Vincent. Can I go back just to clear up this matter of the possible relationship of this to the summary ?

Mr. Sourwine. Surely.

Mr. Vincent. I hope it is clear to you that the summary of those conversations has no relation to this.

Mr. Sourwine. You have so stated, sir, very clearly.

Mr. Vincent. I just wanted you to be sure of that.

Mr. Sourwine. I presume you made that statement from your own |7ersonal knowledge.

Mr. Vincent. From my own personal knowledge, and I have tried to narrow down who it was in the Department that summarized my memoranda of the conversation.

Mr. Sourwine. But you remember that summary well enough that you can say definitely it is not the basis for this report ?

Mr, Vincent. It has no relation to this.

]SIr. Sourwine. Your memory in that regard is clear?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir.

Now I am reading the wliite paper, and if you would like to have it before you

Mr. Vincent. I have it, sir.

Mr. Surrey. Do you have another copy, Mr. Sourwine ?

Mr. Sourwine. The chairman has it now.

You will note on page 550, at the top of the page, you wrote :

Mr. Wallace expressed the opinion that there should not be left pending any question which might result in conflict between China and the U. S. S. R. Pres- ident Chiang suggested that President Roosevelt act as an arbiter or middleman between China and the U. S. S. R.

Note. — President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wall- ace's earlier statement that President Roosevelt was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time.

By that you mean, unquestionably, that Mr. Wallace made no com- ment at the time of President Chiang's suggestion; but your own note suggests that Wallace previously made the statement that President Roosevelt was prepared to act as arbiter between the Communists and Kuomintang?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. May I ask if the record makes it clear that the white paper shows on page 549 that what you are reading was pre- pared by John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, on note 11 at the bottom of the page.

Mr. Sourwine. These are his notes.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Mr. Vincent. These are the notes I made.

Senator Ferguson. So they are not Stanton's notes; they are your your notes.

Mr. Vincent. No. This is the full text of the memorandum rather than the abbreviated form.

Senator Ferguson. But these were made by you and not Stanton ?

2040 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. No, sir — yes, sir. Mr. SouRwiNE, They were made by-

Mr. Vincent. They were made by me. Mr. SouRwiNE. Then the notes continue :

However, after discussing tlie matter with Mr. Vincent that evening, Mr. Wallace made it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R.

That was one occasion when you pulled the Vice President back from what might have been a commitment?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, because the Vice President himself had in- formed me of his conversation with the President in which he jotted down notes.

Mr. SouRWiNE, Yes.

Mr. Vincent. Which was that he could tell Chiang Kai-shek that he would be glad to be helpful in anyway to bring about a settlement of the difficulties between the Kuomintang and the Communists. That was his statement to me.

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. You wanted Mr. Wallace to make it perfectly clear to Chiang that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as ar- biter between China and the U. S. S. K ?

Mr. Vincent. I wanted him to make it clear because he himself told me that was just exactly what the President wanted him to do, was to be an arbiter if it was needed or asked for between the Kuomin- tang and the Communists, and not between Russia and China.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean to say that the President had told Mr. Wallace and that you knew about it that he, President Roosevelt, was willing — ready, willing and able, shall we say — to act as an arbiter be- tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. Vincent. That is what Mr. Wallace told me that the Presi- dent told him. Whether he used the word "arbiter" or not

Mr. SouRwiNE. Intermediary?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, or help settle their difficulties.

Mr. Sourwine. When you told Mr. Wallace about this situation and persuaded him to make it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R., did you also make it clear to him that the President was willing to act as arbiter between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. Vincent. I reminded Mr. Wallace that that was what he had told me and Chiang apparently misunderstood it to mean arbiter between Russia and China.

Mr. Sourwine. But when Mr. Wallace made his position clear to President Chiang, the generalissimo, the next day before breakfast, did he express that distinction to him, or did he simply make it clear that Roosevelt was not available as an arbiter between China and Russia ?

Mr. Vincent. I was not present at that conversation.

Mr. Sourwine. You reported in your notes

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace reported the conversation to me.

Mr. Sourwine. I see.

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether Mr. Wallace made this clear to him. From his own statement to me of this conversation before breakfast

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2041

Mr. SouRWiNE. Go ahead.

Mr. Vincent. He told me tliat he had made it clear to Chiang that the President had not intended to suggest that he be a mediator be- tween China and Russia.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Your notes do not indicate anything beyond the unavailability of President Roosevelt as a mediator between Russia and China.

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Your notes do not indicate any availability as a mediator between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Vincent. The notes here state "President Chiang's suggestion was apparentl}' prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that the President was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang."

Mr. Sourwine. That is right.

Mr. Vincent. So Mr, Wallace must have made an earlier statement.

Mr. Sourwine. That is right.

Mr. Vincent. To the Generalissimo.

Mr. Sourwine. That is right.

Mr. Vincent. Which, as far as I can figure here, was misinterpreted by the generalissimo because it says here, "Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time."

Mr. Sourwine. What I am trying to get at is whether when he went to Chiang the next morning before breakfast to correct this false impression, against which you had warned him the night before, whether he did it in such terms as to negative his original statement with regard to President Roosevelt's availability as an arbiter between the Connnunists and the Kuomintang, or w^hether he made it clear that he was simply fearful that Chiang had broadened his statement to carry a meaning that he had not intended.

Mr. Vincent. I cannot add anything to what is said here, but it would appear here that all he did was to straighten out the miscon- ception that the President was willing to be a — what do you call it — a mediator between U. S. S. R. and China.

Mr. SouR^^^NE. All right. Bearing on the question of your influence on Mr. Wallace, which we discussed before, this is another incident where you did have a considerable influence, is it not ?

INIr. Vincent. Yes. It is a case where Mr. Wallace had himself been misunderstood and I pointed out to him that the generalissimo had misunderstood him.

Mr. Sourwine. It is evidence of the fact that Mr. Wallace was re- ceiving and listening to your advice.

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, we find this statement farther down on the same page, referring to a conversation which Mr. Wallace had had in Tashkent with Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. Wallace suggested that Dr. Soong discuss the matter with Mr. Vincent who had probably a better idea of the contents of the memorandum since he had had a number of conversations with Ambassador Harriman.

(Note. — That evening Dr. Soong asked Mr. Vincent about the matter, requesting to see any notes that Mr. Vincent might have made. Mr. Vincent said that he had only his memory to rely upon.)

Was that correct?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

22^48— 52— pt. 7 4

2042 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. SouRwiNE. You had no notes?

Mr. Vincent. I had not made notes of the conversation.

Mr. SouRwiNE (reading) :

And informed Dr. Soong of those portions of the memorandum which he thought it appropriate and judicious to give him.

Wliat portions of the memorandum did you withhold from Chiang?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the portions I withheld from him. I only recall what I had told him. There may have been things in Mr. Harriman's memorandum which were highly injudicious to show him. 1 had no memorandum. We are speaking now of Mr. Harriman's memo which he showed me in Tashkent.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you write this in your notes because you knew there had been portions of the memorandum which you thought it inappropriate or injudicious to give to Chiang and which you had therefore withheld, or did you merely use this language to protect yourself against any eventuality?

Mr. Vincent. I would say from reading this that I had knowledge of some comments that were in Mr. Harriman's memo which would not have been wise to give him.

Mr. SouRWiNE. At any rate, that is the impression intended to be conveyed ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRWiNE. I take it at the time you were talking with Dr. Soong, the Harriman memo was clear in your mind?

Mr. Vincent. Fairly clear, yes. I noted this

Mr. SouRWiNE. How long before had it been that you had seen that memo?

Mr. Vincent. Possibly a week or 10 days.

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was quite recent at that time ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Sourwine, I do not see any other member of the committee here, and I want to be on the floor, so I will have to recess at this time. Senator McCarran and I have a meeting with other Senators at 2. I would have to put this at 2 : 30, so we will recess until 2 : 30.

Mr. Morris. May I ask Mr. Vincent one question ?

Mr. Vincent, you testified that you did not know Agnes Smedley ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you look at that picture, and see if you ever met that woman ?

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of meeting Agnes Smedley.

Mr. Morris. There is another picture here. According to the back she is identified as the first one on the lower left. That is the same woman ?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. Sourwine. May the record show that these photographs and pictures which have been shown to Mr. Vincent are pictures of Agnes Smedley, if that is the fact ?

Senator Ferguson. I think there is testimony on that.

Mr. Sourwine. The pictures have not been identified.

Mr. Morris. The picture has the caption "Agnes Smedley" and there is a designation "Agnes."

Mr. Sourwine. How can that be identified for our record ? Will you read what is on the back of it?

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2043

Mr. Vincent. "Front row, left to right, Agnes Smedley" and some- body else. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. That will be marked an exhibit, and so will the pamphlet.

(The pictures referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 381 and 381A" and were filed for the record.)

Mr. SouRWiNE. Just for the sake of the record, I want to ask Mr. Vincent if he will put his initials somewhere on the back of the picture as the picture shown here. That is for his protection.

Senator Ferguson. And the same under her name.

Mr, SouRwiNE. Just on the back of that photograph, to identify that as the one that is shown you, and which you have not recognized.

Mr, Surrey. Put "Shown to me this date.''

Mr. SouRwiNE. Whatever you wish. Otherwise, we could put in any picture.

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until 2 : 30.

(Thereupon at 11:55 a. m,, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., the same day.)

AFTER recess

Senator Ferguson (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Mr, SouRWiNE, Mr, Vincent, at the noon recess, we were discussing the notes you made of the Wallace mission,

Mr, Vincent, Yes, sir,

Mr, SouRwiNE, I had read an excerpt from page 550 of the white l)aper with regard to a conversation you had w^ith Mr. Soong, Dr, Soong, about the discussions of Mr, Wallace with Mr. Harriman, at Tashkent?

Mr, Vincent, Yes.

Mr, SouRWiNE, Reading further from your notes : "Specifically," meaning Mr, Vincent —

he told Dr. Soong that Mr. Stalin had agreed to President Roosevelt's point that support of President Chiang was advisable during the prosecution of the war, that Mr. Stalin had expressed a keen interest in there being reached a settlement between the Kuouiintang and the Chinese Communists, basing hie interest on the practical matter of more effective fighting against Japan rather than upon any ideological considei'ations ; that Mr. Stalin had criticized the suspicious attitude of the Chinese regarding the Sakhalin agreement with Japan, and that Mr. Stalin felt the United States should assume a position of leadership in the Far East.

Is that your own best summary of what you told Dr, Soong at that time ?

Mr, Vincent. That is my best summary of that, sir.

Mr, SouRwiNE, Do you have a present re ollection of the Harri- man conference with Stalin as it was recounted to you ?

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not.

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not present at that, were you ?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. And I haven't seen the memorandum of that conversation with Stalin since that time.

Mr. Sourwine, Can you tell the committee, sir, whether, in say- ing in your notes that Stalin based his interest in a settlement between the Kuomintang and tlie Chinese Communists on the practical mat- ter of more effective fighting rather than upon any ideological con- siderations, you are .stating something which Mr, Stalin himself had . told Ambassador Harriman, or stating merely Ambassador Harri-

2044 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

man's nnderstaiiding of Stalin's attitude, or stating merely your own interpretation of it ?

Mr, Vincent. So far as I was capable of remembering the memo- randum, I was reporting what Mr. Harriman had told me had taken place in his conversation w^ith Stalin.

Mr. SouRW^iNE. In other words, it is your impression, your under- standing, that Stalin liimself had made the distinction, had said, "I am interested in this from the standpoint of fighting tlie Japanese" rather than from the standpoint of any ideological consideration ?

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of what Mr. Harriman told me.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Going over to page 553 of the white paper, the paragraph that begins near the bottom of the page, we find this sen- tence : "Mr. Vincent inquired as to the progress of conversations be- tween the Communist representative in Chungking" — how do you pro- nounce that name ?

Mr. Vincent. Lin Tso-han.

Mr. SouRWiNE. "And the Kuomintang representatives of which Dr. Chiang Tse-che was chief."

You were, in other words, saying in effect, "Let's talk about the ques- tion of how the negotiations are getting along beteween the National- ists and the Communists" ?

Mr. Vincent. We liad an interest in how they were getting along. Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador, had indicated that they were talking.

Senator Ferguson. They were what?

Mr. Vincent. That they were discussing this matter among them- selves. I hadn't been back for a year, but this Lin Tso-han — I don't know who lie was, but apparently I was told that he was a Commu- nist delegate at tliat time.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Just before that, a different matter had been under discussion; is that correct?

Mr. Vincent. I will have to read this to see, sir.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is a change of subject.

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was then one of the occasions where you brought about a change of subject in the conversations; is that correct?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I woiddn't say it was a very abrupt change in subject.

Mr. SouRwiNE. No ; I did not characterize it as abrupt. You were opening up a new subject; you were changing the focus at that point.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Was that because you did not want Mr. Wallace to discuss the other point?

Mr. Vincent. No. I mean, I have no recollection of that being in my mind, to change the subject. The conversation may have lapsed,

Mr. Sourw^ne. It was probably because this was a matter of par- ticular interest to you and you wanted it brought up; right?

Mr. Vincent, That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Had you any instructions as to what to dis- cuss in China when Mr. Wallace was there?

Mr. Vincent. You mean, did we receive any instructions from

Senator Ferguson. From the State Department ?

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2045

Mr. Vincent. No; the State Department gave me no specific in- structions as to what line of instructions, line of conversations ; no.

Senator Ferguson. They had given you warning, Mr. Hull had, not to permit Mr. Wallace to make promises; is that correct?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. But you had no instructions as to what to take up ?

Mr. Vincent. Myself; no.

Senator Ferguson. With the respective parties?

Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Gauss himself was the Ambassador there, and any instructions about what was to be taken up would have come from him.

Senator Ferguson. But he did not give you any instructions?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Gauss did not give me any instructions. I talked with him, when I got there.

Senator Ferguson. What did you figure the Wallace mission was ? What were you trying to accomplish ?

Mr. Vincent. As far as I was told at the time, it was the return of the visit that Madame Chiang had made to the United States the year before. I never did know exactly what.

Senator Ferguson. Was that the only purpose; just a return courtesy call?

Mr. Vincent. Well, then it was, too, just that occasion for Mr. Wallace to have conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator Ferguson. But what was he to accomplish ? He was not to promise anything. What was he to accomplish ?

Mr. Vincent. You ask me something there, Mr. Chairman, that I don't know, what he was supposed to accomplish. He had himself a little note that he referred to from time to time, as to his con- versations with Roosevelt before he left.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, whatever instructions he had came from the President ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And whatever instructions you had were that of a warning from the Secretary of State ?

Mr. Vincent. That is all I know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know wiiether the Secretary of State had any mission for Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection that Mr. Wallace ever saw the Secretary of State before he went out. He may have; but I say I don't know what he did.

Senator Ferguson. How did you know that, if INIr. Wallace, was making a promise, he did not have a direct authority from the Presi- dent to make it ?

Mr. Vincent. Because from time to time Mr. AVallace would refer to these rough notes he had taken in his conversations with the Presi- dent, and the main idea of this was to go out and talk to Chiang Kai- shek about the situation in China and bring it back and report to him, insofar as I knew.

Senator Ferguson. What were some of the things that Mr. Wallace had on these notes that he was to accomplish in China ?

2046 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. There is only one of them that I recall right now, and that was to try to bring about some kind of cessation or better rela- tions between the Chinese groups for more effective fighting in China.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, were you at that time to get a combination of the Nationalists and Communists?

Mr. Vincent. For more effective military operations.

Senator Ferguson. For more effective military operations?

Mr. Vincent. That was the emphasis at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I see.

Mr. Sourwine. Will the Senator pardon me ?

Do you mean that Mr. Wallace had been given instructions, to your knowledge, by the President, which were, in effect, a forerunner of instructions given General Marshall?

Mr. Vincent. My meaning there is that Mr. Wallace, himself, told me that the President had indicated to Chiang that he was prepared to act as adviser or mediator to get them together, which showed that the President even at that time had an interest in trying to settle the internal dispute in China.

Mr. Sourwine. Very good.

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed.

Mr. Souravine. Mr. Vincent, still on that same page, and going back just a little bit above the passage that I read in my last question, you were recounting the remarks of Chiang, were you not — "it was his statement * * *" to quote your words as a matter of fact — "the Communists follow the orders of the Third International." It that right?

Mr. Vincent. I don't see that here. Yes, I do.

This is Chiang speaking ?

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you. It is not you speaking is it ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I will have to read this to see.

Mr. Sourwine. xind it would not be Mr. Wallace, would it?

Mr. Vincent. That is General Chiang speaking there.

Mr. Sourwine (continuing) :

The Chinese Government cannot oi)enly criticize the Communists for their connection with the Third International because it is afraid of offending the V. S. S. R. * * *.

That was Chiang himself, was it not ?

JSIr. Vincent. That is a report as well as I understood Chiang's statement.

Mr. Sourwine (reading) :

Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States —

That is Wallace speaking, your report of what he said?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine (continuing) :

and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that this difference in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communists might be explained by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communists seizing power ; whereas, the Chinese Communists definitely desired to do so in China.

Now, going back to your reference to Mr. Wallace, can you give us any further details about Mr. Wallace's reference to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States ?

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2047

Mr. Vincent. No more than there is right there, sir. I was trying to be just an accurate reporter of the conversations that were taking place.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Just how did Mr. Walhxce refer to it? Did he say, "In our country the Communists are patriotic," or do you remember just what kind of words he used?

Mr. Vincent. Other than what I have here, at this time, I do not recall. This was put down at the time.

Mr. Sour"svine. This is a generalization of what he said ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, he probably had more words to say, but I put down here all I could recall at that time.

Mr. Sourwine. All you could recall at that time, and all you can recall now, is that he referred to the American Communists as pa- triotic ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Souewine. You do not know what he meant by that ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what he meant by that. That is his statement.

Mr. Sourwine. He then said — and you are referring to Wallace — that "* * * the United States was far removed from the U. S. S. R." Is that Wallace or Chiang?

Mr. Vincent. That is Chiang, I think.

Mr. Sourwine. That is Chiang — "but that the U. S. S. R. would not feel safe if the Communists were not in power in China. He then laughingly remarked * * *." That is still Chiang, is it not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine (reading) :

* * * He tben laughingly remarked tbat the Chinese Communists were more communistic than the Russian Communists.

Do you know why Generalissimo Chiang should laugh about that?

Mr. Vincent. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. He did laugh ?

Mr. Vincent. He did.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it your understanding that he was referring to the Chinese Communists being more communistic than the Russian Communists in the sense that they lived a more communal life, or that they were more indoctrinated with the principles of Marxist-Leninist- Stalinist communism ?

Just how did he refer to it?

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't tell you. I don't know what was in the Generalissimo's mind at that time.

Mr. Sourwine. How did you understand it ?

Mr. Vincent. I understood him to mean that they were more dan- gerous.

Mr, Sourwine. More dangerous ?

Mr. Vincent. More communistic. It wasn't a case to my mind, but I was trying to remember here, that he wasn't referring to the fact that their doctrines were more of a Russian doctrine, but from his point of view they were a greater menace.

Mr. Sourwine. He was saying that the Chinese Communists were more dangerous, more dangerous to him than the Russian Com- munists ?

2048 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. And lie was laughing about it?

Mr. Vincent. He did.

Mr. SoTJEwiNE. Now, turning over to page 554, in the second para- graph, we find this sentence — and may I ask, sir, throughout these if, on any case in reading these, you feel that they are being taken out of context, will you please so say and indicate the whole context which should be read? These are necessarily notes which jumped around among a lot of subjects.

I am trying to read all of a note that had to do with a particular subject that was pertinent to the question.

If, in your opinion, I fail, please call attention to it.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think I have taken anything improperly out of context, so far?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that you did. I would have to read the whole thing, but it doesn't seem so to me.

Mr. SouRWiNE. This sentence is on page 554 :

President Roosevelt should bear in mind that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use the U. S. A, opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.

That is a statement by Chiang, as you report it; is that correct?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouRwaNE. Do you know^ whether Mr. Wallace reported that to the President at any time ?

Mr. Vincent. Whether Vice President

Mr. SouRAViNE. Whether Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, reported that to the President at any time ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he did or not.

Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not do so in his Kunming cable, did he?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not do so in this report which was trans- mitted under the January 10 date, did he?

Mr. Vincent. I would have to reread that to see. Do you want me to read that ?

Mr. SouRWiNE. No. Do you know whether he did ?

I will rephrase the question. The report will speak for itself.

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he did.

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. All right. Do you think that was a fair statement?

Mr. Vincent. I think it w^as a statement of Chiang, and I think it was a fair statement from his point of view that that is what he thought actually at the time.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Without regard to what he thought, was it a fact at the time that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that the Communists were using U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think they were making any effort in that regard ?

Mr. Vincent. They probably were,, which I don't recall. They probably were. At least, Chiang Kai-shek felt they were.

Mr. SouRWiNE. JS'o, I am asking you what you thought.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2049

Did you know of any efforts that the Communists were making in that regard ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any at that time.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you realize at that time that the Communists would like to have the force of the United States public opinion back of accession by the Kuomintang to Chinese Communist demands?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I think there were people reporting that. The press were reporting it.

Mr. SouRwiNE. No, I say, did you realize that that is what the Chi- nese Communists wanted?

Mr. Vincent. At that time?

Mr. Souewine. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. Well, I am trying to think whether I had any obvious reason for realizing it at that time, that this is a flat statement of Chiang Kai-shek, and I am trying to think of what other evidence there might be, I mean, that would have come to my attention.

And as I say, I can't think of any specific thing that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence American opinion in their favor.

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not know, and you do not now recall, any- thing that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence American public opinion?

Mr. Vincent. No; I'm afraid I don't.

Senator Ferguson. Did you keep close track of what the Com- munists were doing in America ?

Mr. Vincent. Of what the American Communists were doing in America ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. To sway public opinion?

Mr. Vincent. In this country?

Senator Ferguson, Yes.

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You anticipated, from what was said here, that they apparently were doing something?

Mr. Vincent. That the Communists were doing something, that the Chinese Communists were doing something ?

Senator Ferguson. No, that the Communists in this country were doing something to sway opinion here that would sway opinion over in China.

Mr. Vincent. In this statement?

Senator Ferguson. You do not find anything in there to that effect ?

Mr. Vincent. No. I thought we were talking about Chinese Com- munists in here, and I think that is what Chiang Kai-shek was talk- ing about.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Chinese Communists. Were there any?

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall specific instances.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know any Chinese Communists in this country ?

Mr. Vincent. I did not at that time, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, going down to the bottom of page 554 of the White Paper, we find this paragraph

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment.

2050 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Do you think the IPE, might have been acting to sway public opinion, as a pro-Communist organization ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir.

Senator Feeguson. You found no evidence in any of these writings that have been shown to you or that you have read ?

Mr. Vincent. At that time ? No.

Senator Ferguson. At that time or up to that time.

Mr. Vincent. Up to that time ?

Senator Fekguson. Nothing in any of these documents ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall anything up to that time of evidence that the IPR was trying to sway.

Senator Ferguson. Had you known of any pro-Communist activi- ties in America up until that time ?

Mr. Vincent. In 1944? No, I don't.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, up to the time this trip was made. You did not know that the Communists had been active along any line?

Mr. Vincent. I w^as not following Communist propaganda or lines at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that you had no knowledge about any of their activities in America?

Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge of their activities in this country at that time, in 1944.

Senator Ferguson. Was that generally true in the State Depart- ment ?

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say it was generally true in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Was it true in your Department ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that it was generally true in my Department.

Senator Ferguson. Who was assigned in your Department to keep track of what was going on among the Communists ?

Mr. Vincent. I would say no one was particularly assigned in the Far Eastern Office to keep track.

Senator Ferguson. That is, as far as you know, there was not any one looking into that question at all ?

Mr. Vincent. In the Far Eastern Office, no, no one that I know of.

Senator Ferguson. No one that you knew. And do you not think you would know^ if there was someone ?

Mr. Vincent. I would say I would know if there was someone in the Far Eastern Office specifically assigned to that task. There were people in the State Department who did have such jobs to do, I be- lieve. They were security.

Senator Ferguson. Did they report to your Department?

Mr. Vincent. They didn't report to me. I don't know whether they reported to the higher-ups.

Senator Ferguson. At least, in your Department, they did not report ?

Mr. Vincent. To me.

Senator Ferguson. You said that there were people to look out for the security because of Communists ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You know, then, they were a menace. Is that not true ?

Mr. Vincent. That the Communist ideal was a menace ; yes.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2051

Senator Fergusox. You knew that?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But no one was assigned to look into the prob- lem as to what they may be doing to change opinion here in America as far as China was concerned ?

Mr. Vincent. Nobody in the Far Eastern Office that I taiew of, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No one in the Far Eastern Office. And that covered China?

Mr. Vincent. That covered China.

Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness.

Mr. Sourwine. The paragraph at the bottom of page 554, is :

Mr. Wallace was asked whether it was not possible to reach an understanding on a lower level with a view to maximum use of forces in the north. Mr. Vincent asked what President Chiang thought would be the adverse effects of sending the United States Army Intelligence group to Communist areas now without awaiting settlement.

Now, that was another occasion, was it not, on which you shifted the focus of the conversation ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. On the next page, which is your account of the dis- cussions of the morning of June 23 :

Mr. Wallace reported conversations with General INIarshall and with Secretary Stimson before leaving America in regard to China's situation in an endeavor to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, but are interested in the prosecution of the war. He and Mr. Vincent had de- cided upon this line of approach the night before in order to avoid further lengthy discussion of the Communists, per se.

That is, is it not, another instance in which you had guided the course of the conversation through a conference with Mr. Wallace alone, and not with Chiang ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes, where I had given Mr. Wallace the best of my advice which I thought would save time.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. and he had taken it ?

Mr. Vincent. But let me say here that these conversations are not fully reported because I didn't take a note on everything, and the con- versation would go on for 3 hours. This is my quick note on what was said.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. But you have, I am sure, endeavored to bring out all of the salient, all of the important points of the conversation!

Mr. Vincent. I had endeavored to ; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. And you were a trained observer in that regard ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. So it is reasonable to assume that you have covered all of the important points, all of the salient points of the conversation ?

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't promise that I have covered every salient point, because, as I say, this whole thing can be read and these conver- sations covered 3 hours. I was trying to clarify, because there would be very lengthy discussions, which then had to be translated, on the Communists, per se.

Mr. Sourwine. But you did not deliberately leave anything out ?

Mr. Vincent. I didn't deliberately leave anything out.

Mr. Sourwine. This was a case where, the night before; that is, June 22, there had been a rather involved conversation about the Com- munists, per se; is that correct?

2052 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. That would be correct.

Mr. SouRWiNE. And you wanted to avoid the continuance of that discussion the next day, so you discussed with Mr. Wallace what kind of an opening- approach could be made to avoid it ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. And Mr. Wallace took that line in opening the con- versation the next day ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, what he was trying to do, according to your statement here, is to persuade President Chiang that we, that is, the United States ; is that right ?

Mr. Vincent. That we, the United States.

Mr. Sourwine. That we are not interested in Chinese Communists,, but are interested in the prosecution of the war. You mean only in the prosecution of the war ; right ?

Mr. Vincent. Interested in the Communists from the standpoint of the prosecution of the war.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Only from that standpoint?

Mr. Vincent. Only from that standpoint.

Mr. Sourwine. Just so that the record can be completely clear, by saying that Mr. Wallace reported his conversations with General Marshall and Secretary Stimson in an endeavor to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, and so forth, you do not mean any implication that he was just trying to per- suade Chiang of something, do you?

Mr. Vincent. No; he reported it as a fact, and it was simply to get the conversations down to what he thought was some kind of progression along, to disabuse his mind of the fact that we were interested in comminiism and Communists in China, as such.

Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, you were not interested, Mr. Wal- lace was not interested, and the Government of this country was not interested in the Chinese Communists, per se, but only in the progress of the war against Japan ?

Mr. Vincent. That was what he had come out there to discuss, getting on with the war.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, from what was said on page 554, of what President Chiang had said about the Communists, particu- larly what they were doing in this country, did that not indicate to you that we should have an interest in it if we wanted a real prosecu- tion of the war ?

Mr. Vincent. No; because at that time, Mr. Chairman, what we were trying our best to do was to get some kind of joint military activity.

The Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese, and the Kuo- mintang were jBghting the Japanese, and it was the hope of Mr. Wal- lace, of me, of the Army authorities, and the President to get those groups fighting in some kind of joint effort.

Senator Ferguson. But did he not indicate the fact that the Com- munists were acting as they were acting, that that was interfering with the prosecution of the war, and that they were trying to use America, or American Chinese, to influence the opinion in the Far East?

Mr. Vincent. Influence opinion in the Far East, that is what his testimony, his statement, was here.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2053

Senator Ferguson. All right; after you heard that, and returned to this country, did you pay any attention to Communist activities in this country as far as they related to the Far East?

Mr. Vincent. To whatever came to my attention, I did ; but I don't recall any specific instance of the Communist activity in this country, Chinese Communist activity.

Senator Ferguson. You had great difficulty in determining whether or not propaganda or literature or statements were pro-Communist; have you not?

Mr. Vincent. No, I haven't ; I don't think.

Senator Ferguson. You have not? You would say this testimony did not indicate that you had difficulty in determining when a thing was pro-Communist?

"V\nien I read a Communist statement yesterday, you did not recog- nize it as pro-Communist?

Mr, Vincent. I think I testified that I could not readily have a definition of what I would call procommunism.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know if the statement that I read to you yesterday did not indicate to you that it was pro-Communist? Would you tell me what procommunism was back at that time?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I haven't got a ready definition of what one would call procommunism in 1944.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you know what the State Department means when it uses the phrase "pro-Communist"?

Mr. Vincent. I do not.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you not heard that phrase used in the State Department ?

• JNIr. Vincent. The State Department uses it in many contexts, I would say.

Mr. SouR^vINE. It does not always mean the same thing when used as a phrase ?

Mr. Vincent. I would not think so.

Mr. Sourwine. It may mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what it would mean at any time.

Mr. Sourwine. It does not mean that?

Mr. Vincent. There is one time when procommunism might mean sympathy, or, at another time, people working for communism or Communists.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, have you not had any warning in the State Department about what is or is not pro-Communist, so that you may guard against Communist activity in the State De- partment?

JNIr. Vincent. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, any warning that one had about what is procommunism.

Senator Ferguson. You do not think you have had any warning?

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so.

Senator Ferguson. You knew it was a menace, because you had a Security Department; is that right?

Mr. Vincent. That is right ; yes.

Senator Ferguson. And you know of no instructions or warning as to what communism really was or its menace?

2054 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. I know of no warnings that were given an officer in the State Department to alert him to what was a warning against communism or procommunism.

Senator Ferguson. Then Communists might have been working right in the very Department.

Mr, Vincent. But that was a matter of the Security Division, to try to find out whether Communists were working in the State De- partment.

Senator Ferguson. I see; so it was not up to the Department it- self, it was up to some distant security officer

Mr. Vincent. No; that was an integral part of the Department, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How many security officers worked in your Department ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were there any ?

Mr. Vincent. In my Division ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that any worked in my Division, because it was a separate Division.

Senator Ferguson. How would they be able to tell whether or not you had pro-Communists or even Communists in your Department, if none of them worked in there ?

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that they made investigations of the people as they were employed.

Senator Ferguson. And do you think that you can tell by an inves- tigation when you employ a person as to whether or not he is a Communist?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't know whether you can or not. That was the intent of it.

Senator Ferguson. Would you think that by asking a man if he was a Communist you would ascertain the fact as to whether or not he was a Communist ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't think you would, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You do not think you would ?

Mr, Vincent. I do not think you would; but there were security investigations even back in those days, I imagine.

Senator Ferguson. Are you only imagining that there were security investigations back in those days?

Mr. Vincent. I am saying that because I have not any direct famil- iarity with how the Security Division operated.

Mr. SouRWTNE. Mr. Vincent, just to clear up one little point before we go back to your notes, is it your desire to leave the impression with the committee that the State Department considers that procommu- nism or the phrase "procommunism" is a relative phrase, that it covers a rather broad field of conduct, some of which is relatively harmless and some of which is serious?

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I would want to leave that impression, but I just simply can't make what would be a definition of pro- Communist.

Mr. SouRwiNE. When the State Department uses the appellation "pro-Communist," the State Department is always referring to a seri- ous problem; is it not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2055

Mr. SouRWiNE. The State Department does not use the phrase "'pro- Communist" to mean merely some one who has a slight ideological aberration from the normal ; does it ?

Mr. Vincent. If they were using the phrase carelessly, I don't know.

I mean that the common use

Mr. SouRwiNE. Does the Department of State use the phrase "pro- Communist" carelessly ?

Mr. Vincent. What I was about to say, I don't recall frequent use of the phrase "pro-Communist" by the Department of State.

Mr. SouRwiNE. The question of frequency has not been asked, sir. The question is when the Department of State uses that phrase, if it does use that phrase, how is it meant ?

Mr. Vincent. It is meant to describe a person who is sympathetic with communism.

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that is all ?

Mr. Vincent. That is what I would say would be a simple definition of "pro-Communist."

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is a definition. Now, can we talk about pro- communism in the frame of that definition from now on ?

Mr. Vincent. I should think we could ; yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, fine.

Now, reading from page 555 of the white paper :

Mr. Vincent again stressed the point that whereas he appreciated that Presi- dent Chiang was faced with a very real problem in handling negotiations for a settlement with the Communists, the American Army was also faced with a very real problem with regard to obtaining intelligence from North China.

That was, was it not, another occasion when you brought up in these conversations the matter of sending a mission to North China?

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. I was doing it after conversations with the American military there in Chungking, with the full knowl- edge and agreement of Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now we find this sentence :

He- referring to you —

pointed out that the American Army had no interest whatever in the Commu- nists, but that it had for very urgent reasons an interest in carrying on the war against Japan from China.

Now, when you stated that the American Army had no interest whatever in Communists, did you mean to imply that the American Army had no interest either for or against the successes of the Com- munists in China?

Mr. Vincent. What that meant, by that, is that the American Army, to disabuse Chiang's mind of anything, they had no interest in the support of the Chinese Communists, per se. They wanted to get intelligence out of North China.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you realize at the time, did you feel at the time, that the American Army had any interest adverse to the success of the Chinese Communists in China ?

Mr. Vincent. The American Army's, at that time, interest was pri- marily, sir, the prosecution of the war against the Japanese, and 1 cannot vouch for what the Army's attitude was toward the Chinese Communists other than as the Chinese Communists were useful to the Army in prosecuting the war against the Japanese.

2056 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then your answer must be, must it not, that you did not know at the time of any adverse interest which the Army had to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. Vincent. That the American Army at that time was not in the position to take an adverse attitude because tlie Chinese Communists themselves were fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SoURWiNE. Then what you were saying, is it not correct, is that the American Army had no interest either for or against the Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. Vincent. In taking a position against the Chinese Communists, no.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, going down into the next paragraph, sir, you were recounting what President Chiang had said, were you not, when you said this :

Much pressure has been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but the United States Government has exerted no pressure upon the Communists.

Mr. Vincent. That is a statement, as I can see — is that Chiang say- ing that?

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking if it was not. I believe it was.

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. The sentence itself does not attribute it. but in con- text it seems clear you were reciting what Chiang had said.

He said that the American Government should issue a statement that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Govern- ment. He said that the United States Army attitude supported the Communists and requested Mr. Wallace, upon his return to America, to make it clear that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Government. That is all what Chiang said to Mr. Wallace and you, is it not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, was Chiang stating matters factu- ally as they then existed, when he said that?

Mr. Vincent. I would say that Chiang was overstating the matter when he says that the American Army here — where is that state- ment ? — that the United States Army attitude supported the Commu- nists. I have no knowledge that that was a factual statement.

Mr. Sourwine, Was it a factual statement that much pressure had been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists?

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that is also an overstatement.

Mr. Gauss had frequently spoken to Chiang, and so had some of the military commanders, about the vital necessity of their getting to- gether in a military way for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

Mr. Sourwine. But you do not think that constituted much pres- sure ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not think it would constitute much pressure. I mean, it wasn't pressure in the sense of intervening. It was just from time to time the Chinese themselves were trying to get together.

The pressure was brought to bear as much by Chinese leaders to bring about some settlement and that therefore we were not introduc- ing any subject that the Chinese were not familiar, of not themselves anxious to accomplish.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2057

Mr. SouRwiNE. The question, sir, is not who else brought pressure, but whether the United States brought much pressure.

Mr. Vincent. The United States had certainly expressed its inter- est in many cases. I think "pressure" would be an overstatement — had expressed its interest in some kind of a settlement.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you not tell us just a few minutes ago that Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to do that very thing ?

Mr. Vincent. Mr. "Wallace's mission to China was to tell Chiang Kai-shek that the President was prepared, himself, if there was any opportunity for it — he would be glad to assist in getting them to- gether; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Would you not figure that that was some pres- sure, to send the Vice President out to see the President of China, to tell him to get together with the Communists, and if he could not do it alone, the President of the United States would mediate or help to get them together ?

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly say that was expressing an interest in it.

Senator Ferguson. Was it not more than an interest? Was it not indicating that that is what the President wanted done ?

Mr. Vincent. I do not think that it is what you would call exerting pressure.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did not the President of the United States at that time, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, hold a position in world affairs and in world esteem such that if he conveyed a message directly to the sovereign of another nation through the second execu- tive officer of this Nation, it could not fail to have a profound effect?

Mr. Vincent. It could not fail to have a profound effect.

Mr. Sourwine, Then was that not exerting substantial pressure, when he so conveyed his wishes and expressed his desires ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it true, sir, that the United States Government had exerted no pressure upon the Communists to reach a settlement with the Nationalist Government?

Mr. Vincent. The United States Government had no contact with the Communists, and I know of no pressure that was brought to bear on them.

Mr. Sourwine. It was a true statement, then, was it not?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

Do you change your testimony? You say that the United States Government had no contact, when they sent the Vice President out there ?

JSIr. Souravine. This is with the Communists.

Mr. Vincent. With the Communists in China.

Senator Ferguson. But with the President of China.

Mr. Vincent. With the Communists. The question here — would you restate your question ?

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you want to let it stand that we did not exert, as a nation, any pressure on the Chinese Government — that is, the Nationalists?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I have just testified that we did exert pressure on them.

Senator Ferguson. Did we in any way see the Communists ?

22S4S— 52— pt. 7 5

2058 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. We did not see the Communists at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Wallace see any Communists up there?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that Mr. Wallace saw any Communists on his visit to Chungking.

Senator Ferguson. Will you think over and see whether or not he did while he was in China on this mission ?

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did he see Madame Sun Yat-sen while he was there ?

Mr. Vincent. He saw Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. Morris. She is a Communist.

Mr. Vincent. She was not a Communist that he knew of at that time. I didn't know of her at that time as a Communist.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn she was a Communist?

Mr. Vincent. When she first went to Peking, and when I heard that she was a Communist, I had no direct knowledge that she was a Communist.

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Wallace go to any place where the Communists were in domination?

Mr. Vincent. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. At that time, he did not go ?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Senator Feruson. Then as far as you know, he saw only Nationalist officials?

Mr. Vincent. He saw only Nationalist and provincial officials, and American officials.

May I read from your own hearings here? This is Mr. Wallace^s testimony.

Senator Ferguson. I wanted your knowledge.

Mr. Vincent. But I was saying, in fact :

He- meaning the President —

asked me not to see the Comnnmists at all, since a visit by the Vice President of the United States might be misunderstood as indicating that our country favored the Communist cause.

That is Mr. Wallace's testimony here.

Senator Ferguson. Had you any such instructions ?

Mr. Vincent. I had no such instructions.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, Mr. Vincent, up until the time you left the Far Eastern desk, or had any connection with it, that there were Communist fronts in this country ?

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I would have known there were Communist fronts in this country. I don't know now what specifically they might have been.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know any of them?

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall them now. This would be in 1946-47.

Senator Ferguson. When did you leave the Far Eastern desk?

Mr. Vincent. I left in 1947.

Senator Ferguson. What part of 1947?

Mr. Vincent. The middle of 1947.

Senator Ferguson. Up to that time, do you know of any ?

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't name any now.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of the Committee for a Demo- cratic Far Eastern Policy ?

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2059

Mr. Vincent. Now that you mentioned it, I have heard of it ; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether or not that was a Com- munist front?

Mr. Vincent. I have heard since it was; I don't know whether I knew then it was or not.

Senator Ferguson. You did not know at that time?

Mr. Vincent. I can't specify now that I did know at that time it was a Communist front.

Senator Ferguson. You know now that the former Attorney Gen- eral had found it to be a Communist front?

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and I don't know at what time he found it to be a Communist front.

Senator Ferguson. Can you name any ?

Mr. Vincent. No; I can't,

Mr. Morris. How about the China Aid Council ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether the Chinese Aid Council was a Communist front at that time or not.

Senator Ferguson. And you are unable to name any Communist fronts ?

Mr. Vincent. From the memory of that time, I probably knew of them, but from my memory now, I can't recall what you would call a Communist-front organization.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what a Communist-front organ- ization is?

Mr. Vincent. It is an organization which does not take on real Communist character, but it is a front for the Communists, just what it says.

Senator Ferguson. You have read some articles and books and pamphlets by the IPK?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Would 3'OU say that they were or were not a Communist front?

Mr. Vincent. I would not say they were Communist front, from what knowledge I had of them at the time.

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you that. I said, from what has been read here.

Mr. Vincent. No, I would not say they were a Communist-front organization.

Senator Ferguson. You would not say that?

Mr. Vincent. I would not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You may j^roceed.

Mr. SouRwiNE. We have established, then, have we not, Mr. Vin- cent, that in that one particular, that double-barreled statement, Chiang was correct when he said that pressure had been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Govern- ment reach a settlement with the Communists, but that the United States Government had not exerted pressure upon the Communists?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, at the bottom of that paragraph, you will note the sentence :

Mr. Vincent again pointed out that solution of President Chiang's important problems of relations with the (Communists and the U. S. S. R. need not precede the dispatch of military observers to North China.

2060 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouEWiNE. That was another occasion, was it not, on which you turned the conversation ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right. And I will tell you why, because I myself had been in contact with the Army, and it was a matter which appealed to me because of their advice as one of the utmost importance. I had just been in Chungju, where we had B-29's flying out. There I was told of the urgent need for getting people into North China, to get Intelligence there for them, and it seemed to me to be the most urgent problem there was at the time, to try to get some kind of mili- tary group into this North China area.

It was a vacuum in all of our Intelligence work.

Mr. SouRwiNE. And at that time, that is, at the conclusion or very near the conclusion of the morning session of June 23, you finally won your point and President Chiang said that the military observers would be permitted to go. Is that right ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, over on to page 556, in the third paragraph from the bottom, we find this statement :

Mr. Vincent suggested that the best defense against communism in China was agrarian reform.

That is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the conversation ; is that correct ?

Mr. Vincent. Where is that statement ?

Mr. Sourwine. It is just this far down the page, here.

Mr. Vincent. I would like to see it.

Mr. Sourwine. It is, I believe, the third sentence in the paragraph, but I began with it because it appears to be a new thought at that time, and I am trying to find out if that is right.

Mr. Vincent. That is a statement that, as I say, I would have made.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes; it is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the conversation.

Mr. Vincent. No ; I think in that case Mr. "Wallace said that unity should express itself in the welfare of the people if communism was to be avoided.

Now, this was when we were having a conversation and the welfare of the people was mentioned. It was largely an agrarian population, and I simply added to that that the best defense against communism would be agrarian reform, meaning the welfare of the people.

Mr. Sourwine. That was the first mention of agrarian reform at that point in the conversation ?

Mr. Vincent. Agrarian reform is not a change in the subject. It is discussing the same subject but introducing a new idea.

Mr. Sourwine. It is, shall we say, a particularization of the general subject of the welfare of the people?

Mr. Vincent. Just exactly.

Mr. Sourwine. And to that extent, can we agree that what you did was, if not to change the conversation, to narrow it down to the agrarian reform at that point?

Mr. Vincent. To narrow it down or to add to it that, for the welfare of the people, being 80 percent agriculture, agrarian reform would certainly contribute to the welfare of the people.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2061

Mr. SouKWiNE. The welfare of the people is a broader term, is it not?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Soura\t:ne. So when yon spoke of agrarian reform, you were narrowing the subject, if the previous subject had been the welfare of the people ; is that right ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I was interpreting it down, sir. I was interpreting what the welfare of the people was.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you mean that welfare of the people was wholly agrarian reform?

Mr. Vincent. No, I did not.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then there must have been some area of welfare of the people outside of agrarian reform ?

Mr. Vincent. There would be, yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then the term "agrarian reform" is narrower than the term "welfare of the people"; is it not?

Mr. Vincent. In this context, yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then you were narrowing it down, were you not?

Mr. Vincent. If you wish it that way, it was narrowing it down, but not much, when you have 80 percent of your population that are agricultural.

Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not know why we quibble about this, sir.

Mr. Vincent. Because, in my own mind, that was not. It was just simply an explanatory statement of whether it would be welfare rather than narrowing it down.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, if we will look at the very last sentence, be- ginning on page 556 :

Mr. Vincent made a brief recapitulation of the morning's conversation, and asked President Cliiang wlietlier Ills understanding was correct that the observer group might proceed to North China as soon as it was organized.

That was another occasion on which you swung the conversation back to the matter of sending observers into Communist-held North China. Is that correct ?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. And your purpose, I take it, was to be sure that the consent which Chiang had granted at the end of the morning session was nailed down, so to speak?

Mr. Vincent. This was a summary of the morning conversation, and I inquired again whether I had correctly understood.

Mr. Sourwine. That one point, you wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding about it?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. On page 558, in the third paragraph from the top of the page, we find this :

A conference with regard to Pacific affairs was desirable, and the United States would be the logical place for such a conference.

Now, that was Chiang speaking ; is that correct ?

Mr. Vincent. I haven't found that place yet, sir.

Mr. SouR\viNE. Page 558, the third paragraph from the top.

Mr. Vincent. Yes, that is Chiang.

Mr. Sourwine. Then you say :

Madame Chiang interpolated to suggest that it be called the "North Pacific Conference." Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two re-

2062 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

lated but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in regard to their problems, and a conference of nations border- ing on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said —

that is, you said, is that correct ? Mr. Vincent. Yes. Mr. SouBWiNE [reading] :

He said that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any North Pacific conference.

Now, that was another occasion in which you directed the trend of the conversation ; is that correct ?

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. And I directed it at that time in keeping with what was my earlier understanding we have spoken of here, that the President's indication was to keep out of — not keep out of, but to not be a mediator between the Chinese and the Russians, wliich I would have interpreted a North Pacific conference to have been at that time.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, in effect, what you were telling Chiang, was it not, was this : that he would have to settle his differences with the Chinese Communists before he could expect any American help with regard to a North Pacific conference such as Madame Chiang and he M-ere urging?

Mr. Vincent. I was expressing the opinion that a conversation be- tween the Chinese and Soviet — I am speaking of the U. S. S. R. now, not the Chinese Communists — that a Sino-Soviet negotiation would be preferable in advance of any North Pacific conference.

Mr. SouRwiNE. I realize that that is what it says here, sir. But I had understood you, in your last answer, to say that you were fol- lowing what you understood to be the President's desire to separate the question of conversations betw^een the Chinese and Russia from the question of conversations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

Did I misunderstand you ?

Mr. Vincent. That was true.

Mr, SouRwiNE. Did I misunderstand?

Mr, Vincent. No. But here we are speaking of Chiang intro- ducing the subject of conferences with the U. S. S. R,, and here we are speaking of possible conferences between the U. S. S. R. and China.

Senator Ferguson. Taking your last view, did you not know that the Communists of China were under the control and domination of theU. S. S. R.?

Mr. Vincent. At that time I did not know that they were under the control and domination of the U. S, S. R.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first come to that conclusion ?

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified already it was about 1945 that I began to recognize the fact that the Chinese Communists were being directed from Moscow. As a matter of fact, in those days. Ambassador Hurley and the others had generally accepted the idea that the Rus- sians were not interfering on the side of the Chinese Communists in China.

Mr. Sourwine. You did not believe Chiang when he told you and Mr. Wallace, when he told you that the Chinese Communists took their orders from the Third International?

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Mr. Vincent. We had no evidence that that was the case.

Mr. SouEWiNE. You did not consider Chiang's statement as ■evidence ?

Mr. Vincent. No.

Senator Ferguson. Wliat had you to the contrary, that you did not believe Chiang?

Mr. Vincent. Because there had been visitors to Moscow, and Mos- •cow had itself said several times that they were not interfering in China, and we saw no evidence of it at that time. They weren't get- ting material aid.

Senator Ferguson. But you had Chiang's statement ?

Mr. Vincent. That they were supported ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. "V\^iose statement did you have that it was not a fact?

Mr. Vincent. We had the statements of people who were observers that did not see any evidence of it.

Senator Ferguson. Wlio ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean observers in China, that we saw no evidence that the Russians were in any way giving any aid to the Communists.

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. John Stewart Service had so reported, had he cot?

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether he reported it or not.

Mr. Sourwine. And Mr. Ludden, did he so report ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any report from Ludden.

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Emmerson so report ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall those reports.

Mr. Sourwine. Was that a view held by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a view of Edgar Snow ?

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the view of Edgar Snow.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a view held by Israel Epstein ?

Mr. Vincent. I haven't read Epstein's book, so I don't know.

I know 6 months later it was a view held by Ambassador Hurley when he came back from Moscow, when he reported they were not supporting the Communists. And we saw no visual evidence of it there. When you mention these people, did they report it, I do not recall it.

But it was a generally accepted view of Gauss and all others, and all of us there. Therefore, it could have been of the names that you have mentioned.

Senator Ferguson. Then you felt Chiang was wrong?

Mr. Vincent. That any direct aid was given to the Chinese Com- munists ? We saw no evidence of it.

Senator Ferguson. We were not talking about aid, we were talking about under the influence. Are you talking about aid ?

Mr. Vincent. I was talking about aid or influence.

Senator Ferguson. Let us talk about influence?

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what influence the Russians were exert- ing in Yenan at that time.

Mr. Sourwine. If any ?

Mr. Vincent. If any. I just don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Chiang said they were, is that not right ?

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Mr. Vincent. I would have to read his statement here to see whether he said they were influencing him or not. Do you recall what page that was on ?

My recollection was that Chiang said that the Communists were not being aided by Russia.

Senator Ferguson. Not openly.

Mr. Vincent. Well, as I say, I can't find that quotation I was just trying to remember.

Senator Ferguson. Here it is, on page 554 :

Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Commuuists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement.

So Chiang did claim they were connected, did he not? He said they were linked.

ISIr. Vincent. The quotation I had in mind, or the reference I had in mind, Mr. Chairman, was :

President Roosevelt —

this is Chiang speaking —

should bear in mind that the Communists do not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use U. S. A.

Senator Ferguson. That is right, openly. But down at the next part, where Mr. Wallace pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked witih the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement.

That indicated clearly that they were so linked, did it not ?

Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean, Mr. Wallace is certainly giving an "if" clause.

Senator Ferguson. If they were as Chiang contended : Chiang was contending that they were linked.

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any evidence that they were not?

Mr. Vincent. That they were not linked ?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You had at least Chiang's word that they were. Did you have any that they were not ?

Mr. Vincent. We were taking it purely from the standpoint of what was brought to them, and I don't recall any evidence that we had that they were getting support from

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about support. I am talk- ing about being linked with them.

Mr. Vincent. No ; we had no evidence that I know of, other than Chiang's statement, that tliey were linked with them at the time.

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you did not take that state- ment?

Mr. Vincent. That statement, that is right.

Mr. SouRwiNE. I just want to be sure that the record speaks truly with regard to this matter of a North Pacific conference,

Mr. Vincent. Yes. What page is that?

Mr. SouRwiNE. Page 558. Your note says :

Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two related but sepa- rate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in

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regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said —

that is, you said —

that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any North Pacific conference.

Now, in view of that whole conversation right at that point, what Chiang had said, what Mrs. Chiang had said, what you said, I ask you were you not, in effect, telling Generalissimo Chiang that his nation could not expect any United States aid in bringing about a North Pacific conference until it had first settled its matters with Soviet Russia ?

Mr. Vincent. I was indicating that it was preferable, from my mind, that they settle their own differences before they would call to- gether a general North Pacific conference; yes.

Mr. SouRwiNE. How does that differ from the way I phrased it?

Mr. Vincent. Well, you will have to rephrase.

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you not getting across to him the idea that he had better settle his affairs with Soviet Russia before he could ex- pect any aid from this country in setting up a North Pacific con- ference ?

Mr. Vincent. I would not want to say it that way. I much prefer to say it my own way. It is that I was expressing an opinion that it would be advisable for them to settle their own differences before you got into any general North Pacific conference.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you making it clear to him that that was only your own, individual opinion and you were not intending to reflect the opinion of the American Government?

Mr. Vincent. I would say that General Chiang himself would have taken it in this conversation as an expression of my opinion in any discussion carried on there.

Mr. Sourwine. And not reflecting the opinion of your Government?

]Mr. Vincent. Not as reflecting it as the opinion of my Government.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean in such conversation, on a very high dip- lomatic level, you would ever be presumed to have expressed an opinion not in complete accordance with that of your Government?

Mr. Vincent. He would expect it to be in accord, but he didn't at that time, I don't believe, because he simply introduced the subject that very morning and I couldn't have had any consultation with the Government and, therefore, be expected to express a Government opinion.

Mr. Sourwine. You were not expressing a Government opinon in a strict diplomatic sense. But he did know, as you have said, that he had a right to expect what you said to be in accord with your Gov- ernment's opinion, did he not?

Mr. Vincent. He would have a