The Theology of al-Allāma al-Hillī (d. 726/1325)
Sabine Schmidtke
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To my parents
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INTRODUCTION

During the last decades, scholars have made extensive progress in investigating the nature of the relationship between Mu'ātazilism and Imamism.¹

W. Madelung began this advance when he offered a general outline of the development of Shi'ite theology in relation to the corresponding Mu'ātazilite theological developments.² M. McDermott investigated the views of the three important theologians Ibn Babûya (d. 381/991), Shaykh al-Mufîd (d. 413/1022) and C'Alam al-Hudâ al-Murtaḍâ (d. 436/1044) in a very detailed study.³ Further significant contributions to the study of Imamite theology were made by D. Sourdell in his two articles on al-Mufîd.⁴

It can therefore be safely stated that the relationship between Mu'ātazilism and Imamism has been surveyed up to C'Alam al-Hudâ al-Murtaḍâ with whom the fusion of Imamism and Mu'ātazilism reached its final shape.⁵

¹Prior to this, C' Abbâs Iqāb'al's Khānādān-i Nawbakhtî (Iranian Culture and Literature, no.43. Tehran: Tahirî, 1966) had already been published. The first edition was in 1932.
⁵Madelung, "Imāmism," 27.
Some time after Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), who was a student of al-Murtada and who followed his master in theological questions, the last Imamite Mu'tazilite school started to develop, about which until now not much has been known. W. Madelung has remarked that this development was largely under the influence of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-BAṣrī and his followers.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-BAṣrī (d. 436/1044), who was a student of the Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), had developed independent theological views which set him apart from the school of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933). Despite much criticism by the Bahshamiyya and later heresiographers that he introduced philosophy under the cover of kalam, Abū l-Ḥusayn's views were successful to the extent that his school established itself side by side with the Bahshamiyya. His views were later adopted by some of the

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9 Ibn al-Murtada, 119.

10 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for example, states that in his time the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-BAṣrī and the Bahshamiyya are the last active of the Mu'tazilite schools; see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Iṣṭiqādāt firāq al-muslimin wa-l-mushrikīn (edited by Taha ʿAbd al-Ra'ūf Sa'd and Mustafā al-Hawārī. Min turāth al-Rāzī, no. 2. Cairo, 1398/1978), 42.
Zaydī Muṣṭazīlītes\textsuperscript{11} and to a much greater extent by the Imámite Muṣṭazīlītes;\textsuperscript{12} as a result they survived longer than the teachings of the Bāḥshamīyya.

The sources for the reconstruction of the theological views of Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-Bāṣrī, all of whose works on theology are lost,\textsuperscript{13} are the writings of a later follower of his school, Rūkn al-Ḏīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥīmī (d. 536/1141), viz. the shorter Kitāb al-fā'iq fī usūl al-dīn\textsuperscript{14} and the more extensive Kitāb al-muṣṭamad fī usūl al-dīn\textsuperscript{15} which is only partly extant. A further valuable source is the Kitāb al-kāmil fī l-istiqaṣā' fīmā balaghanā min kalām al-qudamā' by Taqī al-Ḏīn al-Najrānī (or al-Bahrānī) al-Ṣājālī (vocalization uncertain) about whom no further biographical details are known.\textsuperscript{16} This work, which highlights the differences between the Bāḥshamīyya and the school of Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-Bāṣrī, was written between 536/1141 and 675/1276-7.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{12} Ibn al-Murtadā, 119.

\textsuperscript{13} For his lost theological works, see W. Madelung, "Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-Bāṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Supplement Fasc. 1-2: 25.

\textsuperscript{14} Rūkn al-Ḏīn b. al-Malāḥīmī, Kitāb al-fā'iq fī usūl al-dīn (MS Ṣan'ā', al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, Cīm al-kalām 53).


There are safe indications that the Imamite Mu'tazilites had already adopted the doctrine of the school of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥimṣī al-Rāzī (d. after 600/1204) is the first known Imamite follower of this school. The development of this last Imamite Mu'tazilite school reached its peak with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Kanāl al-Dīn Mītham b. Mītham al-Bāhrānī (d. 699/1300), and Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) who is usually known as al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī.

From among these scholars, al-Ḥillī has been the most outstanding and fruitful writer on theological questions; indeed, his fame as a theologian lasts until today. One of his more concise works, for example, the Bāb al-hādi ʿAṣhar, together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's (d. 826/1423) commentary on it, not only serves today among Shi'ites as a basic textbook on theology, but is also well known in the western world from W.M. Miller's English translation. In addition to numerous concise books, al-Ḥillī also composed a considerable number of extensive theological works. We have, therefore, a large number of his writings which allow us to investigate his theological views in great detail. This does not apply to the same extent to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who seems to have been more of a philosopher than a theologian, and whose few theological writings are too concise to be suitable for a thorough

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18 Ibn al-Malāhīnī, Mu'tamad, introduction, viii.
Mitham al-Bahrani whose theological views are laid down only in a single work, the \textit{Qaw\c{c}id al-mar\={a}n f\={i} Cilm al-kal\={a}m}, also offers too limited a field.\(^{21}\)

During the centuries between the time of Ab\={u} 1-Husayn al-Basri and al-Hilli, a number of significant developments had occurred in Islamic thought which must also be taken into consideration in an investigation of al-Hilli's doctrine.

Most significant among these was the growing interest among the different theologians in the philosophical thought of Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), who was a contemporary of Ab\={u} 1-Husayn al-Basri. Although the theologians traditionally opposed all those philosophical principles which disagreed with their theological views, they tended nevertheless to adopt more and more philosophical terminology, and even elements of philosophical teachings, as long as they could possibly be brought into agreement with their theological doctrine.

Ab\={u} 1-Husayn al-Basri, who seems to have studied philosophy and the sciences with the Christian Ab\={u} 'Ali b. al-Samh,\(^{22}\) was considered by later writers such as al-Shahrastani (d. 548/1153) and Ibn al-Qifti (d. 646/1248)

\(^{20}\)His most important theological writings are his "Tajrid al-Caq\={a}'id" (together with Hasan b. Yusuf al-Hilli's Kashf al-murad f\={i} sharh tajrid al-i\c{c}ti\={g}\={a}d. Qum: Maktabat al-mustafaw\={i}, n.d.), his \textit{Fu\c{s}ul f\={i} l-usul} (edited by Sh\={a}kir al-C\={a}rif and Hamid K\={a}lisi. Al-Caq\={a}'id al-islamiyya, vol.1. Baghdad, 1960), and his "Qaw\c{c}id al-Caq\={a}'id" (together with Hasan b. Yusuf al-Hilli's "Kashf al-fawa\c{i}d f\={i} sharh qawa\c{c}id al-Caq\={a}'id," in Majmu'at al-rasa\={i}l, 2-97. Qum: Maktabat Ayat Allah al-Cuzma\={a} al-Mar\={a}sh\={i} al-Najafi, 1404H.)

\(^{21}\)Kamal al-Din Mitham al-Bahrani \textit{Qaw\c{c}id al-mar\={a}n f\={i} Cilm al-kal\={a}m} (edited by Ahmad al-Husayn. Min makhtutat maktabat Ayat Allah al-Mar\={a}sh\={i} al-C\={a}mma, no.3. Qum, 1406H.)

to have been deeply influenced by the concepts of the philosophers. Yet this opinion is disputed among modern scholars and certainly requires further investigation.

The profound impact of the philosophical tradition can easily be found in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209). He is famous for having fully developed what had been initiated by his predecessor al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and what Ibn Khaldūn called the "method of the moderns" (tariqat al-muta'akhkhirin) in Ash'arite theology, through freely mixing philosophical and theological concepts and terminology.

However, despite this adoption of elements of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī usually displayed a highly critical attitude towards basic philosophical doctrines when he held on to the traditional Ash'arite views. An exception is his Mabāḥihīth al-mashriqiyya which he wrote in his youth and in which he usually follows the philosophical views of his teacher Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 560/1164-5).

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25 Abū ʿZayd ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Muhammad b. Khuldūn, Mugaddima (edited by ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Wāfī. Cairo, 1376-1382/1957-62), 3:1048. Although Ibn Khuldūn maintained that al-Ghazālī founded this new method of theological thinking, his contribution should not be overestimated. Despite his study of philosophy which resulted in the composition of his Maqāsid al-falāṣifah (a neutral exposition of philosophical views) and his Tahāfut al-falāṣifah (a refutation of the philosophical positions), al-Ghazālī's main interest did not lie in theology. Moreover, in his theological exposition, the Iktīṣād fī l-ʾīqtīṣād, he maintains somewhat conservative views. It was rather Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who fully developed this modern method.

A further significant peculiarity of al-Rāzī's theology is that he often adopted the theological concepts of Abū l-Husayn al-Bāšrī although modifying and interpreting them in such a way that they support the AshCarite rather than the MuCtazilite point of view. Owing to the impact of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī often employed philosophical terminology to express his views, which are otherwise directly based on the positions of Abū l-Husayn al-Bāšrī. There are safe indications that al-Rāzī was thoroughly acquainted with the positions of the School of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Bāšrī; during his visit to Khwārazm al-Rāzī was involved in debates with MuCtazilites who were most likely followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Bāšrī, possibly even direct students of Ibn al-Malāḥīmī. He moreover frequently mentioned the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Bāšrī and Ibn al-Malāḥīmī and even quoted at times from Abū l-Ḥusayn's Kitāb al-taşāffuh.

Al-Rāzī's theological doctrine can be learnt from his extensive theological works which have been published, such as his Kitāb al-arba'īn fī usūl al-dīn, his Muhassal, his MaCālim usūl al-dīn and his MaTa refined al-Caliyya min al-Culūm al-ilāhiyya. His Tafsīr is a further valuable source of his thought. His Nihāyat al-Cuqūl fī dirāyat al-usūl is extant in manuscript.

27Ibn al-Murtadā (119), for example, points out that al-Rāzī followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Bāšrī and Ibn al-Malāḥīmī in the 'subtle (laCīf)' points of theology not touching, however, basic doctrine.
29Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, MuCtamad, introduction, vff.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what degree al-Hillî's doctrine is directly based on the views of Abû l-Husayn al-Baṣrî and his followers, and to what extent the thought of Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî and the Avicennan tradition had an impact upon his theology. In regard to the influence of the philosophical tradition, it will be of interest to compare al-Hillî's reception of it with the position of his master Naṣîr al-Dîn al-Ṭûsî, who must be considered as a philosopher rather than as a theologian.
CHAPTER I
THE BIOGRAPHY OF AL-CALLĀMA AL-HILLĪ

1. Dates of Life and Family

Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Hillī, called al-Callāma al-Hillī, was born in 648/1250 in al-Hilla. This is confirmed by al-Hillī himself although a minor disagreement occurs concerning the exact date. In his Khulāsa, he reports the date as 29 Ramaḍān/25 December\(^1\) but in his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya, he says that according to a statement by his father he was born on 27 Ramaḍān/23 December.\(^2\) Al-Cāmilī suggests that this difference may be the result of a writing error since the numerals 7 and 9 look very similar.\(^3\)

Al-Hillī died either on 20 or 21 Muharram 726/27 or 28 December 1325 in his home town al-Hilla.\(^4\) All biographers agree on this year except al-Afandi who erroneously reports that al-Hillī died in the same year as Uljaytū, i.e. in 716/1316.\(^5\)

\(^2\)Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Hillī, Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya (Qum: al-Khayyān, 1401H.), 139.
\(^3\)Muḥsin al-Amīn al-Cāmilī, Aṣyān al-shī'ah (Damascus, 1948-1982), 24:222.
\(^4\)Al-Cāmilī, 24:223; see also ʿAbd al-Nabī b. ʿAlī al-Kāzimi, Takmilat al-rijāl (edited by Muhammad Ṣādiq Bahr al-Cūlūm. Najaf: al-Ādab, 1971), 1:315, who reports the 29 Muharram/5 January 1326. Muhammad Bāqir al-Khwānsārī, (Raudāt al-Jannāt. Qum, 1987, 2:282) and Nūr Allāh al-Shushtārī (Majālis al-mu'minīn. Tehran, 1365sh, 1:574) report the 21 Muharram/29 December. Muhammad b. ʿAlī al-Astarābādī (Manhaj al-maqāl fī taḥqīq ahwāl al-rijāl. Tehran, 1306/1889, 109) reports the 19 Muharram/26 December. This may also be the result of an error; see al-Cāmilī, 24:223. See also al-Hillī, Rijāl, 49 n. 1, where Fakhr al-Muhaggiqīn is said to have given the 11 Muharram/18 December as the date of his father's death.
Al-Hillī's father was Sādīq al-Dīn Yūsuf b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar al-Hillī, about whom not much is known, not even the date of his death. In 665/1267 he was still alive. He is said to have written several works on hadīth and usūl, but no titles are known.

The information which al-Hillī provides about his father indicates that he must have been a very learned man and in his time one of the leading personalities of al-Hilla. He reports that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī visited al-Hilla shortly after the fall of Baghdad on 4 Šafar 656/10 February 1258 in his position as a minister of Hūlākū. On this occasion, he asked the Muḥaqiq al-awwal who of the scholars of al-Hilla was the most excellent. Following al-Muḥaqiq's answer that all of them were excellent, Naṣīr al-Dīn specified further, asking who was the best with respect to theology and legal methodology. Al-Muḥaqiq named al-Hillī's father together with Mufīd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jahn (d. 680/1281-2). A further indication that Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar must have been a learned man derives from al-Hillī's teaching permits (ijāzāt) where he cites his father frequently as an authority for his own knowledge.

Al-Hillī's report on the role which his father played in the surrender of al-Hilla to the Mongol conquerors in 656/1258 suggests that he was one of the leading personalities of al-Hilla. When, after the fall of Baghdad, the remaining inhabitants of al-Hilla and Kūfa decided to surrender to the conquerors, Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar together with Majd al-Dīn b. ʿAwāṣ and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-ʿIzz are reported to have delivered the proposal of

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⁶About him, see al-Afandi, 5:395ff.
⁸Al-Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64. For this instance, see also R. Strothmann, Die Zwölfer-Schi'a (Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 1975), 47ff; al-Afandi, 5:395-6.
⁹See later.
surrender to Hūlākū. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar then went at the request of Hūlākū to the latter's residence and convinced him of the sincerity of the motives of the people of al-Hilla.10

Al-Ḥillī's mother was a descendant of the Banū Sa'īd.11 His brother Raḍī al-Dīn ǦAlī,12 who was the author of al-ǦUdād al-gawīyya,13 was 13 years older and is reported to have died before him.14 Al-Ḥillī also had a sister who was married to Majd al-Dīn al-Fawāris.15 This couple had five children,16 two of whom, ǦAmīd al-Dīn ǦAbd Allāh al-ǦRajī al-Ḥusaynī (681/1282-3-754/1353) and Diyā' al-Dīn (683/1284-5 - after 740/1339-40), became students of al-Ḥillī and wrote commentaries on a number of his works.17


14Al-Bahrānī, 266 n. 1; on 28 Muḥarram 703/11 September 1303 Raḍī al-Dīn issued an ijāza to Zayn al-Dīn al-Astarābādī (see Aḡā Buzurg, Dhāriqā, 1:223 (no.1170); idem, Tabāqāt aṭ-Ṭām al-shī'ā (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-Ǧaraḫī, 1971-5), 5:139); the date of his death is therefore between the beginning of 703/1303 and the beginning of 726/1325.

15About him, see al-Bahrānī, 199-210 (no.76).

16Al-Bahrānī, 199 n. 16.

17See lāter.
2. His Teachers

At first al-Ḥillī studied in his home town al-Ḥilla mainly under the guidance of his father¹⁸ and Najm al-Dīn Jaʿfar b. Muhammad b. Saʿīd al-Ḥillī, known as al-Muḥaqqiq al-awwal (d. 676/1277),¹⁹ who was his maternal uncle.²⁰

From his teaching permits (ijāzāt) which were issued later to some of his pupils, it is possible to establish the contents of his studies at this time. In regard to traditions, he studied the Shi‘ite legacy such as the Kāfī of al-Kulīnī and the various collections of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and Ibn Bābūyā,²¹ together with the important Sunnite collections such as the Muwatta' of Mālik b. Anas,²² the Sahīh of al-Bukhārī,²³ the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal²⁴ and the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd.²⁵ His studies with his father also included the science of hadīth criticism.²⁶

In theology he was introduced to the works of the earlier Shi‘ite Muṣṭazīlītes such as al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, Alī al-Hudū al-Murtadā and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. In all these important fields, his father appears to have been his most important teacher.²⁷ In his legal study, al-Muḥaqqiq al-awwal,

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¹⁹ Ibid., 62-3; about him, see al-Afandī, 1:103ff.
²⁰ Al-Afandī, 1:359; also al-Khwānsārī, 2:277.
²² Al-Ḥillī, “Ijāza kabīra,” 90.
²³ Ibid., 88-9.
²⁴ Ibid., 86.
²⁵ Ibid., 92.
²⁶ Ibid., 88, 95.
²⁷ Al-Ḥillī, Rijāl, 282; idem, “Ijāza kabīra,” 68-70; 135-7.
one of the most outstanding scholars of law of his time, also played an important part. Al-Hillī also studied Qur'ān exegesis and grammar with his father.

Among his teachers in this period were further the brothers Jamāl al-Dīn b. Tāwūs (d. 673/1274) and Raḍī al-Dīn b. Tāwūs (d. 664/1266) who were descended from an important family of Imāmī scholars in al-Hillī. In addition to their own writings, both are also said to have taught him the works of the former Shi'ite authorities such as Ibn Bābyūṣ, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Murtada and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. From the ijāza it is evident that Raḍī al-Dīn b. Tāwūs was of less importance in al-Hillī's education than his brother Jamāl al-Dīn. The reason for this was presumably Raḍī al-Dīn's involvement in politics. In 661/1262-3 he was appointed syndic of the Tālibīdīs in Iraq (Niẓābat al-ṭālibīyīn), a post which he held for three years and eleven months, and probably until his death. He left al-Hillī, therefore, when al-Hillī was only 13 years old.

Another scholar whom al-Hillī mentions as his teacher was Mufīd al-Dīn Muhammad b. Jahm (d. 680/1281-2). Al-Hillī wrote that in the time when Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī visited al-Hillī, al-Muḥaqqiq described him, together with his father Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar, as the foremost scholar in

\[\text{See H.T. Modarresi, An Introduction to Shi'ite Law: A Bibliographical Study (London: Ithaca, 1984), 65-70 for a list of his legal works.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., 102.}\]

\[\text{About him, see al-Bahrānī, 235-45 (no. 85).}\]

\[\text{About him, see "Umar Ridā al-Kahhāla, Mu'jjan al-mu'allifīn (Beirut, 1376-81/1957-61), 7:248; al-Khwānsārī, 4:325 ff; Strothmann, 86-168.}\]

\[\text{Al-Bahrānī, 236 n. 17.}\]

\[\text{Al-Hillī, "IJāza li-Muhanna' b. Sinān," 144-6 (for Jamāl al-Dīn); idem, "IJāza kabīra," 68-9 (for Jamāl al-Dīn), 136-7 (for Jamāl al-Dīn and Raḍī al-Dīn).}\]

\[\text{Abūbās al-ʿAẓzāwī, Tā'rikh al-Iraq bayn al-iḥtiḥālāyyn (Baghdad, 1353-/1934-), 1:246.}\]

\[\text{Strothmann, 93.}\]

\[\text{Al-Hillī, "IJāza kabīra," 64; about him, see al-Bahrānī, 265 (no. 92).}\]

\[\text{IJāza kabīra," 64.}\]
theology and legal methodology. From this notice and from the reports that Mufīd al-Dīn died in al-Ḥilla, it is evident that al-Ḥillī studied under his guidance during this early stage of his education in al-Ḥilla.

The same applies to another teacher of al-Ḥillī, Najīb al-Dīn Yahyā b. Yahyā b. Saʿīd al-Hudhalī (d. 689/1290 or 690/1291), a cousin of the Muḥaggig al-awwal. Although he was born in Kūfa, Najīb al-Dīn moved later to al-Ḥilla where he is reported to have died. Since he primarily was a lawyer and the author of a legal compendium entitled Jāmiʿ al-sharā'i, al-Ḥillī probably studied law with him.

Although al-Ḥillī does not indicate who were his authorities for the theological works of Ibn al-Malāḥimi, it is most likely that he became acquainted with these during the first stage of his studies; Ibn al-Malāḥimi's writings were very famous and known even to such opponents of Muʿtazilism as Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭawūs. Similarly he does not indicate when he was introduced to the Kitāb al-kāmil by Taqī al-Dīn. Yet there is no doubt that he was familiar with this work.

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40 Ibid., 64.
42 Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64; about him, see al-Bahrānī, 252-3' (no.88); Āghā Buzurg, Dharīca, 1:263-4; al-ʿArādī, 5:334-342; al-Khwānsārī, 2:182 ff (no.170).
43 See Modarressi, 70.
44 See Ibn al-Malāḥimi, Muʿtamad, introduction.
At the next stage of his studies, al-Ḥilli's teachers were Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and the Shafiite scholar Naṣîm al-Dīn Ṣaḥīḥ b. ʿUmar al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277). The former founded the observatory in Marāgha in 657/1258-9 during the reign of the Ilkhan Hūlākū. This observatory not only served its technical purpose but was also a kind of academy which attracted many scholars, such as Ibn al-C̣Ibrī from Antioch and Tumaji from China.


47 Al-C̣Amīlī, 46:10.


together with numerous other students. It contained a large library which is said to have contained 400,000 volumes which Naṣīr al-Dīn collected from various Islamic countries.

Al-Kātibī was one of the four co-founders of the observatory who were invited to Marāgha by Hūlākū at the request of Naṣīr al-Dīn. Besides al-Kātibī, there were Mu'ayyid al-Dīn al-ʿUrdī from Damascus (d. 664/1265-6), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Khilāṭī (d. 680/1281-2) from Tiflis and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maṛāḡī (d. 667/1268-9) from Maŭṣīl.

There seem to be no reports confirming al-Ḥillī's presence at Marāgha. One of the best informed biographical sources which would probably say more about this, the Talkhīš majmaʿ al-ʿādāb of Ibn al-Fuwatī (d. 723/1323), is partly lost and with it the section containing al-Ḥillī's biography. Al-Ḥillī mentions Naṣīr al-Dīn and al-Kātibī as

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52 Al-Safadī, 1:179; also Boyle, 247; Ibn al-Fuwatī, Majmaʿ, 4/2, introd. 17; al-ʿĀmilī, 46:11; Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 31; for this purpose it was helpful that he was the minister of endowments (Ibn al-ʿIbrī, 500) since as such he could transfer the endowment books from other places to Marāgha.

53 About him, see Seeann, 111-4.

54 About him, see Ibn al-Fuwatī, Majmaʿ, 4/3:215-6 (no. 2175).


56 Ibn al-Fuwatī stayed at Marāgha from 660/1261-2 for 13 years during which time he studied mainly philosophy and astronomy with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; see Nāṣīr Maʿrūf, Taʿrīkh al-mustānṣīriyya (Baghdad: ʿĀmilī, 1379/1959), 288. For ten years he acted also as the librarian at the Marāgha observatory; see ibid. 299.

57 For the extant portions of the work, see F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Fuwatī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:769.
his teachers but does not state where he met them. From the existing evidence, however, it can safely be assumed that he studied in Marāḡa. Naṣīr al-Dīn worked in Marāḡa from 657/1258-9 and left the town a few times only to inspect religious endowments in his function as minister of endowments. Moreover, the Ilkhan Abaqa sometimes demanded Naṣīr al-Dīn's company as a political advisor on his journeys. In the year 662/1263-4 Naṣīr al-Dīn is said to have visited many places in Iraq to inspect the endowments and to collect books for the library in Marāḡa. In 672/1273-4 he visited Qūsān, Wāsiṭ and Baghdad together with the Ilkhan Abaqa to inspect the endowments and the situation of the teachers and the lawyers. Since Naṣīr al-Dīn is known to have died in the same year in Baghdad, he presumably died during this visit. Al-Ṣafadī reports that this second visit to Baghdad lasted some months and that during this time Naṣīr al-Dīn took with him some students from Marāḡa and taught them in Baghdad until his death; but no other historian confirms this. Al-Ḥillī, therefore, must have studied under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Marāḡa but his opportunity to do so must have been limited to a few years only as he died when al-Ḥillī was only 24 years old.

It is most likely that al-Ḥillī met al-Kātibī similarly at Marāḡa. Although it is reported that al-Kātibī left Marāḡa shortly before his death to teach at Juwayn, no exact dates are mentioned for his departure. In 670/1271-2, five years before his death, he must still have been in Marāḡa.

58 Ibn al-Cībrī, 500.
59 Al-Qazwīnī, 1:247.
60 Ibn al-Fuwatī, Hawādīth, 375.
61 Ibid., 380; also Muhammad Mudarrisī Zanjānī, Sargudhasht wa-Qāḏī-id-i falsafī-yi Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (Tehran: Mu‘assasat-i intisharat-i Amīr kabīr, 1363/1984), 75ff.
62 Al-Ṣafadī, 1:183; see also al-Kutubī, 2:312.
63 See e.g. Sāyīlī, 64.
64 Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 137.
65 See Ma‘rūf, 63, where a report is given on Muḥyi al-Dīn al-Qābāsī who arrived in 670/1271-2 in Marāḡa to study with both Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-Kātibī; also Mudarris Ridawī, Ahwāl, 151; Zanjānī, 210ff.
The influence of these two scholars on al-Ḥillī must be considered as formative. He states that he studied philosophy and especially the Ilāhiyyāt of Ibn Sīnā's Kitāb al-shifā' under Naṣīr al-Dīn and he further mentions having read Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's al-Tadhkira fi Ǧilm al-hay'a with him. Moreover, al-Ḥillī wrote commentaries on two of the latter's works on theology, the Tajrīd al-aqā'id and the Qawā'id al-aqā'id and on his Manṭiq al-tajrīd on logic, and a note in his Muntahā al-māṭlab seems to indicate that he also studied law under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. This, however, is most unlikely.

Under the guidance of al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī studied philosophy and also logic. Later he wrote commentaries on both of al-Kātibī's important works, the Risāla al-shamsīyya on logic and the Hikmat al-Cayn on metaphysics and natural sciences. Al-Kātibī also introduced al-Ḥillī to three important earlier writers. One of these was Athīr al-Dīn Mufaddal b. ǦUmar al-Abharī (d. 663/1264), an important philosopher, mathematician and astronomer and author of Ḥidāyat al-hikma and Kitāb al-Īsāqūjī. He further taught al-Ḥillī the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209).
Also with al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī read the writings of Muhammad b. Nāmāwar b. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Khūnī (d. 646/1248)\textsuperscript{72} who wrote on astronomy and logic.

It is also possible that al-Ḥillī met Mītham al-Bahrānī (d. 699/1300)\textsuperscript{73} who was an important philosopher and theologian. Since Mītham al-Bahrānī was a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and held frequent discussions with him,\textsuperscript{74} it is likely that he stayed in Marāgha for some time.

It is not known when al-Ḥillī left Marāgha but there is no reason to assume that he stayed there after the death of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in 672/1274.\textsuperscript{75}

During the following twenty years, until the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century, al-Ḥillī stayed partly in al-Ḥilla\textsuperscript{76} where he mainly taught, and partly in nearby Baghdad where he met some more of the scholars whom he mentions as his teachers.

\textsuperscript{72} Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67-8; there appears to be some disagreement about the date of his death. Al-Kāhālā (12:73) reports 646/1248 while Ibn ʿImād (5:236-7) reports 647/1249-50.

\textsuperscript{73} Mītham al-Bahrānī is usually mentioned by biographers as one of al-Ḥillī's teachers (e.g., al-Khwānsāri, 2:278; al-Afandī, 1:359); however, al-Ḥillī does not include him in the list of those who issued an ijāza to him; about Mītham al-Bahrānī, see al-Afandī, 5:226ff.; al-ʿAmīlī, 49:98-9 (no. 11109); al-Khwānsāri, 7:216ff.; al-Bahrānī, 253-61 (no. 89). Some biographers report 679/1280 as the date of his death (see Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur Suplementband (Leiden: Brill, 1937-49), 1:713 (hereafter cited as GALS and GAL); Mudarris Ridāwī, Ahwāl, 115). However, Aghā Buzurg showed that the date 699/1300 is correct, since Mītham al-Bahrānī did not complete his smaller commentary on the Nahj al-balāgha until 681/1282-3 (Tabayyūt, 4:188).

\textsuperscript{74} Al-Bahrānī, 255.

\textsuperscript{75} This seems to be confirmed by the fact that al-Ḥillī is not mentioned among those who continued the work at the Marāgha observatory after Naṣīr al-Dīn's death in 672/1274; see Ibn al-Fuwātī, Majmāʿ, 4/1, introduction, 21.

\textsuperscript{76} That al-Ḥillī usually taught in al-Ḥilla is indicated when he designates himself as "al-Ḥillī maulidān wa-maškanān"; see his Rījāl, 45.
One of these was the Shāfiʿite scholar Shams al-Dīn Muhammad b. Muḥammad b. ʿĀhmād al-Kīshī who is reported to have started teaching in Baghdad in 665/1266-7 at the Nizāmiyya College where he remained until he was called to Isfahan by the minister Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī. He died in 695/1296 in Shirāz. Al-Kīshī was the author of a compendium on grammar together with some other treatises and is known to have had a correspondence with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Having studied under the guidance of the Sufi Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan Masʿūd b. Mahmūd (d. 655/1257-8), he was well-acquainted with the works of Ibn al-ʿArabī. Some time between 678/1279-80 and 685/1286, al-Kīshī regularly attended the Sufi circle in Shirāz which was founded by Najīb al-Dīn al-ʿAlī Buzghush Shirāzī (d. 678/1279-80). Although mysticism had no impact upon al-Ḥillī's theological thought, it is likely that through al-Kīshī he became thoroughly acquainted with the views of Ibn al-ʿArabī. It is probable that he was already to some extent familiar with Sufi ideas since his stay at Marāgha where the Sufis were represented in large numbers.

Another of al-Ḥillī's teachers was Burhān al-Dīn Muhammad b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288) who wrote several works mainly on disputation (jadāʾil gīlm al-khilāf).

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77 Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 65-6; about him, see al-Ṣafādī, 2:141 (no. 493); Mūdarris Ridawī, Ḥawālī, 100-8.
78 Al-ʿAẓzāwī, 1:263; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawādīth, 358.
79 Al-ʿAẓzāwī, 1:263; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawādīth, 358; see also Mūdarris Ridawī, Ḥawālī, 106.
80 Al-Ṣafādī, 2:141; another report mentions 694/1294-5 as the date of his death, see al-ʿAẓzāwī, 1:371; also H. Landolt, "Der Briefwechsel zwischen Kašānī und Simnānī über Waḥdat al-Wuġūd," Der Islam 50 (1973): 34.
81 Mūdarris Ridawī, Ḥawālī, 107.
82 Ibid., 108; Zanjanī, 198ff; Landolt, 34 n.21.
83 See Landolt, 345.
84 One of the outstanding mystics at Marāgha, for instance, was Qutb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī (d. 710/1311) who arrived there in 658/1259-60; see Ibn Fuwaṭī, Majmaʿ, 4/4:716-7 (no. 2927).
85 Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 65-7; about him, see al-Kahhāla, 11:297-8; al-Ṣafādī, 1:282-3 (no. 185); Brockelmann, GAL, 1:615; GALS, 1:849.
He is reported to have come to Baghdad in 675/1276-786 where he taught, probably at the Mustansiriyya college, until his death in 687/1288. With him, al-Hillī studied disputation. In addition he studied grammar with Jamāl al-Dīn b. Āyāz al-Nahwī (d. 681/1282-3), who is known to have been a lecturer in grammar at the Mustansiriyya college in Baghdad. Al-Hillī records having read with him the works of the celebrated grammarian Jamāl al-Dīn b. al-Hājib (d. 646/1249). Another of his teachers was Īzz al-Dīn Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās b. Ibrāhīm b. ʿUmar al-Fārūthī al-Wāṣīṭī (d. 694/1292-3), who is said to have come from Damascus to Iraq in 692/1292-3. Al-Hillī presumably met him during the two years of his stay in Iraq. Since al-Wāṣīṭī was a student of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190), it is likely that al-Hillī studied the latter's works with him. While there are no indications that al-Suhrawardī's doctrine of illumination made any impact upon him, he was certainly interested in the latter's philosophical works, indeed he even wrote a commentary on the Kitāb al-talwiḥāt.

86 Al-Safadī, 1:283; al-ʿAzzāwī, 1:343.
90 Asrī, 157; al-Suyūṭī, Bughya, 1:532.
93 Ibn al-ʿImād, 5:425.
Al-Hillī further states that he studied under the guidance of the Ḥanafīte scholar Taqī al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī al-Ṣabbāgh al-Kūfī.⁹⁴ With him, he read the Qurʾān commentary al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-tanzīl of Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhshārī (d. 538/1144).⁹⁵
3. Al-Ḥillī at the Court of Uljaytū

Ghāzān (d. 703/1304), Uljaytū's brother and predecessor, became a convert to Islam in 694/1295. This was a decisive step towards the revival of the Muslim community in Iran and Iraq which had suffered greatly during the reign of his predecessors who had been hostile towards Islam. He attempted to restore the dominant position of Islam by re-establishing Islamic schools and mosques which had been destroyed by his predecessors. Although he adhered to Sunnite Islam he also paid special attention to the Shi'ites in Iran and Iraq.

After his accession in Dhū al-Ḥijja 703/July-August 1304, Uljaytū, who had been baptized as a child and had later become a Buddhist, declared Islam the religion of state. At this time he adhered to the Ḥanafī school of law. This was apparently due to the fact that while governor of Khurāsān he was surrounded mainly by Ḥanafīs. After

96 See A. Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," in The Cambridge History of Iran (edited by J. A. Boyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 5:541-2; B. Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 154. The Ilkhan Ahmad (d. 683/1284) who ruled from 680/1282 until 683/1284 had already converted to Islam. However, he did not succeed in spreading Islam among the other members of the ruling society; see Spuler, 69ff.

97 Concerning the religious situation of Iran and Iraq under the Mongols, see Spuler, 165ff; also Bausani, 538ff.


100 Spuler, 158, 184.

101 Ibid., 158.

102 Al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 606.

103 Qāshānī, 89.

703/1304 when he succeeded his brother as Ilkhan, he came under opposing influences at court. The first minister, Rashid al-Din, who was a Shafiite and in conflict with the Hanafites at court,\textsuperscript{106} attempted to break their influence. For this purpose, he introduced in Ramadān 707/February-March 1308 the Shafiite scholar Nizām al-Dīn Ḥādī al-Malik al-Marāghi at court\textsuperscript{107} who engaged the Hanafite scholars in frequent debates.\textsuperscript{108} Subsequently, he gained the confidence of the Ilkhan and was appointed the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Iran.\textsuperscript{109} He held this position until his death in Sha'ban 716/October-November 1316.\textsuperscript{110} Apparently under his influence, Uljaytū was converted to the Shafiite school of law in 707/1308.\textsuperscript{111} Disputes between the two groups, however, did not end.\textsuperscript{112} This apparently upset the Ilkhan so that he decided to abandon the Shafiite school also.\textsuperscript{113} Eventually he joined Shi'ite Islam in Sha'ban 709/January-February 1310\textsuperscript{114} and ordered that the names of the twelve Imams be mentioned in the Friday prayers\textsuperscript{115} and that they be substituted for the

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A.K.M.d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchingiz-Khan jusqu'\'a Timour Bey ou Tamerlan (Amsterdam, 1852), 4:535.

\textsuperscript{106} Qāshānī, 28, 34; Shushtari, 2:356; also C. Abbas Zaryab, "Struggle of the Religious Sects in the Ilkhanid Court," in La Persia nel Medioevo (Rom, 1971), 465.

\textsuperscript{107} Qāshānī, 89.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 74, 89.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 89; Shushtari, 2:357; Ḥāfīz al-Abrū, 101 n.1; d'Ohsson, 4:537.

\textsuperscript{110} Qāshānī, 74.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 190.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 89-90.

\textsuperscript{113} Ḥāfīz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.102); d'Ohsson, 4:537-8.

\textsuperscript{114} Qāshānī, 93; no exact date of the conversion is known. However, in Sha'ban 709/January-February 1310 (ibid., 93), the Ilkhan ordered the change of the coinage. Thus the date of his conversion must be either identical with, or precede, this event. (See also Ibn Abī l-Fadā'il al-Mufaddal, "Histoire des sultans Mamlouks," (edited and translated by E. Blochet) Patrologia Orientalis 20 (1929):171-2 who reports also 709/1310 as the year when the conversion took place.) Other sources give earlier dates. Al-'Azzawī (1:489), who does not mention the earlier conversion from the Hanafite to the Shafiite school, dates the conversion in 707/1307-8. According to al-Afandī (1:361), Uljaytū joined Shi'ism in 708/1308-9.

\textsuperscript{115} Ḥāfīz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.103); d'Ohsson, 4:541; Ghāzān already intended to exclude the names of the first three
names of the first four Caliphs on the coinage. Uljaytū apparently tried unsuccessfully to convert the entire population of Iran and Iraq to Shiʿism.

The sources differ about al-Ḥillī's role in connection with the Ilkhan's last conversion. Some biographical accounts of al-Ḥillī suggest that he was mainly responsible for convincing him of the truth of Shiʿism and they offer two versions of how he attracted the Ilkhan's attention.

One version says that Uljaytū in a state of anger divorced his wife, which he soon regretted deeply. The lawyers at court, however, could not find any way to nullify this divorce according to their laws and the only suggestion they could offer was that a Shiʿite lawyer would be able to annul it. Consequently, al-Ḥillī was summoned to court where he engaged in discussions with Sunnite scholars. His success in defeating his opponents in the debate made such an impression upon Uljaytū that he adopted Shiʿism. According

caliphs from the Friday prayers but failed to do so following the advice of Rashīd al-Dīn (Qāshānī, 87-8).

Spuler, 159; Ḥāfiz al-Abru, 101 n.1 (on p.103); d'Ohsson, 4:541.

Muhammad b. CAbd Allāh b. Batūta, The Travels of Ibn Batūta, A.D.1325-1354 (translated with revisions and notes from the Arabic text edited by C. Defrémedy and B.R. Sanquetti by R.A.R. Gibb. Cambridge, 1958-71), 2:58-9; Abū ʿl-Mahāsin Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf b. Ṭaghribirdī, al-Nujūm al-zāhirā fi mulūk Misr wa-1-Qāhirā (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-misriyya, 1348-92/1929-72), 9:238; see also Zaryāb, 466 where a summary of the account of Shāh Tahmāsp Safawi's Takmilat al-akhbār is given; also Ibn Kathīr, 14:77; Spuler, 202 n.78. Apparently, Uljaytū was more successful in motivating the members of the court to embrace Shiʿism; see Qāshānī, 92.

E.g. al-Afandī, 1:361.

Al-Khwānsārī, 2:279 ff; al-Cāmilī, 24:231ff.

The historical sources do not report such an event. However, in Muharram 707/July 1307 a debate took place between Nīzām al-Dīn CAbd al-Malik and his Hanafīte opponents on adultery and the legality of marriage with a mother and her daughter (Qāshānī, 89-90). During this debate, which was initiated by the Hanafītes in order to defeat Nīzām al-Dīn, both sides displayed extreme fanaticism. This event induced Uljaytū to turn away from both schools of law (ibid.). The version of the Shiʿite biographers may be based on this event, although it took place before al-Ḥillī's time.
to the other version,\textsuperscript{122} the Ilkhan called scholars of several Islamic schools to court and ordered them to debate various theological questions. Owing to the impression al-Ḥillī made on Uljaytū, the latter embraced Shi'ism.

The historical sources of the period do not confirm these reports. Some of these sources attribute a decisive role in Uljaytū's conversion 709/1310 to another Shi'ite, Tāj al-Dīn al-Awjī from Mashhad\textsuperscript{123} who was the appointed minister of religious affairs.\textsuperscript{124} According to another report, Uljaytū had a dream during his visit to Mashhad Čalī in Rajab 709/December 1309 which moved him to adopt Shi'ism.\textsuperscript{125} A thunder clap is also said to have influenced him to convert.\textsuperscript{126} There are reports that Amīr Tarnatāsh, who has been a close advisor of Ghāzān\textsuperscript{127} with sympathies for the Shi'ites,\textsuperscript{128} induced Uljaytū to embrace Shi'ism; when Uljaytū abandoned the Shāfi'ite school of law Amīr Tarnatāsh suggested that he should consider the possibility of joining Shi'ism.\textsuperscript{129}

The sources differ also about the date of al-Ḥillī's arrival at court. Al-Afandī states that he was already at court in 708/1308-9.\textsuperscript{130} Those sources, according to which al-Ḥillī played a decisive role in the conversion of the Ilkhan to Shi'ism, imply that al-Ḥillī arrived at court before Shāhān 709/January 1310. In contrast, Qāshānī reports that al-Ḥillī and his son, together with some other

\textsuperscript{122} Al-Khwānsārī, 2:279; Ibn Baṭūta also ascribes to al-Ḥillī a decisive role in Uljaytū's conversion to Shi'ite Islam; see Ibn Baṭūta, 2:57; similarly Ibn Kathīr, 14:77.
\textsuperscript{123} Hāfiz al-Abrū, 101, 101 n.1; see also al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 608; al-ČAzzāwī, 1:409; Shushtarī, 2:358; Ibn Taghrībirdī, 9:238.
\textsuperscript{124} Qāshānī, 116. On 2 Dhū al-Hijja 711/10 April 1312, he was executed because of his relations with Sa'd al-Dīn, Rashīd al-Dīn's opponent at court. The immediate occasion for his execution was a measure which Tāj al-Dīn took in his function as minister of religious affairs, which Rashīd al-Dīn disliked (ibid., 116-7).
\textsuperscript{125} Qāshānī, 92; Shushtarī, 2:359; Hāfiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p. 1:102).
\textsuperscript{126} Qāshānī, 91.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 87.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{130} Al-Afandī, 1:361.
Shi'ite scholars, were summoned to court only after the conversion of Uljaytū to Shi'ism.\textsuperscript{131} From among those, Uljaytū chose al-Hillī as an advisor while the other scholars were permitted to return home.\textsuperscript{132} Al-Hillī subsequently had many discussions with Uljaytū on theological issues and introduced him to the teachings of Shi'ism.\textsuperscript{133} These discussions confirmed the Ilkhan in his decision to join this persuasion.

Despite the contradictory reports of the different historians, there are a number of sound indications that al-Hillī arrived at court before the conversion. In Rabi'\textsuperscript{i} II 709/September-October 1309 he issued a teaching permit (ijāza) to Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Rāzī in Sulṭānīyya,\textsuperscript{134} the city which Uljaytū had chosen for his future capital.\textsuperscript{135} Moreover, according to the account of Rashīd al-Dīn\textsuperscript{136} al-Hillī accompanied the Ilkhan in Rajab 709/December 1309 on a visit of the tomb of Salmān Fārisī. On the basis of this evidence it is likely that he had some influence in the conversion of Uljaytū.

During their stay at court, al-Hillī and his son were frequently engaged in theological discussions with other scholars. There is evidence that they took part in a lengthy debate at court on 25 Dhū al-qa'da 710/14 April 1311,\textsuperscript{137} which Uljaytū himself proposed. In the course of the debate, the value of poverty was discussed.\textsuperscript{138} The Shi'ite biographical

\textsuperscript{131} Qāshānī, 93.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 93. According to Ibn al-Fuwartī (Majma\textsuperscript{c}, 4/3:318-9), Fakhr al-Muharrīnīqīn stayed at court only from 710/1310-1 onwards.
\textsuperscript{133} Qāshānī, 92.
\textsuperscript{135} Qāshānī, 52ff.
accounts of al-Hillī portray his superiority in this kind of
debate over his Sunnite opponents and especially over Nizām
al-Dīn Ābd al-Malik.\textsuperscript{139}

During his stay at court, al-Hillī dedicated his
Risāla al-sa’dīyya to the minister Sa’īd al-Dīn who was an
enemy of Rashīd al-Dīn. This is surprising since al-Hillī was
on general on good term with Rashīd al-Dīn. The quarrels
between the latter and Sa’īd al-Dīn had apparently started in
710/1310-1.\textsuperscript{140} On 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312 Sa’īd al-Dīn
was executed for embezzlement.\textsuperscript{141} On 2 Dhū al-Hijja 711/10
April 1312, Taj al-Dīn al-Awji, his two sons and some other
men were executed because of their close relations with Sa’īd
al-Dīn.\textsuperscript{142} However, al-Hillī's relations with Rashīd al-Dīn do
not seem to have deteriorated. In a list of proposed
recipients of presents from Rashīd al-Dīn written in
712/1312-3, al-Hillī is shown as due to receive a
riding-horse with a saddle, a shoulder-belt and 2000 dīnār.\textsuperscript{143}

Rashīd al-Dīn's competence as a scholar and his desire
to exchange views with other scholars are evident in several
of his works where he collected his correspondence with the
representatives of various disciplines.\textsuperscript{144} Al-Hillī's name

\textsuperscript{139}Al-Shushtari, 1:571-2; also Hāfiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on
p.103); however, Nizām al-Dīn's performance cannot have been
entirely unsatisfactory since he held his position as Qādī
al-qudat until his death in 716/1316 (see supra, p.24).
Moreover, Qāshānī reports that Uljaiytū continued to
appreciate his presentations after his conversion (Qāshānī,
101).

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid., 109ff; see also al-Cazzawī, 1:418; Chiyāth al-Dīn
Khwāndamīr, "Dastūr al-wuzarā‘," (translated by Harbī Amīn
Sulaymān, in al-Mu‘arrikh al-‘Irānī al-kabīr Chiyāth al-Dīn
Khwāndamīr, by Harbī Amīn Sulaymān. Cairo: al-Hay‘a
al-misriyya al-Camma li-l-kitāb, 1980), 373ff; Hāfiz al-Abrū,
97ff.

\textsuperscript{141}Qāshānī, 114; Spuler, 94; Hāfiz al-Abrū, 98.

\textsuperscript{142}Qāshānī, 116.

\textsuperscript{143}Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn, Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī (edited by Muhammad
Shafī‘. Lahore, 1364/1945), 61 (no.15); the dating of this
letter in 712 was proposed by J.Van Ess
("Biobibliographische Notizen zur islamischen Theologie," Die

\textsuperscript{144}For these works, see van Ess, Wesir; in the introduction to
his Kitāb bayān al-haqā‘īq, Rashīd al-Dīn stresses his own
quality as a scholar and claims that he often defeated other
scholars in discussions; see van Ess, Wesir, 39. Evidence for
occurs several times in the lists of scholars with whom he held discussions, or exchanged letters. On one occasion, al-Hillī himself addressed Rashīd al-Dīn with two questions. First, he requested him to explain the apparent contradiction between a statement of the prophet in Qur'an XX:114 and a tradition from the Imam ʿAlī. Secondly, he asked how the contradictions between Qur'an XV:92 and XXXVII:24 on the one hand and Qur'an LV:39 on the other in regard to man's responsibility for his sins might be resolved. The fact that al-Hillī, a scholar with a high reputation, posed questions to Rashīd al-Dīn, a Jewish convert to Islam, and recorded them together with the answers, indicates his eagerness to ingratiate himself with the vizier. The latter's appreciation of al-Hillī is in turn reflected by his inclusion of him in the list of those entitled to receive presents. With the sum of 2,000 dīnār assigned to him, al-Hillī appears to have been particularly favoured by Rashīd al-Dīn, since several others received only 1,000 dīnārs, and nobody more than 2,000 dīnārs.

The relationship between Uljaytū and al-Hillī was apparently excellent. Uljaytū seems to have been most eager to acquire religious knowledge. Al-Hillī was highly regarded by him as a scholar and through him, the Ilkhan was

Rashīd al-Dīn's thorough acquaintance with philosophy can equally be found in al-Hillī's Kashf al-khafā' where he frequently mentions the vizier's views on philosophical questions.

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1. See van Ess, Wesir, 47 (C 9).
2. See ibid., 47-8.
4. See Rashīd al-Dīn, Mukātabāt, 57-69; the financial recompense which he and other scholars received for their services was apparently generous; see Shihāb al-Dīn Abū ʿl-Fadl Ahmad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAsqalānī b. Hajar, al-Durar al-kāminā fī aʿyān al-miʿār al-thāmīna (edited by Muhammad Sayyid Jāʾd al-Haqq, Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-ḥāditha, 1966-7), 2:158 (no.1618); Ibn Hajar then goes on to say polemically that al-Hillī was pious.
introduced to Shi'i theological dogmatics. For this purpose, he frequently held conversations with al-Hillī. Moreover, he appointed al-Hillī as a teacher in the mobile school, the madrasa sayyāra, a position which was apparently reserved for scholars with a very close relationship with the Ilkhan. This school was apparently founded at the suggestion of Rashīd al-Dīn for the purpose of accompanying the Ilkhan wherever he went. Other scholars who were probably not so close to him were appointed to teaching positions in the numerous schools founded by him in Sultānīyya. There is also evidence that al-Hillī used to accompany the Ilkhan on his journeys independently of the school. On several occasions, the Ilkhan addressed a specific question to al-Hillī about which the latter then wrote a treatise for him. This was the case concerning the question of the abrogation of religious law, the merit of the veneration of tombs and a question related to the Imamate. During his stay at Uljaytü's court he also wrote several polemical works which he dedicated to the Ilkhan. These were his Nahj

151 Qāshānī, 93.
152 Ibid., 93.
153 Al-Khwānsārī, 2:281. Apart from his the other teachers were Nizām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik al-Maḥāḏī (d. 716/1316), Nur al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Hākim al-Tustarī, Burhān al-Dīn al-Ibrī (d. 743/1343) and ʿAbd al-Dīn al-Ijī (d. 755/1355); Hāfiz al-Abru (101 n.1 (on p.104)) and al-Shushtarī (2:300) also include Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn among the teachers.
154 Hāfiz al-Abru, 104.
156 Amuli, 2:258; Qāshānī, 52.
158 Jawāb al-suʿāl ʿan ḥikmat al-naskh fī l-ḥākām al-ilāhīyya, this treatise is lost.
159 See van Ess, Wesir, 42.
160 Qāshānī, 93-6.
al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq, the Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma, the Iṣtiqṣā' al-naẓar fī l-qḍā' wa-l-qadar and the Rashf al-yaqīn fī fadā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn.

It is noteworthy that al-Ḥillī's son, Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn, also gained high esteem at court while still relatively young - in 709/1309-10 he was only 27 years old. Although it is not certain that he was also appointed a teacher in the madrasa sayyāra, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that he was occasionally asked either by him or by the Ilkhan to write a treatise on various subjects.\(^{161}\)

There is no definite information on the date of al-Ḥillī's departure from court. Ḥafīẓ al-Abrū reports that he and his son received permission to return to al-Ḥilla during the lifetime of Uljaytū.\(^{162}\)

This agrees with the reports of some historians that Uljaytū rejoined Sunnite Islam during his lifetime, mainly as a result of his failure to convert the people of Iran and Iraq to Shi'ism.\(^{163}\) Yet the Persian historians who were best acquainted with the situation at court do not confirm this and the numismatic evidence indicates that it was only Uljaytū's son, Ābū Sa'ūd, who returned to Sunnite Islam.\(^{164}\)

Abbās Zaryāb argues that following the execution of Tāj al-Dīn Awjī in 711/1312, Shi'ite influence at court declined and to some extent Uljaytū turned away from Shi'ism.\(^{165}\) This opinion cannot easily be supported by the historical evidence available. As seen above, al-Ḥillī's relations with Rashīd al-Dīn, and apparently also with Uljaytū, were good at least until 712/1312-3 and it is unlikely that al-Ḥillī's departure from the court was due to Uljaytū's declining interest in Shi'ism following the disappearance of Tāj al-Dīn Awjī's influence at court. Moreover, Mufaddal reports that in 716/1316-7 Uljaytū supported a plan, proposed by Ḥumayda b. Abī 'Numay al-Makkī (d. 720/1320) and favoured by the Shi'ites, to march to Medina and destroy the tombs of Abī

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\(^{161}\) See van Ess, Wesir, 44, 48 (C 10).
\(^{162}\) Ḥafīẓ al-Abrū, 103.
\(^{163}\) Ibn Batūta, 2:58-61.
\(^{164}\) See al-'Aẓžāwī, 1:409; Ibn Kathīr, 14:77.
\(^{165}\) Zaryāb, 466.
Bakr and Šūmar there. The plan failed because the Mongol attackers were defeated by an army of Arabs led by the Amīr Muḥammad b. ʿIsā. The Uljaytū died only shortly afterwards. The report clearly implies that Uljaytū continued to adhere to Shiʿite Islam until his death.

There is firm evidence that al-Ḥillī and his son stayed in Sultānīyya during the first half of the year 715/1315. At some time between 3 Jumādā I 715/5 August 1315 and 14 Muḥarram 716/8 April 1316 al-Ḥillī apparently left Sultānīyya for al-Ḥilla. It is not clear how long he stayed there but he must have returned for some time to Sultānīyya where he is known to have been on 26 Jumādā I 716/16 August 1316, four months before the death of Uljaytū on 27 Ramadān 716 /13 December 1316.

167 Ibn Ṭabrīzī, 9:238–9; Ibn Kathīr, 14:78.
168 On 6 Rabīʿ I or Rabīʿ II 715/10 June or July 1315, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn completed his Miṣrāj al-yaqīn fī sharḥ nāḥī al-muṣṭarshidīn in Sultānīyya; see Aḥā Buzurg, Dhāriʿa, 21:237.
169 On this date, al-Ḥillī completed a section of his Tadhkira in Sultānīyya; see Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Tadhkira al-fugahāʾ (Tehran: al-Murtadaʾiyya, 1984), 2:289; see also M. Shīrwanī, Fihrīst-i Ṯuskhāhā-yi khattī-yi Kitābkhana-yi Wazīrī (Tehran, 1350sh), 1:52–3; Fihrīst-i Ṯutub-i Kitābkhana-yi mubāraka-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Ridawī, (Mašhad, 1305sh–) 5:383.
170 On this date, al-Ḥillī completed another section of the Tadhkira in al-Ḥilla; see his Tadhkira, 1:295. See, however, M. T. Dānishpazhūh, "Nuskhahā-yi khattī-yi Kitābkhana-yi Ayāt Allāh Ridawī dar shahr-i Kāshān," Nāshriyya-yi Kitābkhana-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehran dar barā-yi nuskhahā-yi khattī 7 (Tehran, 1353sh): 33 and Fihrīst-i Ridawī, 5:382 where no place is mentioned.
171 On this date, he completed another section of his Tadhkira; see his Tadhkira, 2:451; see also Fihrīst-i Ridawī, 5:383.
4. Al-Hillî's Last Years

From various notes in the sources it is evident that al-Hillî stayed during this period mostly in al-Hilla where he was engaged in teaching. There is evidence that in 717/1317-8 Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinân, who had formerly been qa'dî in Medina\textsuperscript{172} and arrived in Iraq in 716/1316-7,\textsuperscript{173} studied with al-Hillî in the latter's home in al-Hilla.\textsuperscript{174} At this time al-Hillî had already compiled his answers to some questions posed by him. Sayyid Muhanna' records that he formulated his questions in Baghdad and then sent them to al-Hillî in al-Hilla.\textsuperscript{175} In Dhū al-Ḥijja 719/January-February 1320 al-Hillî issued an ijâza to Sayyid Muhanna' which, according to his own testimony, was written in al-Hilla.\textsuperscript{176} The same applies to al-Hillî's second ijâza to Sayyid Muhanna' which he wrote in Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320.\textsuperscript{177} Further evidence that al-Hillî lived in his home town during this period is provided by his Tadhkira, parts of which he finished in al-Hilla on 6 Rabâdân 718/1 November 1318,\textsuperscript{178} on 12 Rabî‘ I 719/3 May 1319,\textsuperscript{179} on 19 Shawwâl 719/3

\textsuperscript{172} Al-Bahrâنî, 208 n.28 (on p.209); about him, see Al-Afandî, 5:222-3; al-CAmîlî, 49:18ff (no.11077); Āghâ Buzurg, Tabâqât, 5:223-5; Ibn Hajar, 5:138 (no.4864).
\textsuperscript{173} Āghâ Buzurg, Tabâqât, 5:224; idem, Dhâri‘a, 5:238.
\textsuperscript{174} Al-Hillî, Ajwiba, 13.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibtî‘î, 13,18.
\textsuperscript{176} Al-Hillî, "Ijâza li-Muhanna' b. Sinân," 146; in the edition of this ijâza in al-Hillî's Ajwiba (117), no place is mentioned. Āghâ Buzurg (Dhâri‘a, 1:178 (no.910); Tabâqât, 5:224) reports the date as Dhū al-Ḥijja 709/May 1310 for this ijâza. This must be a mistake.
\textsuperscript{177} Al-Hillî, Ajwiba, 157; see also idem, "Ijâza ukhrâ 'li-l-Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinân," in al-Majlîsî, Bihâr, 107:149 where no place is mentioned.
\textsuperscript{179} See Loth, 2:308; Āghâ Buzurg, Dhâri‘a, 4:44.
December 1319\(^{180}\) and on 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321.\(^{181}\) On 15 Sha‘bān 723/19 August 1323 al-Ḥillī issued the great ijtā‘a to the Banū Zuḥra.\(^{182}\) Unfortunately, he does not mention the place of his writing.\(^{183}\)

According to Ibn Ḥajar, al-Ḥillī performed a pilgrimage to Mecca in the last years of his life where he is said to have met Ibn Taymiyya\(^{184}\) but this report is not confirmed by any other source.\(^{185}\) Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya is not known to have made a pilgrimage during the years in question.\(^{186}\)

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\(^{180}\) Fihrist-i Ridawī, 5:383.

\(^{181}\) Al-Ḥillī, Tadhkira, 2:661; see also M. Fādil, Fihrist-i nuskha‘ā-yi ḥattī-yi Kitabkhāna-yi Dānishkada-yi ilāhiyyat (ʿAṣṣhād, 1976-), 2:244; Āghā Buzurg, Dharī‘a, 4:43.

\(^{182}\) See also al-Bahrānī, 201 n.18 (on p.203) according to whom this ijtā‘a was dated 25 Sha‘bān/29 August.

\(^{183}\) Al-Ḥillī, "Ijtā‘a kābira," 137.

\(^{184}\) Ibn Ḥajar, 2:159; the report that al-Ḥillī met Ibn Taymiyya was later added to the margin of the Durar al-kāmina (ibid., 159 n.2).

\(^{185}\) Al-Āfandī (1:384-5) quotes the passage from the Durar al-kāmina (without the marginal note) and expresses his doubts about it.

5. Al-Hillī's Students

With his high reputation as a scholar, al-Hillī attracted a large number of students during his life. 187

The most important of them was his son, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (682/1283-771/1369) 188 who accompanied him everywhere until the father's death in 726/1325. According to the biographical reports on him he was an outstanding scholar. He wrote commentaries on a number of his father's works. In regard to al-Hillī's legal works, he wrote ʿIdāh al-fawā'id fī ḥall mushkilāt al-qawāʿid 189 and Sharḥ khutbat al-qawāʿid which are both commentaries on al-Hillī's Qawāʿid al-ahkām. Further, he wrote Ghāyat al-suʿāl 190 a commentary on his father's Tahdīb al-wusūl on legal methodology. Of the latter's theological works, he commented on the Nahj al-mustashshidīn. 191 He also wrote a number of independent works on theology such as the Kāfiya fī l-kalām. 192 From Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn's different ijāzas it appears that he started teaching together with his father and eventually took over a number of the latter's students after his father's death. 193 Some of his ijāzas are dated between 701/1301-2 and 706/1306-7. This shows that he was recognized as an outstanding scholar while still relatively young.

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187 See infra, pp. 93-5, for a list of the ijāzat which he had issued to his different students.
188 About him, see al-Bahrānī, 190-4 (no. 73); al-Khwānsāri, 6:330ff; al-Afandi, 5:77ff; al-Kahhala, 9:228; al-Cāmilī, 44:32 (no. 9806); Brockelmann, GAL, 2:212; GALs, 2:209.
189 See Brockelmann, GALs, 2:207.
190 See Aghā Buzurg, Dhāriʿa, 13:169.
191 Ibid., 14:163.
192 Ibid., 17:250; see also Modarresi, 76, 103, 119, 152, 163 for his legal works.
193 See later.
Two further important students of al-Hillî were his nephews ʿAmīd al-Dīn (681/1282-3 - 754/1353) and Ḥiyâ' al-Dīn al-Aṣraji Ḥusaynî (683/1284-5 - after 740/1339-40). Both also appear sometimes in the ijāza of various scholars as teachers besides al-Hillî and Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqîn. This suggests that they, too, took over some of al-Hillî's students after the latter's death. Since both were born around the same time as Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqîn, it may be assumed that all three began their studies with al-Hillî at about the same time. However, while there is clear evidence that Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqîn accompanied al-Hillî to the court of Uljaytû and on the trips of the madrasa sayyara, no such evidence is available regarding ʿAmīd al-Dīn and Ḥiyâ' al-Dīn. Yet the possibility that they also attended this school should not be ruled out. Like Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqîn, the two brothers wrote commentaries on several of al-Hillî's works. ʿAmīd al-Dīn commented on al-Hillî's Tahdhib al-wuṣūl and on the Qawāʿid al-akhkām. Of al-Hillî's theological works, he wrote commentaries on the Nahj al-mustarshidîn and the Anwār al-malakūt. Ḥiyâ' al-Dīn wrote a commentary on the Tahdhib al-wuṣūl, and another one on the Nahj al-mustarshidîn which he completed in 703/1303-4. Moreover, he commented on the Tasālik al-nafs. The commentaries of the brothers on al-Hillî's Tahdhib al-wuṣūl were especially important. These two works were vital for the development of Shiʿite legal methodology. In

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194 About him, see al-Khwānsârî, 4:264-8 (no.394); Ibn Fuwâṭî, Muṣjam, 2:925-6.
195 See later.
196 See Ḫəghâ Buzurg, Dhāriʿa, 13:168.
197 Kitāb ʿīr kanz al-fawāʿid fī ḥall mushkilât al-qawāʿid, see ibid., 18:162.
198 Tābṣirat al-ʿalîbīn fī sharḥ nahj al-mustarshidîn, see ibid., 3:318.
199 See ibid., 13:115.
200 Munyat al-lahib, see ibid., 13:168.
201 Tādhkīrāt al-wāṣilîn fī nahj al-mustarshidîn, see ibid., 4:31.
202 ʿIdāh al-labṣ fī sharḥ tasālik al-nafs, see ibid., 2:498.
his Jāni al-bayn, the Shahīd al-awwal Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Makkī (d. 786/1384) joined these two commentaries together with some additional useful notes by himself. 203

Al-Ḥillī's ijāzās indicate that the circle of his students in al-Hilla was already large by the time he left for the court of Uljaytu.

Among these students was Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Futūḥ b. ČAlī b. Āwī 204 who received an ijāza from al-Ḥillī in 705/1305-6. 205 Evidence exists that he studied in 703/1304 with al-Ḥillī 206 and was also a student at the madrasa sayyāra. 207 He studied also with Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn who issued to him two ijāzas in 705/1305-6. 208 Sharaf al-Dīn Husayn b. Muḥammad b. ČAlī al-ČAlawi al-Husaynī al-Ṭūsī 209 received his ijāza in Muḥarram 704/August-September 1304 for al-Ḥillī's Irshād al-adḥhān. 210 ČAlī b. Ismā ġil b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ al-Gharawī 211 was given an ijāza by al-Ḥillī on 12 Jabal 701/13 March 1302 for the latter's Irshād al-adḥhān 212 and by Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn in 705/1305-6. 213 In Rajab 705/January-February 1306 al-Ḥillī issued an ijāza to Rashīd al-Dīn ČAlī b. Muḥammad Rashīd al-Āwī 214 who studied the Risālat al-Ḥisāb of Naṣīr al-Dīn

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203 See ibid., 23:207-8; also Modarressi, 8.
204 See about him Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:5.
205 See Āghā Buzurg, Darī ġa, 1:176 (no. 898); also al-ČAmīlī, 7:274.
206 He completed on 21 Ramadān 703/29 April 1304 a copy of al-Ḥillī's Mabādī' al-wusūl and received an Ijāza for this work from al-Ḥillī; see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:5.
207 On 20 Jabal 717/29 September 1317 he completed in Sultānīyya a copy of Mitham al-Bahrānī's Qawāqīd al-maraq; see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:5.
208 See Āghā Buzurg, Darī ġa, 1:234-5 (no.1232); idem, Tabaqāt, 5:5. The two ijāzas were issued for al-Ḥillī's Mabādī' al-wusūl ilā ġīlm al-usūl and his Nahj al-mustashridīn. For the quotations of the two ijāzāt, see Ġ. Ġa. Mahfūz, "Nafā'is al-Makhtūtāt al-afürbiyya fi Irān," Majallat Maχhad al-Makhtūtāt al-afürbiyya 3 (1957):19-20.
210 See Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:58 for the quotation of this ijāza; see also idem, Darī ġa, 1:177 (no.903).
211 Zayn al-Dīn ČAlī b. Ismā ġil b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ; about him, see Āghā Buzurg, Tabaqāt, 5:134.
212 See Āghā Buzurg, Darī ġa, 1:177 (no.904).
213 See ibid., 1:235 (no.1233).
214 See al-Čafandī, 4:205; Āghā Buzurg, Darī ġa, 1:177 (no.905).
al-Ṭūsī with al-Ḥillī.\textsuperscript{215} Al-Afandī holds that this student is not to be identified with the minister Rashīd al-Dīn.\textsuperscript{216} Āghā Buzurg, however, seems to identify him with the vizier.\textsuperscript{217} Since it is known that al-Ḥillī had discussions and corresponded frequently with Rashīd al-Dīn it would be possible that he gave the latter an \textit{ijāza}. However, the date seems to preclude this. Al-Ḥillī arrived at the court only in 709/1309, and it is extremely unlikely that Rashīd al-Dīn could have left the court for a while in order to study with al-Ḥillī. Another student of his at this time appears to have been Rukan al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī al-Gharawī, author of a commentary on al-Ḥillī's \textit{Mabādī` al-wusūl} which he completed on 19 Shawwāl 697/30 July 1298.\textsuperscript{218} Diyā' al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Ḥārūn al-Tabrisī\textsuperscript{219} received his \textit{ijāza} for al-Ḥillī's \textit{Qawā`id al-ahlākām} on 17 Rajab 701/18 March 1302.\textsuperscript{220} In 707/1307-8, al-Ḥillī issued an \textit{ijāza} for his \textit{Qawā`id al-ahlākām} to Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Hargali.\textsuperscript{221} The latter had also studied with the Muḥaqiq al-awwal.\textsuperscript{222} ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Yahyā al-Astarābādī\textsuperscript{223} received al-Ḥillī's \textit{ijāza} on 28 Ṣafar 708/17 August 1308.\textsuperscript{224} The students to whom an \textit{ijāza} was issued between the years 709/1309 and 714/1314-5 are probably those who attended al-Ḥillī's lessons at the madrasa sayyāra. Among them were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215} Al-Afandī, 4:205.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 4:205.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Āghā Buzurg, \textit{Tabaqāt}, 5:147.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Ghāyat al-bādī fi sharh al-mabādi'; see Āghā Buzurg, Dharīca, 16:10. About Rukan al-Dīn; see al-Qāmilī, 46:29 (no.2447).
\item \textsuperscript{220} Āghā Buzurg, \textit{Tabaqāt}, 5:42; idem, Dharīca, 1:178 (no.912); also al-Khwānsārī, 2:264-5.
\item \textsuperscript{221} See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīca, 1:177 (no.906). See about him, idem, \textit{Tabaqāt}, 5:179-80; also al-Hurr al-Qāmilī, 2:245 (no.721); he reports that al-Hargali also studied al-Ḥillī's \textit{Mukhtalaf al-shī'a} with the author.
\item \textsuperscript{222} See Āghā Buzurg, \textit{Tabaqāt}, 5:179-80; the Muḥaqiq al-awwal gave him an \textit{ijāza} for his \textit{Sharā'ī} in 671/1272-3; see ibid.; idem, Dharīca, 1:164.
\item \textsuperscript{223} See about him Āghā Buzurg, \textit{Tabaqāt}, 5:54-5.
\item \textsuperscript{224} See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīca, 1:177 (no.902).
\end{itemize}
Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-ʿAmuli 225 who received his ijāza in 709/1309-10.226 Apparently, he was already studying in 706/1307 in al-Ḥilla, since Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn issued an ijāza to him on 12 Ramaḍān 706/1307 March 1307.227 Among these students was also Sirāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Bahāʿ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī al-Majd al-Sirābshānawī (ijāza dated Jumādā I 715/August-September 1315)228 and Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-ʿQādī ʿAbd al-Waḥīd al-Rāzī 229 (ijāza dated Rabīʾ II 709/September-Oktober 1309).230 The latter received his ijāza in Sultānīyya.231

One of al-Ḥilla's outstanding students, whom he taught most likely also at the madrasa sayyāra, was Qūṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad (or: Maḥmūd) b. Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Būwayhī (d. 766/1365)232 who received his ijāza on 3 Shābān 713/23 November 1313 in the region of Warāmīn.233 He is famous especially for his works on logic, such as his commentary on the Risāla al-shamsīyya of al-Kātibī, and on philosophy. He evidently was a scholar of some repute even at this time since he was included in Rashīd al-Dīn's list of scholars entitled to receive gifts.234

A number of al-Ḥilla's students appear to have joined him after he returned from the court of Uljaytū or may have returned with him from there. Among the former was probably Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ʿYār who received his ijāza in Jumādā...
II 724/May-June 1324 for al-Hillî's Tahrir al-aḥkām and Sayyid Muḥanna b. Sinān. Another student of al-Hillî was Tāj al-Dīn b. al-Muʿayyāya (d. 776/1374) according to the latter's testimony in an ijāza which he issued to one of his students. He reports there having studied also under the guidance of Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn and the brothers ʿAmīd al-Dīn and Diyar al-Dīn al-ʿArājī. Ibn al-Muʿayyāya became a renowned scholar who wrote a large number of works in various fields such as tradition, law and history.

According to the Shahīd al-aʿwall two more scholars studied with al-Hillî. These were Raḍī al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ṭurād al-Maṭārābādī (d. 762/1360-1), a scholar who taught later in al-Hilla, and Jamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Mazyādī (d. 757/1356) whose primary competence was in law.

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235 See Aḡā Buzurg, Dharihā, 1:178 (no. 909); idem, Tabaqāt, 5:212.
236 About him, see supra, p. 33.
239 Ibid., 174-5; see also al-Khwānsārī, 6:326.
240 See al-Khwānsārī, 6:325 for a list of his works.
241 See ibid., 7:5.
242 About him, see al-Bāhrānī, 190 n. 1.
243 See ibid.
244 About him, see al-Afandī, 3:369; al-Khwānsārī, 4:345 ff (no. 409); al-Bāhrānī, 190 n. 2.
CHAPTER II
WORKS OF AL-HILLĪ

1. General Introduction

The principal sources for our knowledge of al-Hillī's works derive from the author himself. In his biographical work Khulāṣat al-aqwāl, he offers an article on himself containing a list of his works up to Rābi‘ II 693/March 1294.¹ In Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320, he issued a teaching permit to his student Muhanna b. Sinān authorizing him to teach his works and this ijāza includes a list of some of al-Hillī's books up to this date.²

Despite this fortunate circumstance there are a number of problems connected with the use of these two lists.

In regard to the KH list, it is evident that its contents cannot be as originally included in 693/1294. It contains a number of works which al-Hillī is known to have started to write much later. The most striking examples are

¹ Rījāl, 45. According to Aqīhā Buzurg (DhārīCa, 23:12), the list was dated 7 Rābi‘ II 693/7 March 1294. This list will be referred to in the following as KH. The following copies of the Khulāṣa have been consulted: (1) Rījāl al-ʿAllāma (edited by Muḥammad Bahr al-ʿUlūm. Najaf: al-Haydariyya, 1961), 45-48 = KH 1; (2) Kitāb al-rijāl (Tehran, 1311/1893-5), 23-25 = KH 2; (3) MS Bibliothèque Nationale, 384r-v = KH 3; (4) MS Los Angeles M959, 5-7 = KH 4; (5) MS Ismaʿili Institute 409, 19v-20v = KH 5; (6) MS Ismaʿili Institute 104, 14v-15r = KH 6; (7) MS Ismaʿili Institute 103, 20v-22r = KH 7; (8) MS Princeton University Library New Series 770, 17r-18r = KH 8; (9) MS Princeton University Library New Series 880, 23vff. = KH 9; (10) MS Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 9926, 25v-27r = KH 10; (11) MS Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 9927, 26r-28r = KH 11; (12) quotation in al-Khwānsārī, 2:271-3 = KH 12.

² This list will be referred to in the following as IM. The following copies have been used: (1) in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:147-149 = IM 1; (2) in al-Hillī, Ajwība (Qum: al-Khayyam, 1401H.), 155-157 = IM 2; (3) MS India Office 1797 (278v-279r) = IM 3; (4) MS Princeton University Library New Series 960 (32v-33r) = IM 4; (5) quotation in al-Afandī, 1:367ff = IM 5.
the works which he composed at the request of Uljaytū which he certainly did not begin before Rabī' II 709/August-September 1309, the earliest date when there are safe indications for al-Hillī's presence at the court. This impression, already current among medieval authors, cannot therefore be explained by his statement at the end of the list that some of the works included have not yet been completed.

Further evidence for frequent later additions to this list appears from its arrangement. At first sight, it lacks any internal order. The titles are often not placed in the appropriate sections but appear at random anywhere in the list. It is, however, possible to establish sections in the list which point to an originally logical arrangement. In addition to the presumably original sections, there are for some subjects, such as law and theology, additional sections which are completely detached from these original sections and which were most likely added later. Other titles are placed between or in the middle of inappropriate sections.

It is likely that most of the additions were made during the author's lifetime and presumably even by al-Hillī himself. As a biographic work, the Khulāṣa belonged to the curriculum which al-Hillī used to teach. Evidence for this is found in teaching permits issued by him to numerous students of this work. In the course of this teaching he presumably regularly added the titles of those works which he wrote later. Later writers added even more titles to it but many of these later additions did not become standard.

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3 See supra, p.27.
4 E.g. al-Afandī, 1:377.
5 Riḍāl, 48.
6 For the following examples, the numbers of the titles correspond to KH 1. Titles 1 - 6 are legal works, titles 7 - 9 are works on traditions, titles 11 - 14 are exegetical works, titles 17 - 25 are works on theology, titles 28 - 35, except title 32, are works on philosophy, titles 36 - 40 are works on grammar.
7 Titles 45 - 49 are legal works, titles 51 - 53 are works on theology.
8 E.g. titles 10, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58.
9 See Aghā Buzurg, Dhariṣ, 7:214-5.
10 See e.g. al-Afandī, 1:372 ff.
therefore impossible to consider the list as an indication of the date of composition of the works included; it only indicates the authenticity of the titles as works by al-Hillī.

The problems of the IM list are of a different nature. Since it appears in a teaching permit and since it was written only six years before al-Hillī's death, its content seems to have remained largely unchanged. This is supported by the fact that the list is clearly subdivided into sections whereby each title appears in its appropriate section and no section is duplicated. It can, therefore, safely be assumed that the titles included were either partly or completely written before 720/1320.

Yet the IM obviously does not include all of al-Hillī's works. Owing to its nature as a teaching permit, al-Hillī appears to have included only those works which were suitable as books for the purpose of teaching. He therefore excluded, for example, his polemic writings which he composed at the request of Uljaytū and, apparently, also works which he did not consider as important enough to be included. Thus, neither of the lists are reliable, exhaustive catalogues of al-Hillī's entire works.

This defect led later authors to add the missing titles to their own lists of al-Hillī's works and this resulted at times in erroneous attributions.  

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11See e.g. al-Afandī, 1:375ff; al-Khwānsārī, 2:273ff.
12The following works were erroneously attributed to al-Hillī by some of his biographers: Rasā'il al-dalā'il al-burhāniyya, Kitāb al-asrār fī l-imāma, and al-Kashkūl. For these see al-'Āmilī, 24:255-6. Other works falsely attributed to him were the Muqtamad (Āghā Buzurg, Dhariqa, 21:213-4) and the Majāmī al-akhbār (ibid., 5:37, 19:374). Al-Khwānsārī further attributed to him a work entitled Ḥāshiyyat talkhīṣ al-nārām. Al-Afandī (1:379-80) rejected the existence of such a work, suggesting that this Ĥāshiya consisted simply of a small number of marginal notes by al-Hillī on his Talkhīṣ. See also Āghā Buzurg, Dhariqa, 6:47. Another work usually attributed to al-Hillī is entitled al-Huqaj al-qawiyya fī ithbāt al-wasiyya (edited by Muhammad Ḥādī al-Āninī. Najaf: Dār al-kutub al-tijāriyya, n.d.). Āghā Buzurg has shown (Dhariqa, 6:265, no.1449) that this work cannot possibly have been written by al-Hillī.
Another more reliable source for establishing a complete list of his works is internal evidence which points to their authenticity.

The following discussion of al-Ḥillī’s works is divided into two parts. First, each subject on which he composed works will be discussed separately; here, the main aim is to establish the chronological order of the works which belong to it and to determine the relative importance and the specific characteristic of each work.

In the appendix, a systematic alphabetical list of his writings will be given. The titles are arranged according to the Arabic alphabet. An attempt has been made to give the exact titles as used by al-Ḥillī himself. If different titles occur preference has been given to the one given in the works themselves. In regard to lost works whose titles differ in various copies of the KH list and the IM list, no reasonable preference could be exercised. Variants of titles will be mentioned. The information in this list consists first of the title of the work together with an indication of where the work has first been mentioned. IM, KH, or KH/IM shows that the work is included always in the indicated list. KH* indicates that only some copies include the title and that it is definitely known that the title has been added to the list at a very late stage. KH** indicates that none of the consulted copies of the KH include this title, but that Āghā Buzurg reports that there are some copies of the KH list which do include this title. These additions are usually very late and must almost certainly be considered erroneous. IM* indicates that not all copies of the IM list include this title. This is usually because of a fault of the copyist and as such without serious implications for its authenticity. IE signifies that the work in question is authentic on the basis of internal evidence, even though it is not to be found in either of the lists. DH signifies that Āghā Buzurg attributes this title in his Dharī' to al-Ḥillī without any further information why he does so. DH* signifies that the work in question was attributed to al-Ḥillī by later authors.
References are given in the appropriate section in the Dhāriʿā. Rū signifies that al-ʿAfandī attributes this work in his Riyāḍ al-ʿulamāʾ to al-Ḥillī while it is not listed in the Dhāriʿā.

The list furthermore includes a reference to ʿAghā Buzurg's Dhāriʿā which contains additional valuable information about the work and especially locations of manuscripts mostly in private libraries in Iran and Iraq. Since the Dhāriʿā is accessible, the information given there will not be included in the present list. As far as it could be established in the first part, the dates of composition will also be indicated.

The most important editions of published works will be listed¹³ and the locations of manuscripts of extant works will also be given. Since most of the consulted manuscript catalogues are available in print, neither the date of the

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copies nor whether they are complete will be indicated. Although an attempt was made to consult the catalogues of all the relevant manuscript collections, the information given cannot be considered exhaustive. For the theological works, a list of the important commentaries in Arabic will be offered. Translations into European languages will likewise be noted.

Al-Hillî's first work on theology was his *Manâhij al-yaqîn fî ʿusûl al-dîn*. This is known from the introduction to his *Kitâb ghâyat al-wusûl*, where he states that *Manâhij al-yaqîn* and *Asrâr al-khafiyya* were his first works on theology and philosophy. The *Manâhij* were completed on 6 Rabî‘ II 680/25 July 1281. The work was highly regarded by al-Hillî himself and it must be considered as second in importance, just after his most extensive work on theology, the *Nihâyat al-marâm fî Cîlm al-kalâm*. Evidence for this is that he not only refers to the *Manâhij* in his other theological and philosophical writings before he started writing the *Nihâyat al-marâm*, but even in his later works he often refers both to the *Nihâyat* and the *Manâhij*. Moreover, al-Fâdíl al-Miqdâd al-Suyûtî (d. 826/1423) who wrote commentaries on a number of al-Hillî's theological works used the *Manâhij* as one of his principal sources.

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Another early work is his very brief treatise Nuzum al-barâhîn and the commentary on it, entitled Maârîj al-fahm fî sharh al-nuzum. According to one manuscript copy, this commentary was completed on 6 Ramadân 678/10 January 1280. Since it has safely been established that the Manâhij was his first work on theology, it is likely that he started writing the Nuzum and the Maârîj and completed them before he had finished the Manâhij. That the Manâhij and the Maârîj were written more or less simultaneously is further indicated by cross references in both works. In his introduction, he states that he wrote the Maârîj in order to elucidate the meanings of the Nuzum which is, owing to its concise style, difficult to understand. His method of expressing his ideas in the Maârîj is therefore often more original than in his Manâhij where he frequently bases his discussions directly on earlier works, such as Ibn al-Malâhîmi’s Fâ‘iq. Yet except for very few exceptions his views do not differ in the Maârîj from those in the Manâhij.

In Jumâdâ II 684/August-September 1285 he completed the Anwâr al-malakût fî sharh al-yâqût. This is a commentary on the Kitâb al-yâqût which was written by the otherwise unidentified Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm b. al-Nawbakhtî. Since al-Hillî states in the introduction that he started to

Qum: Matba‘at Sayyid al-shuhadâ‘, 1405H.), 52. He wrote commentaries on al-Hillî’s Bâb al-hâdi Cashar and his Nahî al-mustashhidîn both of which have been edited repeatedly.

20 Rawdâtî, 194-5.
21 Manâhij, 87r; Maârîj, 110v, 115v, 118r.
22 Maârîj, 106r.
23 Anwâr, 230.
24 Iqâbî (168ff) argued that this work was composed by a descendant of the Banû Nawbakht and that is was written in the first half of the 4th century. Muhammad Khân Qâzînî suggested orally to P.Kraus that it may have been compiled "not long before the commentary of al-Hillî" (P.Kraus, "Raziana I," Orientalia 4 (1935):306 n.6). W.Madelung finally showed that the Kitâb al-yâqût does not correspond to the theological doctrine of the Banû Nawbakht ("Imâmism," 15 n.1). He suggests that the work was written at the earliest in the 5th century or even later (ibid., 15). As a possible author he suggests (ibid., 15 n.1) a certain Ibrâhîm Nawbakhtî whom ‘Abd al-Jalîl al-Râzî mentions in his Kitâb al-na‘qî (written about 565/1170).
compose this commentary after having already written a number of works on theology,\textsuperscript{25} it is likely that he started it after 680/1281.

On 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288, he completed the first section of his Muntahā al-wuṣūl fi ḡilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl which deals with theology.\textsuperscript{26} The next section deals with legal methodology. This work, which is comparable in length with the Manāḥij,\textsuperscript{27} is written in a much more concise style than the latter. Al-Ḥillī does not seem to have considered it as important as the Manāḥij since he refers to it only rarely in later works.\textsuperscript{28} Moreover, in contrast to the Manāḥij, no commentary has been written upon it by later scholars.

Probably after having written at least some of the works mentioned above, al-Ḥillī started to write his famous commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd al-iḍtiqād, the Kāshf al-murād fi sharḥ tajrīd al-iḍtiqād; in the introduction he states that he began composing this commentary after having already written a number of theological works.\textsuperscript{29} Since, however, he does not mention there his largest work, the Nihāyat al-marām fi ḡilm al-kalām, it seems most likely that he started to compose the Kāshf al-murād before beginning the latter work. This is supported by the fact that he does not refer to the Nihāya throughout the first half of the Kāshf al-murād but only to the Manāḥij\textsuperscript{30} and the Aṣrār.\textsuperscript{31} Since he refers to it, however, in the second half of the Kāshf al-murād,\textsuperscript{32} he apparently started to work on the Nihāya before having finished with the Kāshf al-murād. He completed the Kāshf on either 15 or 16 Rabī' I 696/11 or 12

\textsuperscript{25} Anwār, I.
\textsuperscript{26} Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutakhar al-Ḥillī, Muntahā al-wuṣūl fi ḡilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl (MS British Museum OR 8326), 134v.
\textsuperscript{27} See e.g. Nahj al-mustashfīdīn, 438 where al-Ḥillī recommends both as medium-sized works on theology.
\textsuperscript{28} E.g. Nahj al-mustashfīdīn, 438.
\textsuperscript{29} Kāshf al-murād, 4.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 126.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 36, 151, 209.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 259, 281, 284.
January 1297. The treatise belongs to the most widely read of al-Hilli's works. Its special importance lies in its being the first commentary written on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād thus serving as a basis for the understanding of that work for numerous later commentators.

In the light of the evidence of the Kashf al-murād, al-Hilli evidently started to write his major theological work, the Nihāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām, before having completed the Kashf al-murād. When he composed his Nahj al-mustarshidīn, which was completed in 699/1299, large parts of the Nihāya must have already been written since he frequently refers to the work. From this work onwards, references to the Nihāya are usually given. Al-Hilli presumably completed the Nihāya at a very late stage. In his IM list written in 720/1320 he states that at that time four volumes of the work had been completed. It is unknown how much these four volumes covered of the whole Nihāya as it was planned originally, and how much more he completed during the rest of his life. None of the extant manuscript portions of the work seem to be a complete copy.

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33 According to Aghā Buzurg (Dhariʿa, 18:60) it was completed on 15 Rabiʿ I 696/11 January 1297; see also A. Husayni, Fihrīst-i nuskahā-ye khaṭṭī-yi kitābkhāna-yi Īmāmī-yi Marāghe (Qum, 1395H.-.), 2:324. According to MS India Office Loth 471/14, the Kashf was completed on 16 Rabiʿ I/12 January (1297) (Loth, 1:128). MS Chester Beatty 4279 is dated 16 Rabiʿ I 690/12 January 1297. (Arberry, 5:87). Since the evidence that the work was completed in 696 is quite strong, this date is most likely an error of the copyist.

34 The commentator Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿl-Thanā al-Isfahānī (d. 749/1348), for instance, pointed out that if it were not for al-Hilli's commentary, it would be impossible to understand the Tajrīd (see Aghā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 18:60; for a list of the various commentaries on the Tajrīd, see ibid., 3:352ff).

35 Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 123, 190, 202, 203, 216, 244, 371, 386, 393, and 438 where he recommends his Nihāyat al-marām to the reader as his most extensive work on theology.

36 Hasan b. Yusuf b. al-Muthahhar al-Hilli, Tāslīk al-nafs ilā hazīrat al-quds (MS British Museum OR 10971), 12r, 44v, 75r; "Kashf al-fawā'id," 2, 5, 21, 37, 43, 82; Ajwība, 22.

37 Aghā Buzurg, Dhariʿa, 24:407 (no. 2153); see also Rawdātī, 37, for MS Haydariyya 628. Not having seen the appropriate catalogue, I am indebted to Professor Modarresi for his information that the MS Majlis 10192 contains only the first
Moreover, some of the references to the Nihāya are suspect. This applies to those in the Kashf al-murād where it is highly unlikely that he had already reached the corresponding sections in the Nihāya. He similarly refers to the Nihāya in the works which were completed after the Kashf to the Nihāya in regard to subjects which were usually discussed by him at the end of the theological works. In most of these instances it is unlikely that at that stage he had advanced so far in the writing of the Nihāya. It may therefore be assumed that most of these references were inserted with the intention of dealing with these points in greater detail in his Nihāya. On the basis of this evidence, the possibility that the Nihāya was never completed cannot be ruled out.

The Nihāya had only a very limited circulation. Only four incomplete manuscripts apparently exist today. Even al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī who wrote commentaries upon some of al-Hillī's theological works mentions that he did not have a chance to consult the Nihāya.

At the request of his son, al-Hillī wrote the Nahj al-mustashridin which he completed on 22 Rabi' I 699/17 December 1299. This work is written in a very concise style. Among later scholars, it became highly popular as is evident from the numerous commentaries which were written upon it. On 3 Dhū al-Hijja 703/7 July 1304, he completed the Kitāb kashf al-fawā'id fī sharḥ qawā'id al-Caqā'id, a commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's Qawā'id al-Caqā'id and on 12 Muharram 704/15 August 1304 he finished the medium-sized work Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥāzīrat al-quds. Again, both works were compiled at the request of his son. All the works mentioned are included in the KH and the IM.

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part of the work. MS Mar Cashī 254 also breaks in the middle of the discussion on accidents.

39 E.g. Nahj al-mustashridin, 386 (referring to the question of what is man); Ajwība, 22 (referring to the issue of belief and muwafāt).

40 Al-Miqdād, 395.

41 Nahj al-mustashridin, 9.

42 Kāshgā Buzurg, Dhari'ca, 24:424 (no.2222).

43 Ibid., 18:51-2 (no.635).

44 Taslīk, 82r.

45 "Kashf al-fawā'id," 2; Taslīk, 3v.
As was characteristic of the theological works of this period which were heavily influenced by the philosophical tradition, al-Ḥillī started off most of his systematic theological works with a chapter on metaphysics. An exception is his Maṣārij which begins with a chapter on man's obligation to reason towards the knowledge of God. This agrees with the traditional pattern of theological works.

None of the works which al-Ḥillī composed after Rabī' II 709/August-September 1309 on the request of Uljaytū are included in either of the two original lists. Although some copies of the KH contain the titles of the most important works of this period, they were obviously added by later writers and they regularly appear at the end of the list in these copies. The reason for not including them in the IM was apparently that most of these works were concerned mainly with polemics and as such, they were not suitable for teaching. Thus it would have been inappropriate to include them in a teaching permit.

Owing to their polemic character, the works of this period are of little significance for the investigation of al-Ḥillī's theological views. To this group of works belong the Minhāj al-kārāma fī l-imāma which defends the Shi'ite positions on the Imamate and the Istiqṣā' al-nazār fī l-qadā' wa-l-qadar in which al-Ḥillī defends the

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46 According to Ibn Khaldūn (3:1112), this new pattern was first introduced by al-Rāzī in his Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya. For this pattern of theological works among later theologians, see also see L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane (Études de philosophie médiévale, no. 37. Paris: Vrin, 1948), 160ff.
47 The titles Nahj al-hagg wa-kashf al-siqā, Minhāj al-kārāma fī l-imāma, and Istiqṣā' al-nazār fī l-qadā' wa-l-qadar are listed in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9, KH 11, and KH 12. They do not appear in KH 5, KH 6, KH 7 and KH 10.
Mu'tazilite view of man's free choice in his acts against the determinists. In the Kitāb nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq, al-Ḥillī polemically deals with the views of the Ashʿarites. The polemical character of these works provoked Sunnite authors to compose refutations of them. The refutations of the Nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq and the Istiqṣāʿ al-naẓar fī l-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar in turn provoked later Shiʿite authors to write counter-refutations.\footnote{See appendix no. 120 & 26.}

Al-Ḥillī, moreover, wrote a number of smaller treatises on specific theological questions at the request of the Uljaytū. To these belongs a treatise which deals with the problem of abrogation of the divine laws.\footnote{Jawāb suʿāl ʿan hikmat al-naskh fī 1-ḥākām al-ilāhiyya.} According to Rashīd al-Dīn, al-Ḥillī formulated an answer at the request of the Ilkhan concerning the purpose of visiting the tombs of saints.\footnote{See van Ess, Wesir, 42.} It is not known whether he did so in writing or orally. Since the earliest definitely known date of his presence at court is Rabīʿ II 709/August-September 1309,\footnote{See supra, p. 27.} it is certain that he did not start or plan to start writing any of these works before then.\footnote{H. A. Mahfūz records ("Nafāʾis al-makhtūtāt al-ʿArabiyya fī ‛Trān," Majallat Maḥfūz al-Makhtūtāt al-ʿArabiyya 3 (1957):52) a MS copy of the Nahj al-ḥagg which is dated 704/1304–5. This clearly must be an error.}

Another work which is listed in only some copies of the KH and which does not appear in the IM list is the Risāla al-saʿdiyya dedicated to the minister Saʿd al-Dīn. This treatise was written between Rabīʿ II 709/August-September 1309 and 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312.\footnote{On this date, Saʿd al-Dīn was executed; see Qāshānī, 114.} The very concise Risāla fī wājib al-ʾiṭtiqād is also one of al-Ḥillī's later treatises. This title is not included in the IM and was added later to some copies of the KH.\footnote{The title is included in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9; KH 12.} Its authenticity as a work by al-Ḥillī is known since he mentions it in his Ajwībat al-masāʾil al-muḥannaʾiyya.\footnote{See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīʿa, 25:4.} 

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Some copies of the KH list include another title of al-Hillî, the Kitāb al-alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-sidq wa-l-mayn. The aim of this work is to prove the Shi'ite doctrine of the Imamate. In the introduction, al-Hillî states that he started to compose it at the request of his son. He completed the draft (taswīd) of the first section on 20 Rabi' I 709/28 August 1309 and the draft of the whole work in Ramadān 712/December 1312-January 1313. Yet there are clear indications that al-Hillî's contribution to this book must have been very limited. His son Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn appears to have written most of it although he claims at the end of the first and the second section merely to have made a fair copy (tabyīd) of his father's draft. In the first section of the book, Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn says that on 11 Jumādā II 726/15 May 1326 (several months after the death of his father) while editing the book he encountered a problem which perplexed him. Subsequently, his father appeared to him in a dream and clarified the point in question. This instance clearly indicates that Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn did not work on a final version which he had received from his father. It is therefore questionable whether al-Hillî made any major contribution to the work at all. Another indication that his son wrote most of the work is the considerable distance in time between the date on which al-Hillî is said to have completed the draft and the date on which Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn completed the fair copy of it; this amounts in the first section to 17 years and in the second section to 42 years.

Both lists include the titles of works which are lost and it is therefore impossible to establish the date of their composition. To these belong the Kitāb muṣtaqad al-wāṣilīn or

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57 The title is included in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9, KH 11; KH 12.
58 Alfayn, 11.
59 Ibid., 138.
60 Ibid., 445.
61 Ibid., 125ff.
62 Ibid., 138.
63 Ibid., 445.

Among al-Ḥillī's last works on theology is the short treatise al-Bāb al-ḥādī Cashar fīma yajibu ġalā ġammat al-mukallafīn min maCrifat usūl al-dīn which he added as the eleventh chapter to his Minhāj al-ṣalāh fī ikhtisār al-miṣbāh. This work was completed on 11 Dhū al-Ḥijja 723/11 December 1323.64 The Bāb al-ḥādī Cashar which was written, as the title indicates, for the general reader rather than for students of theology, is clearly the most popular among his theological works to this day. The large number of extant manuscripts as well as the numerous commentaries written upon it bear witness to this.65 Together with its most famous commentary by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), it has been edited frequently and translations of the two works in Persian and English are currently available.66

A number of titles were attributed to al-Ḥillī by later writers but these works are apparently lost. The authenticity of the attribution of these works to him can therefore neither be affirmed nor denied. Those works are Risāla fī buṭlān al-jabr,67 Risāla fī taḥqīq maCnā al-īmān,68 and Risāla fī khalq al-aCmāl.69

Furthermore, Aḡā Buzurg attributes al-Khūlāṣa fī usūl al-dīn and al-Muqaddima fī l-kalām to al-Ḥillī.70 While he does not indicate his reference in regard to the Muqaddima, he attributes the Khūlāṣa to him on the basis of a manuscript copy in the Maktabat al-Khwānsārī.71

64 See Rāwḍātī, 103.
65 See appendix no.36.
67 Al-Afandī, 1:375.
68 Ibid., 1:379; also Khwānsārī, 2:275.
69 Al-Afandī, 1:375.
70 Aḡā Buzurg, DarīĆa, 22:89 (no.6205)
71 Ibid., 7:208-9 (no.1024). There exist numerous copies of an anonymous text which may possibly be the Khulāṣa by
Al-Hillī's first philosophical work was his *Kitāb al-asrār al-khafiyya*,72 which he dedicated to the minister Hārūn b. Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī73 who died in 685/1286. Thus he must have written it before that date and there are safe indications that he began to write it, or even completed it, long before. In his *Manāhij*, he frequently refers to the *Asrār*,74 it is therefore likely that at least considerable parts of the *Asrār* were written before 6 Rabi‘I 680/25 July 1281, when he completed the *Manāhij*. This is confirmed by his concluding remarks in the *Qawā'id al-jaliyya*,75 a work on logic completed in Rabī‘ II 679/July-August 1280,76 where he refers to the *Asrār*.

The *Asrār* is arranged in a manner typical of philosophical works; it is divided into the three sections logic (*mantiq*), physics (*tabi‘iyyāt*) and theology (*ilāhiyyāt*).

This work is one of al-Hillī's most important philosophical treatises and for a long time he himself considered it as his most authoritative work in this field. He refers to it frequently not only in his commentary on al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī's (d. 675/1277) *Hikmat al-Cayn*, the

al-Hillī if the attribution of the manuscript mentioned by Aghā Buzurg is correct. One of these is MS Princeton University Library New Series 1886 (39r-48r) contained in a collection of works which were all written either by al-Hillī or by his son Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqīn (see Mach, 128-9). Mach and Ormsby mention further copies of the same work in two Iranian libraries, one of which is anonymous whereas the other is attributed to al-Shahīd al-thānī (ibid.). Another copy of the same treatise is extant in MS British Museum OR 10968/2. The theological positions in this treatise agree with al-Hillī's views.

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72 This is known from his introduction to his *Ghāyat al-wusūl* (2r) where he states that the *Manāhij* and the *Asrār* were the first works he compiled on theology and philosophy.
73 Aghā Buzurg, *Dharī‘a*, 2:45.
74 E.g. *Manāhij*, 89r, 90r, 91r.
75 Quoted in *Jawān*, 1:348.
76 See later.
Idāh al-maqaṣīd fī sharḥ hikmat al-ʿaṣīn⁷⁷ (completed on 8 Shawwal 694/21 August 1295)⁷⁸ but also in most of his theological works.⁷⁹ Even al-Miqdād al-Suyūṭī sometimes refers to the Asrār in his commentaries on al-Ḥillī’s Nahj al-mustarshidīn.⁸⁰ In his later theological works, however, al-Ḥillī rarely refers to the Asrār. Instead, he advises his readers to consult his extensive theological work Niḥāyat al-mārām which similarly contained detailed discussions on philosophical questions. This indicates that he did not compose another work on philosophical issues after the Asrār which he considered its equal in authority.

In this work, al-Ḥillī is highly critical of the philosophical propositions whenever they disagreed with vital theological views.

In the Idāh al-maqaṣīd, the author refers to two other works on philosophy. These therefore must have been written before 8 Shawwal 694/21 August 1295, the date when the Idāh was completed. They are his Muqāwāmah al-ḥikmiyya⁸¹ and his Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth fī l-ʿulūm al-thalātha,⁸² neither of which is extant. Both works are mentioned in at least some copies of the KH⁸³ but not in the IM. Al-Ḥillī possibly did not consider them as important enough to be included in the IM list. The Muqāwāmah al-ḥikmiyya were apparently completed even before Rabī’ II 693/March 1294 since he mentions in the KH that this work had already been completed.⁸⁴ In his Idāh al-maqaṣīd, he further refers to his "Asrār together with its summary" (al-Asrār wa-khulāṣatuhu).⁸⁵ It is not evident which work is meant to be this summary.

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⁷⁷Idāh al-maqaṣīd, 114; 132; 220, 222; 224.
⁷⁸Ibid., 385.
⁷⁹E.g. Manāḥij, 89r, 90r, 91r; Kashf al-murād, 36, 151, 209; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 48; Maʿārīj, 111r.
⁸⁰Al-Miqdād, 54.
⁸²Ibid., 246, 268.
⁸³Although none of the copies of the KH consulted contain the Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth, Aḥūḍ Buzurg mentions (Dhāriʿa, 4:460) that some of the KH copies do include this title.
⁸⁴Rijāl, 47.
⁸⁵Idāh al-maqaṣīd, 10.
Of his Kitāb kashf al-khafā' min kitāb al-shifā', only the second portion is extant; this starts off with a discussion about the ten categories and deals subsequently with substance (jawhar) and the accidents of quantity (kam) and of relation (mudāf). This portion was completed on 9 Rabi‘ II 717/21 June 1317. At its end, a third section on the accident of quality (kayf) is announced. Al-Hillī mentions in the IM list that only two volumes (mujalladān) of this work had been written up to then. The possibility that this work was never completed cannot therefore be ruled out.

Of his Marāṣid al-tadgīq wa-maqāṣid al-tadgīq, which originally contained sections on logic, physics and theology, only the section on logic is extant.

All his remaining philosophical works are lost. In so far as the titles indicate, a large number of his works are concerned with the works of Ibn Sīnā and especially with the latter's al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīḥāt or with commentaries on this work. This applies to al-Hillī's Muḥākamat bayn shurrāb al-ishārāt, the Ishārāt ilā ma‘ānī al-ishārāt, Idān al-mu‘ādilāt min sharḥ al-ishārāt, and the Bast al-ishārāt. His works Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra‘īs and Idān al-talbīs min kalām al-ra‘īs appear to be similarly

86 Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Hillī, Kashf al-khafā' min kitāb al-shifā' (MS Chester Beatty 8151), 102r.
88Ibid., 102r.
88 See IM 2. According to IM 4, only one volume had been written until then. This is unlikely since the second portion was completed before the IM was written. IM 1 and IM 4 do not specify how many volumes had been written to that date. According to IM 5 "a number of volumes" (mujalladāt) had been written.
90 The IM copies differ regarding the exact title of this work. According to IM 1 the title is Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra‘īs; according to IM 2 it is Kashf al-talbīs fi bayān sayr al-ra‘īs. IM 3 reads Kashf al-talbīs min sharḥ al-ra‘īs. Al-Amīlī (24:252) suggests the reading gahw. Another possibility which would make sense would be to read it as ghubah.
91 Agha Buzurg suggests (Dharīca, 18:24) that these two titles refer to the same work. This possibility should not be ruled
concerned with the views of Ibn Sīnā. Al-Hillī wrote two further works entitled Ḥall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt and Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt which seem to be commentaries on the Kitāb al-talwīḥāt by al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190). His Tahṣīl al-mulakhkhas may possibly be a commentary on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Mulakhkhas.

For those titles which appear both in the KH list and in the IM list, there is no indication of their date of compilation. To these belong the titles Kashf al-talbīs min kalām al-ra'īs, and the Muḥākamāt bayn shurrāḥ al-ишārāt. Those titles which appear only in the IM list, were presumably written just before 720/1320. These are the Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt, Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs, Ishārāt ilā ma'ānī al-ишārāt, Idāh al-mu'dilāt min sharḥ al-ишārāt, Bast al-ишārāt, Tahrīr al-abhāth, Tahṣīl al-mulakhkhas, and Lubb al-ḥikma.

out since the different copies of the two lists are consistent in the wording of the two titles. The KH lists all agree in the title Idāh al-talbīs..., while all IM copies list the work under the title Kashf al-talbīs....

It is possible that these two titles refer to the same work. Indication for this is that all KH copies list the work as Hall al-mushkilāt whereas all IM copies list it under the title Kashf al-mushkilāt.

See also al-'Amīlī, 24:252.

Tahṣīl al-mulakhkhas is mentioned in IM 3 and IM 5 only; in IM 5 it is moreover mentioned that only one volume had until then been written.

The title Lubb al-ḥikma occurs only in IM 2 and IM 5. In IM 3 Kutub al-ḥikma appears instead as a heading for the following four titles. IM 4 offers at this position Kitāb al-ḥikma. IM 1 does not mention either of the titles. Since there does not appear to be any substantial difference between the four titles which are listed after the title in question (Kitāb al-ta'li'm al-thānī, Kitāb kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān al-ra'īs, Kitāb idāh al-mu'ḍilāt min kitāb al-ишārāt and Kitāb kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt) and the titles of the previous section which is headed kutub al-ṭuğūl and in which al-Hillī's remaining works on philosophy as well as on logic are listed, there does not seem to be any justification for the reading kutub al-ḥikma or kitāb al-ḥikma. The reading of Lubb al-ḥikma as a separate title seems therefore preferable.
Al-Ḥillī's Taṣbīḥ al-thānī belongs to the more extensive works of this later period; according to the IM list this consists of a number of volumes. Since it is mentioned there that to that point only some of the sections had been written, it is likely that this work was never completed.

The reason why most of al-Ḥillī's philosophical works are lost was presumably that they were of little originality. Since he was a theologian rather than a philosopher, it is most likely that he composed most of his philosophical works as books of instruction for his students. This impression is confirmed by the titles of some of the lost works.
4. Works on logic

Besides those philosophical treatises which include a separate section on logic,\(^{96}\) al-Ḥillī composed a number of works exclusively concerned with logic.

The Qawā'id al-jaliyya fī sharḥ al-risāla al-shamsiyya which he completed in Rabī' II 679/July-August 1280\(^{97}\) was apparently the earliest. This work is a commentary on the Risāla al-shamsiyya by al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277).

Presumably after 680/1281, he composed his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd on logic, entitled al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd. The time of composition suggested can be justified in so far as al-Ḥillī mentions in this work, from among his other writings, only his Asrār\(^{98}\) and his Manāḥij.\(^{99}\) Since the Manāḥij was completed in 680/1281 and the Asrār presumably even earlier, it is likely that the Jawhar was written shortly after these two works. The Qawā'id and the Jawhar are the only works on logic which are extant.

In his KH and his IM list al-Ḥillī furthermore lists the Nahj al-Cīrfaq fī ġilm al-mīzān. His Kāshif al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār, which is equally included in both lists, is presumably a commentary on the Kāshf al-asrār can ghawāmid al-afkār by Muḥammad b. Nahmār b. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Khūnī (d. 646/1248). Another work on logic, the Kitāb nūr al-mushriq, is to be found only in the IM list. It was possibly written only just before 720/1320. His Kitāb al-durr al-maknūn fī ġilm al-qānūn appears only in the KH list.

\(^{96}\) Such as the Asrār or the Marāṣid al-tadqīq.
\(^{97}\) See Jawān, 1:348.
\(^{99}\) Ibid., 35.
5. Legal works

Al-Hilli’s contribution to the development of Shi‘ite law was formative. He composed numerous and extensive legal works.

His first work in this field was the Muntahā al-maṭlāb which was also his most extensive one although the extant portions cover only the field of acts of devotion (ṣibā‘āt). The first part was completed in 684/1285-6 and the second part on 11 Jumādā II 688/2 July 1289. The Mukhtalaf al-shi‘a which is also one of his more extensive works, was completed between 4 Jumādā II 699/26 February 1300 and 15 Dhū al-Qa‘da 708/26 April 1309. This work, which in contrast to the Muntahā covers all fields of law, also differs from the latter in its purpose; while the Muntahā deals systematically with the relevant legal questions, the Mukhtalaf is confined to those questions about which there was disagreement among the Shi‘ite lawyers.

His Qawā‘id al-ahkām which al-Hilli compiled at the request of his son is of a more concise style. The work, which covers all areas of the law, enjoyed high popularity among later scholars which is indicated by the large number

100 Modarressi, 47-8.
101 In the KH (Riżā‘āl, 45), al-Hilli states that by Rabī‘ II 693/March 1294 he had completed the seventh portion of this work. Since the extant portion includes only the sixth part, it is likely that he wrote at least one more portion of this work. Yet this portion is apparently not extant; see also Aghā Buzurg, Dharī‘a, 23:12.
102 Hasan b. Yusuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Hilli, Muntahā al-maṭlāb fī taḥqīq al-madhhab (Tehran, 1333/1915), 1:192; the date given there is 784 which is clearly an error. Most likely, 684 is meant.
103 Aghā Buzurg, Dharī‘a, 23:12.
105 ‘Ibīd., 5:274.
of commentaries on it. Al-Ḥillī concluded the work with a wasiyya for his son in which he states that he completed the work when he (al-Ḥillī) was at the end of his fifties and the beginning of his sixties. This suggests that he completed the work around the year 700/1300-1. This is confirmed by one manuscript copy which is dated 24 Dhū l-Ḥijja 699/10 September 1300. In regard to one question on a legal issue connected with the Qawācid, al-Ḥillī is reported to have had a correspondence with ʿAbd Allāh al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286).

Āghā Buzurg suggests that the Tahrīr al-ʾaḥkām and the Talkhīṣ al-marām fī maʿrifat al-ʾaḥkām were both written before the Mukhtalaf al-shīʿa, which al-Ḥillī started shortly before 699/1299-1300. The Tahrīr which covers the field of acts of devotion (Cibādāt) and mutual relations (muʿāmalāt) is described by the author as a summary of the Muntahā al-maṭlaʿab.

The KH further includes the title Ghayrat al-ʾiḥkām fī taṣḥīḥ talkhīṣ al-marām which apparently is lost. The title suggests that this work was a commentary on al-Ḥillī's Talkhīṣ al-marām. It is, however, worth noting that the title appears only in some KH copies while it is not included in the IM. Its attribution to al-Ḥillī is therefore doubtful. Since the work is not extant, however, it is difficult to decide this matter. Al-Ḥillī's Irshād al-adhān, comparable in length to the Qawācid, enjoyed great popularity among later scholars. This is indicated by the vast number of commentaries on this work. According to Āghā Buzurg, the Irshād was completed either in 676/1277-8

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108 See Modarressi, 73-4; Āghā Buzurg, DharīCa, 14:17-26.
109 Qawācid, 2.346.
110 See M.T. Dānishpazhūh, 'Fihrist-i nuskhahā-yi khattī-yi Kitābkhanā-yi Dr. Husayn Miftāh,' Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhanā-yi Markazi-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehran dar barā-yi nuskhahā-yi Khattī 7 (Tehran, 1353sh): 203.
111 Al-ʿAmilī, 24:237.
112 DharīCa, 20:220.
113 Hasan b. Yusuf b. al-Mutahhari al-Ḥillī, Tahrīr al-ʾaḥkām al-shariyya Calā madhab al-ʿimāmiyya (Tehran, 1314/1896); 2. KH 1, KH 2, KH 5, KH 6, KH 10.
114 See Āghā Buzurg, DharīCa, 1:511-2.
or in 696/1296-7.\textsuperscript{116} The year 676/1277-8 seems unlikely since 
al-Ḥillī's first legal work, the Muntahā al-maṭlāb, was 
completed only in 688/1289. Moreover, at the end of the 
Irshād, the author refers to the Muntahā al-maṭlāb, the 
Taḥrīr al-ahkām, the Qawā'id al-ahkām and the Tadhkira 
al-fuqahā'\textsuperscript{117} most of which al-Ḥillī had not even begun writing 
in 676/1277-8. The Tabṣirat al-muta外表imīn, his shortest 
systematic exposition on law, was written for non-specialists 
and novice students.\textsuperscript{118}

The Tadhkira al-fuqahā' which al-Ḥillī wrote at the 
request of his son\textsuperscript{119} is one of his most extensive legal 
works. The first section was completed on 24 Ṣafar 703/7 
October 1303\textsuperscript{120} and the last section was finished on 16 
Dhū al-Hijja 720/17 January 1321.\textsuperscript{121} Because of a reference in 
one of Fakhr al-Muḥaqiqīn's legal writings, it has been 
suggested that he continued the Tadhkira after his father's 
death.\textsuperscript{122} Yet the printed edition of the work and apparently 
also the manuscripts available contain only the portions of 
the book which al-Ḥillī himself had written. These end with 
the section on marriage (nikāh).\textsuperscript{123} The Nihāyat al-īkām which 
al-Ḥillī wrote also at his son's request was another late 
work.\textsuperscript{124} In 720/1320, al-Ḥillī states in his IM that so far 
only the first two sections on ritual purity (tahāra) and 
prayer (ṣalāt) had been written. The work was apparently not 
continued.\textsuperscript{125}

Al-Ḥillī further composed some shorter treatises on 
specific legal points, such as his Risāla fī manāsik al-ḥajj 
which is included in the KH. In addition later writers 
ascribed to him a treatise entitled Wājib al-wuḍū'.
wa-l-ṣalāt\textsuperscript{126} and the \textit{Risāla fī wājibāt al-hajj wa-arkānihi min dūn dhikr al-adʿiyā wa-l-mustaḥabbāt}.\textsuperscript{127} Modarressi also records a manuscript entitled \textit{Risāla fī l-mawārīth} which contains evidence that it was written by al-Ḥillī,\textsuperscript{128} as well as two other treatises entitled \textit{Ajwībat al-masāʾīl al-fiqhiyya} and \textit{Ajwībat masāʾīl Ibn Zuhrā}.\textsuperscript{129}

His \textit{Taslīk al-adhān} and \textit{Tahdīb al-nafs} appear to be lost. Both titles are listed only in the IM which suggests that they were written shortly before 720/1320 and both were apparently shorter works.\textsuperscript{130} His \textit{Taslīk al-afhām} which is also lost is listed only in the KH. This may indicate that the author considered it less important. His \textit{Madārik al-ahkām}, which is lost as well, is included in both lists. Since al-Ḥillī states in the IM that until then he had written only the first section on ritual purity (ṭahāra), he must have started it just before 720/1320. It is doubtful whether he completed any more sections during the rest of his life.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{126}Al-ʿAfānī, 1:378.
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 1:378.
\textsuperscript{128}Modarressi, 204.
\textsuperscript{129}Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{130}In the IM list, both are characterised as consisting of one volume (mujallad).
\textsuperscript{131}See also al-Khwānsārī, 2:275.

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5. Works on Legal Methodology (Usūl al-Fiqh)

The Ghāyat al-wusūl wa-īdāh al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtasar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amal, which is a commentary on the Mukhtasar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amal of Ibn al-Ḥajib (d. 646/1249), was al-Hillī's first work in this discipline. This is indicated by his statement in the introduction to this work that after having written the Manāhij on theology and the Aṣrār in philosophy, he now turns to legal methodology.\(^{132}\) It is likely, therefore, that he began to write this work after 680/1281. According to Āghā Buzurg, the Ghāyat al-wusūl was completed on 12 Rajab 697/25 April 1298.\(^ {133}\) The second portion of the middle-sized work Muntahā al-wusūl ilā Cilmay al-kalām wa-l-usūl was presumably written after 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288, the date when al-Hillī completed the first portion on theology.\(^ {134}\) The Mabādī' al-wusūl ila Cilm al-usūl is a summary of the Minhāj al-wusūl fi maṣrīfat Cilm al-usūl of ʻAbd Allāh al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286)\(^ {135}\) which he composed at the request of Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Muhammad al-Baṣrī.\(^ {136}\) It was written at least before 705/1305-6.\(^ {137}\)

At the request of his son,\(^ {138}\) al-Hillī started his most extensive work in this discipline, the Nihāyat al-wusūl ilā Cilm al-usūl, which he completed on 8 Ramaḍān 704/4 April 1305.\(^ {139}\) Since he states in the introduction to this work

\(^{132}\) Ghāyā, 2r.

\(^{133}\) Dhari'ā, 16:24-5.

\(^{134}\) Muntahā al-wusūl, 134v. The MS copy is incomplete at the end of the work.


\(^{136}\) Āghā Buzurg, Dhari'ā, 19:44.

\(^{137}\) In this year, the work was already studied by his students; see Mabādī', introd., 41.

\(^{138}\) Hasan b. ʻYūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Nihāyat al-wusūl ilā Cilm al-usūl (MS Bankipore 1567), 2v.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 316v.
that he had already written a number of shorter and more extensive works in this field, he began to compose it at a later stage of his career.\textsuperscript{140}

During or after the composition of the Nihāya, he wrote the more concise \textit{Tahdhīb al-wusūl ilā \c{c}ilm al-\usūl} which was very popular among later scholars. Since al-\Hillī refers in it to his Nihāya\textsuperscript{141} it must be one of his later works. The afore-mentioned works are extant and included in both lists.

Al-\Hillī wrote two further works both of which are lost. The \textit{al-Nukat al-badī\textsuperscript{c}a fī tāhrīr al-dhārī\textsuperscript{c}a} may possibly have been a commentary on al-Murtuqā\textsuperscript{a}'s \textit{Dhārī\textsuperscript{c}a ilā \usūl al-shārī\textsuperscript{c}a}. Since it is listed in the KH only, al-\Hillī may not have considered it as very important. The \textit{Nahj al-wusūl ilā \c{c}ilm al-\usūl} is listed in both the KH and the IM.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{140}{Ibid., 2v.}
\footnote{141}{See Hā'irī, 13:21.}
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
7. Biographic Works

Around Rabī' II 693/March 1294\textsuperscript{142} al-Ḥilli wrote his Khulāṣat al-aqwal fī maCrifat al-rijāl which lists in the first part reliable transmitters, and unreliable transmitters in the second.\textsuperscript{143} Since the work is designed as a short work (mukhtāṣar)\textsuperscript{144} the author does not offer complete biographical and bibliographical dates for every transmitter. An exception is the article on himself in which he offers a list of his own works.\textsuperscript{145}

His Ḥidāh al-ishtibāh fī aḥwāl al-ruwāt was completed on 19 Dhū al-Ḥaḍra 707/11 May 1308.\textsuperscript{146} This work is much more concise than the Khulāṣa.\textsuperscript{147} Although it is not included in the IM list, its authenticity as a work by al-Ḥilli is established by internal evidence.\textsuperscript{148}

The Kashf al-maqaṣl fī maCrifat aḥwāl al-rijāl is described by the author as his most extensive biographic work. He refers to it both in his Ḥidāh al-ishtibāh\textsuperscript{149} and in his Khulāṣa.\textsuperscript{150} This work is apparently lost.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, although al-Ḥilli refers to it frequently he does not include it in either of the lists of his works.\textsuperscript{152} Since the work must

\textsuperscript{142}Rijāl, 45.
\textsuperscript{143}Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{144}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{145}Ibid., 45-8.
\textsuperscript{146}Aghā Buzurg, Dharī'Ca, 2:493.
\textsuperscript{147}See Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥilli, Ḥidāh al-ishtibāh fī asmā' al-ruwāt (MS Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 10164), 1v.
\textsuperscript{148}Ibid., 1v, where al-Ḥilli states that he is the author of the work.
\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., 60v: "Whoever seeks the coverage and thorough examination of the knowledge of all transmitters and their states,...he should refer to our book entitled Kashf al-maqaṣl fī maCrifat al-rijāl."
\textsuperscript{150}Rijāl, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{151}Aghā Buzurg mentions in fact (Dharī'Ca, 18:63-4) that there is a MS copy listed in the catalogue of the Khizānī al-Ridawīyya in Mashhad. However, he expresses doubt about this.
\textsuperscript{152}Aghā Buzurg mentions that al-Ḥilli included the title in his KH according to some manuscripts (Dharī'Ca, 18:64). But none of the consulted copies includes this work.
have been considered very important by al-Hillî, this is striking and the possibility that he never wrote this work but rather intended to do so should therefore not be ruled out.
8. Works on Grammar

Of al-Hilli's works on grammar, none appears to be extant. His *Basa al-kafiya* was a summary of the *Sharh al-kafiya* by Radî al-Dîn Muhammed b. Hasan al-Astarabâdî (d. 686/1287)\(^{153}\) which in turn was a commentary on the *Kafiya* by Ibn al-Hajib (d. 646/1249). Al-Hilli's *Kashf al-maknûn min kitâb al-maknûn* was a summary of the *Sharh al-mugaddima al-jazuliyya* which is a commentary by Ibn al-Hajib on the *Mugaddima al-jazuliyya* by Ĥâsî b. Ĥâb al-Aziiz b. Yûmarîlî al-Jazuli (d. 610/1213). His *Kitâb al-maqâsid al-wâfiya li-fawâ'id al-qânûn wa-l-kafiya* was based on the above-mentioned *Mugaddima al-jazuliyya* and the *Kafiya* of Ibn al-Hajib. Except for the *Kashf al-maknûn* and the *Durr al-maknûn fi sharh al-qânûn* which are mentioned only in the KH, all works are listed in the KH and the IM. His *Kitab al-matalîb al-Caliyya fi Cilm al-Carabiyya* is similarly mentioned in both lists.

Since most of al-Hilli's works on grammar were largely based on works of earlier grammarians, they were presumably of little originality. It is likely that he composed most of them as textbooks for his own students. This is presumably also the reason why none of the works have survived.

\(^{153}\)Rijâl, 47.
Although al-Ḥillī had contacts with Sufis and was almost certainly acquainted with the mysticism of Ibn al-ḤArabī (d. 638/1240) and the philosophy of illumination (ishrāq) of al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190), their views did not make any impact on his thought. Later authors attributed to him a work entitled Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq which is said to be a commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-ishrāq. This attribution seems doubtful; the title is not listed in any of al-Ḥillī's works. Moreover, given his limited interest in mystical ideas, it seems unlikely that he wrote such a work.

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154 See supra, p. 201.
155 Ḥāfīẓ Ḥāfīẓ, Ḥarīṯa, 13:211 (no. 750).
10. Exegetical Works

Al-Hillî wrote two exegetical works, the Kitâb al-qawl al-wajîz fî tafsîr al-Qur'ân and the Kitâb nahj al-Îmân fî tafsîr al-Qur'ân, neither of which is extant. The Nahj al-Îmân is described in the KH as a work in which he abridged the Kashshâf an ḥaqâ'iq al-tanzîl of Jâr Allâh Maḥmûd b. Cümar al-Zamakhsharî (d. 538/1144), the Tafsîr al-tibyân of al-Shaykh al-Îsâî (d. 460/1067) and other exegetical works. 156 Since both titles are listed only in the KH but not in the IM, it may be assumed that al-Hillî did not consider them very important. Moreover, the fact that both are lost seems to indicate that they were of little originality and significance.

Since most of al-Hillî's works on grammar were largely based on works of earlier grammarians, they were presumably of little originality. It is likely that he composed most of them as textbooks for his own students. This is presumably also the reason why none of the works have survived.

156 Rijâl, 46.
11. Works on Traditions

Al-Hilli wrote a number of works on traditions, of which all but one are lost. The extant work is entitled Ḥadīth mukhlafat al-sunna which was completed in 723/1323.157 Because of the extremely late date of its compilation, the work is not included in either of the lists. Later authors ascribed it to al-Hilli.158

Of his remaining works on tradition which are all lost, the Kitāb mašābiḥ al-anwār and the Kitāb nahi al-wadāḥ fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥḥah are listed only in the KH. The Istiqṣā' al-iqṭibār li-tahrīr maqānī al-akhbār and the Kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥḥah wa-l-hisān are listed in the KH and the IM. His Tanqīḥ qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha ḍān Al Yāsīn is included only in the IM list. This latter work may have been based on al-Hilli's al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥḥah wa-l-hisān; IM 1 reports the title of the work as Tanqīḥ qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha ḍān kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥḥah wa-l-hisān. Yet no other copy agrees with this version. According to IM 4 its title is Tanqīḥ al-qawā'id al-ma'khūdha ḍān al-ra'Isayn.

157 Aghā Buzurg, Dhāriʿa, 2:499.
158 Ibid., 2:498-9. Not having seen a copy of the work, I cannot say whether it contains internal evidence for its authenticity as one of al-Hilli's works.
Appendix: Alphabetical List of al-Hilli's Works

(1) al-Abhāth al-mufīda fī taḥṣīl al-ḥaqīda (KH/IM).
   (theology)
   Dharī‘a, 1:63 (no.310).
   MSS: Hakīm M599 (cat.16); see also the locations of the
   following commentaries.
   Commentaries: (1) Sharh al-abhāth al-mufīda by Naṣīr b.
      Ibrāhīm al-Ahsā‘ī (d. 853/1449) (Dharī‘a, 13:57, no.182),
      MSS: Bīnish 13 (cat.852) - Ridawī Ḥikma 13 (cat.1:14 = 132
      new edition); (2) Sharḥ al-abbāṯ al-mufīda by Ḥādī b.
      al-Mahdī al-Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1872) (Dharī‘a, 13:57,
      no.183), MSS: Ridawī Ḥikma 2 (cat.1:17 = 133 new edition)
      -Bīnish 27 (cat.852).

(2) Ithbāt al-ra‘jā (DH).
   Dharī‘a, 1:92 (no.442).
   MSS: Madrasat Fāḍil Khān (see Dharī‘a).

(3) al-Ijāza li-Ṣalāh b. Ismā‘īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ
   al-Gharawī.
   Dharī‘a, 1:177 (no.904).
   (issued on 12 Rajab 701/13 March 1302)
   MSS: no MS known.

   Dharī‘a, 1:175-6 (no.897).
   (issued in 709/1309-10)
   MSS: no MS known.

(5) al-Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. al-Husayn b. al-Ḥasan
   al-Sirābshanawī al-Kāshānī.
   Dharī‘a, 1:177 (no.901).
   MSS: no MS known.

(6) al-Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Māḥmūd b. al-Mawlā Zayn al-Dīn
   Muḥammad b. al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Wahīd al-Rāzī.
   Dharī‘a, 1:178 (no.908).
   (issued in Rabī‘ II 709/September-October 1309)

(7) Ijāza thāniya li-Najm al-Dīn Muḥanna b. Sinān b. ʿAbd
   Dharī‘a, 1:178 (no.911).
   (issued in Muharram 720/February-March 1320 in al-Hilla)
   Editions: in ʿal-Majlisi, Bihār, 107:147-149; in al-Hillī,
   Ajwībat al-masāʿīl al-muḥannatiyya, Qum: al-Khayyam,
   MSS: Majlis 5192 (4) (cat.16:20); Ridawī fiqh 120 - 121
   (cat.2:36); Princeton New Series 960 (cat.77).

(8) al-Ijāza li-Jamāl al-Dīn Abī al-Futūḥ Ahmad b. al-Shaykh
    Abī ʿAbd Allah Bālūk b. Abī Ṭālib b. ʿAlī al-Awī.
    Dharī‘a, 1:176 (no.898).

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.905).
(issued in Rajab 705/January-February 1306)
MSS: no MS known.

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.900).
(issued in Jumādā I 715/August-September 1315)
MSS: no MS known.

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.903).
(issued in Muharram 704/August-September 1304)

Dharīʿa, 1:178 (no.912).
(issued on 17 Rajab 701/18 March 1302)
MSS: no MS known.

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.902).
(issued on 28 Ṣafar 708/17 August 1308)
MSS: no MS known.

(14) al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Banī Zuhrā.
Dharīʿa, 1:176 (no.899).
(issued on 15 Shawābān 723/19 August 1323)
MSS: Berlin 152 (cat.1:56); Danīshgāh 3108(3) (cat.11:2063)
-5396(5) (cat.15:4238) - 6955(4) (cat.16:410); Majlis
4873(14) (cat.14:13) - 5138(104) (cat.15:181).

Dharīʿa, 1:178.
(issued in Dhū al-Hijja 719/January-February 1320 in al-Hilla)
Editions: in al-Majlisī, Bihār, 107:143-146; al-Hillī,
Ajwība, 114-117.
MSS: Hakim M534 (cat.22); Majlis 4566(4) (cat.12:259)
-5192(2) (cat.16:19); Princeton New Series 960 (cat.77).

Dharīʿa, 1:177 (no.906).
Dhariʻa, 1:178 (no.909).
(issued in Jumāda II 724/May-June 1324)
MSS: no MS known.

(18) al-Ijāza li-Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad
al-Rāzī al-Buwayhi.
Dhariʻa, 1:177-8 (no.907).
(issued on 3 Shaʻbān 713/23 November 1313)

(19) Ajwibat masāʻil Ibn Zuhra.
(see Modarresi, 103)
MSS: Dānishgāh 1474(3) (cat.8:125) - 3514(17) (cat.12:2526);
Ḥakīm M548 (cat.28); Ḥuqūq J178(1) (cat.460).

(20) Ajwibat al-masāʻil al-fiqhiyya.
(see Modarresi, 103)
MSS: Dānishgāh 2621(5) (cat.9:1497); Majlis 5642(2)
(cat.17:97).

Dhariʻa, 5:236-8 (no.1136) & 5:238 (no.1137).
(a collection of answers on a variety of topics; these
answers on questions posed by Najm al-Dīn Muḥanna` b. Sinān
b. Șabd al-Wahhāb al-Husaynī al-Madānī were given orally in
717/1317-8 in al-Hilla and subsequently written down by
al-Hillī. The first portion was completed in Dhū al-Hijja
719/January-February 1320, the remaining portion in Muḥarram
720/February-March 1320.)
Editions: Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.
MSS: Bīnīsh 2330 - 2331 - 2332 - 2022 - 2727 (cat.689);
Dānishgāh 741 - 1474(4) - 2144(3) - 2477(6) - 5396(1)
-6710(59) - MF2068 (cat.1:380); Dār al-Kutub B 19178
(cat.3:58); Huqūq D10 (cat.459); Ilāhiyyāt D246(4)
(cat.1:266); India Office 1797 (cat.2:309); Isfahān
Dānishgāh 291(1) (cat.937); Majlis 4566(3) (cat.12:259)
-4566(5) (cat.12:260) - 5192(1) (cat.16:19) - 5192(3) (cat.16:
20); Malik 5210 (cat.1:666-7); Marqāshī 1409(8) (cat.4:187)
- 1409(9) - 1409(10) (cat.4:188); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat 1744(3)
(cat.3:832); Nawwāb cat.475; Princeton New Series 524
(fol.15v -21r) - 960 (fol.1v-32v) (cat.6); Ṣadūqī Figh 582
-583 -584 (cat.5:396-8) - Figh 120 - 121 - 122 - 123 - 124
-125 -126 (cat.2:36); Rampur 930 MK (cat.3:470).

(22) al-Adīya al-fākhira al-maṇqūla ʿan al-Aʿīma al-ṭāhīra
(KH).
Dhariʻa, 1:398 (no.2066).
MSS: no MS known.

(23) Arbaʻīn masʻala fi usūl al-dīn (DH).
Dhariʻa, 1:435-6 (no.2205).
(theology)
MSS: Maktabat al-Sayyid Rājah Muḥammad Mahdī Ṣāhib (see DhariğCa, 1:435-6).

(24) Irshād al-adhkhān fī ahkām al-Imān (KH/IM).
DhariğCa, 1:510-512 (no.2509).
(law; completed in 696/1296-7)
MSS: Cat. Abd al-Çazīm 130(1) (cat.439); Adabiyāt (1960) J28-D132 (cat.23ff); Aghā Hakīm 77 (cat.424); Ambrosiana C 134 (cat.2:187); Adabiyāt (1965) 382 (cat.69); Berlin 4590 - 4591 (cat.4:133-4); Bīnīsh cat.586-7 (29 copies); Dānishgāh 1548 (cat.8:173-4) - 1706 (cat.8:254) - 1983 (cat.8:592) - 3560 (cat.12:2580) - 3665 (cat.12:2675) - 4145 (cat.13:3115) - 6273 (cat.16:221) - 6340(3) (cat.16:246) - 6369(2) (cat.16:253) - 6775 (cat.16:358) - 6853 (cat.16:382-3) - 7123 (cat.16:460) - 7316 (cat.16:511) - 7720 (cat.16:683) - 8629(1) (cat.17:182) - 9503 (cat.17:305) - MF2544 (cat.11:281); Dār al-Kutub B23235 (cat.1:134); Farḥād 62 (cat.148); Gavharshād cat.210-1; Gulpāyīgānī 39 (cat.46) - 50 (cat.63); Hakīm 1671 (cat.44) - 1424 - 1730 - 1018 - 611 - 477 - 121 - 537 - 695 - 1562 - 1619 - 1803 - 1899 (cat.45-6); Hujūq J34 - J41 - J287 - J345 (241); Ilāhīyyāt J10 - B83 - J243 - D75 - D273 - D505 (cat.1:450ff); India Office 1794 - 1795 - 1796 (cat.2:308-9); Isfahān Dānishgāh 75 (cat.882) - 113(3) (cat.925); Isfahān Qūmī 2882 (cat.1:76) - 2966 - 2972 - 2995 - 3031 (cat.177) - 3067 - 3093 - 5350 (cat.178); Isma'ili Institute A(399) - B(504) (cat.2:62); Kāshān 2 (cat.32); Kāshānī 8 (cat.59); Los Angeles M161 - M818 - M855 - M1118 - M1148 (cat.147-8); Maḍārif 53 (cat.1:74); Mahfūz 1 (cat.3:17) - 95 (cat.3:24) - 39 (cat.3:22) - 15 (cat.4:196) - 354 (cat.4:232) - 30 (cat.4:255) - 25 (cat.4:257); Majlis 1287 (cat.4:62) - 2869(1) (cat.10/1:218) - 3086 (cat.10/2:641) - 3445 (cat.10/3:1304) - 3462 (cat.10/3:1426) - 3770 (cat.10/4:1755) - 4404 (cat.12:104) - 4645(1) (cat.13:33) - 4673(2) (cat.13:56) - 4941(2) (cat.14:171) - 5819 (cat.17:239) - 5848 (cat.17:256) - 5863 (cat.17:268); Malik 1961 - 2127 - 2320 - 2612 - 5872 (cat.1:29-30); Marqāshī 961 (cat.3:153) - 1248 (cat.4:47) - 1285 (cat.4:83) - 1487 (cat.4:284) - 1588 (cat.4:393) - 1728 (cat.5:116) - 2805 (cat.8:7) - 3363 (cat.9:138) - 3400 (cat.9:184) - 3981 (cat.10:360) - 4136 (cat.11:155) - 4357 (cat.11:355) - 4408 (cat.12:10) - 4827 (cat.13:26); Mashhad Adabiyāt 9 (cat.18); Mashhad Ilāhīyyāt 1621 (cat.3:745) - 1751 (cat.3:836) - 19 (cat.1:10) - 548(1) (cat.1:296); Masjid-i Jāmi' 43 (cat.311) - 44 (cat.312); Miftāḥ 108 (cat.100) - 157(1) (cat.224); Millī Arabic 1157 (cat.9:146) - Arabī Arabic 446 (cat.9:478) - Arabīka 996 (cat.8:483) - Arabic 845 (cat.8:348) - Arabic 402 (cat.7:343); Mīrāz Ja'far cat.34,43; Nawwāb cat.449, 469; Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 87 - 111 - 122 - 318 - 602 - 826 - 836 - 1170 - 1329 - 1444 - 1840 (cat.81); Ridawī Fiqh 487 - 488 - 489 - 490 - 491 - 492 - 493 (cat.5:357-9) - cat.2:3-6 (16 copies); Rampur 10275 D - 10239 D - 1009 D - 657 D - 987 MK (cat.3:464-6); Sipahsalar 447 - 448 - 449 - 450 - 451 (cat.1:355, 359); Sulaymān Khān cat.4-5; Tabrīz Millī 3377 (cat.1:46); Topkapi Serai A 1082.

(26) Istiqṣa' al-nāzār fī l-bāḥth Cān al-qādā' wa-l-qadar (KH*). DharīCā, 2:31-2 (no.122). (theology; written after RabīC II 709/September-October 1309) Editions: edited by CAlī al-Khākānī al-Najafī. Najaf, 1354/1935. MSS: Adabiyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.27); Bīnīsh 314 (cat.590); Dānishgāh 2091(2) (cat.8:714) - 5896(1) (cat.16:137) -7243(6) (cat.16:498) - MF2314(2) (1:671) - MF2992(1) (cat.1:776); Hakīm M1087 - M294 (cat.51); Ḥuqūq J227 (cat.244); IsmāCīli Institute 631 (fol.1v-16v) (cat.2:64); Majlis 4232(2) (cat.11:250) - 4322(2) (cat.12:16) - 4763(3) (cat.13:149) - 4953(1) (cat.14:225) - 4954(13) (cat.14:237) - 5168(5) (cat.15:306); MarCashī 2796(2) (cat.7:362); Mashhad Ilāhīyāt 936(1) (cat.2:86); Princeton New Series 461 (fol.25r-31r) - 1084 (fol.154r-162r) - 1886 (fol.57v-65v) (cat.87); Ridwān Hikma 328 (cat.4:15) - Hikma 45 (cat.1:21 = 206 new edition); Tustariyya 562(4) (cat.866). Commentaries: Nūr Allāh al-Shushtarī (d. 1019/1610), al-Nūr al-anwar wa-l-nūr al-azhar fī tawwīr khafāyā al-qādā' wa-l-qadar (DharīCā, 24:362, no.1952), written against objections by some Indian scholars against al-Hillī's Istiqṣa' al-nāzār.

(27) al-Asrār al-khafiyya fī l-Culūm al-Caqliyya (KH/IM). DharīCā, 2:45 (no.175). (philosophy; written before 680/1281) MSS: ʾAḡā Hakīm 179 (cat.420); Bankipore XXI, 2384; Hakīm 380 -1295 (cat.51); Mahfūʿ 49 (cat.4:217).

(28) al-Ishārat ilā maCānī al-ishārat (IM). DharīCā, 2:98. (philosophy; written after RabīC II 693/March 1294) MSS: no MS known.

(29) al-Alfayn al-fārig bayn al-ṣīdq wa-l-mayn (KH*). DharīCā, 2:298-9 (no.1199). (theology) Editions: edited by Ḥusayn al-AClimī. Beirūt: MuCassasat al-AClimī, 1402/1982. MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 94 (cat.71); Adabiyyāt (1341) 197 (cat.74); Bīnīsh 29 - 28 - 30 - 340 (cat.603-4); Dānishgāh 4551 (cat.13:3493); Gawharshād cat.218; Hakīm 669 (cat.67);
(30) Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt (KH/IM).
Dhari'ī, 2:444-5 (no.1725).
(theology; completed in Jumādā II 684/August-September 1285)
MSS: Bīnish 31 - 32 (cat.609); Būhār 95 (cat.2:106);
Dānishgāh 1046 - 4273 (cat.13:3240-1) - MF3081 (cat.2:62);
Hakīm 1096 (cat.76); Huqūq J146 (cat.257); Ja'fariyya 29 (cat.437);
Mahfūz 60 (cat.4:218) - 82 (cat.3:34) - 34 (cat.3:59);
Majlish 81 (cat.2:41) -1689 (cat.5:10); Malik 479 - 1292 (cat.71);
Mar'ashi 1241 (cat.4:40); Princeton New Series 1128 (cat.9-10); Ridawī Hikma 31 - 32 (cat.1:18 - 49-50 new edition);
Tabriz Millī 3511 (cat.1:111)
Commentaries: Nahj al-Āmīdī lāā anwār al-malakūt, by Āmīd

(31) Idāh al-ishtībāh fī asmā al-ruwāt (IE).
Dhari'ī, 2:493 (no.1934).
(biographic work; completed on 19 Dhū al-Qa'da 707/11 May
1308).
Editions: Tehran, 1318H.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1341) 138 (cat.74); Adabiyyāt (1960) B107
- J127 - D22 - D133 (cat.38 ff); Berlin 10164 (cat.9:517-8);
Bīnish 8266 (cat.612); Adabiyyāt (1965) 151(2) - 309 - 452(3)
(cat.77); Dānishgāh 2359(3) (cat.9:964) - 2945(4)
(cat.10:1829) - 6290(2) (cat.16:235) - MF1441(1) (cat.1:601);
Majlis 25/12 (cat.7:23) - 1599 (cat.4:300) - 3153(3)
(cat.10/2:730) - 5903 (cat.17:296); Fu'ād Sayyid 589
(cat.2/2:18); Mahfūz 51 (cat.4:203) - 21(2) (cat.4:209);
Mar'ashi 108(2) (cat.1:129) - 443(1) (cat.2:45) - 1176(4)
(cat.3:348); 2548(2) (cat.7:130) - 3029(2) (cat.8:217)
- 4772(2) (cat.12:336) - 4910(2) (cat.13:90) - 4952(2)
(cat.13:151); Mashhad Ilahiyyāt 1429(3) (cat.2:578) - 1862(2)
(cat.3:931) - 30 (cat.1:16); Millī Arabic 1433(3)
(cat.9:455); Ridawī Rijāl 39 - 40 (cat.6:641-2) - Rijāl 3
(cat.2:353); Sulaymān Khān 106(3) (cat.18); Saryazdī 66(2)
(cat.427).

(32) Idāh al-talbīs fī kalām al-ra'īs (KH).
Dhari'ī, 2:493 (no.1938).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(33) Idāh mukhālafat al-sunnā (DH*).
(traditions; completed in 723/1323).
MSS: Bīnish 6096 (cat.613); Dānishgāh MF1751 - MF2970 (cat.1:288); Majlis 5070 (cat.15:30); Sinā 29 (cat.1:14).

(34) یاد al-muʿdilāt min sharḥ al-ishārāt (IM).
(philosophy; written after Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(35) یاد al-maqāsid fī sharḥ ʿhikmat ʿayn al-qawāʾid (KH).
(philosophy; completed on 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)
MSS: Dānishgāh 4792 (cat.14:3831) - MF71 (cat.1:289);
Ridawī Hikma 47 (cat.1:22 = 53 new edition); see also above mentioned edition, introduction, 25-33.

(36) al-Bāb al-hādī ʿaṣhar fīnā yajibu ʿala ġammat al-mukallafin min maʿrifat usūl al-dīn (IE).
(becoming the 11th chapter of no.110)
Dhariʿa, 3:5-7 (no.4).
(theology; completed on 11 Dhū al-Ḥijja 723/11 December 1323)
MSS: ḤAb al-ʿAzīzin 212(2) (cat.444) - 287(3) (cat.447); Bīnish 48 - 356 - 357 - 355 - 352 - 353 (cat.614); Bodleian MS arab f.64 (ff.109-112); Dānishgāh 328 - 4176(3)
(cat.13:3143) - 7274(2) (cat.16:503) - 8596(7)
(cat.17:169); Gūwārashād cat.224; Gulpāyigānī 387(4)
(cat.320); Ḥakīm M1757 - M1927 - M725 - M1177 - M1705
(cat.85); Ḥṣafān Dānishgāh 122(2) (cat.926); Kāshānī 22
(cat.83); Los Angeles M97(2) (cat.663) - M105(1) (cat.707);
Majlis 109(12) (cat.7:325) - 2767(3) (cat.9:1:178) - 3149(1)
(cat.10:2:729) - 4339(1) (cat.12:38) - 4954(26) (cat.14:243) - 5344(4)
(cat.16:256) - 5384(2) (cat.16:290) - 5417(10)
(cat.16:327); Marʿaṣī 69(2) (cat.1:82) - 1003(2) (cat.3:194)
- 2247(4) (cat.6:232) - 5148(1) (cat.13:353); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt
1577(3) (cat.2:712) - 668(2) (cat.1:467);
Millī 1190(6) (cat.9:178); Nawwāb Hikma 79 (1) (cat.518);
Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 1550 (fol.150v- 156r)
- 1886 (fol.48v- 51r) (cat.24); Ridawī Hikma 371- 372 - 373
- 374 - 375 - 376 (cat.4:33-4) - Hikma 48 (cat.1:22 = 53-4
new edition); Wāzīrī 2085(4) (cat.4:1159) - 2284(4)
(cat.4:1132) - 2520(1) (cat.4:1325).

Commentaries: (1) Al-Fāḍil Miqdād al-Suyūṭī (d. 826/1423),
al-Nāfīʿ yawn al-ḥashr fī sharḥ al-Bāb al-hādī ʿaṣhar (2)
Miṭṭāḥ li-l-Bāb al-mulḥaq bi-mukhtasar al-misbāb by
Abū l-Fath b. Makhḍūm al-Khādīm al-Husaynī al-ʿArabshāhī (d. 976/1568-9); (3) Irshād
al-Bāshar fī sharḥ al-Bāb al-hādī ʿaṣhar by Sulaymān b. Ahmad
b. al-Husayn Al-ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Qāṭīfī (d. 1266/1850)
(Brockelmann, GALS 2:794; Dhariʿa, 2:794); (4) Sharḥ al-Bāb

(37) Bast al-ispārāt (IM/KH**).

Dhari'a, 3:108 (no.358).

(philosophy; written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)

MSS: no MS known.

(38) Bast al-kāfiya (KH/IM).

Dhari'Ca, 3:109 (no.360).

(grammar)

MSS: no MS known.

(39) Tabṣīrat al-muta'callimīn fī ʾahkam al-dīn (KH/IM).

Dhari'Ca, 3:321 - 323 (no.1180).

(law)

Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-islāmiyya, 1372H.
MSS: Amīr al-Mu'mīnīn 25 (cat.412) - 26(2) (cat.412); Bīnish 2281 - 2280 - 6432 - 2279 - 3515 (cat.627); Chester Beatty 4359 (cat.5:113); Dānishgāh 7192 (cat.16:480) - MF2594 (cat.1:295 & 2:11) - MF2992(5) (cat.1:777); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.27); Hākim M1669 - 1852 (cat.100); Huqūq D2 (cat.281); India Office 1793 (cat.2:308); Los Angeles M652 (cat.164); Majlis 2767(2) (cat.9:1:177) - 4254 (cat.11:269) - 4953(9) (cat.14:229) - 5396 (cat.16:302); Malik n.n. (cat.1:106); Mar Ğashī 2074(2) (cat.6:87); Mashhad Ilāhīyyat 1123(4) (cat.2:258) - 994(2) (cat.2:145); Nawwāb cat.451; Princeton New Series 1372 (cat.314); Ridawī Fīgh 530 (cat.5:374) - Fīgh 69 - 70 - 71 (cat.2:21); Rampur 984 MK (cat.3:462); Sipahsālār 457 (cat.1:369); Wazīrī 1350 (cat.3:936) - 2013 (cat.4:1128) - 2656 (cat.4:1379).

(philosophy; written after Rabī'C II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(41) Tahrīr al-akhām al-shar'īyya ġalā madhhab al-ināmiyya (KH/IM).
Dhārīca, 3:378-9 (no.1375).
(law; completed on 10 Rabī'C I 690/13 March 1291)
Editions: Tehran, 1314/1896.
MSS: ĠAb al-CĀzīm 45 (cat.73); Adabiyyāt (1965) 322(2) - 497 (cat.78); Bīnish 2276 - 2277 - 2703 - 2705 - 2704 - 2708 - 2707 - 5705 - 2706 - British Library OR 8405 - OR 8329; Dānishgāh 872 - 1516 (cat.8:151) - 2730 (cat.10:1603) - 2923 (cat.10:1782-3) - 6670 (cat.16:330) - 6790 (cat.16:360) - 7632 (cat.16:660) - 8168(1) (cat.17:46) - MF2756 (cat.1:297); Farhād 34 (cat.158); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.27); Gāwarshād cat.233; Gulpāyīgānī 130 (cat.123) - 261 (cat.227) - 262 (cat.228); Hākim 858 - 859 - 1771 - 1779 - 1579 (cat.102); Haydariyya 671 (cat.48); Kāshān 9 (cat.33); Los Angeles M62 (cat.166); Ma'rīf 55 (cat.1:78); Mahfūz 49 (cat.3:22); Majlis 2841 (cat.10:1/168) - 3396(1) (cat.10:3:1261) - 4007 (cat.11:10) - 4710 (cat.13:91) - 5010 (cat.14:317) - 5171 - 5172 (cat.15:311) - 5218(2) (cat.16:50); Malik 975 - 1249 - 1373 - 1429 - 9122 - 3053 (cat.1:109); Mar Ğashī 272 (cat.1:301) - 385 (cat.1:402) - 543 (cat.2:146) - 915 (cat.3:104) - 1008 (cat.3:202) - 1084 (cat.3:263) - 1279 (cat.4:80) - 1556 (cat.4:359) - 1598 (cat.4:400) - 1639 (cat.5:41) - 2631 (cat.7:205) - 3535 (cat.9:330) - 3572 (cat.9:359) - 3751 (cat.10:144) - 3822 (cat.10:200) - 4831 (cat.13:29); Mashhad Ilāhīyyat 1165 (cat.2:296) - 1701 (cat.3:804) - 58 (cat.1:28); Millī Arabic 925 (cat.8:425); Nawwāb cat.451; Nūrbakhsh 159 (cat.1:173-4) - 436 (cat.2:132); Princeton New Series 528 - 552 - 1231 - 1518 (cat.323-4); Ridawī Fīgh 531 - 532 - 533 - 534 - 535 - 537 - 538 (cat.5:374-6) - Fīgh 66 (cat.2:20); Rampur 1278 D (cat.3:454); Sipahsālār 458 (cat.1:370); Sulaymān Kḥān cat.6; Tadbīrī Millī 3352 (cat.1:192); Topkapı Serayi A 1143/1 - A 1143/2 - A 1143/3 - A 1143/5 - A 1143/6 - A 1143/7 - A 1143/8 - A 1143/9; Tustariyya 807 (cat.791) - 808 (cat.792); Wazīrī 386 (cat.1:351) - 368 (cat.1:336) - 2589 (cat.4:1355); Zanjānī cat.206.
(42) تهذیلالملکخواه (IM).
ذهیّ، 3:397-8 (نرو.1427).
(فیلوسوفیا; نوایری بعد از رابیّ II 693/مارس 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(43) تذکیر المفغه‌ای عالّکلتکه یس فتیویه المعلمان (KH/IM).
ذهیّ، 4:43-4 (نرو.169).
(نظامی; نوایری بین 24 سفار 703/۴ اکتبر 1303 و 16 دی احیّه 720/۱۷ یانویّر 1321)
(repr. of the 1388/1968 edn.).
MSS: Bīnish 2713 - 6672 - 2267 - 5776 - 2298 - 7495 -7496 -2266 - 2264 - 2265 - 2263 (نرو.641); Būhār 180 (نرو.2:204);
Dānishgāh 6245 (نرو.16:225) - 6617 (نرو.16:313) - 6666 (نرو.16:329); Dār al-Kutub ب.0018 (نرو.1:149); Gawharshād
نرو.۲۳۶; Hakīm 318- 844 - 882 - 884 -1433 - 1961 - 1991 - 1617 (نرو.110-113); Huqūq ج.4 -ج.24 (نرو.287); India Office 1791 -1792 (نرو.2:307); Isfahān ق.ع.م. 2913 (نرو.۲۰۱) - 2974 -5416 (نرو.202); Kāshān 10 (نرو.33); Los Angeles M801 (نرو.168);
Mahfūz 6 (نرو.4:251); Majlis 3227 (نرو.10:2:810) - 3228 (نرو.10/2:811) -3229 (نرو.10/2:811) - 4465 (نرو.12:140) - 4517 (نرو.12:185) - 5810 (نرو.17:234) - 5811 (نرو.17:235); Malik
1916 - 2460 -2461 - 2463 - 2464 - 2465 -2466 - 2490 (نرو.1:130 ff); Marāqī 1071 (نرو.3:254) - 2309 (نرو.6:291-2) - 3745 (نرو.10:141) - 4832(1) (نرو.13:30) -1611 (نرو.5:14); Masjhad Ilāhiyyat 1070(1) (نرو.2:225) - 1108 (نرو.2:244) - 78 - 79 (نرو.1:39); Masjidi Jāmiّ 55 - 56 (نرو.314); Miftah 1033 (نرو.118); Princeton New Series 44 -599 -1829 (نرو.315); Ridawī 546 - 547 - 548 - 549 (نرو.5:382-3) - 53 - 54 - 55 - 56 - 57 - 58 (نرو.2:16);
Sinā 1117 (نرو.2:123); Sipahsālār نرو.1:371-5; Topkapī Serayي A1143/1 -A1143/2 - A1143/3 - A1143/5 - A1143/6 - A1143/7 (نرو.2:747-8); Wazīrī 41 (نرو.1:48).

(44) تاسلک الادخان عالی اکم الیمن (IM).
ذهیّ، 4:174 (نرو.865).
(نظامی)
MSS: no MS known.

(45) تاسلک الافام زی مکیفیت الیکم (KH).
ذهیّ، 4:179 (نرو.887).
(نظامی)
MSS: no MS known.

(46) تاسلک الیکنف الیک حاسیرت الکوثر (KH/IM).
(تشیعی؛ نوایری سل ۷۰۴/۱۵ اوت ۱۳۰۴)
MSS: Agha Hakīm 166(1) (نرو.428); British Library Or 10.971; Dānishgāh MF1523 (نرو.1:299) - MF2913(1) (نرو.1:740); Hakīm
M929 (نرو.120); Haydarīyya 724 (نرو.67); Mahfūz 50(1) (نرو.4:217); Majlis 5384(1) (نرو.16:289).
(47) al-Ta'lisim al-thānī (IM*).
(also al-Ta'lisim al-tāmm)
Dhari'a, 4:226-7 (no.1137).
(philosophy; written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(48) Talkhīs al-marām fi ma'rifat al-aḥkām (KH/IM).
Dhari'a, 4:427 (no.1893).
(law)
MSS: Bīnīsh 2274 - 2275 (cat.667); Majlis 4253 (cat.11:268) - 4818 (cat.13:229) - 5314 (cat.16:228-9); Mar'ashi 472 (cat.2:77); ṭīdawī Fiqh 64 - 65 (cat.2:20).

(49) al-Tanāsub bayn al-Ash'ariyya wa-l-firaq al-sūfīstā'īyya (KH).
Dhari'a, 4:435 (no.1934).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(50) Tānqīh al-abhāth fi l-Culūm al-thalātha (KH*).
Dhari'a, 4:460 (no.2053).
(philosophy; written before 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)
MSS: no MS known.

(51) Tānqīh qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha can al-A'imma al-tāhirin (IM).
(also: Tānqīh qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha can Al Yāsin and Tānqīh al-qawā'id al-ma'khūdha can kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fi l-ahādīth al-sīhāh wa-l-ḥisān).
Dhari'a, 4:464 (no.2061).
(traditions; written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(52) Tahdhib al-nafs fi ma'rifat al-nadhāhib al-khamsa (IM).
Dhari'a, 4:515 (no.2285).
(law; written after Rabī' II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(53) Tahdhib al-wuṣūl ilā Cilm al-uṣūl (KH/IM)
Dhari'a, 4:511-514 (no.2280).
(legal methodology)
MSS: Adabiyyat (1965) 303 (cat.81); Dānishgāh 872 -1637 (cat.8:216-7) - 1670(2) (cat.8:236) - 1702(3) (cat.8:252) - 1876 (cat.8:481) - 3534 (cat.12:2554) - 7691 (cat.16:672) - 8307 (cat.17:103) - 9254(1) (cat.17:332); Farhād 3(2) (cat.169); Gawharshād cat.247; Ḥākim 1949 - 554 - M1310 - 1286 - 1578 - 1158 -1226 (cat.146-7); Ḥuqūq J330 (cat.311); Isfahān Qumānī 3076 (cat.213-4); Isma'il Institute A(493) -B(648) (cat.2:187); Kāshānī 41 (cat.112); Los Angeles M69 - M824 - M1340 (cat.182); Majlis 3427(1) (cat.10/3:1288) - 4629 (cat.13:21) - 5756 (cat.17:195); Mūza 4321(2) (cat.202); Malik 2014 (cat.1:185); Mar'ashi 119(3) (cat.1:143) - 126 (cat.1:148) - 4170(1) (cat.11:181); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat 1536(2) (cat.2:676) - 1538 (cat.2:680) -1540(1) (cat.2:680-1); Nawwāb
(54) Jawāb al-su'āl can ḥikmat al-naskh fī 1-ahkām al-ilāhiyya (DH).  
Dhari'a, 5:183 (no.805).  
(theology; written after Rabi'C II 709/September-October 1309)  
MSS: no MS known.

(55) Jawāhir al-maṭālib fī fāda'il Amīr al-mu'minin 'Alī b. Abī Ṭalib (DH).  
Dhari'a, 5:280-1 (no.1313).  
(on the virtues of the Imam 'Alī)  
MSS: no MS known.

(56) al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd (KH).  
Dhari'a, 5:290 (no.1356).  
(logic)  
MSS: 'Abd al-'Azīm 255 (cat.461); Adabiyyāt (1965) 265 (cat.83); Bīnish 1140 - 1141 (cat.695); Dānishgāh MF5217(2) (cat.3:143); Hakīm 448 - 1668 (cat.176); Isfahān 'Umūmī 2814 - 5400 (cat.218); Los Angeles M1263 (cat.191); Mahfūz 54 (cat.4:217); Majlis 3909 (cat.10/4:1939) - 4319 (cat.12:14); Mar'āṣī 4680 (cat.12:268); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 152 - 153 (cat.1:81); Princeton New Series 591 - 715 (fol.2v-51v) -1127 (cat.103); Ridāwi Mantiq 182 - 183 (cat.4:370); Rampur 1442 D (cat.4:258); Tustariyyā 165 (cat.796); Wazīrī 1284 (cat.3:916) - 1593 (cat.3:997) - 1981 (cat.3:1116).

(57) Ḥāshiyyat talkhīs al-ahkām (DH*).  
Dhari'a, 6:47 (no.233).  
(law)  
MSS: no MS known.

(58) Hall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīhāt (KH).  
Dhari'a, 7:74-5 (no.399).  
(philosophy)  
MSS: no MS known.

(59) Khulāsāt al-agwāl fī ma'rifat al-rijāl (IM/IE).  
Dhari'a, 7:214/5 (no.1040).  
(biographic work; written around Rabi'C II 693/March 1294)  
MSS: 'Adabiyyāt (1341) 205 (cat.78); Adabiyyāt (1965) 151(1) -178 (cat.87); Berlin 9926 - 9927 (cat.9:385-6); Bibliothèque Nationale 1108 (2) (cat.2:323); Bīnish 6890 -3606 - 8181 -3605 -3607 - 3629 - 3630 - 3631 - 5736 - 6589 -7323 - 6614 (cat.743-4); Būhār 277 (cat.2:307) -466 (cat.2:527); Dānishgāh 194 - 1772 (cat.8:312) - 4198 (cat.13:3167) -5385(1) (cat.15:4232) -6714(1) (cat.16:343) -7190.
(cat.16:472) - 7682 (cat.16:670) - 8308 (cat.17:103) - MF3027 (cat.2:31) - MF3573 (cat.3:226); Dār al-Kutub B26297 (cat.1:297); Fu'ād Sayyid 1593 - 1594 (cat.2:4/166); Gawaharshād cat.293; Isfahān 3266 (cat.243); Isma`ili Institute A (409) - B (103) - C (104) (cat.2:74); Los Angeles M959 (cat.210); Ma'had 200(2) (cat.29); Mahfūz 4 (cat.3:9) - 19 (cat.3:38) - 52 (cat.4:203) - 35 (cat.4:241) - 21 (cat.4:257) - 184 (cat.4:224); Majlis 2936(2) (cat.10/1:347) - 3153(1) (cat.10/2:737) - 4406 (cat.12:105) - 5432 (cat.16:333) - 5761(3) (cat.17:201); Malik 3543 (cat.1:280); Mar`ashi 108(1) (cat.1:129) - 137 (cat.1:156) - 221 (cat.1:249) - 773 (cat.2:381) - 410 (cat.2:23) - 1452(2) (cat.4:241) - 2262 (cat.6:267) - 2548(3) (cat.7:131) - 3435 (cat.9:221) - 4135 (cat.11:154) - 4147(1) (cat.1:1:163) - 4952(1) (cat.13:151); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 200 - 201 - 202 (cat.1:104-5) - 518(1) (cat.1:270) - 881 (cat.2:53) - 886 (cat.2:55) - 1381 (cat.2:529); Miftāh 242(1) (cat.230) - 110 - 538 (cat.149) - 1002(2) (cat.265); Millī Arabic 862(1) (cat.8:365) - Arabic 1272 (cat.9:262) - Arabic 1878 (cat.10:511); Mīrzā Ja`far cat.39; Nawwāb cat.547; Nūrbaksh 580 (cat.2:231); Princeton New Series 770 - 880 (cat.130); Ridawī Rijāl 57 - 58 - 59 - 60 - 61 - 62 - 63 - 64 - 65 - 66 (cat.6:599-602) - Rijāl 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 (cat.2:357-8); Sulaymān Khān cat.11; Tabrīz Millī 3139 (cat.1:461); Tustariyya 175 (cat.798); Ustādī cat.17; Zanjānī cat.199,236.

(60) al-Khulāsā fī usūl al-dīn (DH).
Dhari`ī, 7:208-9 (no.1024).
(thology)
MSS: no MS known.

(61) al-Durr al-maknūn fī sharh al-qānūn (IM).
(grammar; written after Rabī`ī II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(62) al-Durr al-maknūn fī Cilm al-qānūn (KH).
Dhari`ī, 8:73 (no.253).
(logic)
MSS: no MS known.

(63) al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-ahādīth al-sīhāh wa-l-ḥisān
(KH/IM`).
Dhari`ī, 8:87 (no.312).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(64) al-Risālā al-sa`diyya (KH`).
Dhari`ī, 12:183 (no.1211).
(thology; written between Rabī`ī II 709/September-October
1309 and 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312)
Editions: in Kalimāt al-muḥaggīqīn (Tehran, 1315/1898),
338-379.
MSS: Adabiyāt (1960) D136 (cat.313); Bānish 600 - 602
(cat.818) - 5655 (cat.819); Būhār 451(1) (cat.2:495);
Dānishgāh 415 - 3819(1) (cat.12:2798); Ilāhiyyāt 245d
(cat.1:561); Isfahān Dānishgāh 87(3) (cat.924); Majlis
4322(3) (cat.12:16); Mar`ashi 4099 (cat.11:116) - 1530

86
(65) Risāla fī adab al-baḥth al-mukhtasār (DH).
Dhari‘a, 1:13 (no.60).
MSS: see Dhari‘Ca, 1:13.

(66) Risāla fī buṭlan al-jabr (RU).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(67) Risāla fī taḥqīq ma‘nā al-īmān (RU).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(68) Risāla fī Khaliq al-a‘māl (DH*).
Dhari‘Ca, 7:243 (no.1177).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(69) Risāla fī su‘ālayn sa’ala ṣanhumā al-Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn (IE)
(theology; written after Rabī‘ II 709/September-October 1309;
for this treatise, see J.v.Ess, Weziir, 47-8).
MSS: Dānishgāh 1795(3) (cat.8:368); Gawharshād cat.250;
Lucknow Nāṣiriya 714; privat library of Mahmūd Shihābī (for
the latter two references, see van Ess, Weziir, 48).

(70) Risāla fī l-mawārīth.
(see Modarressi, 204)
(legal treatise)
MSS: Masjīd-i A‘ẓam 3085 (7).

(71) Risāla fī wājib al-iqtiqād ġalā jamī‘ al-Ǧibād. (KH*)
Dhari‘Ca, 25:4 (no.19).
(Theology)
Editions: together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī’s Iftimād fī
sharh wājib al-iqtiqād, in Kalimat al-muḥaggīqīn (Tehran,
1315/1897), 380-422.
MSS: Dānishgāh 7693(7) (cat.16:673); Gawharshād cat.428;
Īṣfahān Dānishgāh 83(3) (cat.924) -126(4) (cat.928) -182(7)
(cat.930); Isma‘ilī Institute 361 (cat.2:206); Ṣajil
4953(11) (cat.14:230); Mashhad 1lāhiyyāt 658(6) (cat.1:449);
Princeton New Series 1886 (fol.128v-137r) (cat.357);
Ustādī cat.65.
Commentaries: (1) Nahj al-sadād fī sharh wājib al-iqtiqād by
C‘abd al-Wāhid b. al-Safī al-Nūnānī (d. after 1130/1718)
(Dhari‘Ca, 14:163); (2) Taḥṣil al-sadād fī sharh wājib
al-iqtidād by ‘Abd al-Muqīd al-Ǧamī‘ al-Mayṣī (d. after 1020/1611)
(Dhari‘Ca, 3:396-7, no.1424); (3) al-Iqtiqād fī sharh wājib al-iqtiqād
by al-Qādī al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423) (Dhari‘a,
2:230, no.908).
(72) Risāla fī wājibāt al-hajj wa-arkānīhi min dūn dhikr al-adā'iyā wa-l-mustahabbāt (Rū).
Dhari‘a, 25:1 (no.4) & 22:260 (no.6962).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(73) Sharh hikmat al-îshrāq (DH*).
Dhari‘a, 13:211 (no.750).
(mysticism)
MSS: see Dhari‘a, 13:211.

(74) al-Risāla al-Cîzziyya (KH**/IM**).
Dhari‘a, 15:262 (no.1701).
MSS: no MS known.

(75) Ghāyat al-îhkām fī tashîh talkhīs al-maram (KH*).
Dhari‘a, 16:6 (no.24).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(76) Ghāyat al-wusūl wa-îdāh al-sabul fī sharh mukhtaṣar muntahā al-su‘āl wa-l-amal (KH/IM).
Dhari‘a, 16:24-5.
(legal methodology; completed on 12 Rajab 697/25 April 1298)
MSS: Āqā Hakim 180 (cat.428); British Library OR 3970;
Dānishgāh 2771 (cat.10:1528); Los Angeles A446 (cat.297);
Mahfūz 133 (cat.4:221); Nawwāb cat.462; Ridwāl Usūl 63-64
(cat.2:203-4); Topkapi Serayî A 1244 - A 1299 - A 1300 (cat.
2:318-9); Wazīrî 1955 (cat.3:1105-6).

(77) Qawācid al-aḥkām fī maṣrifat al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām
(KH/IM).
Dhari‘a, 17:176-7 (no.930).
(law; completed on 24 Dhū l-Hijja 699/10 September 1300)
Editions: Qun, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn.).
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 34 - 49 (cat.101); Ābd al-Cāzīm 6 - 18
(cat.78) - 402 (cat.473); Āmīr al-Mu‘minīn 61
(cat.415); Bīnish cat.942-3 (27 copies); British Library OR
8341 - OR 8403; Dānishgāh 918 - 1382 (cat.8:69) -1408
(cat.8:84) - 1503 - 1504 - 1505 (cat.8:145-6) -1850
(cat.8:446) - 1857 (cat.8:450) - 2112 (cat.8:748) - 6350
(cat.16:247) - 6362 (cat.16:252) - 6698 (cat.16:335) - 6743
(cat.16:349-50) - 6860 (cat.16:388) - 7314 (cat.16:510) - 8955
(cat.17:261) - MF2537 (cat.1:363); Fāyḍ Maḥdawī (cat.37);
Gawharshād cat.37-1; Gulpāyğānī 136 (cat.129); Huqūq Jā-J9
- J64 - J346 (cat.414 ff); Ilāhiyyāt 388 - 57J - 164J -
175J -(cat.1:630); India Office 1798 (cat.2:309) - 1799
(cat.2:310); Isfahān Cūmūnī 2910 (cat.278) - 2925 (cat.279)
- 2941 (cat.279); Iṣmā‘īlī Institute A(448) - B(449)
(cat.2:126); Kaḥšān 62 (cat.38); Los Angeles M655 - M1065
-M1316 (cat.321); Maṣ‘īrī 67 (cat.1:93); Maḥdawī 798
(cat.165); Mahfūz 59 (cat.3:23) - 70 (cat.3:23) - 373
(cat.4:233); Majlīm 144 (1) (cat.7:330) - 170 (cat.7:218-9)
- 2748(2) (cat.9:1:118) - 2748(3) (cat.9:1:119) - 2839
(cat.10:1:166) - 3275 (cat.10:2:884) - 3276 (cat.10:2:884-5)
- 4196 (cat.11:211) - 4471(4) (cat.12:145) - 4545
(cat.12:217) - 4809 (cat.13:218) - 5219(2) (cat.16:51)
(78) al-Qawāʾid al-jaliyya fī sharḥ al-risāla al-shamsiyya (KH/IM).

DhariʿCa, 17:182 (no.955).

(Logic; completed in Rabīʿ II 679/July-August 1280)


MSS: Bīnish 1144 (cat.943); Ridawī Mantiq 1114 (cat.1:43 = 348 new edition); see also Turāthunā, 17 (1409):243-4 for further MSS.

(79) Qawāʾid wa-magāsid fī l-mantiq wa-l-tabīqī wa-l-ilāhī (KH/IM).

DhariʿCa, 17:195 (no.1031).

(Philosophy)

MSS: no MS known.

(80) al-Qawl al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ṣāliḥ (KH).

(also: al-sīr al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ṣāliḥ).

DhariʿCa, 17:216 (no.1173), 12:170-1 (no.1138).

(exegesis)

MSS: no MS known.

(81) Kāshf al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-āsrār (KH/IM).

(also: Kashf al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-āsrār).

DhariʿCa, 17:233-4 (no.37).

(logic)

MSS: no MS known.
(82) Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra‘īs (IM).
(also: Kashf al-talbīs fi bayān sayr al-ra‘īs).
Dhari‘ī’a, 18:24.
(philosophy; written after Rabī‘ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(83) Kashf al-khafā‘ min kitāb al-shifā‘ (KH/IM).
Dhari‘ī’a, 18:34 (no. 549).
(philosophy; completed on 9 Rabī‘ II 717/21 June 1317)
MSS: Chester Beatty 5151 (cat.7:51).

(84) Kashf al-fawā‘id Cala‘ irdāh mā ishtamalat icalayhi
al-riqā‘āla al-mawsūma bi-qawā‘id al-Qa‘ā‘id (KH/IM).
Dhari‘ī’a, 18:52-3 (no. 635).
(theology; completed on 3 Dhū al-Hijja 703/5 July 1304)
Editions: in Majmu‘at rasā‘il (Tehran: Maktabat Ayat Allah
MSS: Dānishgāh 128; Gawharshād cat.377; Isma‘ili Institute
450 (fol.24v-105r) (cat.2:73); Majlis 81(2) (cat.7:234) -179
(cat.7:232); Ridawī Hikma 482 - 483 - 484 - 485 (cat.4:340);
Tustariyya 860 (cat.808).
Commentaries: (1) by Muḥammad al-Qaṣṣār al-Tihra‘ī (Dhari‘ī’a,
18:52).

(85) Kashf al-murād fī sharh tajrīd ad-iqtigād (KH/IM).
Dhari‘ī’a, 18:60 (no. 668) & 3:353.
(theology; completed on 15 or 16 Rabī‘ II 696/11 or 12 January
1297)
Editions: Saida: Matba‘at al-Qirfān 1353/1934; Qum:
al-Maktaba al-Mustawfiyya, n.d.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1341) 17 (cat.83); Adabiyyāt (1960) J60
(cat.394); ‘Abd al-Qāsim 337 (cat.475); Būhār 87 (cat.2:99);
Chester Beatty 4279 (cat.5:87); Dānishgāh 1104 - 1869
(cat.8:475) - 1865 (cat.8:472) - 6738 (cat.16:348) - 6997
(cat.16:423) - 9336 (cat.17:350); Gawharshād cat.379; India
Office 471(14) (cat.1:127); Los Angeles M661 (cat.330);
Mahfūz 20(4) (cat.3:29) - 74 (cat.3:44); Majlis 630(12)
(cat.1:390) - 4741 (cat.10:4/1726); Malik 806 - 2543
(cat.1:597-8); Mar‘ashi 727 (cat.2:324); Mashhad Adabiyyāt
200 (cat.110); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 819 (cat.2:11) - 457
(cat.1:231); Mi‘taf 1002(1) (cat.265); Nawwāb cat.511;
Qādiriyya 559 (cat.2:398) - 560 (cat.2:399); Ridawī Hikma 220
(cat.1:67 = 118 new edition) - Hikma 221 (cat.1:68 = 189 new
edition) - Hikma 486 - 487 - 488 (cat.4:340-1); Sinā‘ 525
(cat.1:324); Wazirī 2622 (cat.4:1366-7).
Commentaries: (see also Dhari‘ī’a, 6:118) (1) by Abū Qāsim
al-Ibusayn al-Radawī al-Qummi al-Hā‘irī (d. 1324/1906); (2) by

(86) Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīhāt (IM).
Dhari‘ī’a, 18:62 (no. 679).
(philosophy; written after Rabī‘ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.
(87) کاشف al-maqāl fī maqrifat al-rijāl (KH**).
Dharićا, 18:63-4 (no.689).
(biographic work)
MSS: no MS known.

(88) کاشف al-maknūn min kitāb al-gānūn (KH).
Dharićا, 18:64 (no.692).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(89) کاشف al-yaqīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'mīnīn (IE).
Dharića, 18:69-70 (no.721).
(on the virtues of the Imam Ālī)
Editions: Najaf n.d.
MSS: Dānishgāh 128 - 1627(2) (cat.8:210) - 1796 (cat.8:368) -
MF3856(1) (cat.2:270); India Office 471(4) (cat.1:123);
MarCāshī 980(2) (cat.3:172); Mashhad Ilāhīyyāt 1804
(cat.3:874); Mahfūz 31 (cat.3:41); Millī Arabic 1379(1)
(cat.9:378); Princeton New Series 61 (cat.113);
Rīdāwī akhbār 245 (cat.1:80); Wāżīrī 1700 (1) (cat.3:1025).

(90) Lubb al-hikma (IM*).
Dharića, 18:286 (no.131).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(91) al-Mabāhith: arbaCūn mas'ala fī Cūsūl al-dīn (DH).
Dharića, 19:37 (no.198).
(theology)
MSS: Maktabat al-Samāwī (see Dharića, 19:37).

(92) al-Mabāhith al-saniyya wa-l-muCāradāt al-nasīriyya (KH).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(93) Mabādi' al-wusūl ilā Cīlm al-wusūl (KH/IM).
Dharića, 19:43-4 (no.229).
(legal methodology)
Editions: edited by Ābd al-Husayn Muḥammad b.
MSS: Ābd al-Ḥāzīm 382 (cat.475); Berlin 4427 (cat.4:39);
British Library OR 10963; Chester Beatty 3788(2) (cat.4:12);
Dānishgāh 1395 (cat.8:75) - 1690(3) (cat.8:247) - 4798
(cat.14:383) - 7312(3) (cat.16:510) - 9262(1) (cat.17:334)
-MF3043(2) (cat.2:41); Fayd Mahdawi (cat.38); Gawharshād
cat.384; Ḥujjatiyya 252(2)' (cat.102) - 441(1) (cat.107)
-569(2) (cat.114); Ḥuqūq J217 -D56 (cat.452); Isfahān
Dānishgāh 148(2) (cat.929); Isma'īlī Institute' 417
(cat.2:92); Kāshān 82(2) (cat.41); Mahfūz 30 (cat.3:19) -2
(cat.4:253); Majlis 3850 (cat.10/4:1884) - 5406(1)
(cat.16:311); Malik 2813 (cat.1:630); MarCāshī 4(2)
(cat.1:19) - 28(3) (cat.1:40) - 49(3) (cat.1:61) - 119(2)
(cat.1:143) - 482(2) (cat.2:87); Mashhad Ilāhīyyāt 1191
(cat.2:320) - 1206(1) (cat.2:341) -1209(2) (cat.2:345);
Mili Arabic 800(4) (cat.8:304) - Arabic 1678 (cat.10:261);
Müza 4321(1) (cat.212); Princeton New Series 150 - 874
(cat.139-40); Ridawī Usūl al-Fiqh 323(2) (cat.6:140) - Usūl 92
(cat.2:212); Rampur 963 MK (cat.3:68); Tustariyya 867(1)
(cat.877); Ustadī cat.34.

(94) Muhākamāt bayn shurrār al-ishārāt (KH/IM*).
Dharića, 20:132 (no.2256).

(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(95) Mukhtasar sharh nahj al-balāqha (KH).
(also: Mukhtasar nahj al-balāqha)
MSS: Mahdawi 795 (18).

(96) Mukhtalaf al-shića fi ahkām al-sharīća (KH/IM).
Dharića, 20:218 - 221 (no.2666).
(law; written between 4 Jumādā II 699/26 February 1300 and 15
Dhū l-Qa'da 708/26 April 1309)
MSS: Adabiyyat (1965) 121 (cat.105); CAbd al-Cázīm 20 - 29
(79-80); Bīnīsh cat.996-7 (17 copies); Bodleian MS
arab D.108; British Library OR 7811; Dānishgāh 778 - 1472
(cat.8:122) - 1594 (cat.8:195) - 1855 (cat.8:449) - 6653
(cat.16:326) - 6690 (cat.16:334) - 6735 (cat.16:347) - 5769
(cat.16:357) - 6898 (cat.16:689-90) - 7717 (cat.16:638);
Gawharshād cat.389; Gulpaygānī 151 (cat.140); India Office
1790 (cat.2:306); Isfahān Dānishgāh 70 (cat.915); Isfahān
Ummūnī 2831 (cat.298); İsmā'īlī institut 743 (cat.2:109);
Ja'farīyā 14 (cat.435); Kāshān 88 (cat.43); Los Angeles
M1281 (cat.349); Ma'ārif 69 (cat.1:97); Mahfūz 1 (cat.4:250);
Majīs 157 (cat.7:335) - 1316 - 1317 (cat.4:90-1) - 3504
(cat.10/3:1458) - 4003 (cat.11:7) - 4225 (cat.11:244) - 4235
(cat.11:253) - 4511 (cat.12:183) - 4733(1) (cat.13:113);
Malik 2082 - 2198 (cat.1:657); Mar'Cāshī 963 (cat.3:154) - 964
(cat.3:155) - 1052 (cat.3:241) - 1195 (cat.3:363) - 1196
(cat.3:363) - 1229 (cat.4:30) - 1545 (cat.4:347) - 1715
(cat.5:105) - 2609 (cat.7:190) - 3252 (cat.9:43); Mashhad
Ilnāhiyyāt 1379 (cat.2:526) - 1479 (cat.2:623); Masjid-i Jāmīć
171 (cat.337); Millī Arabic 442 (cat.7:375) - Arabic 530
(cat.8:28); Arabic 911 (cat.8:415); Arabic 928 (cat.8:427)
-Arabic 952 (cat.8:445); Mīrza Ja'far cat.41; Nawwāb cat.475;
(cat.2:108) - 803 - 804 - 805 - 806 - 807 - 808 - 809 - 810
-811 (cat.5:492-5); Rampur 10247 D - 986 M (cat.3:470);
Sipahsālar 632 - 633 - 634 - 635 - 636 - 637 (cat.1:515-8);
Sulaymān Khān cat.20; Tustariyya 816 (cat.810);
Ustadī cat.34; Wazīrī 346 (cat.1:323) - 684 (cat.2:584) - 686
(cat.2:588) - 687 (cat.2:588) - 1596 (cat.3:997) - 2930
(cat.4:1476).

(97) Madārik al-ahkām (KH/IM).
Dharića, 20:239 (no.2764).

(law)
(98) Marāṣid al-taqīq wa-maṣāṣid al-taqīq (KH).
Dhariṣa, 20:300 (no.3073).
(phiosophy)
MSS: Dānishgāh 2301 (cat.9:934-5).

(99) Maṣābīh al-anvār (KH).
Dhariṣa, 21:85 (no.4056).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(100) al-Matsālībi al-Qaliyya fī maṣrifat al-Qarabīyya
(KH/IM).
(also: al-Matsālībi al-Qaliyya fī Cilm al-Qarabīyya)
Dhariṣa, 21:140 (no.4324).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(101) Maṣārīj al-faḥm fī sharḥ al-nuẓum (KH/IM).
Dhariṣa, 21:183 (no.4517).
(theology; completed on 6 Ramadān 678/10 January 1280)
MSS: Berlin 1796 -1797 (cat.2:348-9); India Office 471(6)
(cat.1:124); Bankipore, cat.10, no.618; British Library OR
8476(1) (fol.1r-93v) (fragment); Dār al-Kutub (general
catalogue) 1:208; Chester Beatty, 3788 (1) (cat.4:12); CAbd
al-Qāsim 362(1) (cat.450); Āghā Hakīm 166(1) (cat.428);
Dānishgāh MF2448 (cat.1:283); Maḥfūz 50(2) (cat.4:217);
Rawdātī 46 (cat.194); Wazīrī 956 (cat.2:786).

(102) al-Maṣāṣid al-wāfiya bi-fawā'id al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiya
(KH/IM).
Dhariṣa, 21:386 (no.5579).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(103) al-Muqaddima fī l-kālam (DH)
Dhariṣa, 22:89 (no.6205).
(theology)
MSS: see Dharīṣa, 22:89.

(104) Maṣqad al-wāsilīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (KH/IM).
(also Muṣqad al-wāsilīn)
Dhariṣa, 22:112 (no.6312).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(105) al-Muqāwāmat al-hikmiyya (KH).
Dhariṣa, 22:9 (no.5759).
(phiosophy; written before Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(106) Mukātaba bayn al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī wa-l-Qādī al-Baydāwī
(see al-ʿAmīlī, 24:237-9).
(law)

(theology; completed on 5 Rabi’c II 680/25 July 1281)
Editions: Bombay, 1298H. (see Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207); edited by Muhammad Rīḍā al-Anṣārī (forthcoming) (see Turāthunā, 17 (1409):243).
MSS: Aмир al-Mu’mīnin 3 (cat.410); Bīnīsh 251 (cat.1037) – 252 (cat.1038); Huqūq J146 (cat.480); India Office 471(5) (cat.1:124); Kītābkhanā-yi Masjīd-i Āzhām/Qum 655 (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409):87); Mahfūz 424 (cat.4:235); Maktabat Shāh Jirāgh/Shirāz 548 (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409H.):88); Malik 736 (1:740); Rīḍāwī Hikma 251 (cat.1:80 = 238-9 new edition)
– Hikma 252 (cat.1:81 = 240 new edition); Rawdātī 29 (cat.95)
Commentaries: (1) al-Īdān wa-l-tabyīn fī sharḥ minḥāj al-yaqīn, by Kānāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Āṭāʾīqī al-Hillī (d. after 788/1386) (completed on 12 Dhū al-Qaʾādā 789/24 November 1387) (Dhārićā, 2:502, no.1965);
(2) Taʿlīqāt by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥasan al-Kāshīmī (d. 1313/1895) (Dhārićā, 20:352)

Dhārićā, 23:11-2 (no.7841).
(law; completed on 11 Jumādā II 688/2 July 1289)
Editions: Tehran, 1333/1915.
MSS: ʿAbd al-ĆAzīm 15 (cat.82); Āqā Ḥakīm n.n. (cat.420); Bīnīsh 2850 (cat.1041); British Library OR 9854; Gawharshād cat.416; Dānishgāh 1929(1) (cat.8:544); Isfahān Dānishgāh 41 (cat.918); Majlis 2840 (cat.10/1:166) – 3309 (cat.10/2:961) – 4755 (cat.13:141); Malik 1012 – 1228 – 1370 – 1371 (cat.1:745-6); Marʿāshī 4461 (cat.12:48); Mashhād Ilāhiyyāt 878 (cat.2:52); Millī Arabic 370 (cat.7:323); Princeton New Series 798 (cat.184); Rīḍāwī Figh 872 (cat.5:520); Wazīrī 39 (cat.1:47-8) – 523 (cat.2:455) – 1592 (cat.3:996) – 1798 (cat.3:1057); Tustariyya 772 (cat.813).

Dhārićā, 23:15 (no.7848).
(theology/ legal methodology; the first portion on theology was completed in 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288)
MSS: British Library OR 6326; Dānishgāh 1807 (cat.8:394); Mahfūz 128 (cat.3:48).

(110) Minhāj al-salāḥ fī ikhtīsār al-miṣbāḥ (IE).
Dhārićā, 23:164-5 (no.8510).

1 See also Rīḍāwī Usūl 6 (cat.2:210) where a work entitled Maʿārij al-dīn wa-manāḥij al-yaqīn is listed. It is suggested there that this work is identical with al-Hillī's Manāḥij al-yaqīn. The manuscript is, however, described as a legal work. It is therefore impossible that it is identical with the Manāḥij. It is moreover likely that it is not a work of al-Hillī at all. See also Āqā Buzurg, Dhārićā, 21:181 (no.4508).
(law; completed on 11 Dhū al-Hijja 723/11 December 1323).
MSS: Bīnīsh 8019 - 3288 (cat.1047); Dānishgāh 9603 (cat.17:433); India Office 342 (cat.1:87) - 371(10) (cat.1:96); Mahfūz 20 (cat.3:18); Majlis 4405 (cat.12:105); Mar'ashī 1157 (cat.3:328); Miṣṭān 1044 (cat.302); Princeton New Series 53 (cat.167); Ridawī Adīya 493 (cat.6:298) - Adīya 201 (cat.2:296); Rawdātī 30 (cat.100) - 31 (cat.106).

(111) Minhāj fī maṣāṣik al-ḥājī (KH).
Dhāriṭa, 23:171 (no.8531).
(legal work).
MSS: Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1017(2) (cat.2:174).

(112) Minhāj al-karama fī maṣrifat al-imāma (KH*).
Dhāriṭa, 23:172-3 (no.8534).
(theology; written after Rabī' II 709/September-October 1309)
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.503); Bīnīsh 263 - 264 -938 -939 -5666 (cat.1047); Dānishgāh 889 - 1627(1) (cat.8:210) -1990(3) (cat.8:599) - 2603(6) (cat.9:1458) - 4543(4) (cat.13:3488) - 5396(9) - 5398(2) (cat.15:4241) - 6837(2) (cat.17:377) - 7033(1) (cat.16:434) - 8971(16) (cat.17:267) - MP2120(2) (cat.1:645); Farhād 153(2) (cat.230); Gawharṣād cat.417; Huqūq J227 -D15 (cat.485 ff); India Office 471(3) (cat.1:123) - 2089 (cat.2:396); Los Angeles M122(8) (cat.707); Mahdawi 543(2) (cat.122); Mahfūz 20 (cat.3:18); Majlis 1932(3) (cat.9:637) - 4322(1) (cat.12:16); Malik 500 -2235 (cat.1:753-4); Mar'ashī 49(2) (cat.1:60) - 620(3) (cat.2:220) - 593(2) (cat.2:186) - 895 (cat.3:90) - 2523(1) (cat.7:109) - 2843(2) (cat.8:46) - 3160(1) (cat.8:391); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1154 (cat.2:282) - 756 (cat.1:583); Nawwāb 156 Akhbar (2) (cat.496) - cat.521; Millī Arabic 159(3) (cat.7:142); Princeton New Series 456 (cat.166-7); Ridawī Hikma 1043 - 1044 - 1045 (cat.4:261) - Hikma 263 (cat.1:84 = 240 new edition) - Hikma 264 (cat.1:85 = 241 new edition); Sinā 164(3) (cat.1:82); Tustariyya 855(2) (cat.876); Ustādī cat.39; WazIrī 1222 (cat.3:899) - 1562(2) (cat.3:989-90) - 2262(2) (cat.4:1222-3) - 2738(2) (cat.4:1409-10).
Refutations: (1) Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fī naqḍ kālām al-shī'a wa-l-qadariyya; (2) Sarija b. Muḥammad al-Malatī al-Māridīnī (d. 788/1386), Sadd al-fatiq al-muzahhar wa-sadd al-fasīq Ibn al-Muṭahhar (see Kātip Çelebi, 2:1872).

(113) Minhāj al-hidāya wa-maṣāṣik al-dirāṣa fī qilm al-kālām (KH/IM).
(also: Minhāj al-hidāya wa-maṣārīj al-hidāya)
Dhāriṭa, 22:351 (no.7398).
(theology).
MSS: no MS known.
(theology)
MSS: Mahfūz 104(2) (cat.4:220); together with Maqārij al-fāhm, see there. Commentaries: Maqārij al-fāhm fī sharḥ al-nuzum by the author himself.

(legal methodology)
MSS: no MS known.

(116) Nihāyat al-ihkām fī maqūf al-ahkām (KH/IM*).
Dhariqa, 24:394 (no.2108).
(law)
MSS: Aghā Hakīm 40 (cat.423); Bīnish 2659 - 2661 (cat.1063); Dānishgāh 6662 (cat.16:328) - MF2438 (cat.1:395); Isfahān Cümüm 2989 (cat.320); Majlis 5487 (cat.16:385); Malik 1928 - 2967 (cat.1:779); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1188 (cat.2:318); Nawwāb cat.480; Nūrbakhsh 374 (cat.2:95); Princeton New Series 1256 (cat.194-5); Ridawī 449 - 450 - 451 (cat.2:138-9); Waziri 531 (cat.2:461).

(117) Nihāyat al-marām fī Cilm al-kalām (KH/IM).
Dhariqa, 24:407 (no.2153).
(theology)
MSS: Haydariyya 628 (cat.37); Majlis 10192; Marqashī 254 (cat.1:280); Ridawī 11606 (cat.11:419).

(118) Nihāyat al-wusūl ila Cilm al-usūl (KH/IM).
Dhariqa, 24:408-9 (no.2160).
(legal methodology; completed on 8 Ramaḍān 704/4 April 1305).
MSS: Dār al-Kutub (general catalogue) 1:568; Bankipore XIX, I, 1567; Abd al-Qāsim 12 (cat.82); Bīnish 2952 - 6975 - 8170 - 2951 - 2662 (cat.1064); Chester Beatty 3054 (cat.1:22); Dānishgāh 801 - 1176 - MF4215 (cat.3:32); Gulpaygānī 200 (cat.179) - 229 (cat.198); Mahfūz 121 (cat.4:221); Majlis 3418 (cat.10:3:1281) - 3842 (cat.10:4:1879) - 4052 (cat.11:52); Malik 1879 (cat.1:785); Marqashī 277 (cat.1:305) - 384 (cat.1:401) - 1356 (cat.4:132) - 1642 (cat.5:43) - 1908 (cat.5:278) - 1927 - 1926 (cat.5:296) - 2217 (cat.6:207) - 4566 (cat.12:142) - 4876 (cat.13:59); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1243 (cat.2:377) - 1873 (cat.3:937); Mištāh 1262 (cat.308); Oppenheim 292(4) (Opp.116.1988); Princeton New Series 376 (cat.195); Ridawī Usūl al-Fiqh 353 - 354 - 355 (cat.6:92-3) - Fiqh 452 (cat.2:139) - Usūl 96 - 97 (cat.2:213); Sinā 1385 (cat.2:241-2); Sulaymān Khān cat.23; Topkapi Serayi A 1271 (cat.2:346); Tustariyya 492 (cat.814); Ustādī cat.41; Waziri 48(1) (cat.1:63) - 550 (cat.2:470).

(119) Nahj al-Imān fī tafsīr al-gur'ān (KH).
Dhariqa, 24:412 (no.2170).
(exegesis)
MSS: no MS known.
Dānishgāh 126(2) (cat.928) - 153(1) (cat.929); India Office 471(7) (cat.1:124) - 2094 (cat.2:398); Isma'īli Institute 342 (cat.2:114); Kāshān 82(1) (cat.41); Los Angeles M930(2) (cat.700) - M1505(9) (cat.707) - M306(3) (cat.723); Mahfūz 23 (cat.3:18) - 70 (cat.3:65) - 31 (cat.3:19) - 30 (cat.4:202) - 80 (cat.4:218); Majlis 3256(2) (cat.10/2:848) (Irshād al-tālibīn) - 3427(2) (cat.10/3:1289) (Irshād al-tālibīn) -4954(12) (cat.14:237) - 5466 (cat.16:367); Mar'ashī 4(3) (cat.1:19) - 750(7) (cat.2:355) -1467(6) (cat.4:259) -2494(3) (cat.7:84) - 4081(3) (cat.11:94) - 3427 (cat.9:214) (Irshād al-tālibīn); Mashhad Ilāhiyyat 1219(1) (cat.2:356) -1834(1) (cat.3:903-4); MāLi Arabī 856 (cat.8:356) -Arabī 1691(3) (cat.10:274); Princeton New Series 1308 -1886 (cat.191) -367 (Irshād al-tālibīn); Ridawī Ḥikma 1065 -1066 -1067 -1068 -1069 (cat.4:268-9); Tustariyya 247(7) (cat.845); Wazīrī 1304 (cat.3:923) - 1069(2) (cat.3:843).


(123) Nahj al-wuṣūl ilā ʾCilm al-uṣūl (KH/TM).
Dharī'C, 24:426 (no.2227).
(legal methodology)
MSS: no MS known.

(124) Nahj al-waddāh fī l-ahādīth al-ṣiḥāh (KH).
Dharī'C, 24:427 (no.2229).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(125) al-Nūr al-mushriq fī ʾCilm al-mantiq (IM).
(logic, written after Rabī'C II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(126) Wājib wudū' wa-l-salāt (DH*).
(also: Wajibat al-wudū')
Dharī'C, 25:5 (no.23).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.
CHAPTER III

JUSTICE

1. Ethical Objectivism Versus Divine Subjectivism

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī disagreed about the origin and character of the ethical standards for good and evil.

Al-Ḥillī supported the Muʿtazilite position of ethical objectivism. He presents the views of the different parties and clarifies his own position:

The Muʿtazilites agree that there are things the goodness and evil of which are necessarily known such as the goodness of beneficial truth, of fairness (insāf), of doing good (iḥsān) and of thanking the benefactor and [like] the evil of harmful lying, oppression (ẓulm), corruption (fasād), and the imposition of something as obligatory which cannot be fulfilled (taklīf mā la yutāq). There are other things whose goodness and evil is known by deduction from reason, such as the goodness of harmful truth and the evil of beneficial lying. Other things are known by revelation. This does not mean that [revelation] is the cause (Cilla) of the goodness and the evil, rather it uncovers it....

The Ashʿarites maintain that both good and evil are standards determined by the law (sharʿiyyāt). Thus good is what the Lawgiver commands and evil is what He prohibits, because this knowledge is not reached by reasoning nor by consensus and it is not necessary.¹

This passage highlights the difference of view between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites.² According to Muʿtazilite doctrine, good and evil have real existence and are independent of revelation. Through reason, man knows in

¹Tasālīk, 62r; see also Maṣārij, 121v.
general terms certain primary propositions of good and evil. In regard to acts which are apparently affected by contradictory judgements, man can through reasoning arrive at further conclusions about their status. He may assess the weight of various aspects and thus arrive at a conclusion about the value of the act as a whole. In addition to these two categories, there were certain acts whose goodness cannot be known by reason, and here revelation serves to teach man what he is unable to know by himself. This category contains for instance the acts of worship. Revelation is, thus, understood by al-Ḥilli and the Muʿtazilites as a detailed explanation of what man already knows in a general way by reason. It does not determine moral standards but rather reveals them to man. Through revelation, God therefore assists man to gain access to the full knowledge about objective values to which He is subject Himself.

In the Ash'arite view, God determines what is good and evil through His command and prohibition. He does so solely on the basis of His will. Man is therefore unable to know what is good and what is evil by reason prior to revelation. God Himself is not bound by any laws or values since He is sovereign above them.

When al-Rāzī discussed the origin of ethical values he differentiated between three different types of good and evil. He states:

It is important in regard to this question about the origin of ethical values to determine the place of disagreement.

We say there is no disagreement that we know by reason that certain things agree with our nature while others disagree with it. Thus, pleasure

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4See Hourani, "Ethics," 104.
5Al-Ḥilli, Manāḥij, 98v.
8For references, see ibid., 208.
(ladhāḥa) and whatever leads to it agree [with man's nature]; pain and whatever leads to it disagree [with it] and there is no need for the law to recognize this agreement and this disagreement. We know further by reason that knowledge is characterized by the attribute of perfection (kāmāl) while ignorance is characterized by the attribute of deficiency (nūgān). The disagreement concerns, therefore, [the issue] that some acts are connected with blame (dhamm) in this world and punishment (ṣīqāb) in the hereafter while others are connected with merit (madh) in this world and reward (thawāb) in the hereafter. Is this so because of an intrinsic characteristic of the act or is it rather the case that this is only the judgement of the law about this or the statement of the people of knowledge about it? The Mu'tazila maintain that the effector for these judgements (ahkām) are intrinsic attributes of the act. Our view is that it is determined only by the judgement (hukm) of the law.\(^9\)

The first type of ethical values, according to al-Rāzī, applies to human beings only.\(^10\) Whatever suits a person's advantage, such as pleasure or joy, is perceived to be good by this person. Whatever disagrees with it, like pain and grief, is evil from the subjective point of view of this person.\(^11\) Since these values differ in their meaning from person to person, al-Rāzī argued, not even two people could ever agree about the ethical value of a certain act.\(^12\) This type of ethical values does not contain any objective aspect. Nor do they indicate for which act man deserves praise or blame. They are, therefore, not related to the knowledge of ethical values as known by revelation.

In regard to the second type of values, al-Rāzī defined good in terms of perfection and evil in terms of deficiency. This concept, which derived from the philosophical tradition, was of no significance in his discussion on ethics.

In his discussion of the third type of values, al-Rāzī strictly adhered to the traditional Ash'arite position of divine subjectivism. God alone determines the

\(^9\)Arba'a, 246; see also his al-Ishāra fī ġilm al-kalām (MS Alexandria 519/2), 32v-33r.

\(^{10}\)Ma'ālim, 86-7.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., 86-7; Matālib, 3:21ff, 289ff.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., 3:32.
ethical values through His command and prohibition. The subjective standards for good and evil which man knows by reason are unrelated to this type. Man is, therefore, unable rationally to know any of the values laid down by God.  

The acknowledgment of merely subjective human standards for good or evil which are not related to the ethical standards as they are determined by God originated from al-Juwaynī who adhered to this view in his āqīda. His position was later adopted by al-Ghazālī.

On the basis of this notion of subjective ethical values, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī disagreed with their predecessors why man is obliged to obey the religious law. The earlier Ashʿarites held that this obligation is founded in the law itself. Al-Juwaynī was the first to reject this view. He argued that because of the subjectivity of his own standards for good and evil man feels the

necessity to act according to the law in order to avoid the punishment for disobeying it.\footnote{17} This view was adopted by al-Ghazālī\footnote{18} and al-Rāzī. The latter argues:

Do you agree that it is reason which demands precaution (iḥtiṣāz) against punishment or do you say that this obligation is established only by the law?

If you adhere to the first alternative, you agree that good and evil are established by reason in the visible world (fī il-shāhīd).

If you adhere to the second alternative, man is not obliged to avoid punishment except by another obligation while the meaning of this obligation is again the punishment following upon it. This necessitates an endless chain in the sequence of punishments which is absurd. This proves that reason is the judge for good and evil in the visible world.\footnote{19}

\footnote{17} He states (\textit{Aqāda}, 45): "Our predecessors held that God's command must be obeyed only when it is specifically given, and that it is because of His power and divinity that God's order deserves to be obeyed. But this is an attitude towards which an intelligent person should be cautious, if his aspiration makes him guard against blindly following authority.... Rather I say that were it not that the law states the threat of punishment (waṣīd) for those who fail to do what He orders, man would not understand [that he has] an obligation.... Indeed, when a man becomes aware of a threat of punishment, his reason induces him to recognize the obligatory nature of those things for the omission of which he would suffer what is more than unbearable."

\footnote{18} See Hourani, "Ghazālī," 139-40.

\footnote{19} \textit{Maṣā'īl}, 87; see also \textit{Arba'īn}, 249; \textit{Maṭālib}, 3:18, 289-90.
2. The Nature of God's Justice

As a result of their differences regarding the character of ethical values and God's relationship to these values, al-Hillī and al-Rāzī supported different views about God's relation towards His creation.

Al-Hillī maintained that objective ethical standards apply to God as well as to man and so God's justice must be measured in accordance with these values. He therefore defined God as just in the sense that He neither commits any evil nor falls short in His obligations acting only for the purpose of pure goodness and for the benefit of others or, as al-Hillī expressed it, because of the "motive of wisdom" (dā'ī al-ḥikma).

The Muʿtazilites traditionally argued that God does not commit any evil since He is self-sufficient (ghanī) and omniscient. Thus He does not have any motivation to do evil. Al-Hillī argues accordingly when he states:

The proof of the doctrine chosen by the Muʿtazila is that God has a motive for the good and no deterrent (ṣārif) from it and He has a deterrent from the evil without any motive for it, while

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22 Maʿārij, 122r.
having power over everything subject to power; and when power and motive are joined, the act is necessary.

We say so because God is self-sufficient, as need is impossible with regard to Him and He knows the goodness of good and the evil nature of evil. [And] it is necessarily known that from someone who knows evil without needing it, it will not issue. [It is] furthermore [known] that one who knows good over which he has power, will produce it, when it is free from aspects of corruption. The explanation (tahrir) of this is that an act is contingent (mumkin) with regard to itself and necessary (wajib) with regard to its cause and every contingent is dependent (mustanid) on a capable agent. Its cause (Cilla) becomes complete through the means of capability and the motive. When they are present the means (sabab) is complete, and when the means is complete the existence is necessary.24

Al-Hilli argues here on the basis of his theory of acts. Acts necessarily occur when motive and power come together and they cannot occur when either power or motive are lacking.25 Thus God cannot commit evil or fall short in His obligations since He does not have a motive for doing so.

His argument is directly based on Ibn al-Malāhīmī's discussion in which the latter similarly argued that God is a capable agent (gādir) who cannot act without a motive. Since He does not have a motive to commit evil or to fall short in His duties because of His self-sufficiency and His omniscience, He cannot possibly commit evil.

This argumentation differed from that of the Bahshamiyya who supported the same position, arguing by analogy from man to God (gīyās Calā l-shāhid).26 Ibn al-Malāhīmī held that it is redundant to argue on the basis of analogy from man to God once it has been acknowledged that God has no motive to do evil.27 The reason for this difference is to be found in the differing theories of acts. Ibn al-Malāhīmī and

\begin{footnotes}
24\textit{Kashf al-murād}, 237; see also \textit{Manāhij}, 97r; \textit{MaCārij}, 122r.
25\textit{See later.}
26\textit{Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī}, 6/1:177ff, 186; \textit{Mānakdīm}, 303, 316ff.
27\textit{Faʿālīq}, 69r-v.
\end{footnotes}
al-Ḥilli both maintained that a capable agent cannot act without a motive. The Bahshamiyya, in contrast, allowed that a capable agent may produce an act without a motive.  

Al-Rāzi differed fundamentally from al-Ḥilli's view on God's relation towards His creation. According to his concept of divine omnipotence, God is the sole creator of everything existing, including every evil. Moreover, since God determines what is good and evil, He Himself is not subject to any ethical values and His acts therefore cannot be judged. For this reason, God is also not obliged to perform any act. Al-Rāzi rejected, therefore, the Muḥtazilite view of justice which he considered as an infringement of the principle of divine omnipotence. In doing so he was in agreement with the Ash'arite tradition. On this basis, al-Rāzi was concerned to show that God's acts cannot be judged as either evil or good. He argues:

Know that when it has been established that the judgement of good and evil has no meaning except [in relation to] gaining benefits (jalb al-manāfi') and repelling of harmful matters, this can reasonably be affirmed only in regard to one for whom benefit and harm apply. Since God is exalted above this judgement of good and evil it cannot be affirmed in His regard.  

This argument is based on al-Rāzi's concept of rational good and evil. These standards have a meaning only in regard to man and are irrelevant in relation to God who is self-sufficient and therefore exalted above them. Al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī, who also affirmed purely human rational values, likewise argued that since good and evil apply only to men, God's acts cannot be judged by these standards.

28 See later.
30 E.g. Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:140; for this notion among earlier Ash'arites, see also Hourani, "Juwaynī," 133.
31 Māṭālīb, 3:66, 291 ff; also his "al-Maṣā'il al-khamsūn," in Majmu'at rasā'il (Cairo, 1328H.), 376.
32 Agīdā, 26, 41.
33 Iqtisād, 74.
Elsewhere, al-Rāzī argued also that God cannot be judged according to the non-rational ethical values known from revelation. Since He determined them and since they are relevant to mankind only, God is not bound by them.\textsuperscript{34} In this regard, too, His acts cannot be subject to the standards of good and evil.\textsuperscript{35} This second point was traditionally employed by earlier Ash'arites as an argument that God's acts cannot be judged to be evil.\textsuperscript{36}

It is noteworthy that al-Rāzī unambiguously maintained here that God's acts can neither be evaluated as evil nor as good. While this was correct on the basis of Ash'arite principles, most of his predecessors had in fact argued that since all of God's acts are beyond evaluation and as such cannot be evil, they must be qualified as good.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Arba'īn, 246; Ishāra, 32v-33r.
\textsuperscript{35} Masa'il, 376.

\textsuperscript{37} E.g. Abū Bakr b. Fārāk, Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ash'arī (edited by D. Girmet). Recherches. Nouvelle Série: A. Langue arabe et pensée islamique, vol.14. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1987), 130 where all of God's acts are qualified as wise (hikma); Abū l-Ḥasan Ālī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī, "Risāla ilā ahl al-thaqīf bi-bāb al-abwāb," Ilahiyat fakultesi mecnuası 8 (1929):99, where God is labelled as just (ṣādiq) in all His actions; Ālī b. Muhammad Sayyid al-Shārīf al-Jurjānī, Statio Quinta et Sexta et appendix libri Mevakif cum commentario Gorganī (edited by Th. Soerensen). Leipzig, 1894), 148-9 where a similar conclusion is drawn; see also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 213 for further references. Elsewhere, al-Rāzī draws, however, the conclusion in the traditional Ash'arite way that all of God's acts are good; see Ishāra, 32v, where he maintains that God's actions are all good in the sense that He acts without any obstruction; also Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:144-5 where he calls God's acts all wise since He acts in His own property (mulk). Al-Juwainī was among the few Ash'arites who pointed out that good and evil, both of which are standards applicable only to man but not to God, cannot be applied to any of God's acts. He states (Āqīda, 26): "If it were not that the community of the Truth (Cusbat al-hagg)
In contrast to al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī further denied that God acts for a purpose and with this he was in agreement with the Ashʿarite tradition. He therefore rejected the notion that God ever acts either for the purpose of pure goodness or for the benefit of others. As seen above, al-Ḥillī considered these the only admissible motivations for God's actions. In support of his position, al-Rāzī employed the argumentation deriving from the philosophical tradition that God's actions emanate from Him only because of His own essence, not for any extraneous consideration. If God acted for a purpose, this would necessarily imply that God is deficient in Himself and perfecting Himself through this act. However, in contrast to the philosophers who maintained that God is Himself the most perfect goodness so that only goodness emanates from Him, al-Rāzī and the Ashʿarites held that God acts in accordance with His will (irāda). Men have neither the right to ask, nor the possibility to know, what God's motivations are.

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upheld that God is the creator of good and evil, the doctrine of unity (tawḥīd) would require that one should say that there is nothing among God's actions which is good and evil in relation to (His) divine rule. For all actions are alike in His ruling. Their ranks vary only in relation to men. 
41 Maʿālim, 88; see also al-Ḥillī, Manāhid, 97r where he notes the philosophical argumentation and its adoption among later Ashʿarites. By this, he had undoubtedly al-Rāzī in mind.
3. God's Obligation to Act in Man's Best Interest (Aslah)

According to the Mu'tazilite theory of justice, God acts only out of pure goodness and for the benefit of others. Moreover, having imposed on man a moral obligation as an act of grace, God is obliged to render man every possible facilitation enabling him to fulfil that obligation. On this basis, the question arises whether God's obligation to act in man's interest is restricted to assisting man to fulfil his moral obligation or whether this obligation applies also to purely worldly matters. ⁴³

Al-Hillī held that God's obligation goes beyond the religious sphere affirming that God always acts for man's best interest whenever He knows that His act will result in pure benefit free of any harm. His argument rested on his theory that action must occur when motive and power come together. God thus acts necessarily for man's best interest whenever He has the motive to do so, regardless of whether the act is beneficial to man in regard to the fulfilment of his moral obligation or in any other respect. ⁴⁴ When al-Hillī surveyed the various positions held by his Mu'tazilite predecessors, he ascribed the view which he himself favoured to Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī (d. 319/931):

If God knew that if He gave Zayd money he would gain benefit and there was neither cause of corruption (mafsada) nor harm (madarra), nor any evil aspect in it, the Baghdadis and Abū l-Qāsim held that God would be obliged to give [Zayd this

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⁴⁴ Manāhīj, 98v.
money] but the Baṣrāns denied this. The former argued that if the motive exists and there is no deterrent, the act is necessary.\textsuperscript{45}

The positions of al-Ḥillī's Muṣţazilite predecessors, however, were not as clear-cut as he presents them.

The view that God is obliged to act in man's best interest in the realm of religion only, which became later associated with the school of Basra, was in fact shared by all of the earlier Muṣţazilites. They discussed God's obligation to act in man's best interest only in terms of facilitating favours (lutf, pl. altāf) which assist man to fulfil his moral obligation.\textsuperscript{46} They agreed that God's actions reach the limit of the beneficence He is capable of rendering in this realm.\textsuperscript{47} The founder of the early school of Baghdad, Bishr b. al-Muṣṭamīr (d. 210/825) who in substance agreed with this view, further refined the Muṣţazilite position. He pointed out that there is no limit to the beneficence which God is capable of rendering. It is, therefore, absurd to say that God is obliged to act in man's best interest since this implies an obligation for the infinite. He therefore held that although God acts in the most beneficial way for the

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., 247, 574. To safeguard the notion of divine omnipotence they commonly argued that although God's beneficial actions are the most beneficial He is capable of rendering, He has the capacity of rendering infinite acts of similar beneficial acts (anthāl); see ibid. An exception was Abū 1-Ḥudhayl who differed from the other Muṣṭazilites when he held that the similar beneficial acts God is capable to render are also finite; see ibid., 249, 576-7. Abū 1-Husayn al-Khayyāt (Kitāb intīṣār (edited by H.Nyberg. Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyyā, 1925), 16ff) explains that Abū 1-Ḥudhayl's assertion of the finitude of creation resulted from his view that God differs from the contingent in His being infinite. Therefore, nothing other than God can be infinite. See also R.Frank, "The Divine Attributes According to the Teaching of Abu 1-Hudhayl al-Allāf," Le Muséon 82 (1969): 473ff; J.van Ess, "Abu 1-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an Anecdote," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy (edited by M.Marmura. Studies in Honor of G.Hourani. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 235ff; also S.Pines, Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre (Gräfenhainichen: A.Heine, 1936), 14-5.
morally-obliged to assist him in the fulfilment of his moral obligation and although He is obliged to do so, God is capable, yet not obliged, of rendering a further facilitation which would induce an unbeliever to become a believer. The generality of the earlier Mu'tazilites had denied God's capability to do so. Bishr's objection to the view of the other Mu'tazilites was decisive for the position of Abū CAlī and the Bahshamiyya. Abū CAlī maintained that God's obligation applies only to acts which facilitate man's fulfilment of his moral obligation. In this respect, God acts in the most beneficial manner of which He is capable. Although Abū CAlī disagreed with Bishr when he held that God is incapable of granting a facilitation to someone who is morally-obliged with the object of making him a believer when He knows that he will be an unbeliever, he accepted Bishr's argument that it is absurd to say that God acts in man's best interest in the utmost possible manner. He further elaborated this reasoning arguing that since God is omnipotent, what is subject to His power is infinite. If He were under obligation to act for man's best interest while being capable of providing unlimited benefit in that respect, His obligation would be infinite. To create an infinite number of things, however, is impossible. Moreover, creation could not have had a beginning, since God could always be said to be capable of providing the most beneficial effects before any beginning. Abū CAlī therefore held that although God renders the utmost beneficial facilitations to the morally-obliged to assist him in his fulfilment of the moral obligation, God is capable of rendering a facilitation which, when He would render it to someone whom He knows that he does not believe, would induce him to believe. And it is not obligatory for God to render this facilitation....God is not obliged to do the best of things for man. Indeed it is absurd because there is no limit and no term to the beneficence which God is able to perform. He is obliged to do for them only what is best for them in their religion."

48 Al-Ash'arī (Maqālāt, 246) reports Bishr's view: "God is capable of a facilitation which, when He would render it to someone whom He knows that he does not believe, would induce him to believe. And it is not obligatory for God to render this facilitation....God is not obliged to do the best of things for man. Indeed it is absurd because there is no limit and no term to the beneficence which God is able to perform. He is obliged to do for them only what is best for them in their religion."

49 Ibid., 247, 574.

50 Ibid., 247-8, 575.

51 cAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:56.
capable of rendering additional favours which would help him to increase his reward. Yet He is not obliged to render these.

The followers of the later school of Baghdad founded by Abū l-Qāsim al-Kā'ībī (d. 319/931) maintained a different position. They held that God always acts for men's best interest both in religious and worldly matters.\(^5\) In contrast to the Basrans, they moreover held that God does not do so because He is obliged to do so but rather out of generosity (jūd).\(^5\) Presumably in reply to objections by the Basrans that God's acts cannot be the most beneficial He is able to render, the Baghdadis substituted the benefits of the collective for those of the individual. A morally-obliged person may never become a believer but the imposition of moral obligation upon him may still be beneficial as it might induce others to believe.\(^5\)

Al-Hillī's statement that Abū l-Qāsim al-Kā'ībī argued for his view on the basis of the theory that an act necessarily occurs when power and motive come together, is therefore mistaken. With this presentation, al-Hillī followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī who first ascribed this view to Abū l-Qāsim and his followers.\(^5\)

Having adopted the view that God necessarily acts for man's best interest when He has the motive to do so, al-Hillī was confronted with the Basran objection that God's obligation cannot comprise the infinite. In reply to this, he correctly pointed out that the infinite is not contingent (mumkin) but impossible (mum'tani\(^c\)); therefore, it does not belong to what is obligatory for God to perform.\(^5\)

Al-Hillī's position on God's obligation to act for man's best interest is directly based on the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Maintaining that an act occurs necessarily

\(^5\) Jānākīm, 134; see also McDermott, 72ff; Brunschvig, 11.
\(^5\) Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 146r; McDermott, 73-4.
\(^5\) Jānākīm, 518; McDermott, 73 n.1.
\(^5\) See later.
\(^5\) Manāḥij, 98v; this passage is extremely corrupt in the manuscript.
when motive and power come together, the latter argued that when God has the power for a beneficial act and the motive to do it, He necessarily produces it.\textsuperscript{57} Since this principle is not restricted to the realm of what is beneficial for the fulfilment of man's moral obligation, Ibn al-Malāḥimī concluded that God's obligation to act for man's best interest applies equally to worldly matters.\textsuperscript{58} He further attempted to show that his view agreed with the position of both the Baghdadis and the Basrans.

He argued that his own principle of the motive and power necessitating the act underlies the position of both schools. Although the Basrans denied God's obligation to act for man's best interest in every respect, they acknowledged, according to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, that a beneficence has to be done in the presence of capacity and motive and the absence of a deterrent even if God is not obliged to do so on account of His justice.\textsuperscript{59} Since this is in conflict with the Basran position, he presumably meant here that according to the Bahshamiyya, God often acts out of generosity (jūd) beyond the obligatory which He does out of justice (Cadl).

In regard to the Baghdadis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī suggested that they maintained that God acts for man's best interest in every respect owing to the theory of capacity and motive necessitating the act.\textsuperscript{60} Since the Baghdadis certainly did not adhere to the principle of power and motive necessitating the act, which was introduced only by Abū 1-Ḥusayn al- Başrī into the theological discussion, Ibn al-Malāḥimī's claim is not correct. His conclusion was that the disagreement between Basrans and Baghdadis can be reduced to a mere verbal disagreement (khilāf fī 1-Ṣibāra).\textsuperscript{61}

Dealing with the Basran objection that God cannot be said to create an infinite number of things, Ibn al-Malāḥimī argued like al-Ḥillī that it is impossible for

\textsuperscript{57} Fā'iq, 146r-v.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 147r.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 147v.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
the infinite to exist. Therefore, it cannot fall under the obligation of a capable agent. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, this reply originated with the Baghdadis:

If they would say 'the motive calls for the act only in so far as its existence is feasible in itself and the existence of the infinite is not feasible in itself; the motive can therefore not call for it', it should be said to them 'the Baghdadis, too, say that the act is obligatory for the agent [only] in so far as it is feasible in itself. The infinite is not feasible in itself, therefore its obligation upon the capable agent is not admissible'.

The position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī which was adopted by al-Ḥillī, differed to some extent from the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. There are clear indications that the latter hesitated to support the view that God necessarily acts in every instance in man's best interest. He rather held a position between the Baghdadi and the Basran views. When he was confronted with the objection that God cannot possibly be under obligation to act infinitely for man's best interest, Abū l-Ḥusayn argued that in such cases God may or may not act for man's best interest. Ibn al-Malāḥimī comments:

As for our master Abū l-Ḥusayn, he maintained that the doing of the most beneficial is only necessary in some of the cases in which the motives for it exist. He said that if [rendering of] the additional amount to the [initial amount of] 1000 contained an evil aspect, it is obligatory that the [initial] 1000 should be given because he [i.e. the agent] has no deterrent from it. If it [i.e. the additional amount] infinitely [repeated] does not contain any evil aspect this is like a deterrent from giving the 1000. He [i.e. the agent] may therefore sometimes render it and sometimes not.

With this answer, Abū l-Ḥusayn did not go as far as the Baghdadis who maintained that God acts in principle always for man's best interest and who would not have considered infinity as a deterrent from giving the additional amount. He did, however, go further than the Basrans who would have

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62 ibid., 147r.
63 ibid.
64 ibid., 147r; see also al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 270-1.
denied that God is obliged to render the initial amount since this amount would not facilitate the fulfilment of the moral obligation of a morally-obliged.

A further indication that Abū 1-Husayn held a view between the Baghdādi and the Basra position is found in al-Rāzī's Matālib al-Qaliyya and his Tafsīr. 65 Al-Rāzī mentioned Abū 1-Husayn in connection with the famous story of the three brothers. This story deals with the fate in the hereafter of a believer, an unbeliever and one who died young. The one who died young and earned a position in heaven below that of the believer complains to God that He let him die early and deprived him thus of the chance to earn a higher position. God answers that He knew that he would sin; so He let him die early. Thereupon the unbeliever asks God from hell why He did not make him die likewise since He must have known that he would not become a believer. 66 This story, as R. Gwynne has shown, 67 was told for the first time by Abū 1-Husayn al-Baṣrī's contemporary ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādi (d. 429/1037).

Al-Rāzī reports that Abū 1-Husayn dealt with this argument in his Kitāb ghurar al-adilla. 68 Abū 1-Husayn is reported to have answered the objection from the point of view of both positions.

67 Ibid., 133.
68 The printed edition (Matālib, 3:326-7) has the reading Kitāb al-qadar. No such title is among the books attributed to Abū 1-Husayn. The reading Kitāb al-ghurar is confirmed by a manuscript copy of the text (MS Chester Beatty 3114, 141r). This work is lost (see W. Madelung, "Abū 1-Husayn al-Baṣrī, Encyclopedia of Islam, Suppl. Fasc. 1-2:25). In his Tafsīr, al-Rāzī does not mention his source for Abū 1-Husayn's answers. As Gwynne remarks (132), no Muḥtazilite text known so far mentions this argument. If al-Rāzī's information is correct, Abū 1-Husayn's Ghurar al-adilla would therefore be presumed to be the earliest and as far as is known the only Muḥtazilite text where this argument is mentioned.
According to the Baghdadis who substituted the best interest of the community for the best interest of the individual, God let only the brother die young who would have caused harm to the community. The other one who turned out to be an unbeliever constituted no harm to the community. There was therefore no need to let him die early.\footnote{Matalib, 3:327; Tafsir, vol.6, pt.13:195.}

According to the Basran view, the act of God to let the one brother die young was an act of grace which He was not obliged to perform. The fact that He did perform an act of grace to one person does not mean that He is obliged to do the same to another.\footnote{Matalib, 3:327-8; Tafsir, vol.6, pt.13:195.}
4. Pain and Compensation

As a Mu'tazilite, al-Hilli was faced with the problem that pain unavoidably occurs in the world generated by man and by God. In particular the existence of suffering caused by God gave rise to questions about His justice.

Al-Razi as an Ash'arite was not concerned with this problem. Since God's acts are above any standards for good and evil God can inflict as much pain as He pleases without being obliged to recompense the sufferer in any way.\textsuperscript{71}

Al-Hilli enumerated five categories of pain which he considered as good. His list appears to be directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq.\textsuperscript{72}

The Mu'tazilites say that it [i.e. pain] is good under [certain] conditions. First, if [the pain] is deserved (mustahagg); secondly, if it results in great benefit exceeding it [i.e. the pain]; thirdly, if it prevents a greater harm; fourthly, if it occurs according to custom like God's act with regard to a living being when we throw him into fire; fifthly, if it is done in self-defence such as when we cause pain to someone who intends to kill us. For if we know that the pain contains one of these aspects, we definitely judge it to be good.\textsuperscript{73}

From the elaborations of Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his own discussion, it is evident that cases two and three concern pain inflicted by a person to himself. Ibn al-Malāḥimī referred to the examples of drinking medicine to repel illness and of striving for knowledge to repel ignorance.\textsuperscript{74} Case one clearly refers to pain inflicted by God as punishment on a sinner.\textsuperscript{75} Case four equally refers to pain

\textsuperscript{71} "Masa'il," 377-8; Tafsīr, vol.8, pt.16:88-9; also Matālib, 4:423-4. For this notion among the Ash'arites in general, see Mānākīn, 483; Hourani, "Juwaynī," 113.
\textsuperscript{72} Fā'iq, 131v.
\textsuperscript{73} Kashf al-murād, 259.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
inflicted by God such as the burning of a living being in the fire. Since the burning occurs, however, according to custom, God cannot be blamed for this specific burning.76

As for pain inflicted specifically by God, al-Hilli stipulated that it must be inflicted for a benefit (nafas) either for the sufferer or for another person. In the second case, the sufferer must receive a compensation exceeding the pain suffered. God may further inflict pain because it was deserved.77 This was also the general Mu'tazilite view.78 In contrast to man, God cannot inflict pain with the purpose of removing harm (daf al-darar) even if the latter is greater than the pain. The reason for this is God's omnipotence which enables Him to prevent evil by other means. Moreover, while man may inflict pain on the mere presumption (zann) that it will either result in a greater benefit or be deserved, this is impossible for God since He is omniscient.79 Al-Hilli's Mu'tazilite predecessors adhered to the same position.80

When God inflicts pain for a benefit, al-Hilli maintained, God is obliged to render the sufferer compensation (ciwad) exceeding the pain. Moreover, the pain itself must result in a facilitating favour (lutf) either for the sufferer himself or for a morally-obliged person (mukallaf).81 This was also the established position of the Bahshamiyya and Ibn al-Malahimi.82 They all disagreed with Abū ʿAlī who maintained that God may inflict pain upon man for the sake of mere compensation.83 In arguing against his

76 Ibid.
77 Taslih, 67r; Manāhij, 98r.
79 Manāhij, 98r; Muntahā al-wusūl, 99r; Kashf al-murād, 259.
81 Manāhij, 98r; Muntahā al-wusūl, 99r.
82 Ibn al-Malahimi, Fā'iq, 133r, 138r; Mānakdīm, 485.
83 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muqni, 13:390; Mānakdīm, 493.
father's position, Abū Ḥāshim had admitted that pain ceases to be unjust when it is compensated. Even with compensation, however, it would by itself still be futile (Cabath) and thus evil and inadmissible for God. Pain inflicted by God thus must result in some kind of benefit (maslaha) in addition to compensation.  

In regard to whether God may inflict illnesses (amrād/asqām) or other calamities (maṣāʾib) upon men because they are deserved, al-Hillī, following the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, disagreed with the Bahshamiyya. The discussion originated with Abū Ṣalī who held that illnesses inflicted upon infidels and sinners may serve either as a punishment (Ciqāb) or a trial (miḥna). This punishment could, in his view, be appropriate in so far as God would render to man there and then some of the punishment he deserves in the hereafter.

Abū Ḥāshim, in contrast, maintained that every illness inflicted by God on men, regardless of whether they are morally obliged or not, can only have the purpose of a trial and never of a deserved punishment. He supported this view by pointing to the principal difference between undeserved pains (ālām) and deserved punishment (Ciqāb): men must be content with their illnesses and bear them patiently and they are not allowed to be distressed about them just as in regard to favours (niṣam) which God bestows on them. This is, however, not necessary in regard to pains which are a deserved punishment. Owing to these different characteristics, man would therefore be unable to recognize whether a specific illness or calamity is inflicted upon him as a trial or as a deserved punishment. Thus, Abū Ḥāshim

85 Ibid., 13:390-2; Mānakdīm, 493.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
concluded, illnesses can be inflicted by God only for the purpose of trial (miḥnātān/imtiḥānān).\textsuperscript{89} This position was generally accepted among his followers.\textsuperscript{90}

Ibn al-Malāḥimī and al-Ḥillī allowed that God may inflict illnesses upon a morally obliged person either for a trial or as a deserved punishment (muṣaqabatān).\textsuperscript{91} Al-Ḥillī summarizes the disagreement and states his own view:

This is the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī. He admitted that illnesses may occur among infidels (kuffār) or sinners (fussāq) as a punishment for the infidel and the sinner, because it is a pain reaching somebody who deserves it. Thus it is possible that it is [for the sake of] punishment. And its advance (taẓīl) [i.e. its occurrence in this world] may contain a benefit for some morally obliged persons as it is the case with the Qur'ānic punishments (ḥudūd). The chief judge [ʻAbd al-Jabbār] considered this impossible and affirmed that their illnesses are inflicted upon them as trials (miḥān), not as punishments, because they are obliged to be content with them and to bear them patiently, to submit to them and not to be distressed about them. This is unnecessary for them with regard to punishments. [Our] answer is that we deny that this is unnecessary with regard to punishment because 'contentment' (ridā) is applied in two senses. First, the belief that an act is good. This meaning is shared by punishment and trial. Secondly, that the act should agree with desire (shahwa). This is not subject to capability and this is not obligatory either in trial or in punishment.\textsuperscript{92}

Al-Ḥillī's ascription of this view to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī is not verifiable. In his Fā'iq, Ibn al-Malāḥimī fails to mention the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn.

Al-Ḥillī further dealt with the situation where God could either cause a pain comprising a facilitating favour (lutf) and compensate for it or cause a pleasure (ladhdha) containing the same facilitating favour. He held that it would be evil for God to choose the pain instead of the pleasure. Pain in combination with facilitation and

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., 13:413-4, 431-2.
\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., 13:435.
\textsuperscript{91}Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 135r.
\textsuperscript{92}Kashf al-muřād, 259-60.
compensation is only good if there is no alternative way to achieve the purpose without pain.93 Here, al-Hillî adhered to the position of Ibn al-Malâhîmî94 who stated that this view was also upheld by an unspecified group of Baghdadis.95

In contrast, Abû Hāshim had maintained that both options are equally admissible. God could in this case inflict pain instead of pleasure, since such pain would neither be unjust (zulm) nor futile (sabath) as it was neutralized by a facilitating favour and compensation.96

Al-Hillî stipulated that the compensation (ciwad) God is obliged to render to the victim must be limited in duration (mungâtîc).97 The same view was held by the Bahshamiyya98 as well as by Ibn al-Malâhîmî.99 Abû cAlî, had initially maintained that compensation is unlimited in time. Later, he reviewed his position, maintaining that it is limited in time.100

In agreement with his Mu'tazilite predecessors, al-Hillî maintained that God is obliged to compensate for pain which He either caused directly or which He had

93 Manâhij, 98r.
94 Fā'iq, 137r.
95 Al-Mufîd who usually adopted the position of the school of Baghdad backed this position and reported that this view was held by many of the "people of justice;" see McDermott, 183.
96 Ibn al-Malâhîmî, Fā'iq, 137r.
97 Manâhij, 98r.
98 Manakdîm, 494.
99 Fā'iq, 138vff.
100 Manakdîm, 494; cAbd al-Jabbâr, Mughnî, 13:508; Ibn al-Malâhîmî, Fā'iq, 138v.
ordered, ordered,102 or caused through constraint (ṣīlim).103 In addition, God is also obliged to compensate for pain caused by those who lack reason,104 that is, beasts, animals, the insane and children. Al-Hillī supported the latter view by pointing out that God enabled these to inflict pain while withholding from them reason (ṣaql), which is needed to recognize that pain is evil. Yet it was possible for Him not to enable them to do evil.105 Here, he followed the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī106 in preference to the view of the Bahshamiyya.

The debate originated with some followers of Abū ʿAlī who maintained that God is obliged to compensate for every harm caused by such creatures because He created their appetites which drive them to commit this harm, while He did not give them reason which would enable them to distinguish between good and evil. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, they ascribed this view even to Abū ʿAlī himself.107 The Bahshamiyya, however, held that these creatures are in principle responsible for their own acts. Only when God compels them to commit evil does He have to compensate for the resulting harm.108

In regard to injustice inflicted by man upon another person, al-Hillī, in concord with his Muʿtazilite predecessors, stipulated that the victim (maṣlūm) must be

101 Al-Hillī gives the example of slaughtering of a vowed sacrifice (dhabh al-mandhūr) (Manāḥij, 98r) and of the offering during the minor pilgrimage (ḥady al-tamattūʿ) (Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 279). For these examples, see Mānakdīm, 502.
102 Manāḥij, 98r. For this principle among earlier Muʿtazilites, see Abū al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:448ff, 452ff; Shaykh al-Tūsī, Igtisād, 89; idem, Tamhīd, 236.
104 Manāḥij, 98r; Taslik, 67r.
105 Manāḥij, 98r; Taslik, 67r.
106 Fāʿiq, 140r-v.
107 Ibid., 140r-v. See also Abū al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:475ff where Abū ʿAlī's view is not mentioned.
108 Ibid., 13:475.
compensated by the wrongdoer (žālim) in a proper way, just as it is when pain is inflicted by God upon man. 109 If no compensation is made on earth, justice must be restored (intisāf) in the hereafter by God who enabled men to commit injustice although He could have prevented it. If He failed to do so He would be acting unjustly. 110 This compensation is taken from that which the wrongdoer would have received for pain inflicted by God in this world. In this way, justice between a wrongdoer and his victim is secured. 111 This principle gave rise to the question of what happens if the wrongdoer does not deserve sufficient compensation to recompense his victim. Al-Ḥillī presents the problem and surveys the views of the different theologians:

Is it admissible that God enables a certain person to do wrong while this person does not own compensation exceeding his wrongdoing at the time he commits that wrongdoing? The author [Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī] denies this and the people of the truth disagreed about this. Abū Hāšim and al-Kaḥībī held this to be possible [in principle]. However, they disagreed [in so far] as al-Kaḥībī maintained that it is possible that [the wrongdoer] may die without owning compensation exceeding his injustice. God would render what is deserved out of generosity and give it to the victim. Abū Hāšim denied this possibility. God must rather prolong [the wrongdoer’s] life because the restoration of justice is obligatory and generosity is not obligatory. It is therefore impossible to suspend the obligatory by the possible. Al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā said that the prolongation of the life is likewise a generosity and that therefore the restoration of justice cannot be connected with it. In his view, it is necessary that the compensation is owned [by the wrongdoer] at the time (fī l-hāl) [i.e. when the injustice is inflicted]. This is the choice of the author [Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī] according to what we have mentioned. 112

109 Manāḥīj, 98r; Taṣlīk, 66v. For this notion among earlier Muṣṭazilites, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:483ff.
110 Manāḥīj, 98r; for this principle among earlier Muṣṭazilites, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:472, 485, 526ff; Mānakdīm, 505.
111 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:486, 530; Ibn al-Malāḥīmi, Fāʿiqa, 141v; Mānakdīm, 505.
112 Kashf al-murād, 264; see also Manāḥīj, 98r.
Neither in this text nor in any of his other texts where he considered this problem, can a clear indication of his own position be found and it seems likely that he was undecided about this question. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who, like al-Ḥilli, usually followed the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimī or Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in his theological works, did not do so in this case, but adopted the view of al-Murtuḍ. Ibn al-Malāḥimī adhered to the position of Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka‘bī.113 The position of al-Murtuḍ had apparently been upheld before him by Abū ǦAlī.114

It seems that the difference between the position of Abū Hāshim and that of Abū ǦAlī, al-Murtuḍ and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was minor. Both rejected the Baghdādī admission that God may compensate the victim instead of the wrongdoer out of grace (tafaddul)115 on the basis that injustice can be compensated only by the wrongdoer. Since the restoration of justice may be deferred to the hereafter it is of minor importance whether the wrongdoer earns the compensation for his injustice prior to committing it, or whether he earns it later during his life.116 The position of the Bahshamiyya may be viewed as a mere elaboration out of the doctrine ascribed to Abū ǦAlī.
5. Free Choice versus Determinism

One of the conclusions deriving from the Mu'tazilite view of divine justice is that man is the sole author of his acts. Since God does not commit any evil it must be man who produces his acts both good and evil. Moreover, if man were not the author of his actions, God would be unjust in imposing moral obligation upon him and in rewarding and punishing him for them. Al-Hillî firmly adhered to this Mu'tazilite principle.

The Mu'tazilites disagreed whether it is known compulsorily (bi-l-ğarûra) or by deduction (bi-l-istidlâl) that man is the author of his actions. Al-Hillî reports the different views and states his own position:

The second investigation [concerning] that we are the producers [of our actions]. Abu l-Husayn al-Thenârî and a group [of Mu'tazilites] argued that this is compulsory (darûrî) [knowledge] and this is the truth in my view. A group among the Mu'tazilites, some of the Imamites and the Zaydis maintained that this is acquired (kashî) [knowledge].... What supports our view is that every reasonable person knows compulsorily (bi-l-ğarûra) that it is good to praise for good action and evil to blame for it, and that it is good to blame for evil action. If our knowledge that the act originated from us were not compulsory, this [i.e. the knowledge that it is good to praise and to blame] would not be sound for us.

The principal argument in this proof is that the fact that man is the author of his own actions is the necessary premise for the admissibility of his being praised and blamed for them. The connection between these two elements is based on the Mu'tazilite notion of justice which affirms that someone can only be praised or blamed for a deed which he himself performed. Otherwise, the praise and blame would be

117 Manâkîm, 345.
118 Manâhi', 96v; Ma'ârij, 122r.
119 Manâhi', 96v; see also Taslik, 66v-66r; Muntahâ al-wusûl, 94v; Ma'ârij, 122r.

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undeserved and, as such, evil. Since it is compulsorily known that it is good to blame for wrongdoing and also good to praise for good actions, al-Hilālī concluded that the premise for this, the knowledge that man is the author of his actions, must equally be known by compulsion.

As al-Hilālī indicated, he shared this view with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Ibn al-Malāhīmī reports his master's reasoning and expresses his agreement:

Our master Abū l-Ḥusayn said that knowledge of this [i.e. that man is the author of his actions] is compulsory and we choose this opinion. What proves by way of indication (tanjīh) that the rational men know by their minds that men are the authors of their actions is that they know compulsionly that it is good to blame and to praise men for them. The knowledge that it is good to blame and to praise them for [their acts] is a branch (fārūq) of the knowledge that they are the producers of [their acts] because it is impossible that they should know the branch compulsionly (bi-l-iḍtirār) without knowing the root (agl) compulsionly.  

The alternative position to which al-Hilālī alluded, that the knowledge of man's being the author of his actions is acquired, was maintained by the Bahshamiyya. They started off from the premise that man's actions depend upon his intention (qasād) and his motives (dawā'ī). This is known compulsorily. If the act were not performed by the one whose motives and intention it reflects, it would not be connected at all with him. This, however, is contrary to what is compulsorily known.  

Abū l-Jabbar explains:

This [i.e. that man is the producer of his actions] is indicated by the fact that if [the action] did not occur on his part [i.e. the person whose intention the act reflects] it would follow that it has no connection with him. This would necessarily contradict our knowledge that his action must occur in accordance with his intention.  

120 From 76r.
In al-Hillî's view, an act necessarily occurs when capability (qudra) and the motive (dâ‘î) for it exist together. To support his point, he employed the principle of causality as it derived from the philosophical tradition. An act is a contingent thing (mumkin) which must necessarily occur when the cause (Cilla) for its occurrence exists, which is the combination of power and motive. Al-Hillî explains:

The act is contingent in regard to itself (bi-l-nazar ilâ dhâtihi) and necessary (wâjib) in regard to its cause (bi-l-nazar ilâ Cillatihi). The cause (Cilla) of every contingent which depends upon a capable agent (gâdir) is completed by the medium of capability (qudra) and motive (dâ‘î). When they are present the means (sabab) is complete, and when the means is complete the existence is necessary. 122

Power without a motive attached to it is therefore mere potential efficacy which becomes actual as soon as it is joined with a motive. The function of the motive is described as that of the preponderator which necessitates the act (al-murajjihih al-mûjib li-l-fi’î). 123

This requirement of both power and motive for the occurrence of an act applied, in al-Hillî's view, to both God and man. While he defined a motive in regard to God as knowledge that a certain act is either purely good or beneficial for someone else without comprising any harm, 124 he allowed that man's motive may be his knowledge, his belief (î’tiqâd) or his presumption (zann) that the act contains a benefit either for himself or for another person. 125

Having produced a motive for a specific act, man develops a longing (shawq) or inclination (mawlay) towards it which is his will (irâda) for it. 126 This longing occurs owing

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122 Kashf al-murâd, 237.
123 Manâhi’î, 96v; Ma’ârîji, 117r.
124 Manâhi’î, 98v.
126 Hasan b. Yûsuf b. al-Mutahhar, al-Asrâr al-khâfiyya fî 1-Culûm al-Caqliyya (MS Bankipore 2384), 223 v; Manâhi’î, 87v, 91v; Tâslîk, 31r.
to man's imperfect nature.\textsuperscript{127} Since God, because of His self-sufficiency, does not share this characteristic there exists no will in addition to His motive.\textsuperscript{128}

With regard to man, al-Ḥillī often treated motive and will as equivalent, describing both as the preponderator (murajjiḥ) for the action.\textsuperscript{129}

His notion of the condition for man's acts to occur is largely based on the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al- Başrī. According to this school an action cannot occur but for a motive joined to power. Ibn al-Malāḥīmī states:

The capacity is attached to two opposites in such a way that the existence of both is possible.... Neither of the two occurs but for something which specifies (amr mukhasṣis) the capacity to produce it. This is the motive (daʿīf) and this [motive] is a condition for the capacity to effect one of the two [opposites].\textsuperscript{130}

The followers of this school distinguished therefore between two meanings of efficacy (siḥha) for capacity. Power without a motive attached to it is potentially efficacious either to produce or not to produce an act. As such, it is defined as the mere denial of the impossibility either to produce or not to produce.\textsuperscript{131} The actuality of the efficacy to produce a specific act requires the motive attached to it as a further condition (shart).\textsuperscript{132}

The function of the motive is described as that of a preponderator; because of this motive a certain act preponderates over another. Taqī al-Dīn states:

The reality of a capable agent (haqīqat al-qādir) is that doing and failing to do the act and its opposite are equal in so far as he is capable. It

\textsuperscript{127} Asrār, 223v.
\textsuperscript{128} Manāḥiḥ, 88r; Taṣlīk, 31r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 118.
\textsuperscript{129} E.g. Taṣlīk, 24v; Nahj al-Mustarshidīn, 118 where will is called the specifier (mukhassas) or preponderator. Also Manāḥiḥ, 88r where will is said to necessitate the act (irāda muṣṭiba) when the power for the act exists.
\textsuperscript{130} Fā'iq, 122v; see also Muṣṭanad, 510.
\textsuperscript{131} Tbid., 184, 229, 511.
\textsuperscript{132} Tbid., 229, 511; Fā'iq, 71r, 122v.
is therefore inevitable that the choice of one of the two [alternatives] is caused to preponderate in regard to him by the motive. 133

Like al-Ḥillī, the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn regarded this principle as valid with regard to man and God. 134 There was disagreement however, whether will (irāda) in regard to man is identical with his motive or not. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-บาشري held the latter view. Since man is a corporeal being he feels for the action for which he is motivated a pleasure (masarra) or longing (talab/taliba) which is his will for this deed. 135 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, in contrast, held that will with regard to both man and God is identical with the motive. 136

The position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-باشر was in conflict with that of the Bahshamiyya on a number of points. 137 The latter maintained that power is the efficacy to act and that it is sufficient as such to produce an act even without a motive. 138 Examples for this are the category of unconscious acts, 139 such as the movement of a sleeper 140 or the action of an inattentative agent (sāḥi) 141 who acts without

\[ \text{133 Taqī al-Dīn, 55; see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 17r; idem, Muṣ'tamad, 510. It is noteworthy that Taqī al-Dīn's exposition is not entirely coherent. The opposite of the act in the present discussion is normally considered to be failure to perform it. Taqī al-Dīn's second juxtaposition of "the act and its opposite" is therefore redundant.} \]

\[ \text{134 See e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 69r-v, 146r-v where this principle is applied to God.} \]

\[ \text{135 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muṣ'tamad, 240-1, 249; idem, Fā'iq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 221.} \]

\[ \text{136 Muṣ'tamad, 249; Fā'iq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 220.} \]

\[ \text{137 For the position of the Bahshamiyya on human actions, see generally Frank, "Autonomy," 323-355; Gimaret, Théories, 39ff. The two authors differ in their conclusions.} \]

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\[ \text{R. Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muṣ'tazila in the Classical Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 127 (quoting Abū Rashīd); Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muṣ'tamad, 510ff.} \]

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\[ \text{Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 8:48ff.} \]

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\[ \text{Maṣakdīn, 337; Abū Muhammad b. Mattawayh, Kitāb majmū' fī l-muḥīṣ bi-l-taklīf (volume 1. Edited by J.J. Houben as a work of} \]

apparent motive. Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn and his followers argued that even in such cases there is a motive although the agent does not realize it.\textsuperscript{142} The Bahshamiyya apparently considered further futile (ṣabath) acts to be produced for no motive although the producer acts in a state of consciousness.

Besides these two categories, according to the Bahshamiyya, are the acts that man would not do but for a motive.\textsuperscript{143} Although they asserted that motives have an effect upon man's actions,\textsuperscript{144} they denied any causal relation between motive and action.\textsuperscript{145} Having a motive for an action rather means that man has a better reason to perform it than its opposite. There is no need for a motive, contrary to the view of the school of Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, to turn power from potential into actual efficacy to produce a specific action. \textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{146}}

\textsuperscript{146}Abd al-Jabbār states:

Motivations are not determinant causes (mūṣṭabāt) but rather they entail (yafaḍāʾ) simply that the given action is more appropriate (awlia) than another to be chosen by the one who is able to act.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{146}The view of the school of Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī that power cannot produce an effect but for a preponderator, and that with the existence of a preponderator the action necessarily occurs has therefore no parallel among the Bahshamiyya. It is very likely that Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn

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\textsuperscript{142}Ibid., 511-2.
\textsuperscript{143}Ibid., 6/1:186-7; 6/2:109. As Ibn Mattawayh points out (\textit{Majmūʿ}, 1:364), this category is divided into two types. When the force of the motive is overwhelming man acts under impulsion (ilja'). Otherwise, he can evaluate his different motives and choose among them. For the notion of impulsion, see D.Gimaret, "La Notion d'impulsion irrésistible' (ilja') dans l'éticoque mu'tazilite," \textit{Journal Asiatique} 259 (1971):25-62; M.Schwarz, "Some Notes on the Notion of Iļja' (Constraint) in Mu'tazilite Kalâm" \textit{Israel Oriental Studies} 2 (1972):413-427.
\textsuperscript{144}Ibid., 6/1:99.
\textsuperscript{145}Ibid., 6/1:189. See also Frank, "Autonomy," 341ff.
\textsuperscript{146}Mughni, 9:93 (translated in Frank, "Autonomy," 348).
al-Baṣrī was under the influence of Ibn Sīnā when he affirmed that power requires a preponderator (murajjih) in order to produce an action.\textsuperscript{147}

The Bahshamiyya asserted, moreover, a meaning of will (irāda) which substantially differed from Abu l-Husayn's notion.

They held that simultaneously with the motive, a will arises in man through which he is in a state (ḥāl) of being willing.\textsuperscript{148} This state has an effect upon the act in so far as it occurs in a specific manner (wajh).\textsuperscript{149} A sleeper, for instance, may utter words without any motive. He is therefore not willing and his words are a simple sequence of words. Someone who has the motive to issue a command (amr) is simultaneously in a state of being willing to command. He therefore utters a certain sequence of words because of his motives, and owing to his state of being willing this sequence has the specific characteristic of a command.\textsuperscript{150} In this case, his action is defined as an intentional act.

Al-Ḥillī agreed with the views of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī and his followers concerning human acts wherever they were at variance with those of the Bahshamiyya. In comparison with the school of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī, however, he employed philosophical terminology much more extensively. This difference most likely resulted from the impact of al-Rāzī's notion of human acts which is largely similar to, and most likely based upon, that of the school of Abū l-Husayn but which employed philosophical terminology to a greater extent.


\textsuperscript{148}For the notion of states (ḥawāl) according to the Bahshamiyya, see later.

\textsuperscript{149}Al-Nisābūrī, Masā'il, 352-3, 363.
\textsuperscript{150}Ibid., 363.
Al-Rāzī maintained\textsuperscript{151} that power, without a motive joined to it, is potentially efficacious for an act and its opposite, both of which are equally contingent. However, it is not actually efficacious to produce one act rather than the other.\textsuperscript{152} If a motive for a specific act is joined to it, this act necessarily occurs (\textit{wājib al-wuqūf}) while its opposite becomes impossible (\textit{mumtāni al-wuqūf}). He states:

The occurrence of the act after the coming together of power and motive (\textit{majmūʿ al-qudra maʿ l-dāʿī}) is necessary (\textit{wājib}). This is so because (for) the capable, in so far as he is capable, the action instead of failure to perform it and vice versa is possible. With the occurrence of this equality (\textit{istiwaʿ}) the preponderance of one of the two sides over the other is impossible. If the occurrence of a motive is attached to it, the preponderance of the side of existence occurs. With this, the act must necessarily occur (\textit{wājib al-wuqūf}). This is the view we have chosen.\textsuperscript{153}

Once the motive is joined to power, the cause for the act is the combination (\textit{majmūʿ}) of power and motive.\textsuperscript{154} Al-Hillī agreed with Al-Rāzī on this point when he maintained that power and motive together are the cause (\textit{cilla}) for the occurrence of the act.\textsuperscript{155} Here, they differed from Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī and his school who defined the motive as only a condition (\textit{shart}) for the power to turn from potentiality into actuality. The effector (\textit{muʿaththir}) of the act is only power.\textsuperscript{156} This disagreement was minor as all agreed that the act must occur whenever power and motive are present and that it cannot occur when either of the two elements is not present.

In regard to the motive itself, Al-Rāzī denied that man might act for the sake of pure goodness (\textit{dāʿiyat al-iḥsān}).\textsuperscript{157} Al-Hillī as a Muʿtazilite disagreed with Al-Rāzī on this

\textsuperscript{151} His doctrine on man's actions has been investigated by Gımaret; see his Théories, 134ff.
\textsuperscript{152} Matālib, 3:10, 41, 45ff, 55.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 9:11. See also Gımaret, Théories, 140ff.
\textsuperscript{154} Maʿṣālim, 83; Matālib, 3:10, 55ff, 73; 9:9.
\textsuperscript{155} Al-Rāzī, Matālib, 3:10-1; Al-Hillī, Kashf al-murād, 237.
\textsuperscript{156} See also Matālib, 3:10-1.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 3:21, 65ff.
point. Every action, according to al-Rāzī, is performed because the agent knows, believes, or presumes that it comprises a benefit for himself.\textsuperscript{158} This view rests on his notion of rational good and evil which does not include any objective standards.

In addition to the motive and the deterrent, al-Rāzī asserted the reality of will (irāda). As soon as a motive for a certain act occurs in man, he develops a longing (mayl/shawq) for it which is his will (irāda) or decisive decision (ījmā' jāzim) for the action.\textsuperscript{159} Al-Hillī's identical terminology to describe man's will was most likely directly adopted from al-Rāzī. Like al-Hillī, al-Rāzī also treated will and motive as equivalent when he described either as the preponderator of the act.\textsuperscript{160}

Having explained how a human action occurs, al-Rāzī's main concern was to show that man's acts are created by God. With this he supported the Ash'arite view that God is the sole creator of everything which occurs. Man, according to this view, therefore cannot be the producer of his acts. Al-Rāzī started off from the assumption that man's power cannot produce an effect unless a motive is attached to it. Basing his argumentation on the philosophical principle that every contingent needs a cause other than itself and that anything contingent must ultimately be caused by God, the Necessary Existent, al-Rāzī argued that man's motives cannot be produced by himself who is also contingent. They must, therefore, be caused by a Necessary Existence which is God. Al-Rāzī states:

If the capability is valid both for the act and for failure to perform it, the preponderance of one of the two sides over the other depends either on a preponderator or not. If it depends on a preponderator [reading murajjih for tarajjuh], this preponderator derives either from God or from man, or without an effector.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 9:39.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 3:175; 9:40. See also Gimaret, Théories, 146-7.
\textsuperscript{160} See ibid., 146.
In the first case, the act is necessary when the motive occurs and impossible without it, and this is what we wanted to show. If it came from man...the creation of this motive would need another motive and this would necessarily lead to an endless chain. If this motive existed without an effector...this would mean that the contingent does not need an effector. This would necessarily imply the negation of the creator.\textsuperscript{161}

Man's motives are therefore created by God either directly or through intermediaries.\textsuperscript{162}

On the basis of this assumption, al-Rāzī concluded that although man appears to be a choosing agent as he acts in accordance with his motives, he is in reality compelled in all his actions (mudṭarr ḵī surat mukhtar)\textsuperscript{163} since his motives do not originate from him. This conclusion was in direct opposition to al-Hillī's view of man's free choice.

With this notion of the occurrence of man's actions, al-Rāzī deviated substantially from the traditional Ash'arite view of human acts.\textsuperscript{164} It is most likely that he adopted Abū l-Husayn al-Bašrī's basic notion of man's acts in order to launch an attack against the Mu'tazilite view of man's free choice. He argued that the view that an act must necessarily occur when the motive for it is attached to power, entails a necessity in action which is incompatible with the Mu'tazilite notion of free choice. The agent must either act when he has the motive to do so, or it is impossible for him to act in the absence of a motive. Thus free choice has no longer any meaning. Rather, the theory of Abū l-Husayn on human action supports the view that all of man's acts are performed under compulsion.

Al-Rāzī concludes:

It is astonishing that Abū l-Husayn disagreed with his companions in regard to their doctrine that the act of someone capable of two opposites doing one of them but not the other does not depend on a preponderator. Rather, he claimed that it is

\textsuperscript{161}Ma'ālim, 78-9; see also Ma'ālib, 3:73.
\textsuperscript{163}E.g. ibid., vol.4, pt.7:142; vol.7, pt.13:89.
\textsuperscript{164}See Ginaret, Théories, 138ff.
necessarily known that this [i.e. the act] depends on the motive. Moreover, he claimed that the occurrence of the action following the motive is necessary. Acknowledging these two premises, he is forced to accept that man is not the author of his act as is our doctrine.\textsuperscript{165}

In an attempt to refute al-Rāzī's conclusion, al-Hillī correctly pointed out that the same conclusion must apply to God. Since He, too, acts necessarily when He has the motive to do so, He would equally have to be compelled in His acts.\textsuperscript{166} Al-Hillī's objection is a very serious one. Gimaret pointed out\textsuperscript{167} that al-Rāzī was in fact confronted with this objection and that he was unable to offer a satisfactory answer to it.

Al-Rāzī's notion of man's actions and his conclusion that man is compelled in all his actions did not originate with him. The same argument had been presented by Ibn Sīnā whose views on man's actions bear a striking similarity to al-Rāzī's position. In his view, man's power can only effect an act when a motive or a will is attached to it which makes one act preponderate over another.\textsuperscript{168} This motive for the act cannot originate from man but comes to him from outside himself (wārid min al-khārij). Therefore it must ultimately have been ordained by God (bi-l-taqdīr min Allāh).\textsuperscript{169} Ibn Sīnā drew the same conclusion as al-Rāzī that although man may believe that he is a choosing agent, he is in reality compelled in all his actions (mukhtār fī ḥukm muḍṭarr).\textsuperscript{170}

Among al-Rāzī's Ashʿārite predecessors al-Ghazālī supported a similar view on man's acts in some of his works which led him to the formulation that man is "compelled to choose" (majbūr ʿalā l-īkhtiyār).\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{165}Al-Jurjānī, 111 (quoting from al-Rāzī's Nihāyat al-Cuqūl); see also al-Rāzī, Arbāʿīn, 227.
\textsuperscript{166}Maḥānī, 96v.
\textsuperscript{167}Théories, 149ff.
\textsuperscript{168}Ibn Sīnā, Taṣlīqāt, 20.
\textsuperscript{169}Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{170}Ibid., 50, 51, 53.
CHAPTER IV
PROPHECY

1. Purpose of the Mission

On the basis of his view of divine justice, al-Hilli disagreed with al-Razi about the purpose of the mission of prophets in every respect. Al-Hilli upheld the Munazalite view that man rationally knows ethical values in a general way. Man moreover knows that it is blameworthy to do evil and worthy of praise to do good, but not that God will punish evildoers and reward the obedient in accordance with their actions in the hereafter. Furthermore, besides the acts whose moral value is known to man by reason, there are some which will either hinder or help man to fulfill his moral obligation. Man is not able to discern their value by reason. God therefore dispatches prophets in order to reveal these things to man.\(^1\) With this view, al-Hilli followed his Munazalite predecessors.\(^2\) He states:

As for the benefits (fawâ'id) it [i.e. the mission of the prophets] contains, there are different aspects. First, they [i.e. the prophets] bring certain notification about the occurrence of punishment and reward; because reason points to the desert but not to its actual occurrence. And there is no doubt that this notification contains a benefit by abstention [of the morally obliged] from committing sins; second, reason admits [omitting ba\(^4\)d which is redundant] that some of our acts may be beneficial for us and [that they may be] a motive for doing what we are morally obliged to do by reason like fasting and [performing] the prayer; and [it admits] that some of our states may be [harmful] [word missing] for us [like] the drinking of wine. Thus, it is beneficial for us that He should inform us of these benefits and harms through the tongue of someone of our kind;...there are things which are good in themselves yet we do not know their goodness and other things which are

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\(^1\)Taslîk, 68v.
\(^2\)See Mânakdim, 564ff; \(^c\)Abd al-Jabbâr, Mughni, 6/1:64-5; Ibn al-Malâhimî, Fâ'iq, 149r-v; al-Murtada, "Majmu\(^c\)a," 64; Shaykh al-\(\text{Tusi}\); Iqtisad, 152-3; idem, Tamhid, 313.
evil while we do not know their evil nature. There must therefore inevitably be a prophet through whom this can be learned.\(^3\)

In agreement with the Ash\(^\text{Carite} \) tradition, al-Rāzī considered God as the sole lawgiver. Thus, revelation has the purpose to inform man of what God has determined by His will to be good or to be evil.\(^4\)

Besides the basic purpose of uncovering certain truths to men, al-Ḥillī counted among the additional benefits coming from the mission of prophets their task of confirming what is already known by reason. He states:

Rational knowledge such as the [doctrine of] unity and the [divine attributes of] knowledge and power are acquired in accordance with reason. With regard to it, revelation has the purpose of confirming [reading li-l-ta'kīd for al-ta'kīd].\(^5\)

The earlier Mu\(^\text{tazilites} \) disagreed as to whether a prophet may be dispatched only to confirm what is already known by reason. Abū Ḥādimī considered such a mission as beneficial.\(^6\) This view was shared by al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.\(^7\) Abū Ḥāshim and his followers disagreed. They argued that prophetic mission is only beneficial when it conveys something supplementary to reason. Otherwise, it would be futile (ṣabath) and thus evil.\(^8\)

\(^3\) Manāḥīj, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v; Nahj al-mustashridin, 296.

\(^4\) Arba'īn, 328.

\(^5\) Manāḥīj, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v. For further benefits of the prophetic mission, see Manāḥīj, 98v.

\(^6\) Al-Jurjānī, 182.

\(^7\) Al-Murtaḍā, "Majmū'a," 64; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Tamhīd, 313. Al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī further allowed that there is a benefit in the mission when a prophet teaches men such matters as languages or the difference between lethal drugs and healthy food which could likewise be known by reason or experience (ibid.). The same view was held by Abū ʿAlī Qāsim al-Balkhī; see al-Qāsim b. Ahmad al-Muhallī, Taqlīd al-aṣl sharh al-imām al-mashhūr bi-Mānakdīm alladhī sharaha bihi al-uqūl al-khamsa li-qādī al-qudāt ʿAbd al-Jabbar b. Ahmad (MS Ambrosiana F192), 174r.

\(^8\) ʿAbd al-Jabbar, Mughnī, 15:20-1; al-Jurjānī, 182. For this disagreement, see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'ilīq, 162r-v. Here, Ibn al-Malāḥimī refrains from indicating his own position on this issue.
On account of his view on divine justice, al-Hillī argued that God is obliged to send a prophet. Having imposed a moral obligation (taklīf) upon man, He must render him every possible assistance to enable him to fulfil his obligation. The mission of prophets belongs to this category of assistance. He states:

Concerning the necessity (wujūb) of the mission: the Muḥtazila agreed upon this....Our proof is that it contains a favour (lutf) in regard to the moral obligation by reason and by revelation (taklīf, qaqlī wa-samīl), and a favour is obligatory according to what has previously been said. Thus, prophecy is obligatory [upon God].

This argument was traditionally put forth by the Muḥtazilites.

Al-Hillī further argued for the obligation of the mission on the basis of his theory of acts. God does by necessity a beneficial act whenever He has the motive for it. A motive for God is His knowledge that a specific act is beneficial and does not contain any harm. Since the mission of prophets is purely beneficial, God must necessarily arrange it. He argues:

Moreover, when the power and the motive are realized, the mission is obligatory....As for the motive, it [i.e. revelation] contains an aspect of benefit, and no evil aspect. As for the former, [the benefit] is the purpose; as for the latter, because the aspects of evil are limited in our view and none of them is established here.

Al-Hillī had adopted the basis for this second proof, that is that God must necessarily act whenever He has the motive to do so, from Ibn al-Malāhīmī. It is, however, noteworthy, that the latter did not refer to this principle when he argued for God's obligation to dispatch a prophet. He rather restricted his reasoning to the traditional Muḥtazilite argument.

9 Manāḥij, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v; Taṣlīk, 69r; Nahj al-mustarshidin, 296.
10 Manakdim, 564; Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:50ff; Ibn al-Malāhīmī, Fā'iq, 150r; Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 153; idem, Tāḥid, 313; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 124.
11 Manāḥij, 98v.
12 Fā'iq, 150r-151r.
Al-Rāzī denied any obligation for God. Arguing against the philosophers who maintained that God is obliged to send a prophet because of His providence (ṣināya), he states:

If you mean by necessity (wuğūb) when you say "since men need a lawgiver, his existence is necessary" essential necessity (wuğūb dhāti), that is impossible. If you mean by it that it is obligatory for God, like the Muṣtazilites say, that is not [in accordance with] your school doctrine. If you mean by it that it is obligatory on His part because it is a cause of order which is a kind of good, and God is the origin (mabda') of every good, this is likewise wrong because the most beneficial (aslah) does not necessarily exist. Otherwise all people would be created innately good since this is the most beneficial.\textsuperscript{13}

Since he adhered to the traditional Ash'arite notion that God acts only in accordance with His will, al-Rāzī presumably agreed with his predecessors that God might perfectly well not have sent any messenger if He had willed not to do so.\textsuperscript{14}

The two theologians furthermore differed on whether the mission of prophets conveys benefits for all men. Al-Ḥillī adhered to the Muṣtazilite view that God created man and put him under moral obligation for his own benefit. Since man is the producer of his acts he is able to choose either to fulfil or not to fulfil his moral obligation. Revelation is a favour rendered by God equally to all morally obliged which is intended to assist them in this task. Whether they will accept it or not depends entirely on themselves.\textsuperscript{15}

Although al-Rāzī claimed that the mission of the prophets is a beneficial act (iḥsān) on the part of God,\textsuperscript{16} he categorically denied that God acts for the purpose of man's

\textsuperscript{13}Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharh al-Ishārāt (Cairo, 1325H.), 2:107-8. Yet in his early philosophical work al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya fī ālim al-ilāhiyya wa-l-tabībiyya (Hyderabad: Dā'irat al-maṣāraf, 1343H.), 2:523-4, al-Rāzī asserts that God is obliged to dispatch a Prophet because of His providence (ṣināya).

\textsuperscript{14}For this Ash'arite view, see Ibn Fūrak, 174-5.

\textsuperscript{15}Manāhij, 97v.

\textsuperscript{16}Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:80.
benefit. Moreover, God determines through His will who will be punished in hell and who will be in heaven in the hereafter. Man has no influence upon his eventual fate as he is not the producer of his acts. On the basis of this predestinarian view, al-Rāzī maintained that the mission is beneficial only for the faithful whom God wants to lead towards belief and piety. He states:

We observe two people who listen to the summons (dā'wa) of the prophet in the same session by the same word. The speech turns in regard to one of them into a cause (sahab) to obtain guidance and longing and desire for the true faith; in regard to the other it turns into a cause of increased impertinence and presumption and to further aversion. It should not be said that this aversion and desire occur through the choice of the morally-obliged. This would be an arbitrary negation of what is perceived because the person who developed aversion finds his heart as if it were compelled (mudṭarr) towards this aversion; and the person who developed the desire finds his heart as if it were compelled towards the desire. When aversion occurs, rebelliousness and opposition necessarily follow. If desire occurs submission and obedience necessarily follow. We know therefore that the fact that the hearing of the summons leads to a desire in regard to one person which necessitates obedience and submissiveness, and to an aversion in regard to the other which necessitates rebelliousness and insubordination is in accordance with God's decision and decree (bi-qādā' Allāh wa-qadarīhi). 17

This notion is characteristic of the Ash'arite view of the purpose of prophecy. 18 Maimonides correctly observed that in the Ash'arite view revelation is in principle useless. Those for whom God has determined a fate in heaven will get there, regardless of whether God sends them a prophet or not.

18 See e.g. Ibn Fūrāk (175): “And he [i.e. al-Ash'arī] used to say: the benefit of the mission is for man. [God] seeks through [the mission] the benefit of him whom He knows will accept the mission. For the man about whom He knows he will not accept the mission, He seeks through [the mission] his ruin (hālāk) and corruption (fasād)...thus what He wanted when He created them will be accomplished in accordance with what is known about what they will be, as far as good and evil, obedience and sin, happiness (sa'āda) and misery (shaqāwa) is concerned.”
Those who are predestined to be punished eternally do not need revelation, since they are unable to act in accordance with the rules laid down by it.  

19 Moses Maimonides states (The Guide of the Perplexed (translated with an Introduction and Notes by S. Pines. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 467): "It also follows necessarily from this opinion that what the Laws entail is quite useless; for man for whose benefit every law has come, has not the ability to do anything either to fulfil what he has been commanded or to avoid what he has been forbidden."
2. The Impeccability (ṣīma) of Prophets

Al-Hillī and al-Raśī agreed that a prophet must be impeccable. They disagreed, however, about the extent of this immunity. Al-Hillī stipulated that the prophets must not commit grave or light sins either before or after their mission. He states:

The acts of prophets are of four types. First, [the type] of religious belief; secondly, their religious actions; thirdly, delivery of rules and transmission of laws; fourthly, the actions which are attached to them in worldly matters. As for the first part, the rational people are agreed that error in it is not possible [for them]. In regard to the second category, people disagreed. Some allowed that they may commit major sins while others denied this allowing, however, the commission of minor sins. The Immites denied [that the prophets may commit a sin] in either of the two categories be it intentionally or by inadvertence, before and after the mission. As for the third category, all parties agreed that error is impossible [both] intentionally and by inadvertence. As for the fourth category, most people allowed that inadvertence may occur on their part. The Immites denied this and this is the truth.20

Although al-Hillī presented his own position as being generally accepted by the Immites, the first Shiite theologian who maintained this strict view was in fact al-Murtadda.21 Their position was at variance with the view of the Mu'tazilites who allowed that prophets may commit minor

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20Mašarij, 124v; see also Manāhij, 99v; Muntaha al-wuṣūl, 102r-v; Tacī, 69v-70r; Nahj al-mustashidin, 303.
21Hisham b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/796) held prophets, in contrast to Imams, not to be protected from sins, mistakes or negligence (al-Asbāri, Magālāt, 48). Although Ibn Babuyah maintained that prophets are prevented from grave and small sins as well as from defilement (danās), he allowed that they may be distracted from prayer (see McDermott, 356-8). Al-Muḥīd denied this but allowed that prophets other than Muhammad may commit small sins which do not bring any discredit upon them (ibid., 100-1).
As al-Murtada pointed out, the Mu'tazilite position rested on the principle of mutual cancellation (ihbāt). Punishment which is deserved for minor sins is automatically cancelled out by deserved praise exceeding it; thus, the commission of minor sins would not bring any discredit upon them. Since al-Hilli and al-Murtada denied mutual cancellation, they could not allow that prophets may commit any sin because they would deserve blame and punishment for it.

Al-Razi held that the prophets are infallible in their beliefs; in the transmission of the divine message and in their judgement of matters of religious law they are free from any error, whether intentional or not. This, he says, had been generally agreed among the Ash'arites. It appears, however, that this statement is not correct. Al-Baqillani allowed that prophets may commit errors inadvertently or through forgetfulness in the transmission of the message to mankind. When al-Razi admitted that they may unintentionally commit minor sins after their mission and grave sins before their mission, he was in agreement with his Ash'arite predecessors.

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22 Al-Ash'arī, Magālat, 226; Mānakdim, 575ff; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Rā'iq, 151r; see also McDermott, 99.
24 For this principle, see later.
26 Arba' in, 329.
29 E.g. Abū al-Qāhir b. Tahir al-Baghdādi, Usul al-dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Ḥaqq al-jadīda, '1401/1981), 167-8; an exception was Abū Ishaq al-İsfarāyini who held a much wider extent of impeccability; see W. Madelung, 'Al-İsfarāyini,' Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:108.
Al-Ḥillī further differed from al-Rāzī in his understanding of impeccability.

Al-Rāzī maintained that a prophet becomes impeccable when God creates for him the motive to obey and not to commit sin. A prophet acts subsequently by necessity in accordance with this prepondering motive. 30 Thus, in accordance with al-Rāzī's notion of man's actions, the prophet is compelled to obey and not to commit a sin. The personal character of the prophet is therefore irrelevant. His view agreed with the traditional Ash'arite position that impeccability does not rest on the prophet's quality but on the fact that God does not create for him the power (qudra) to commit a sin. 31

Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, defined impeccability as a facilitating favour (lutf) rendered by God because of which the prophet has a motive not to commit a sin. It is, however, the messenger himself who develops the motive not to commit sins. Thus, it is not through constraint from God but owing to the prophet's personal quality that he abstains from committing sins. Al-Ḥillī states this principle and envisages three possibilities why a prophet would abstain from committing a sin:

Impeccability is a personal quality (kayfiyya nafsaniyya) which induces [its owner] to adhere to obedience and to abstain from committing sins although he has the power for its opposite and although the occurrence of contrary acts from him is possible. It is inadmissible that he is constrained in the act of obedience and in the omission of the act of disobedience. Otherwise [his] desert for reward and punishment would be negated and it would necessarily have to follow what Muhanna' b. Sinān] - may God prolong his life - said in his question that one of us would deserve more reward than the prophet. This is false by consensus.

There is no doubt that the prophet is equal to the common people as regards power (qudra) and capacity (mukna) and it may be that he receives a facilitation (lutf) from God which exceeds those that other morally obliged persons receive. That facilitation is a favour (tafaddul) from God. It is not incumbent upon God. And it is not obligatory

31 Ibn Fūrak, 109, 122-3; al-Ash'arī, "Risāla," 100; al-Jurjānī, 236; al-Baghdādī, Usûl al-dīn, 169.
that others share this [favour] with him. It is also possible that the reason for the specification of the facilitation is God's knowledge that the locus [i.e. the prophet] will accept it while another will not. Or it [i.e. the impeccability] can come from themselves in so far as they do not choose disobedience although they have the power for it. Disobedience cannot issue from them because of the abundance of their reason, the plentitude of their knowledge, their persistence in thinking and reasoning and their perseverance in obedience, in contrast to others of mankind.32

Al-Hillī's view was in agreement with the position of the Muʿtazilites who equally maintained that the prophet is not prevented from committing a sin, as the Ashʿarites said, but rather abstains from it.33

Al-Hillī argued for the impeccability of the prophets on the basis of divine justice. The mission of the prophets is a facilitation by God to mankind which He is obliged to render and which is intended to serve man's benefit. Its desired effect can only be achieved if men accept the prophet and his statements as the commandments of God. If the prophets were to commit sins, men would not trust their statements. This would contravene God's purpose and to allow it would be evil on His part; therefore it is impossible. He states:

And the proof for the doctrine of the Imāmītes is that if God were to send somebody who is not impeccable, this would contravene His aim; the consequence is false and likewise the premise. The explanation of the conditional sentence is that the purpose of the mission is the acquisition of reward (thawāb) by obedience to their [i.e. the prophets] orders. This can only be accomplished when men trust their statements. This can only happen after knowledge that sin does not issue from them. Moreover, if he were not impeccable, it would be possible that he ordered what he was not commanded to order or that he failed [to mention] some parts of the law.34

32ʿAjwiba, 74.
34Maʿārij, 100r; see also Maʿārij, 124v; Nahj al-mustashhidīn, 300.
The same argumentation was traditionally employed by the Mu'tazilites.35

Al-Ḥillī further supported his view by a number of arguments which do not rest on his Mu'tazilite concept of justice. None of these proofs were employed by the Mu'tazilites. He says:

If they were to commit a sin they would be on a lower rank than common people because their punishment would be harder on account of their knowledge about God being more complete. The conclusion is false by agreement and therefore is the premise. Moreover, if they were to commit a sin their testimony (shahāda) would no longer be accepted [reading mağbulī al-shahāda for mağbulīn al-shahāda] [by God] because of His words 'if an ungodly man comes to you with a report, investigate' [Qur'an XLIX:6]. Moreover, it would be obligatory [for men] to rebuke them for sinning. Thus, it would not be forbidden to hurt them [reading ʿidhā'hum for ʿīdā'hum] [referring to Qur'an XXXIII:57]. Moreover, it would be obligatory not to follow them. The conclusion is false and therefore also the premise.36

In order to support his thesis of the impeccability of prophets, al-Rāzī offered a list of fifteen proofs. These consist of purely rational proofs, proofs from the Qur'an, from tradition and from consensus.37 In employing rational proofs, al-Rāzī differed from his predecessors, who only

35Manakdı̈m, 573-4; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 15:300, 303, 304-312; al-Murtada, Tanzīh, 6ff; Shaykh al-Tūsī, Igtisād, 161; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 125-6. See also T. Andrae, Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und Glauben seiner Gemeinde (Archives d'études orientales, vol.16. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1918), 139ff.

36Manāhij, 100r; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102v.

37Cf. Isma, 3-7; Arbaʿān, 330-334; Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.3: 8-10 where all fifteen proofs are mentioned. See also Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.4:47-8; vol.6, pt.11:44; Muḥāṣṣal, 318-322; Maʿālim, 102-3 where only some of them are mentioned. See also I. Goldziher, "Aus der Theologie des Fachr al-dīn al-Rāzī," Der Islam 3 (1912):238ff. Also al-Jurjānī, 220ff where he quotes al-Rāzī's proofs and criticizes them (ibid., 222-3).
resorted to proofs by revelation\textsuperscript{38} or consensus\textsuperscript{39} in order to show that impeccability goes beyond the conveying of revelation.

On the basis of reason, al-Rāżī argued that if the prophet were to commit a sin man would either have to follow him or not. Both possibilities, however, are unacceptable.\textsuperscript{40} He argued further that since the prophets occupy a higher rank in relation to God and receive greater bounty (ni'\textsuperscript{C}ma) from Him than others, the punishment they would deserve for a sin would be more severe than that of ordinary men.\textsuperscript{41} Al-Rāżī argued further that if the prophets were to commit sins, their testimony (shahāda) would no longer be acceptable to God. This would be in conflict with Qur'an XLIX:6 where men are warned not to accept the witness of a liar.\textsuperscript{42} He also argued that if the prophets were to commit sins, men would be obliged to rebuke them on the basis of the Qur'anic obligation of "commanding what is proper and prohibiting what is reprehensible" (al-amr bi-l-mu\textsuperscript{C}rūf wa-l-nahy \textsuperscript{C}an al-munkar). This would disagree with Qur'an XXXIII:57 where men are warned not to hurt the prophets.\textsuperscript{43}

In view of the striking similarity of these proofs to the non-traditional arguments employed by al-Ḫillā, it is most likely that the latter directly took them from al-Rāżī.

\textsuperscript{38} Such as al-Bāqillānī, see al-Jurjānī, 219.
\textsuperscript{39} Al-Baghdādī, Usūl al-dīn, 167-8. There was, however, no such consensus among the Ash'arites, see W.Madelung, "İśma," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:183.
\textsuperscript{40} E.g. Arba'\textsuperscript{C}in, 331.
\textsuperscript{41} E.g. Ibid., 330.
\textsuperscript{42} E.g. Ibid., 331.
\textsuperscript{43} E.g. Ibid.
3. The Proofs for Muhammad's Prophethood

In addressing the question of how to prove Muhammad's prophetic mission, al-Hillī referred to the miracles God created for him in order to manifest his veracity. With this, he was in agreement with the earlier Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites. Among these miracles, he considered the Qur'an the most outstanding one. He states:

The fourth investigation concerning the proof of Muhammad's prophethood. To this points that he appeared and claimed prophethood and subsequently a miracle appeared on his hand. Whoever is like this, is truly a prophet. As for his claim of prophethood, this is known by widespread reports (tawātur). As for the occurrence of a miracle, there are a number of aspects. First, the Qur'an appeared from him and it is a miracle. The minor premise is the widespread reports. The major premise is that he challenged by it the Arabs who were unable to match it despite their exceeding eloquence....Secondly, he reported about hidden matters as is known by widespread reports and by Qur'anic verses which point to this....And this is definitely a miracle. Thirdly, those miracles which were reported of him by widespread reports in their generality even if the details were not transmitted by widespread reports like the splitting of the moon (inshigāq al-qamar), the saturation of many people with little food,...and the welling of water (nubūc al-mā') from between his fingers and other miracles besides these.  

In regard to the miracle which proves the veracity of a claimant to prophethood, al-Hillī stipulated that it must follow his claim and must further correspond to it. By this he meant that the claimant requests from God a specific miracle as verification for his claim. If it then occurs the

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45 Manāḥij, 98v-99r; see also Muntahā al-wusūl, 101v-102r; Maʿārij, 123v; Nahj al-mustashfiḍān, 311-2; Taṣlīk, 70r-v.
claim is verified but if God created a different miracle this would prove its falsity. The miracle must be created by God and consist of a breach of His custom. These conditions were traditionally recognized by both Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites. Some miracles such as the Qur'an may furthermore be accompanied by a challenge (tahaddā) to the people to match it which cannot be met by them. When these conditions are fulfilled, al-Hillī argues, the veracity of the prophet is established:

Everyone to whom this applies, is a prophet because the creation of a miracle on the part of God following the claim of prophethood is equivalent to the prophet's verification. For if a man claims to be a messenger of a king and says "Oh king! If I am right in claiming to be your messenger,

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48 Manāhīj, 98v–99r; Taslāk, 70r-v. In his Anwār (184) al-Hillī maintains that the challenge is a condition required for every miracle. By the challenge, the prophetic miracle can be distinguished from a non-prophetic miracle. This condition is not stipulated by the Mu'tazilites, who rather confined the challenge to the Qur'an. Ash'arites, in contrast, usually considered the challenge as one of the required conditions for every prophetic miracle (see P. Antes, Prophetenwunder in der Ash'arīya bis al-Gazālī (Algazel) (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol. 2. Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz, 1970), 36-9; Gramlich, Wunder, 28-9; also al-Mutawallī, 51). In their view, the challenge attached to a prophetic miracle distinguishes it from a non-prophetic miracle (see al-Baghdādī, Farg, 344; also Gramlich, Wunder, 4ff). Presumably under the influence of the Ash'arites, the condition that a challenge must be attached to a prophetic miracle tended to be accepted by later Imamite theologians (see e.g. al-Miqdādī, 307).
contravene your custom!" and then the king does so, and if the question of the messenger and the act of the king are repeated [reading takarrara for yukarrar], rational people affirm the veracity of the messenger. The same applies here. And everyone whom God shows to be veracious, is veracious, because God Himself is veracious and if He were to show the veracity of a liar, He would not be veracious. Moreover, God does not commit any evil. The manifestation of a miracle for a liar would be an incentive to evil; therefore it is evil. 49

Al-Hillî's concluding argument is based on the Mu'tazilite concept of justice according to which God never commits any evil. The analogy he drew to the king and his messenger was apparently not referred to by earlier Mu'tazilites. Al-Hillî most likely adopted it from the Ash'arites who commonly employed it. 50

In his Manâhîj al-yaqîn and Muntahā al-wusuûl, al-Hillî adds a different proof for Muhammad's mission pointing out that he had such superiority in his theoretical (guwwâ al-ilmîyya) and practical faculties (guwwâ al-amâliyya) that this was already a sufficient indication for his veracity. He states:

Secondly, the proof by his character (akhlâq) and his actions for the truth of his statements. The personal perfections are twofold, what is related to the person himself and what is related to the perfection of others. The absolutely perfect is the one who is perfect in regard to the two faculties and who perfects others. Muhammad was from the beginning of his mission until its end [reading âkhiriha for âkhirihi] devoted to good acts and beautiful ethics; after the appearance of his status he persevered [reading mulâziman for mulâzim] in worshipping his Lord while turning [reading mutawajjihi for mutawajjih] to Him totally and renouncing the world. [Moreover], he summoned the people to this...and this is based on the perfection of his practical faculty and his perfection of others in it. As for the theoretical faculty, there is no doubt that in the time of the appearance of the Prophet the Arabs were quarrelling among themselves and of different religions. Some of them worshipped idols, others

49Macârij, 123v; see also Manâhîj, 99r; Taslîk, 70r.
50E.g. al-Juwayni, Irshâd, 313; al-Jurjânî, 181; see also Antes, 36 n.4, 80, 95.
the stars [and they also adhered to] other false religions. [The Prophet] spread among them divine sciences and inquests of knowledge including [those about] God's unity, the denial of anthropomorphism, justice and other questions relating to the truth and he clarified in their regard what had been obscure to them. He commanded them to meditate and to strive towards the truth. This is utmost perfection for him in his theoretical faculty and the perfection of others. 51

It is almost certain that al-Ḥillī adopted the latter proof from al-Ṭāzī. The latter similarly argued that people are of three classes; first, the ordinary people who are deficient in their practical and theoretical faculties; secondly, those who are perfect in both faculties but unable to lead anybody else to this stage. These are the saints (awliyā'). The third class are those who are perfect in both qualities and able to perfect the deficient (mukammil). These are the prophets. 52 Like al-Ḥillī, al-Ṭāzī maintained that men can rationally judge the veracity of a prophet by the mere consideration of his superb qualities. 53 However, when al-Ḥillī considered this proof as an equivalent to the traditional proof, he did not follow al-Ṭāzī's view in his later works Maṭālib al-awaiyya and Maḥālim usūl al-dīn and in his Tafsīr where he preferred this proof to the traditional proof by a miracle. Al-Ṭāzī says:

Those who uphold prophethood are two groups: one of them are those who say that the appearance of a miracle on the part of a prophet proves his veracity....This claim is the "first path" and most people of the various religions adhere to it. The second opinion is that we say that we [should] know first what the [right] position is in beliefs and what the sound view about acts is. If we know this and then see someone calling mankind to the true religion and if we see that his speech has a strong impact in diverting mankind from falsehood to the truth we know that he is a veracious prophet who has to be followed. This path is nearer to reason and doubts are fewer in it. 54

51 Manāhib, 99r; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r.
52 Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:120; Maṭālib, 8:104; Maḥālim, 93.
53 Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:81-2; vol.9, pt.17:120; Maḥālim, 94-5; Maṭālib, 8:103.
54 Ibid., 8:103; see also Maḥālim, 94-5; Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:121. In his Muḥassal (301-2), al-Ṭāzī still considers this proof as equivalent to the traditional proofs. Moreover,
Al-Rāzī claimed that al-Jāḥiz and al-Ghazālī in his Munjīd had already referred to the character of the prophet as a safe criterion for his veracity. With regard to the latter, this can be confirmed from his Munjīd min al-ḍalāl where he maintains that miracles are an uncertain criterion for the veracity of a prophet and that it is safer to ascertain it by considering the character traits and states of the prophet. Al-Ghazālī supports his view by comparison with professionals:

If you know medicine and law, you can gain knowledge about the lawyers and the doctors by considering their conditions and by listening to their speech. Likewise if you understand the meaning of prophecy and if you frequently consider the Qur'an and the tradition, you will necessarily know that Muhammad is in the highest rank of prophecy.

Al-Rāzī, followed by al-Hillī, shared with al-Ghazālī the supposition that man knows enough to be able to consider and to evaluate the personal qualities of a claimant to prophethood and to ascertain prior to revelation and without God's help that he is veracious.

Ibn al-Malāḥimī was acquainted with a view similar to al-Ghazālī's which he ascribed to "someone (or some people) indulging in philosophy" (baṣd al-mutafalsīfa). In his refutation he pointed to the shortcomings of this position. Its supporters maintained that man should investigate the laws of the prophet as to their agreement with the general interest (maslaḥa). They justified this procedure by comparison with a craftsman whose veracity in his claim of craftsmanship is known best by investigation of his...
products. Ibn al-Malāḥimī rejected this comparison, pointing out that man, prior to revelation, does not have sufficient knowledge of the law to evaluate the prophet. They further argued that if someone applied the laws of the claimant of prophecy and discovered that they help him to discipline his soul and to develop piety, he would experience the veracity of this prophet. Ibn al-Malāḥimī countered that people are not obliged to follow the law of a claimant of prophecy whose veracity is not yet known to them. Not having any motive to apply it, they would not do so and therefore would not arrive at the knowledge of his veracity.

Neither al-Rāzī nor al-Hillī dealt with these objections.

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61 Ibid., 154v-155r.
62 Ibid., 155r.
63 Ibid., 155r-v.
64 Ibid.
4. The Miraculous Character of the Qur'an (Ijāz al-Qur'an)

Al-Hillī considered the Qur'an as the principal miracle of the Prophet. This view was shared by almost all theological schools. The proof of its miraculous character was men's inability to match the Qur'an despite the challenge to do so. The question was why they were unable to match it. Al-Hillī maintained that the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an consists in its incomparable eloquence (faṣāha) which man is unable to match.

His main concern was to refute the position of those who maintained that the miraculous character of the Qur'an is not due to its intrinsic quality but to God's preventing mankind from matching it. This position was known as the doctrine of prevention (ṣarfa). Al-Hillī summarizes the different views of its proponents:

The advocates of the doctrine of prevention disagreed among themselves. Some held that God deprived them of the power for this [i.e. matching the Qur'an]. Others said that God deprived them of the motive for this together with the occasion (sahab) necessitating its existence. Others held that He deprived them of the knowledge by which they would have been able to match it. This is the position of the Sayyid al-Murtaqa.

The first position, that God deprived the people of the power to match the Qur'an, is usually ascribed to Abū Ishāq al-Nazzām (d. around 221/836). The second view, as will be

65 See supra, p.148.
66 The only exceptions are Cabd b. Sulaymān and Hishām al-Fuwātī who denied the miraculous character of the Qur'an and that it is a proof of the prophet or of God; see al-Ash'ārī, Maĝālāt, 225-6; Abū Bakr Muhammad al-Baġillānī, Icījāz al-Qur'ān (edited by Ahmad Saqr, Da'khā'ir al-Carab, pg.12, Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif, 1954); 99.
67 Manāhij, 98v-99r; Muntahā al-wusul, 101v-102r; Tāslīk, 70r-v; see also Manakdim, 586ff; Ibn al-Malāhīmī, Fā'īq, 164rff.
68 Manāhij, 99v; see also al-Miqdād, 309.
69 Manāhij, 99v; see also Kashf al-murād, 281.
70 E.g. al-Ash'ārī, Maĝālāt, 225; see also R.C. Martin, "A Mu'tazilite Treatise on Prophethood and Miracles Being
seen, was most likely al-Rāzī's explanation. Al-Ḥillī's ascription of the third view to al-Murtadā is not quite accurate. Although al-Murtadā often defended the doctrine of prevention against the upholders of the doctrine of eloquence, he allowed in a number of his works that the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an may be either its eloquence or the prevention from matching it. Moreover, when he defended the doctrine of prevention, he maintained at times

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Probably the Bāb ġa'ā l-nubuwwah from the Ziyādāt al-sharḥ by Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī. (Ph.D. diss., New York University 1975). 37 (quoting Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī). J. Bouman has pointed out (Le Conflict autour du Coran et la Solution d'al-Bāqillānī, Amsterdam 1959, 23) that according to the accounts of al-Ashʿarī, al-Khayyāt and al-Bağhdādī, al-Nazzām did not maintain that prevention of matching the Qur'an was a miracle. This was ascribed to him first by al-Bāqillānī. According to the earlier accounts his main concern was to explain why there were no imitations of the Qur'an although its style was imitable.

71 In his Masāʾīl al-rassiyya al-ūlā (MS Princeton Yehuda 2751, 1401r-141r), al-Murtadā defends this doctrine against an unidentified follower of the Bahshamiyya whom Martin tentatively identifies as Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī or ʿAbd al-Jabbār (Martin, 91). Moreover, in his Ziyādāt al-sharḥ, Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī argues against al-Murtadā on the question of the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an presenting al-Murtadā as a staunch defender of the doctrine of prevention. (See ibid., 95ff for an analysis of this discussion. Martin's analysis is based on MS British Museum 8613 (fol.1-69) which he identifies as a portion of Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī's Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ (ibid., 7ff). For a description of this MS, see A. S. Tritton, "Some Muʿtazilite Ideas about Religion," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 14 (1952):612-22. W. Madelung suggested ("Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1/1:367) that this text is more likely a supercommentary of a later unknown author on Abū Rashīd's Ziyādāt al-sharḥ. In his Jumal al-Cilm wa-l-Camal (edited by Ahmad al-Husaynī. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1387H.), 40-1, al-Murtadā further refers to another work of his entitled Kitāb al-ṣarf. This work is lost and nothing is known about its contents. A. Aleem ("ʾIjaʿū ʾl-Qurʾān," Islamic Culture 7 (1933):227), Bouman (23), al-Ḥīmsī ("Taʿrikh fi ḫikr ʾiʿjāz al-Qurʾān," Revue de l'Académie Arabe de Damas 28 (1953):69ff) and Martin (37 n. 25) further support the view that al-Murtadā adhered to the doctrine of prevention by the evidence of a passage in MS Ahlwardt 4977 (4v) which is ascribed to al-Murtadā. McDermott (387 n. 3) has shown, however, that this passage was not written by him.

72 "Majmūʿa," 68; see also Jumal, 41 (transl. in McDermott, 387 n. 3) where prevention is equally not his only explanation.
that God deprives men of the knowledge which is required to match the Qur'an, whereas elsewhere he is reported to have held that God rather deprived men of their motives to match it.\footnote{Al-Murtadā, Masā'il, 140v (quoted in Martin, 91-2); there he holds that God deprived men of their knowledge required to match the Qur'an. According to Abū Rashīd al-Nīṣābūrī, al-Murtadā rather held that God deprived men of their motives to match the Qur'an; see Martin, 93. Neither in his "Majmū'ā" (68) nor in his Jumāl (41) does al-Murtadā indicate how he defined sarfa.}

Al-Hillī rejected the doctrine of prevention arguing that if God had prevented mankind from matching the Qur'an, this act of prevention rather than the Qur'an would be the miracle.\footnote{Manāḥīj, 99v; Muntahā al-wusūl, 102r.} Moreover, if the miracle were the prevention the Qur'an would necessarily have to be at the height of weakness [in eloquence], since prevention from matching weak speech is a greater miracle than prevention from matching eloquent speech.\footnote{Manāḥīj, 99v; see also Muntahā al-wusūl, 102r.}

He further pointed out that if the Arabs were prevented from matching the Qur'an they would have produced something equal to the Qur'an in pre-Islamic times. But nothing like this is known.\footnote{Manāḥīj, 99v.}

Al-Hillī's arguments against this doctrine were not original but had already been employed by earlier defenders of the doctrine of eloquence such as the Basran Mu'tazilites\footnote{See Martin, 85; for ʿAbd al-Jabbār's arguments against the doctrine of prevention, see his Mughni, 16:322-328.} and the Ash'arite al-Bāqillānī who played a leading role in the discussion on the miraculous eloquence of the Qur'an.\footnote{See generally G.E. von Grunebaum, A Tenth-Century Document of Arabic Literary Theory and Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), XVIII; Boumaan, passim; also Aleem, 224ff. For al-Bāqillānī's arguments against the doctrine of prevention some of which were used by al-Hillī, see al-Bāqillānī, tāj, 41ff.}
In upholding the view that the eloquence is the sole miraculous aspect of the Qur'an, al-Hilli disagreed with his contemporary Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī who considered all doctrines on its miraculous character as acceptable.  

In his Nihāyat al-Ījāz and in some instances in his Tafsīr, al-Rāzī also rejected the doctrine of prevention in favour of the doctrine of eloquence. The arguments he puts forward in order to defend this view against the doctrine of prevention agree with al-Hilli's. In addition he argues against this position that the forgetting of acquired skills in a short time points to a lapse of minds (zawāl al-ʿuqūl). But it is known that the minds of the Arabs did not lapse after the challenge.

This argument is apparently meant to counter a statement attributed to al-Nazzām that God deprived the people of their minds in order to prevent them from matching the Qur'an.

Elsewhere, however, al-Rāzī maintained that eloquence is not the only miraculous aspect of the Qur'an. In his Tafsīr he approves the view that the reports of the Qur'an about hidden matters (ghuyūb) as well as about religious matters (umūr diniyya) are aspects of its miraculous quality.

Elsewhere in his Tafsīr, he admits that the Qur'an may be a miracle either by its intrinsic miraculous character or because God prevented mankind from matching it.

83 Nihāya, 80; the same argument was also used by ʿAbd al-Nabī, see his Muqni, 16:325.
85 Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:100.
87 Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55.
Al-Rāzī's notion of prevention is based on his theory of acts. Although the people had the power and motives to match the Qur'an which under normal circumstances necessitates their action, they were prevented from doing so. Al-Rāzī states:

Concerning the clarification of the miraculous character of the Qur'an, men have two opinions about this. Some say that the Qur'an is a miracle in itself. Others say that it is not a miracle in itself but that, when God removed the motives of the people to match the Qur'an although these motives were strong, this prevention was a miracle. Our choice in this matter is to say that the Qur'an is either a miracle in itself or it is not; in the first case, what we seek to show has been achieved. If the Qur'an is not a miracle in itself, and they i.e. the people had the capacity and abundant motives to match it and there was nothing to deter and to prevent then, the matching necessarily follows. The fact that this matching did not occur in spite of the considerations mentioned, is a breach of the custom. Thus, it is a miracle.

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88 Ibid., vol. 11, pt. 21:55.
5. Non-prophetic Miracles

In agreement with their respective school traditions, al-Hillî and al-Râzî maintained that miracles are created by God not exclusively for prophets but also for non-prophets. The occurrence of miracles of saints was disputed between and even within the various schools. Al-Hillî summarizes the different views and argues for his own position:

On the question of miracles of saints (kâramât). The generality of the Mu'tazilites denied them except Abû l-Husayn al-(Button. The generality of the Ashârîtes considered them to be possible except for Abû Isâq [al-Isfarâyînî]. This is also the doctrine of the philosophers. The proof for [the possibility of non-prophetic miracles] are the miracles which appeared on the part of Mary and for the seven sleepers (âshâb al-kahf). 89

The positions of the various groups were not as clear-cut as al-Hillî presents them.

Among the Mu'tazilites, Abû Hâshim was the staunchest opponent of the possibility of non-prophetic miracles. His opposition was based on his view of the significance of a miracle as a sign for prophethood. He defined a miracle as an indication for a prophet "by way of elucidation and specification" (tarîq al-ibâna wa-l-takhîsî). 90 By this he meant that a prophet must necessarily appear together with a miracle; a miracle, in turn, cannot signify anything but prophethood and it is impossible for it to occur for any other purpose. This implies that it does not simply prove the veracity of a claim, otherwise any claim could be verified by a miracle. 91 Abd al-Jabbâr explains Abû Hâshim's view:

Our master Abû Hâshim mentioned in many of his books that miracles signify prophethood by way of elucidation and specification, not in the way other signs signify, because they must occur and must signify someone's prophethood. This necessity does not apply to other signs. Moreover, if they were to

89 Manâhîj, 100r; see also Ma'ârij, 124v-125r.
90 'Abd al-Jabbâr, Mughnî, 15:217, 234; also Taqî al-Dîn, 267-8; Ibn al-Malâhîmî, Fâ'id, 159r-v.
become numerous they would cease to be an indication. This is not the case with other signs. 91

Among Abū Ḥāshim's followers, this view aroused criticism. Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī and apparently already Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-BAṣrī had rejected the view that miracles exclusively signify prophethood, holding that their purpose is rather to verify the claim to prophethood. 92 Having made this distinction, Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī apparently accepted the possibility of miracles of saints. 93 As evidence, he referred to traditions which support their actual occurrence. 94

Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-BAṣrī definitely broke with the view of Abū Ḥāshim by admitting the possibility of miracles of saints both on grounds of reason and tradition. 95 His view was generally accepted among his followers. 96 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, therefore, differentiated between various types of miracles. 97 First are those which are preceded by a claim to prophethood and which are therefore exclusive to prophets; secondly, non-prophetical miracles which are intended to prove the veracity of a claim to righteousness (ṣalāḥ); thirdly, non-prophetical miracles which occur as an honour (ikrām) to the person who receives them. Each type may only occur, however, if a benefit (naslaḥa) for men is attached to it. 98

91 Mughni, 15:217.
92 For Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-BAṣrī, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughni, 15:222. For Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, see Martin, 68, 77ff. His analysis is based on MS British Museum OR 8613. For the identification of this manuscript, see supra, p.155 n.71.
93 Martin, 78-9.
94 Ibid., 79.
95 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 158v.
96 Taqī al-Dīn, 266ff.
97 Fā'iq, 160r. Gramlich (Wunder, 98) identifies him erroneously as the famous commentator of the Qur'an, Abū 1-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).
98 Fā'iq, 160r. Among the earlier Muṣṭazilites, Ibn al-Tkhshīdī, who apparently was a follower of Abū ʿAlī strongly opposed to Abū Ḥāshim's views (Madelung, "Imāmism," in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (by W. Madelung. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 29 (addenda to p.24)), accepted on rational grounds the possibility of miracles of saints. (Ibid., 24; Gramlich, Wunder, 98) However, on grounds of scriptural
Moreover, in contrast to the Bahshaniyya, the Baghdadis accepted the possibility of miracles as premature signs heralding a prophet still to come. This was also allowed by Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Al-Ḥillī followed him in this respect.

In respect to the Ash'arites, al-Ḥillī correctly stated that the possibility of miracles of saints was generally accepted among them. An exception was Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) who held that non-prophetic miracles do not reach the degree of prophetic miracles, an opinion also held by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥalīmī (d. 403/1012). The Ash'arites argued for the possibility of non-prophetic miracles that in view of God's omnipotence the creation of miracles for non-prophets is possible. Moreover, scriptural evidence points to their actual occurrence. A number of Ash'arite theologians allowed that God may create a miracle in order to verify the claim of its recipient. They further asserted the possibility of miracles as premature signs heralding a prophet still to come.

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{99}] Ibid., 160v.
  \item [\textsuperscript{100}] Ibid., 160v-161r.
  \item [\textsuperscript{101}] Macārij, 124v.
  \item [\textsuperscript{103}] Ibid., 98-9; L. Gardet, "Karāma," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:616.
  \item [\textsuperscript{104}] Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 319; al-Jurjānī, 243.
  \item [\textsuperscript{105}] The usual examples from the Qur'an are the story of Mary (XXVIII:9ff) and the story of the seven sleepers (XVII:40ff); see al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 320; al-Mutawallī, 50-1; al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, 385-6; idem, Tafsīr, vol. 11, pt. 21:82ff, 86ff; see also Gramlich, Wunder, 74ff for the various Qur'anic miracles and ibid., 81ff for the different proofs from traditions.
  \item [\textsuperscript{106}] E.g. al-Baghdādī, Usūl al-ṣīn, 185; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 316, 319.
  \item [\textsuperscript{107}] Al-Jurjānī, 178.
\end{itemize}
Another group which espoused the possibility of non-prophetic miracles were the Sufis[^108] who, like the Ash'arites, stressed God's omnipotence which includes the creation of miracles of saints[^109]. In agreement with the defenders of non-prophetical miracles among the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites, they allowed that these may either serve to verify a claim to righteousness (ṣalāh) or sainthood (wilāya)[^110] or as an honour for a saint (wali)'[^111].

In view of their doctrine of the Imamate, the Imamite theologians, too, traditionally affirmed the possibility of non-prophetic miracles[^112]. However, in contrast to the school of Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the Ash'arites, and the Sufis, they held that miracles serve only to verify a claim. Al-Murtaḍā explains:

> What points to the truth of our view is that miracles indicate the veracity of a claim corresponding to it. If a claimant makes a claim to prophethood with a miracle it signifies his prophethood. If he makes a claim to the Imamate, it signifies his being an Imam. If he makes a claim to righteousness (ṣalāh), excellence, and station, it indicates his veracity in this [claim]. Thus,

[^110]: Most Sufis held that a saint should not be allowed to claim sainthood in public because this could endanger his psychological state; see al-Rāzī, Ṭafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:93; see also Gramlich, Wunder, 43-9 on this issue.
[^111]: Al-Hujwīrī (212-3) says: "The passages [of the Qur'an and traditions on the exalted position of the saints in relation to God] show that God has saints (awliya) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured with diverse kinds of miracles (kāramāt) and has purged of natural corruptions...." See also R.Hartmann, Al-Kushairīs Darstellung des Şūfītums (Türkische Bibliothek, vol.18. Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1914), 154-5.
[^112]: An exception were the Banū Nawaḥakht who denied this possibility under the influence of the Mu'tazilite position. See Madelung, "Imāmīsm," 16.
there must inevitably be a clear or conclusive claim corresponding to all [three types of miracles].

This definition excludes the possibility of non-prophetic miracles which are not preceded by a claim and which serve simply to honour their receiver. On the basis of their restriction of miracles to the purpose of verification, the Imamites did not distinguish between the terms muṣṣjīza and karāma but used the term muṣṣjīza for both prophetic and non-prophetic miracles.

Within these different views about non-prophetic miracles, al-Hillī's position had more in common with the doctrine shared by the school of Abū ʿl-Husayn al-Baṣrī, the Ashʿarites and the Sufis than with the position of his Imamite predecessors. In arguing his view he did not resort to the doctrine of the Imamate but rather referred to the scriptural evidence from the Qur'an. Moreover he distinguished between the terms muṣṣjīza and karāma and admitted that a non-prophetic miracle may either serve to verify a claim to righteousness or to honour a righteous person in which case they are not preceded by a claim. It is therefore very likely that al-Hillī followed in this question the position of Abū ʿl-Husayn al-Baṣrī and his followers.

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113 "MajmuʿCa," 66-7; see also Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtisād, 158-9; idem, Tamhid, 318; idem, Talkhīṣ al-shāfiʿī (edited by ʿUsayn Bahr al-ʿUlum. Najaf: al-ʿAlamayn, 1383/1963), 1:143.

114 See Khulāṣat al-nazār, 68v; also Granlich, Wunder, 39.

115 Manāḥij, 100r (quoted supra, p.159); Maʿārij, 124v-125r; Muntahā al-wusūl, 108r. Following the text of Abū Ishaq Ibrāhīm b. al-Nawbakhtī, al-Hillī refers to the function of the non-prophetic miracle in regard to the concept of the Imamites in his Anwār, 186-7.

116 Manāḥij, 100r; Muntahā al-wusūl, 108v; Maʿārij, 125r. See also Granlich, Wunder, 39 about this differentiation among later Shiʿites.
In his concept of non-prophetic miracles al-Rāzī was distinctly influenced by the Sufi tradition. Besides using scriptural evidence, he argues in his Tafsīr on the basis of the concept of sainthood (wilāya). He begins with a definition of a saint (walī) as a friend of God who commits no sin, either because of his own saintly nature or because God guards him. He further allows that God may create for such a saint a miracle (karakama) which may or may not be preceded by a claim. After these preliminary definitions, al-Rāzī proceeds to put forth his proofs for the possibility of such karamāt which he designates as rational. These may be summarized as follows. When a saint is fully devoted to God, God will also be fully devoted to him and create miracles for him. God bestows upon the saint much greater favours such as His love and knowledge of Himself and if He loves him He becomes the face, hearing and seeing of the saint. If the saint reaches such a close relation to God, how can God fail to create for him a mere trifle like a miracle? Moreover, the soul of the obedient saint becomes so strong that it loses any connection with the corporeal world and instead receives the light of the world of majesty. Being thus strengthened, the soul of the saint is able to perform miracles.

Al-Ḥilli was decisively influenced in the question of non-prophetic miracles by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī. Thus, he agreed with al-Rāzī on all those basic points where the latter's view was in agreement with the position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī. Yet

117 For al-Rāzī's discussions on non-prophetic miracles, see his Arba'īn, 384-8 and esp. his Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:85-93; this passage has been translated by R. Gramlich ("Fahr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzīs Kommentar zu Sure 10, 8-12," Asiatische Studien 33 (1979): 99-152).
120 Arba'īn, 387; Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:86.
121 See also Gramlich, Wunder, 94-5.
123 Ibid., 90-1.
124 Ibid., 91.
125 Ibid., 91.
126 Ibid., 92.
al-Rāzī's elaborations of the issue based on mixing theological and Sufi concepts did not have any impact on al-Hillī.
CHAPTER V
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

1. God's Essential Attributes and Their Referent

One of the fundamental disagreements between the Muḥtazilites and the Ashʿarites concerned the relationship of God's essential attributes to His essence.

The Ashʿarites held that God's essential attributes are neither entailed by, nor identical with, His essence. Rather, they are entailed by eternal essences (dhawāt) or entitative determinants (maqāmāt) which subsist in God's essence (qā'ima bi-dhātihi). Thus, God's being knowing and powerful etc. are founded upon a knowledge (Cilm) and a power (gudra) which inhere in His essence. These entitative determinants are described as being neither identical with, nor other than God.

The Muḥtazilites rejected the existence of such entitative determinants as inconsistent with God's unity (tawḥīd). They held that the notion of eternal attributes in God which are not entailed by His essence must necessarily negate the oneness of God's essence by affirming the existence of external essences besides it. They also considered as absurd the formula of the upholders of such entitative attributes (ṣifātiyya) that these are neither identical with, nor other than God. Against the view of the ṣifātiyya, the Muḥtazila maintained that the divine

1. Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:95; al-Baghdādī, Fardq, 334.
4. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Fadāl, 347; see also al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:46; al-İsfaqāyini, 60; al-Baghdādī, Usul al-dīn, 90.
attributes of essence are entailed by the essence itself.\textsuperscript{5} They commonly expressed this by the formula that God is eternally knowing (Cālim), powerful (qādir) and living (hayy) etc. by His essence (li-nafsīhi) rather than by entitative attributes of knowledge, power, life etc.\textsuperscript{6}

This formula, however, gave rise to other difficulties. If these different attributes are equally founded in God's unitary essence, the question arises of how they relate to, and differ from, one another.\textsuperscript{7} Moreover, the Qur'an speaks of God's knowledge (Cilm)\textsuperscript{8} and power (quwwa)\textsuperscript{9} so that reducing these two attributes to the divine essence was open to objection on scriptural grounds.\textsuperscript{10} The Mu'tazilites had, therefore, to find a conceptual framework analysing the ontological quality of the attributes and their relation to His essence which would do justice to the notion of unity and which at the same time would avoid those difficulties.

Al-Hillī fully supported the traditional Mu'ātazilite notion that God's essential attributes are entailed by His essence (li-dhātihi). He states:

The Ash'Caratites maintain that God is knowing through a knowledge, powerful through a power, living through a life etc. The Mu'ātazilites deny this. They hold that God is knowing through His essence, not through an entitative determinant subsisting in His essence. [They maintained the same] with regard to His remaining attributes. And this is the truth.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{5}There was no strictly defined list of essential attributes recognized by the Mu'ātazilites. Disagreement arose, for instance, in regard to the attributes of hearing (samC) and seeing (basār); see later.
\textsuperscript{6}E.g. al-Ash'Cari, Magālāt, 486, 503, 505; CAbd al-Jabbār, Fadl, 347.
\textsuperscript{7}Al-Baghdādī, Usūl al-dīn, 91-2; al-Imṣafāyīnī, 67.
\textsuperscript{8}E.g. Qur'an IV:166; II:255.
\textsuperscript{9}E.g. Qur'an LI:58; XLII:15.
\textsuperscript{10}See e.g. al-Bazdāwī, 37. Owing to these considerations, the Mu'ātazilites were often accused of denying any attributes of God on principle; see e.g. al-Baghdādī, Farāq, 334; al-Bazdāwī, 35; Abū ʿl-MāCālī al-Juwayni, al-Shānīlī fī usūl al-dīn, (edited by R. Frank. Wisdom of Persia, no.27. Tehran: Haydarī Press, 1360/1981), 80.
\textsuperscript{11}Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 215; see also Taslīk, 54v.
Although he denied that the attributes exist in addition to God's essence al-Hillī guarded himself against the view of the philosophers that the attributes are not existential matters. He clarifies:

He [i.e. al-Hillī in his Nuzum al-barāḥīn] said, "Abū l-Husayn and the philosophers said that these attributes are not existential (laysat wujūdiyya). Others said that they are existential. And this is the truth." ... I [i.e. al-Hillī in the Maʿārīj] say, people disagreed whether God's attributes are existential or not. The Ash'arites maintained that they are existential matters (umūr wujūdiyya). This is likewise the view of the bulk of the Muʿtazilites. The philosophers and Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī denied this.12

The philosophers' notion of attributes with no existential reality arose from their view of God as the primary mover. They denied that God, whose sole activity consists in self-reflection, can be described by attributes which are additional to His essence.13 When one describes God as knowing, willing or powerful etc., all these descriptions merely signify His self-reflection which is the cause of the emanation of the world.14 Attributes are ascribed to God either in negation (salb) of the opposite, or as signifying a relation (idāfa) of contingent things to God, or in a combination of both aspects.15 To describe God, for instance, as eternal (qādīm) is to negate non-existence, the quality of being caused, and the quality of having a beginning from God.16 He is a creator (khāliq) in the sense that the creation

12Maʿārīj, 12r; see also Taslīk, 54r.
16Ibn Sīnā, Risāla, 24.
of everything is related to Him in so far as He is its ultimate cause. Were it not for the world produced by Him, God would not be described by any attribute.

The evidence provided by Ibn al-Malā'īmī does not corroborate al-Hillī's claim that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī shared the philosophers' view of attributes not having any existence in addition to God's essence.

Describing the reality of God's attributes, al-Hillī employed the philosophical notion of mental existentiality in contrast to existence in the external world; God's attributes are additional to His essence in ratiocination (zā'ida can al-dhāt fī l-tā'qquṭ). It is, however, not permissible to reify these mental concepts and to ascribe to them any reality besides His essence in the external world (fī l-khārij).

When discussing the ontological foundation of the essential attributes, al-Hillī maintained that they are founded in God's essence which differs by itself from all other essences. He rejected the position of the Bahshamiyya who held that God's essence is distinguished from others not because of itself but owing to an attribute of essence attached to it. Al-Hillī presents their view and expresses his disapproval of it:

The third investigation: concerning the attribute of essence (gīfā dhātiyya). Know that Abū Ħāshim maintained that God has an attribute of essence through which He differs from whatever He differs, like the atomicity (jawhariyya) of the atom. Moreover, he held that He has four other attributes which are His being eternal (qādīm), living (hayy), knowing (qālim) and powerful (qādir). These attributes are entailed by the attribute of essence (gīfāt muqṭadāt can gīfāt al-dhāt)....This view is foolish...because it is based on the false principle that essences are equal.

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17 Maḫārij, 121r-v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 222; Taslīk, 54r. In his Manāḥīj (92v) he designates the attributes as mental conceptions (išābārāt dhinniyya) which are in contrast to things existing externally (umūr khārijiyya).
18 Manāḥīj, 90v; see also ibid., 94v; Maḫārij, 120r.
With the rejection of the notion of the attribute of essence, al-Ḥillī closely followed the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī and his school. They held that essences differ from each other by virtue of themselves and do not require an attribute of essence. Thus, God is distinguished by His distinctive essence (dhāt nutamayyīza) which sets Him apart from others. By His essence (li-dhātīhi) He is capable and knowing.

Ibn al-Malāḥimī, therefore, held that the divine attributes have a reality as qualities of God's essence. Yet he denied that they have an independent reality in addition to it. He states:

"[Our statement that He is powerful and knowing] is an assertion of His essence (ithbāt li-dhātīhi) together with a [an additional] qualification (amr) which is included in [His] being described by these attributes."

The Bahshamite concept of the attribute of essence was based on the concept of states (ḥāl, pl. āhwāl). The notion of states as it was developed by the Bahshamiyya was one attempt to create a conceptual framework for analysing the

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19 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 42r; also al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:85.
20 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 36v, 42r; Taqī al-Dīn, 148ff.
21 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 35r, 36r-v, 41r-v, 43v; Taqī al-Dīn, 148, 173.
22 Fā'iq, 38r; also ibid., 37r, 39r, 42v
ontological quality of God's attributes and their relation to His essence within the established Muqtazilite view of divine attributes.\textsuperscript{24}

For this purpose, Abū Ḥāshim adapted the concept of state (ḥāl, pl. ḥāwāl) employed by the grammarians for a complement in the case of the accusative occurring in a sentence which consists of a subject and a form of kāna (to be) as a complete verb. In this case, the accusative cannot simply be taken as a predicate to kāna as it would be if kāna were incomplete and transitive; it must rather be understood as a ḥāl.\textsuperscript{25}

On this foundation, Abū Ḥāshim elaborated a system of five different categories of states which he applied to both God and man. These categories are distinguished by the different ontological basis which brings forth their actuality.\textsuperscript{26}

The first category is the attribute of essence (ṣifā dhātiyya/ṣifat al-dhāt/ṣifat al-nafs) through which the essences (dhawāt) differ from each other.\textsuperscript{27} The atom (jawhar), for instance, is described as an atom not through its essence but through its attribute of essence. The same applies to God who does not differ from other essences through His mere essence, but rather through His attribute of essence.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24}Frank, Beings, 5.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 20ff.
\textsuperscript{26}According to Abū Ḥāshim, a state is not an entity or a thing (dhāt, shay') and can thus neither be said to be existent (mawjūd) nor non-existent (ma’ādūm) (ibid., 26-7). Not being entities themselves, the states can likewise not be known in isolation. Rather, the essence is known to be qualified through them (Mānakdām, 184). Thus, Abū Ḥāshim speaks of the actuality (tahsul) of the states and their initiation (tajaddud) while he refrains from asserting for them a coming to be (hudūth) which would imply their coming into existence (R. Frank, "Ḥāl," Encyclopaedia of Islam, suppl.fasc.5-6:345).
\textsuperscript{27}Al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 590; Abd al-Jabbar, Muḥnī, 7:83; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muṣaddima," in al-Dhikrā al-alfiyya li-Shaykh al-Tūsī (Mashhad, 1391/1970), 2:204; Taqī al-Dīn, 156ff; Frank, Beings, 53-5; also ibid., 55 n.1 for the different technical terms used for the attribute of essence.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūṣ, 1:153.
The second category of states are the essential attributes (ṣifāt muqṭadāt ʿan ṣifat al-dhāt) which are by necessity entailed by the attribute of essence as soon as it becomes existent. The attribute of essence of being an atom which is attached to an essence entails the spatiality of the atom whenever it exists. Thus, occupying a space is an essential attribute of an atom. In regard to God, the specific divine quality of His attribute of essence entails His essential attributes. These are His being powerful, knowing, living and existing. Thus, God must necessarily and eternally be described by these attributes which cannot cease as long as His eternal attribute of essence lasts.

Man's attributes of being powerful, knowing and living differ in their quality from the corresponding attributes in God. They belong to the third category of states which gain actuality through an entitative determinant (maʿna) or cause (Cilla) in the subject. Thus, the qualification of these attributes in man differs from the corresponding attributes in God. Since man's states are caused by entitative determinants, he cannot be described as permanently or necessarily powerful, knowing etc. Moreover, since these determinants inhere in parts of man's body, he needs his

29 Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Frank, Beings, 58-64. It seems that this was not agreed upon by all followers of Abū Ḥāshim. Some of them are reported to have maintained that essential attributes may be asserted of the essence in the state of its non-existence; see Taqī al-Dīn, 106-7. Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī is said to have asserted the essential attribute of an atom, i.e. its spatiality (tahayyuz), in the state of its non-existence, yet in no space (ghayr hāsil fi jiha); see ibid., 107; al-Rāzī, Muḥassal, 84.
30 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:162. A number of writers list instead of "existent" (mawjūd) the attribute of being eternal (gādim); e.g. ibid., 162, 152, 153; also Taqī al-Dīn, 148; al-Hillī, Maʿnāhij, 90v. As Ibn Mattawayh explains (ibid., 160) gādim is in principle identical with mawjūd whenever it is characterized by the quality of being necessary. By this he means that God's attribute of existence is an essential attribute which cannot cease, since it is entailed by His attribute of essence which cannot cease. Thus, the quality of His existence is such that He is eternal.
31 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:162.
33 Ibid., 69, 87 n.63.
limbs as tools for his actions and his heart in order to know. The determinant itself is therefore not sufficient to actualize man's being powerful and knowing. Further conditions like the health of heart and limbs have to be fulfilled for them to serve as tools in carrying out actions.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, the realms of man's power and knowledge are limited by the natural deficiencies of his body. God, in contrast, is unconditionally powerful and knowing since His attributes of being powerful and knowing are essential attributes which do not inhere in any locus and, thus, do not require any limbs.\textsuperscript{35} Yet, the Bāshāmīyīyya applied this category to God when they asserted that God is willing or disapproving through a determinant which is His will or His disapproval. Since it is impossible that a determinant may inhere in God, they maintained that God is willing or disapproving through a determinant which does not inhere in a substrate (lā fī maḥall).\textsuperscript{36}

The fourth category of states are those which are actualized by the action of an agent (bi-l-fā'īl), in particular the existence of a temporal thing which is founded in its producer's capability.\textsuperscript{37} This category is inadmissible in God. While the existence of all created beings is considered as belonging to this category, God's existence is counted as an essential attribute entailed by His attribute of essence.\textsuperscript{38}

The fifth category are states which gain actuality neither by virtue of the essence nor by an entitative determinant (lā li-l-dhāt wa-lā li-ma'na). To this category belongs the attribute of 'being perceiving' (kawnuhu mudrikān) which is entailed by the perceiver's being living.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{34}Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:160.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 1:157.
\textsuperscript{36}See later.
\textsuperscript{37}Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Frank, Beings, 124ff.
\textsuperscript{39}Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Mānakdīm, 170; al-Nīsābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562, 564; Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muʿtamad, 215; Frank, Beings, 153ff. Frank ("Ḥāl," Encyclopaedia of Islam,
In regard to God, it gains actuality when the condition (shart) of the presence of the perceptible is fulfilled. Man, in order to perceive, must possess healthy senses in addition to the existence of the perceptible. This is not required for God whose being alive is an essential attribute. Thus, He perceives without senses.

Al-Hilli, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī, rejected the notion of states. In his view, the states imply an inadmissible reification of the divine attributes. He considered the position of the Bahshamiyya to be very close to that of the Ashʿarites who viewed the divine attributes as eternal determinants additional to God’s essence. The same objection had been put forth against the school of Abū ʿAbd Allāh by Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers.

The Bahshamiyya were confronted with the objection of the opponents that on the basis of the Muʿtaṣīlīte view of God’s attributes there is no way to distinguish between them. They responded by developing a concept of characteristics (ḥukm, pl. ahkām) of attributes, which was adopted by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī and by al-Hilli.

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supl.fasc.5-6:345) seems to have doubts whether this category was introduced by Abū ʿAbd Allāh or only by his followers.

41 Mānākīm, 173; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:131; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muqānī, 4:51, 55.
42 Al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562, 564-5; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūʿ, 1:130-1.
43 Taqī al-Dīn, 162; al-Muḥallī, 72r; al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:85.
44 Ṣāḥib al-Maḥāsin, 92r-v; Ṣad al-murād, 229-30; Nihāyat al-muḥāsin, 115; Ṣāḥib al-kalām (MS Marṭāshī 254), 75r-v.
45 Taqī al-Dīn, 162.
The Bahshamiyya defined a ḥuqm as the manifest characteristic of an attribute or state through which it is possible to recognize the attribute.\textsuperscript{46} We recognize, for instance, a person's being capable only through the characteristic of this state, namely the feasibility (ṣiḥḥa) of a simple act by that person.\textsuperscript{47}

God's attributes may equally be known through their characteristics. Thus, the characteristic of His attribute of essence is that it entails the four attributes of His being powerful, knowing, living and existing.\textsuperscript{48} By the feasibility of the occurrence of a well-wrought act (ṣiḥḥat wuqūf al-fi\textsuperscript{41} al-muḥkam) on His part He is recognized to be knowing\textsuperscript{49} just as the feasibility of a simple act (ṣiḥḥat al-fi\textsuperscript{41}) points to His being powerful.\textsuperscript{50} That He is not incapable of being knowing and powerful indicates His being alive.\textsuperscript{51}

Al-Ḥillī, following Ibn al-Malāhimī and possibly Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, affirmed these characteristics in regard to God. However, in contrast to the Bahshamiyya, Ibn al-Malāhimī and al-Ḥillī denied that these characteristics are entailed by or indicate any states or attributes in addition to God's essence. Rather, they are entailed by and point to God's essence which is qualified as being knowing and powerful. Al-Ḥillī states:

We say that there must inevitably be an additional qualification (amr zā'īd) in the conceptualization [of God's attributes]... Why should this additional qualification not be the characteristics which are effected by God's essence like the feasibility of a simple act [reading siḥḥat al-fi\textsuperscript{40} for hissat al-ḥaql] which is included in the knowledge that

\textsuperscript{46} Al-Nisābūrī explains (Fī l-tawḥīd, 287): "We infer the attribute from its characteristic; for when the attribute is not perceptible nor found by intuition (mawjūda min al-nafs), it can be reached only through its characteristic." See also Frank, Beings, 61.

\textsuperscript{47} Manakdim, 165; al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 488; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū', 1:157; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 207.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū', 1:162.

\textsuperscript{49} CAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:219; 12:14, 21.

\textsuperscript{50} Tbid., 13:267; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū', 1:157.

\textsuperscript{51} CAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:219. For the distinguishing characteristics of the various attributes, see also Frank, Beings, 62ff; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 207-8.
God is powerful; and His awareness (tabayyun) of what is subject to knowledge, and His connection (taqalluq) with it which is included in the knowledge that He is knowing.\footnote{Manāhīj, 92v.}

Al-Hillī disagreed with the Bāshamītī definition of the characteristic of God's being knowing by describing it as His awareness of what is subject to knowledge and His connection with it. Here, he followed the definition of Ibn al-Malāhimī.\footnote{Al-Hillī's account is most likely directly based on Ibn al-Malāhimī's Fā'iq (42v).} The first term merely designates His potential omniscience, while the term connection (taqalluq) designates the actual relation between Him and the objects of His knowledge.

The notion of connection between God's essence and the object of His knowledge as a distinctive characteristic of His being knowing was apparently introduced into Muṭazilīte kālām by Ibn al-Malāhimī.\footnote{Muṭamad, 201, 205, 206. Abū l-Husayn designated this connection as a hāla, but not as a ḥukm. See ibid., 200-1, 205; al-Muhallī, 63v.} The Bāshamīyā apparently did not consider this connection as a distinctive characteristic (ḥukm) of God's state of being knowing.\footnote{The only instance I could find where the notion of the connection as a characteristic is referred to is Shaykh al-Tūsī's "Muqaddima," 207. There al-Tūsī affirms that the characteristic of an attribute to which a connection is attached is this specific connection (al-taqalluq al-nakhsūq). He applies this to belief (iṣṭiqaq), presumption (zann), will (irāda) and disapproval (kāhā).} Ibn al-Malāhimī reports, however, that they employed a concept of connection which they defined as the connection between God's state of being knowing and its objects.\footnote{Muṭamad, 200-1.}

Ibn al-Malāhimī refrained from asserting a similar connection between God's essence and the objects of His power. In his view, the attribute of power is basically confined to the capable agent who is described as able to do, or to refrain from, acts under certain conditions.\footnote{Ibid., 206.} These conditions are in turn confined either to the act insofar as
it needs to be feasible, or to the agent in so far as he needs to have a motive for the act. Thus, the ability to act or not to act is the characteristic of a capable agent.\textsuperscript{58}

In his Ma\textsuperscript{c}àrij al-Hill\textsuperscript{i} affirms a connection between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and is undecided whether this notion may similarly be affirmed in regard to other attributes.\textsuperscript{59} In his other works, however, he draws the parallel between knowledge and power. He affirms a connection between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge as well as the objects of His power.\textsuperscript{60} In this, he presumably was secondarily influenced by al-R\textsuperscript{z}\textsuperscript{i} and earlier Ash\textsuperscript{c}arites.\textsuperscript{61}

Al-R\textsuperscript{z}\textsuperscript{i} agreed with the school of Ab\textsuperscript{u} l-\textsuperscript{H}usayn al-Ba\textsuperscript{s}r\textsuperscript{i} that God's essence differs from other essences by itself.\textsuperscript{62} He defended this notion especially against the Bahshamiyya.\textsuperscript{63}

He further adopted the view of the school of Ab\textsuperscript{u} l-\textsuperscript{H}usayn that God's distinctive essence (dh\textsuperscript{a}t makhs\textsuperscript{u}sa) entails His attributes of being knowing and powerful.\textsuperscript{64} He defined these as connections (ta\textsuperscript{c}allug\textsuperscript{a}t) between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and power.\textsuperscript{65} With his affirmation of connections between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and power, he is only partly in agreement with Ibn al-Mal\textsuperscript{h}im\textsuperscript{i} who asserted such a connection only between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge. Al-R\textsuperscript{z}\textsuperscript{i} rather followed his Ash\textsuperscript{c}arite predecessors in this

\textsuperscript{58} It is noteworthy that later representatives of the school draw the parallel from knowledge to power when they asserted a connection between God's essence and His potentials; e.g. Ta\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{i} al-D\textsuperscript{i}n, 127. Moreover, later authors sometimes held that Ab\textsuperscript{u} l-\textsuperscript{H}usayn and Ibn al-Mal\textsuperscript{h}im\textsuperscript{i} themselves drew this parallel between God's knowledge and His power. See e.g. \textsuperscript{c}Abd All\textsuperscript{a}h b. Zayd al-\textsuperscript{c}Ans\textsuperscript{i}, Kit\textsuperscript{a}b al-mahajja al-bay\textsuperscript{d}a' f\textsuperscript{i} us\textsuperscript{u}l al-d\textsuperscript{i}n (MS Munich Glaser 148), 28v-29r.

\textsuperscript{59} Ma\textsuperscript{c}àrij, 121r-v.

\textsuperscript{60} E.g. Man\textsuperscript{h}i\textsuperscript{z}, 92r-v; Nih\textsuperscript{a}yat al-maram, 79v-80r; Tasl\textsuperscript{i}k, 56r.

\textsuperscript{61} See later.

\textsuperscript{62} Arba\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{i}n, 96; Ma\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{a}lim, 47; Mat\textsuperscript{e}lib, 1:315, 317.

\textsuperscript{63} Arba\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{i}n, 96ff; Mat\textsuperscript{e}lib, 1:313ff.

\textsuperscript{64} Ma\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{a}lim, 58.

\textsuperscript{65} Arba\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{i}n, 155; Mat\textsuperscript{e}lib, 3:223.
respect who asserted connections also for other attributes.\textsuperscript{66} In some instances, al-Rāzī substituted the philosophical term *idāfa* and the term *nisba* for the term *ta\textsuperscript{c}alluq*.\textsuperscript{67} However, his notion of *idāfa* and *nisba* in this context fully agrees with the theological concept of *ta\textsuperscript{c}alluq* and has nothing in common with the philosophical notion of *idāfa*.

Having adopted Abū 1-Ḥusayn al- Başrī's and Ibn al-Malāḥimī's concepts of attributes, al-Rāzī repudiated the view that God's essential attributes are entailed by entitative determinants.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, he rejected the view of those Ashārites who adhered to the notion of states (*ahwāl*), presumably having al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī in mind.\textsuperscript{69} As al-Rāzī presents their view, they held that the entitative determinants of power or knowledge entail the states (*ḥāla*) of God being powerful and knowing. Between these states and the objects of His knowledge and power, they affirmed a connection (*ta\textsuperscript{c}alluq*).\textsuperscript{70}

Al-Rāzī, in contrast, maintained that God's distinctive essence directly entails connections (*ta\textsuperscript{c}alluqāt*) or relations (*idāfāt*/ *nisab*) between His essence and the objects of His being knowing and His being powerful.\textsuperscript{71}


\textsuperscript{67} Arba\textsuperscript{C}īn, 155.

\textsuperscript{68} Matālib, 3:233-4. In some of his more traditional works, however, he affirmed entitative determinants; e.g. "Masā'il," 366-7.

\textsuperscript{69} See Arba\textsuperscript{C}īn, 155-6; there, he attributes the notion of states to al-Bāqillānī. In his two extant works, the *Tāmhīd* and the *Insāf*, al-Bāqillānī rejects the validity of this theory. However, in later works, especially his *Hidāyat al-mustarshīdīn* which is only partly extant in manuscript, he appears to have adopted a theory of states which shares only some elements with the theory of the Bahashāmiyya. See R. Frank, "Ḥāl," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, suppl.fasc.5-6:346; al-ʿAmīdī, 27; also Gherbati, "Ahwāl," 76ff. His notion of states was later adopted by al-Juwaynī; see Frank, loc.cit., 346ff.

\textsuperscript{70} Matālib, 3:223-4; *Ma\textsuperscript{C}ālim*, 56; Arba\textsuperscript{C}īn, 155-6.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 155.
Yet on the basis of the notion of connection, al-Rāzī defended the traditional Ashʿarite position that God's attributes have a reality of their own other than His essence. He identified the connection or relation between the essence and the objects of His being knowing and powerful as knowledge (ʿilm) and (power) and further pointed out that this connection is other than the essence. From this he concluded that God has a knowledge which is distinct from His essence. Thus, whereas al-Hillī considered God's attributes and their characteristics as additional to God's essence merely in ratiocination without any separate existence, al-Rāzī fully reified them. He states:

Know that we do not assert in this question more than that what is understood by God's being knowing, powerful and living is not the same as what is understood by His essence. Rather, it is a matter which differs from His essence. If the Muʿtazilites go along with us to this extent, accord has been reached and disagreement ceases ....We say, whoever knows a certain matter, there must inevitably occur a specific relation (nisba makhṣūṣa) or a specific relationship (iddāfā makhṣūṣa) between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. The theologians call this specific relation "connection" and they say that the knowledge is connected to the object of knowledge. In our view, this knowledge is an expression for this connection itself and for this specific relationship (iddāfā) itself and we claim that this relationship (iddāfā) and relation (nisba) is different from the essence. 72

Al-Hillī further disagreed with al-Rāzī about which divine attributes are essential. Whereas he affirmed only God's being knowing, powerful and living as essential attributes, al-Rāzī, following the Ashʿarite tradition, also counted the attributes of speech 73 and will. 74

72Arbaʿān, 155; see also Matālib, 3:223; Maʿālim, 56.
73Ibid., 61; "Masāʿil," 368-9.
74See later.
2. God as Existent (Mawjūd)

In his notion of existence (wujūd) al-Hillī followed the Avicennan tradition.

According to Ibn Sīnā and his followers, God who exists necessarily by virtue of Himself (wāljīb al-wujūd) is the primary, absolute and perfect existence,75 or pure existence (mujarrad al-wujūd).76 (wujūd maḥī).77 It is, therefore, the strongest form of existence. Contingent things require an effector for their existence as they are, in contrast to God, unable to necessitate their existence by virtue of themselves.78 Thus, their existence is not pure and of a much weaker kind than God's existence.79 Owing to this difference, the existence of God and of the contingents is not the same in a univocal manner (bi-l-tawātu') but it can be said to be the same only by analogy (bi-l-tashkīk).80

76 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 2:347.
77 Al-Ghazālī, Maqāsid, 251-2, 289.
78 Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 2:347; idem, Najāt, 261; al-Ghazālī, Maqāsid, 289; for this view in al-Hillī's writings, see Maḏārij, 79r.
God's existence, according to Ibn Sīnā, is identical with His essence (māhiyya) itself while the existence of contingent beings is other than their essence. The relationship between their essence and existence is described in such a way that existence is accidental to the essence.

Al-Hilli presents the views of the philosophers together with other positions and states his own preference:

People disagreed about existence. Is it an additional matter or not? The generality of the philosophers held that existence as such is applied by analogy (bi-l-tashkik) to all existent things which are specified each by an essence in the sense that they differ in it (i.e. existence), either through precedence (tagaddum) or posteriority (ta'akhkhur), like the existence of cause and effect, or through priority (awwalīyya) and its non-existence, like these two mentioned existences [reading wujūdāyn for wujūd]; or through greater intensity (ashaddiyya) and greater weakness (adṣafiyya) like the existence of the necessary and the existence of the contingent. Whatever is asserted of them by analogy cannot possibly be either a[n integral] part of them or themselves. For the essence itself or a part of it is not subject to disparity. Rather, it [i.e. existence] is an accidental matter to it [i.e. essence].

As for the existences which are specific to each single essence, they are additional to this [reading tilka for dhālika] essence, except for the existence of the Necessarily Existent which is specific to Him. For, it is, in their view, identical with His reality itself (nafs āqiqatihi) ....As for the theologians, most of the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites held that existence is additional to the essence in regard to the Necessarily Existent and all contingent matters besides Him. Others, among them Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī, maintained that existence is identical with the essence both in regard to the Necessarily Existent and the contingent things.

113r; Manāḥij, 93r; Nihāyat al-marām, 12r; Kashf al-khafā', 34v-35r.
81 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla, 18-9; Ilāhiyyāt, 2:344; al-Ghazālī, Maqāsid, 252, 289. For this view in al-Hilli's writings, see Asrār, 208v; Manāḥij, 79v, 93r.
82 Al-Ghazālī, Maqāsid, 289. For this view in al-Hilli's writings, see Asrār, 172v; Manāḥij, 79v, 93r; Taslīk, 6r.
83 Ibn Sīnā, Risāla, 19; al-Ghazālī, Maqāsid, 289.
If you have recognized this, we say: The opinion which we choose [reading nadhabu for yadhhabu] is that existence in regard to the Necessarily Existent is identical with His essence.84

Essence (māhiyya) was understood by al-Hillī, again like Ibn Sīnā,85 as a concept which is not attached to individual entities as long as existence is not attached to it. When existence is attached to it, the essence inheres in the individual entities (kā'ina fi l-aʿyān) and can be discerned through consideration of the existent being.86 Thus, individual things occur only when existence is attached to the essence.87 Moreover, the essence cannot be discerned in the external world (fi l-khārij) when existence is not attached to it. This is only possible in ratiocination.88 Essence itself is neither existence nor non-existence.89 The existent entity is, therefore, to be understood as a sample of the essence which occurs in the external world.90

Having adopted the Avicennan notion of existence, al-Hillī was in disagreement with his Muʿtazilite predecessors. With the Bahshamiyya, he differed on a number of points. They held that an attribute of essence is necessarily attached to every essence (dhāt). This is not conditional on existence but is asserted prior to it. The same applies to God. His state of being existent is understood to be an essential attribute which is entailed by

84Maʿarīj, 112v-113r.
86Nihayat al-maram, 9v.
87Ibid., 8v-9r.
88Ibid., 15r.
89Ibid., 9v; also Rahman, 9; Morewedge, 432.
90Nihayat al-maram, 15r, 18r; see also Rahman, 7, 11; Morewedge, 432.
His attribute of essence. Thus, His existence is not identical with His essence. This was unacceptable for al-Hillī.

In respect to beings other than God, the Bahshamiyya asserted that they have an individual reality prior to their existence owing to the attribute of essence. Al-Hillī disagreed holding that things gain individual reality only when they occur. A non-existent (macdûm) can, therefore, not be asserted to be a thing.

He further disagreed with them as to whether existence is the same in regard to all existent beings in a univocal manner or by analogy. Although the followers of Abū Hāshim considered existence as an attribute which in man is caused by an agent (bi-l-fāʿil) and in God by virtue of His attribute of essence, existence as such was in their view univocal with regard to all. They argued that the characteristic (hukm) of existence is in regard to everything that it constitutes the condition (shart) for the actuality of the essential attributes. Al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī summarizes this difference:

The philosophers, Abū Hāshim and his followers among the Muʿtazila and the generality of the Ashʿarītes held the second view [i.e., that existence is a shared meaning (ishtirāk maʿnawi) for all existent beings. Then they disagreed. The philosophers said that it is predicted by analogy to the existent things which fall under it. The Bahshamiyya and Aḥṭīr al-Dīn al-Abhārī held that it is applied univocally (bi-l-tawātu') to all existent beings. The author [i.e. al-Hillī] and al-Muḥaqiq (Nasīr al-Dīn) al-Ṭūsī chose the position of the philosophers.

92 See Frank, "Non-Existent," 205ff.
93 Asrār, 172v-173r; Ḥāfiz al-maqāsid, 20ff; Nihāyat al-maẓām, 8v-9r, 18r.
94 See supra, p. 173.
95 See Frank, "Non-Existent," 197.
96 Ibn Mattawayh, Majmuʿ, 1:135-6; also ibid., 137 where Ibn Mattawayh argues further that existence cannot differ since it is not connected to anything (lā mutaʿallag laḥā).
97 Al-Miqdād, 38-9; see also al-Hillī, Kashf al-khafā, 34v-35r. Al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's account of Aḥṭīr al-Dīn al-Abhārī's view seems to be mistaken. In his Hidāyat al-ḥikma, the latter maintained the Avicennan view on existence. God's existence which is essentially necessary is absolute (muḥlag)
Al-Hillî equally disagreed with Abû l-Husayn al-Başrî on a number of points. Repudiating Abû Hâshim's notion of states, the latter affirmed that "thing" (shay') or "essence" (dhat) and "existent" (mawjûd) are identical. Thus, God's being existent is not an additional attribute above His essence. Rather, it is identical with His essence. So far, al-Hillî agreed.

Yet in contrast to al-Hillî, Abû l-Husayn did not envisage the philosophical notion of essence. Thus, the existence of a thing also constitutes its characteristics. The difference of the things is, therefore, founded in their existence only. Thus, the existence of any existent entity must differ from the existence of everything else. The existences of the things have, therefore, nothing in common but their name.

Thus, whereas al-Hillî held that the meaning of existence is by analogy shared by all existent entities (ishtirâk ma' nawî), Abû l-Husayn al-Başrî maintained that only the term is shared (ishtirâk lafzî).

and therefore different from the existence of contingent things. Existence can therefore be asserted of them only by analogy (tashkîk); see Husayn b. Muqjin al-Dîn Kâdimir Maybudî, Commentary on al-Abharî's Hîdâyat al-hikma (Constantinople, 1283/1867), 106-7.


99 Ibid., 104-5; Ibn al-Mâlahîmî, Mu'tamad, 254ff.

100 Manâhij, 79v; Kashf al-khâfî', 33v-34r.
With his notion of existence, al-Ḥillī not only disagreed with the earlier Mu'tazilites but equally with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The latter held that existence is additional to essence both in regard to man and God. Since this view was not shared by earlier Ashʿarites,101 al-Ḥillī had presumably al-Rāzī in mind when he ascribed this view to the Ashʿarites.102 Al-Rāzī summarizes the different views and states his own preference:

To speak about God's existence must necessarily be understood in one of the following three ways:

The first is to say that the term "existence" which applies to the Necessary by itself and to the contingent by itself does not convey a single meaning which is shared by both categories. Rather, only the term is shared.

The second view is to say that the term "existence" has a single meaning. However, in respect to the Necessarily Existent by Himself it is pure existence [reading wujūd mujarrad for wujudan mujarradan], i.e. an existence with the condition that it is not accidental to any essence but rather an existence which subsists in itself. On that consideration, God's existence is identical with His reality itself (nafs haqīqatīhi).

The third view is to say that the existence is one of the attributes of the reality (haqīqa) of God and one of the qualities (naqṣ) of His essence (maḥiyya). On that consideration, God's existence is other than His essence.

Each of the three positions was upheld by a multitude of people. The first one is the doctrine of a large group of theologians such as Abū l-Hasan

101 The traditional Ashʿarite view was that "thing" (shay') and "existent" (mawjūd) are synonymous and that the non-existent (maʿḍūm) cannot be defined as a real thing; see Ibn Fūrak, 252ff; al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 15; al-Baḥḍārī, Fargh, 170; al-Juwaynī, Shāmil (edited by A.S. al-NAshar), 124, 610; see also van Ess, Erkennnislehre, 198-9. Thus, they did not treat God's existence as an attribute. Al-Ashʿarī apparently adhered in his Mu'tazilite period to the view that a thing is a thing prior to its existence and wrote a treatise in support of this position. Later, he repudiated it. See O. Pretzl, Die frühsiranische Attributenlehre (München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1940), 60; D. Gimaret, "Bibliographie d'Aš'arī: un réexamen," Journal Asiatique 273 (1985): 256 no.49.

102 Maʿṣūrī, 113r (quoted supra, p.181-2). The editor of al-Miqdād al-Suyūṭī's Irshād suggests that by the Ashʿarites, al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī are meant (al-Miqdād, 33 n.3). This is evidently wrong, since both asserted that thing (shay') and existent (mawjūd) are identical. Al-Miqdād, like al-Ḥillī, had undoubtedly al-Rāzī in mind.
al-Asārī and Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī. The second position was chosen by Abū ʿAlī b. Sīnā in all of his works. The third is the doctrine of a large group of theologians and we have backed it in most of our books. 103

103 Mutālīb, 1:290-1. Al-ʿRāzī upheld the same position in his Arbaʾīn (100), his Mulakhhkhab (85v) and his Mabahith al-nashriyya (1:31). See, in contrast, his Ishāra (10v) and his "Masaʾil" (345ff, 348) where he refrains from taking a position. In his Tafsīr (vol. 5, pt.12:182-3) al-ʿRāzī argues in traditional Asārī terms when he says that God's existence is identical with His essence (ʿayn dātāhī).
3. The Range of God's Power

All parties basically agreed that God has power over everything which is subject to power.\(^{104}\) For al-Rāzī as an Ashʿarite, this principle was self-evident since in their view everything which occurs is solely dependent on God's power.\(^{105}\) The Muʿtazilites, on the other hand, were confronted with a problem arising from their view of justice. If God has power over everything which may be subject to power, this applies necessarily also to man's acts. However, if God had power over man's acts there would be no way to ascertain whether these acts are performed by man's power or rather created by God's power as affirmed by the Ashʿarites.

Upholding that God, in view of His omnipotence, has power over everything which is subject to power,\(^{106}\) al-Hillī affirmed that the specific acts of man are also subject to God's power.\(^{107}\) With this view, al-Hillī adhered to the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-BAṣrī and his followers who drew the same conclusion.\(^{108}\)

Most of the earlier Muʿtazilites denied that God has power over acts subject to man's power. Al-Hillī summarizes the different positions of the earlier Muʿtazilite theologians:

\(^{104}\) An exception among the Muʿtazilites was al-Nazzām who held that God does not have the power to do evil. His view has recently been investigated by J. van Ess ("Wrongdoing and Divine Omnipotence in the Theology of Abū ʿIshāq an-Nazzām," in Divine Omiscience and Omnipotence in Mediaeval Philosophy (edited by T. Rudavsky. Synthese Historical Library. Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy, vol.25. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Reidel, 1985):53-67) and R. Frank ("Can God do What is Wrong?" ibid., 69-79).

\(^{105}\) Muḥājir, 52ff; Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.

\(^{106}\) Manāḥīj, 90v.

\(^{107}\) Manāḥīj, 91r.

\(^{108}\) Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 45r.
Al-Kābī held that God does not have power over the like of what is subject to man's power (mithl magdūr al-ʿabīd) because what is subject to his power is either obedience or foolishness or... [reading unclear] and these are negated [reading manfiyya for mutlbata] in regard to God.... Abū ʿAlī, Abū Ḥāshim and their followers maintained that God has no power over the very acts of men (nafs magdūr al-ʿabīd). Abū l-Hudhayl, Abū l-Husayn and the Ashʿarites allowed this.... Abū ʿAlī and his son argued that [if God had power over man's acts], it would necessarily follow that two capable agents would have jointly power over a single possible act. And this is impossible. 109

The principal difference between the Baghdadis and the Basrans, then, was that the former argued that God has no power over all classes (ajnās) of acts which are subject to man's capability. 110 The Basrans, in contrast, argued that since God enabled men to perform various classes of acts, He must likewise have power over these. Thus, they affirmed that God in principle has power over an infinite number of the class (jins) of acts which man is capable of performing. They maintained, however, that God does not have power over the specific acts which are subject to man's capability (aṣyān al-ʿafāl). 111 Their principal argument for denying God's power over the acts of man was, as al-Ḥālī pointed out, that a possible act (maqdūr) cannot be subject to the power of two capable agents. 112

109 Manāhijj, 91r. For Abū Hudhayl's view on God's omnipotence, see Frank, "Attributes," 473ff.
111 Mānākīm, 375-6; also al-ʿAshʿarī, Maqālāt, 199-200; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.
112 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muqnis, 4:254ff; Mānākīm, 375ff.
4. God as Knowing

a. The Proofs of God's Being Knowing

Al-Hilli puts forth two proofs for God's being knowing:

The proof for God's being knowing is that God performed well-wrought and perfect acts. Everyone who is like this is necessarily knowing. Thus, God is knowing.\textsuperscript{113}

This proof which is based on man's witnessing God's well-wrought acts was commonly employed by the earlier Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite theologians.\textsuperscript{114} Al-Hilli goes on to put forth his second proof:

"There is a second proof for God's being knowing. Its elaboration is that God is powerful and every powerful [agent] is knowing... As for the major premise, the powerful [agent] is he who acts by means of the motive (dā'i) and the intention (qasād) for one side rather than the other. The intention for one side is necessarily conditional on knowledge. Thus, power is only complete with knowledge."\textsuperscript{115}

This proof was apparently first introduced by Ibn al-Malāhimi.\textsuperscript{116} He had argued\textsuperscript{117} that the fact that an agent is knowing may be deduced from a single act regardless of whether it is well-wrought or not. The argument is based on the view that a capable agent cannot perform an act without having a motive for it. Here, Ibn al-Malāhimi differed from the Bahshamiyya who allowed that a capable agent can perform

\textsuperscript{113} Ma'ārij, 116r; see also Asrār, 210r; Manāhij, 91r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 81v; Nahj al-mustarshidin, 194; Taslāk, 51v.

\textsuperscript{114} For its use among Mu'tazilites, see Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū' al-Nisābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 493. For its use among Ash'arites, see al-Asqari, Luma', §13; al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 26; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:58.

\textsuperscript{115} Ma'ārij, 116r; see also Asrār, 210r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 81v; Nahj al-mustarshidin, 194; Taslāk, 51v.

\textsuperscript{116} From the texts of Ibn al-Malāhimi, there is no indication that Abū l-Husayn al-Bāsri had already employed this proof.

\textsuperscript{117} Fā'īq, 18r; Mu'tamad, 198.
an act without a motive. On this basis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī argued that God, since He creates nothing without a motive and since His motive must be based on knowledge of the reality of the thing He creates, must necessarily be knowing. Since al-Hillī shared the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī that an agent does not act but for a motive, he could similarly employ the latter's proof for God's knowledge.

Al-Rāzī also referred to two proofs in order to show that God is knowing. The similarity of his proofs to those employed by Ibn al-Malāḥimī suggests that al-Rāzī was influenced by the latter's reasoning. He states:

The creator of the world is knowing because His acts are well-wrought and perfect as is indicated by observation and because the doer of a well-wrought, perfect act must be knowing. This is known by immediate insight. Moreover, God acts by choice and a choosing agent is one who intends the production of a certain kind. The intention to create a certain kind is subject to the condition that [the agent] conceives that essence. Thus it is established that God conceives some essences and the essences by themselves undoubtedly require the stability of some qualities and the non-existence of others. And the conception of what requires necessitates the conception of what is required. Thus, from God's knowledge of these essences follows His knowledge of their concomitants and effects.  

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118 See supra, p. 129-30.
119 Fā'iq, 18r.
120 Maṣālim, 50-1; see also Arbaʿīn, 133-4; Maṭālib, 3:107ff.; see also ibid., 117ff where he expresses his preference for the second proof.
b. God's Knowledge of the Non-Existent

Al-Hillî and al-Râzî were confronted with the position of the philosophers who held that God knows the universals (kulliyât) but not particulars (juz'iyyât). The argument underlying the philosophical position was that particulars are subject to constant change and if God knew them He, too, would be subject to constant change. This, however, was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{121} Al-Hillî and al-Râzî, who upheld the theological view of divine omniscience which includes universals and particulars, disagreed. Thus they were required to counter this argument.

Of special relevance to al-Râzî and al-Hillî was the philosophical objection that God cannot be aware of the change when something either gains existence or ceases to exist. If He knew that something comes into existence or ceases to exist at this moment, this knowledge would require a change in His essence as well. God's knowledge of the temporals must be timeless and cannot be subject to change. Al-Hillî reports the view of the philosophers referring to the example of God's knowledge of the occurrence of a lunar eclipse:\textsuperscript{122}

This is the objection of the philosophers. They claim [\textsuperscript{Ll} reading unclear] that God does not know particulars. By particulars they mean that He does not know whether something subject to [His] knowledge existed in the past, whether it will exist in the future or whether it exists now. He is in fact able to know something that is connected with its cause and with time but not whether it occurred in the past or whether it will occur in the future. He knows for instance that when the sun reaches a certain limit, the earth is in a middle position between the sun and the moon. Thus, the eclipse occurs. This knowledge is present to Him prior to the eclipse, after it and with it. But He

\textsuperscript{121}The question of how Ibn Sînā in particular understood God's universal knowledge in contrast to man's knowledge has been the subject of a study by M.Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of the Particuars," Journal of the American Oriental Society 82 (1962):299-312.
\textsuperscript{122}For this example among the philosophers, see ibid., 310-1.
does not know whether the eclipse occurred already, whether it will occur in the future or whether it occurs at this moment. This is the elaboration of their argument. 123

Al-Hilli rejected this argument. It is not the attribute of knowledge which changes but the connection (taʾalluq) between God's essence and the object of His knowledge. 124 Therefore, when a thing is non-existent, there exists a relation between it and God's essence in so far as it is non-existent. Once it gains existence, a new connection replaces the former one between God's essence and this object of His knowledge. In some of his works, al-Hilli substitutes the term idāfa for the term taʾalluq. 125

With this view, al-Hilli followed Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who rejected the philosophical objection in the same way. He states:

We have already clarified that knowledge has no meaning but that of a relation (idāfa) between the knower and the object of his knowledge. Accordingly, we say that if the object of knowledge changes that relation must inevitably change [too] because the reality and constancy of any relationship is connected with two related matters. If one of the two changed in the aspect in which it is related while the relationship did not change, it would suggest that the relationship is independent in itself [from the two related matters]. Thus, the relation would not be a relation; rather [knowledge would perhaps be] something else to which the relation is accidental. This is impossible. However, a change like this does not require a change [in His essence] [word missing] because what entails God's knowing that Zayd is in the house is either His essence or a determinant which subsists in His essence with the condition that Zayd is in the house. If Zayd leaves the house, the condition for this relationship does not endure. Thus it [i.e. the relationship] is interrupted and the condition for the stability of another relationship exists which is the knowledge that he has left the house. Thus, the first [relationship] is certainly negated and the second exists without any need for a change. This case is like that which our people agreed upon that God's power is connected with a thing when it comes into

123 Maʾrīj, 116v; see also Asrār, 225r; Manāhil, 91r.
124 Nihāyat al-mārām, 80r.
125 Asrār, 225r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 198; Nihāyat al-mārām, 80r; Taslīk, 56r.
being. When it has become permanent the connection (ta’allug) of the power is interrupted. When He annihilates it the connection of the power to it recurs. From this it does not follow that He needs something which changes.... The same applies here.\(^ {126}\)

With this answer, al-Rāzī followed the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who offered a similar reply when they were confronted with the same objection.\(^ {127}\) They argued that God knows by His essence from eternity that He is one and that He will create the creation. However, the connection (ta’allug) of God's knowledge with the existence of a thing, which is also necessitated by His essence, occurs only when the thing exists.\(^ {128}\)

Thus, God knows a thing before its existence in its reality and how it will be when it occurs but He does not know it as existent.\(^ {129}\) Once the condition of the existence of the thing is fulfilled, the connection of God's knowledge with the existence of a thing is initiated (tajaddada

\(^ {126}\) Ishāra, 15v; see also Maqālim, 51-2; Maṭālib, 3:155ff, 157; Mulakhkhas, 343vff.
\(^ {127}\) See Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 46vff; Taqī al-Dīn, 253ff.
\(^ {128}\) Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 46r-47r.
\(^ {129}\) Ibid., 47v.
According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī and Taqī al-Dīn, 

130 Fā'iq, 47v.

In contrast to Ibn al-Malāḥimī's efforts to confine the change to the connection between God's knowledge and its object, al-Hillī reports in his Manāhīj that Abū 1-Husayn and his followers argued that God's knowledge is in fact subject to change in accordance with the changes occurring in temporal objects of knowledge. This argumentation is not mentioned by Ibn al-Malāḥimī and evidently is not based on the latter's position since it does not refer to the connection between God's knowledge and its object.

Al-Hillī states (Manāhīj, 91r): "It was said against them [i.e. the school of Abū 1-Husayn], 'knowledge is an attribute of essence, so that change is not permissible for it'. They answered: 'Change in an attribute of essence is not permissible if it is absolute. However, if it is subject to a condition, change is permissible. The clarification of this is that God is from eternity capable of the creation of the world and this is an essential attribute. It is not absolute, however, but subject to the condition of the non-existence of the world. When it [i.e. the world] exists, the endurance of the capability is impossible. Otherwise, the production of the existential would be necessary. We say the same about perception. For God is from eternity perceiving, but on the condition of the existence of the perceivable object in contrast to God's essence which is necessitating in an absolute way. Likewise God's being knowing a thing is subject to the condition that the thing is an object of knowledge in this manner. When that which He knew would exist comes into being, the possibility of being subject to knowledge that it will exist may remain and this leads necessarily to ignorance. Or it does not remain, but rather it ceases being subject to knowledge that it will exist after [having come into] existence and He knows that it exists. Thus, you have acknowledged a change of the condition, namely the change of the object of knowledge. From this follows necessarily a change of the subject of the condition [i.e. the attribute]'."

This account apparently derives from the teaching of later representatives of the school of Abū 1-Husayn, most likely from the Kitāb al-Kāmil of Taqī al-Dīn. When the latter mentions the different theological opinions about how God knows the non-existent (ibid., 252ff), he points out that the view of Abū ʿAlī, Abū ʿAlī-gāsin al-Kāshfī and Abū 1-Husayn al-Baṣrī must necessarily lead to the possibility of change in God (ibid., 253). Against the position of Abū Ḥāshim, Taqī al-Dīn puts forth his own argumentation that God's knowledge is in fact subject to change (ibid., 259-60). He does not resort to the notion of connection, but maintains that God's knowledge itself changes. In affirming that this is permissible, he puts forth the same reasoning as it is reported by al-Hillī. Some attributes, like God's being powerful and perceiving, are subject to conditions in order to become actual. The same applies to knowledge. If something occurs in a specific manner, the condition is fulfilled for
the same answer had been offered by Abū ʿAlī and Abū ʿl-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī to a similar objection.131

God to know its existence in this specific manner. If the existence or some other aspects of it change, God's knowledge changes accordingly (ibid., 259-60). Taqī al-Dīn does not ascribe this argumentation to any earlier theologian and his presentation gives the impression that it was he who introduced it.

131 Ibn al-Malāhimī reports (Fāʾiq, 46v): "Our master Abū l-Husayn al-Bāṣrī reported in the [Kitāb] al-ṭassafūḥ about the master Abū ʿAlī and Abū ʿl-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī that they held...that when a thing comes into existence after [its] non-existence its connection (taʿalluq) with God's knowledge and His awareness (tabayyun) that it gained existence is renewed (tajaddada). The connection of the knowledge with that the thing will exist differs from [its] connection with that it has come into existence." See also Taqī al-Dīn, 253.

The position of Abū l-Husayn al-Bāṣrī and his followers provoked accusations by later authors that they had returned to the views of Hishām b. Hakām and Jahm b. Safwān (for their views, see later); see al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:85; idem, Nihāya, 221; Kamāl al-Dīn Ahmad b. Ḥasan al-Bayāḍī, Ishārat al-maraṣm min ʿibārat al-imām (edited by Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Razzāq. Cairo, 1368/1949), 127-8; al-Muhallī, 76r. However, Ibn al-Malāhimī drew a clear line between the position of Hishām b. Hakām and his own. He pointed out that the latter, in contrast to his own thesis, did not allow that God knew that the things will exist (Fāʾiq, 47v).
According to Taqī al-Dīn,\textsuperscript{132} and al-Ḥilli,\textsuperscript{133} Ibn al-Malāḥimī differed from Abū ʾl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in one aspect of their theory. While the latter maintained that the newly arising connection of God's knowledge is added to its former connection with the object, Ibn al-Malāḥimī held that it replaces it so that the former knowledge vanishes. Al-Ḥilli supported the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.\textsuperscript{134}

The position of the school of Abū ʾl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Ḥilli and al-Rāzī was not shared by most of the earlier Muʿtazilites. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, the Bahshamiyya held that God's knowledge of a thing is always connected with its existence regardless of whether it will exist in the future, exists now, or existed in the past. There is only a difference of expression (Cībārāt) in relation to the three cases. Thus, if a thing will exist in the future, God knows its existence and that it will be in the future. In the case of a past thing, God will likewise know its existence and that it existed in the past. Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports Abū Hāshim's position:

His knowledge does not change because of this [i.e. the turning of a thing from non-existence into existence] and He does not depart from the attribute of essence [i.e. His being knowing] because the knowledge that the thing will exist and the knowledge that it has come into existence is one knowledge. Only the expressions change in accordance with the change of the thing known. If its existence is in the future, the knowledge is described as knowledge that it will exist. If it exists the knowledge is described as knowledge of

\textsuperscript{132} Taqī al-Dīn, 261; also ibid., 127.
\textsuperscript{133} Manāhīj, 91r; Nīhāyat al-mārām, 79v-80r.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
its existence. If it ceases to exist it is
described as knowledge [reading ʿilm for ʿalim]
that it did exist.\footnote{Fāʾiq, 46v. For Abū Hāshim's view, see also al-Hillī, Nihāyat
al-maraḥ, 79v. Al-Hillī's account appears to be directly
based on the Fāʾiq. Taqī al-Dīn, 252; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʾiq, 46r-v. Ibn
Mattaṭayh states (Majmūʿ, 1:110): "The state of the
object of knowledge does not differ in its being the object
of knowledge in the [state of] existence and non-existence.
Thus, nothing is initiated which could be made a condition."
It is interesting to note that the issue of how God
knows things in their state of non-existence and existence
was already discussed among earlier theologians. The problem,
however, was different.

Most of the early theologians identified "thing" (shayʿ)
and "existent" (mawjud). This raised for those who held that
the object of all knowledge was things, the problem whether
and how God knows the non-existent which is not a thing. Some
early answers were radical.

Al-Ashʿarī reports (Magālāt, 489) the position of a
group whom he regularly calls the "eternalists" (azaliyya).
They held that since God eternally knows all things, they
must necessarily exist eternally. Van Ess suggests that the
azaliyya were an anonymous group holding non-Islamic views
comparable to the dhāriyya (Erkenntnislehre, 193). The Ikhwān
al-Safāʿi, in fact, called the dhāriyya by the name azaliyya,
presenting them as those who believe in the eternity of the
cosmos (See I. Goldziher and A.M. Goichon, "Dhāriyya,
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2:95.)

Apparently in direct response to this position
(al-Ashʿarī, Magālāt, 489), Ḥishām b. CʿAmr
al-Fuwāṭi (d. before 218/833) drew the opposite conclusion.
Since things cannot be eternal it is not possible to say that
God knew them from eternity. To maintain that God knows
things eternally would be to assert their eternity. God can
be said to be eternally knowing, according to al-Fuwāṭi, only
with respect to His knowledge that He is one (ibid., 158). A
similar conclusion was drawn by Ḥamb b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745)
who also identified "thing" with "existent" (ibid., 494-5; W. Madelung, "The Shiite and Khārijite Contribution to the
5. God as Hearing and Seeing

Al-Ḥillī accepted on scriptural grounds that God is hearing and seeing. Moreover, he affirmed that nothing from the point of view of reason stands against this. He states:


The possibility of God's knowledge of things prior to their existence was asserted as soon as the theologians differentiated the term "thing". Al-Shahām appears to have been the first who offered such a distinction. Prior to their existence, things may be known by God although they become real things only when they occur. (See van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 192-3) Abū Ḫalī envisaged a similar differentiation when he taught that things are not things prior to their existence since existence (kawn) means being found (wjūd) (al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 162). However, a thing may be called a thing and may be known prior to its existence insofar as it is possible to make a statement about it (ibid., 161; see also ibid. for further meanings in which a thing can be said to be a thing prior to its existence).

Owing to their notion of states, the Bahshamiyya were not confronted with the issue whether a thing may be known prior to its existence. The attribute of essence through which it is what it is is always attached to it, regardless of whether the thing exists or not.

The school of Abū ʿUbayd al-Basri repudiated the notion of states and offered a solution similar to that of Abū Ḫalī. They affirmed two meanings for the term "thing" (Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fāʿiq, 49r). In the first sense, "thing" means an existent object, i.e. an essence (dhāt). In the second sense, something non-existent may be called "thing" insofar as it is possible to make a statement about it.

Al-Ḥillī employed the philosophical notion of existence in the mind in contrast to existence in the external world; he held that it is possible to know the non-existent in ratiocination (Manāḥij, 79v-80r).

Thus, the problem that gave originally rise to the question of how God knows the non-existent, i.e. that a thing cannot be asserted to be a thing prior to its existence, was no longer a problem. The main concern of the later theologians was rather to assert God's omniscience without, however, allowing any change to occur in His essence. (For a systematic outline of the dispute among the early theologians, see van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 192ff).
There is no impediment from the point of view of reason from describing God as perceiving. Moreover, the Qur'an [describes Him so] [word missing]. If [reading idha for idhan] [the Qur'an] describes Him [reading yasifuhu for yusifuhu] as such, it is necessary to adhere to this view, unless a rational indication made it impossible to apply [reading itlaqahu for ḍal] [this attribute] to Him, when it would be necessary to interpret [the scriptural evidence metaphorically].

This passage reflects al-Ḥillī's general hesitation to explain what he meant by God's being perceiving. Among the earlier Muʿtazilites, the following two views were most favoured which he summarizes:

Abū Ḥāshim and his followers maintained that the meaning of God's being perceiving is that it is not impossible for Him to perceive the perceivable whenever it exists. Likewise, God is eternally described as being capable of hearing (ṣamīq) and capable of seeing (bāṣīr). He made perception a matter additional to knowledge.

The Baghdadis explained it as meaning that God is knowing what the living among us hear and see. They denied anything in addition to this.

The Bahshamiyya maintained that God's capability of hearing and seeing is entailed by His being alive. Whenever a perceivable object exists the condition for perception is fulfilled. Thus, God is eternally described as capable of hearing and seeing (ṣamīq/ bāṣīr). Yet only when the condition for the actual perception is fulfilled, may He be called actually hearing and seeing (ṣamīq/ mubṣīr). This distinction between the transitive and the intransitive meaning of hearing and seeing originated with Abū ʿAlī.

The Baghdadis, in contrast, reduced God's perception to His knowledge. To say that God is hearing (ṣamīq) and seeing (bāṣīr) can only mean that He knows what man perceives through his senses.

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138 Manāḥij, 92r.
139 Ibid.
140 Al-Nisābūrī, Ḥīl-tawḥīd, 562ff, 564; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 5:242.
141 Al-Ashʿarī, Magālāt, 176.
142 Ibid., 168, 175; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 166, 181; idem, Ṣūl al-dīn, 96; Mānakdīm, 168; see also McDermott, 145.
The school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was divided on this issue. Abū l-Ḥusayn himself is usually reported to have supported the school of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{143} The reliability of these reports is not certain. He had put forward an argument supporting the view of the Baghdadis which appeared to invalidate the position of the Basrans.\textsuperscript{144} He refrained, however, from explicitly stating his support for the view of the Baghdadis.\textsuperscript{145}

Although Ibn al-Malahimī accepted Abū l-Ḥusayn’s objection to the Basran view, he ultimately supported the Basran position.\textsuperscript{146}

In most of his works, al-Ḥillī surveyed the arguments of both positions refuting them all.\textsuperscript{147} He refrained from stating his own preference while asserting that the only safe indication for God’s being perceiving is scriptural evidence.\textsuperscript{148} Only in his Maṣārij, he states that the reduction of God’s perception to His knowledge is the most acceptable explanation.\textsuperscript{149}

Al-Ḥillī followed al-Rāzī in his cautious approach in this question. The latter maintained that God must be said to be hearing and seeing because these are attributes of perfection (ṣifāt al-kanāl) while their opposites would be attributes of deficiency (ṣifāt al-nuqsān). He further referred to scriptural evidence. Yet he acknowledged that

\textsuperscript{143} E.g. al-Rāzī, Muhassal, 248; Mītham al-Bahrānī, 90; al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 205; idem, Taṣlīk, 52v; al-Miqdād, 206. Al-Muhallī (66v), in contrast, reports that Abū 1-Husayn, like Ibn al-Malahimī, supported the position of the Bahshamiyya.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibn al-Malahimī, Fā’iq, 19r; idem, Muṣtamad, 215.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibn al-Malahimī, Fā’iq, 19r. See also al-Rāzī, Tāziqādāt, 42, where he states that Abū l-Husayn was undecided on this issue.

\textsuperscript{146} Fā’iq, 19r-v; Muṣtamad, 212ff, esp.217ff. For the views of Abū l-Husayn and Ibn al-Malahimī, see also Taqī al-Din, 196-7; W. Madelung, "The Theology of al-Zanakhsharī," in Actas del XII Congresso de la U.E.A.I. (Madrid, 1986), 490-1.

\textsuperscript{147} Maṣārij, 92r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 205-6; Taṣlīk, 53r.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 53r.

\textsuperscript{149} Maṣārij, 118r.
this is valid only as long as there is no definite proof that God cannot literally be said to be hearing and seeing. He states:

Concerning the clarification that God is described by hearing and seeing. The proof for this is that hearing and seeing belong to the attributes of perfection while their opposites belong to the attributes of deficiency. Moreover, the Qur'an affirms them for God. Since there are numerous passages reporting [these attributes for God], they must be asserted for God, unless the opponents put forth a proof that the reality of these two states is conditional on a condition whose realization is impossible in regard to God. In that case it would be necessary to interpret [these verses metaphorically].

Like al-Hilli, al-Razi went on to refute the arguments of both those who affirm hearing and seeing as separate attributes to God and those who deny this.

It is most likely that al-Hilli's argument that God is hearing and seeing on scriptural grounds, and that nothing from the point of view of reason stands against this is directly based on al-Razi's Arba'Cin or another work by him.

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150 Arba'Cin, 170.
151 Ibid., 170ff.
152 Ibid., 172ff.
6. God as Willing

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī disagreed about the nature of God's will.

In accordance with his determinism, al-Rāzī held that God's will is an essential attribute. God is qualified by an eternal will (irāda qadīma). Through His eternal will, God has predestined everything that happens. Therefore, nothing can occur that He did not eternally wish to happen.

Al-Ḥillī, following the Muṣtazilite tradition, denied that God has determined things eternally and that He wills through an eternal will. However, although the Muṣtazilites were united in their opposition to determinism, they disagreed among themselves about the nature of God's being willing. Al-Ḥillī identified God's will with His motive (dā'īt) for an act. Whenever God knows that an act would benefit His creation and is free from any evil aspects, this knowledge is His motive to perform this act. Will has no meaning beyond this motive in regard to God.

Here, al-Ḥillī disagreed with those Muṣtazilites who considered God's will as a separate attribute of act which is additional to His knowledge of the beneficial nature of the act. He summarizes the various views on the nature of God's being willing:

Although the Muslims agree that God must be described as willing, they disagree about the nature of God's will. A group of theologians maintained that will is an expression for the motive [for the act] which consists in the knowledge of the benefit of an act; and that disapproval is an expression for the deterrent (ṣarīf) [from the act] which consists in the

154. Arbaʿīn, 244ff; Maṣālik, 89-90.
155. An exception was Bishr b. Muṣtamir who maintained that God's willing is an attribute of essence as well as act. See al-ʿAshʿarī, Muṣālāt, 190; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muqni, 6/2:3. 156. Manāḥij, 91v; Asrār, 223v; Taslīk, 31v.
knowledge of the harmfulness of the act. Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī held that will and disapproval consist of knowledge [of the benefit and harm of the act] in regard to God, but they are additional in regard to us [men]. The majority of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites affirmed that [will] is additional to knowledge in regard to us and to God...Al-Kaʿbī maintained that God's will for his own acts means that He knows them. [His will] in regard to our acts [reading afʿalīpā for afʿalīhi] means that He commands them. 

By the majority of Muʿtazilite theologians who maintained that God's will is additional to His motive, al-Ḥillī meant the school of Basra prior to Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī. He presents their position and refutes it:

The third investigation about God's being willing by virtue of His essence (li-dhātihi). The two Jubbāʾīs held that God is knowing through a temporal will (irāda ḥāditha) which does not inhere in a substrate (lā fī mahāl). . . [This is false] because the subsistence of a will by itself (qiṣm al-irāda bi-dhātihi) is not reasonable, and because its occurrence would require another will. This would lead to an endless regress. 158

The position of the Basran Muʿtazilites originated with Abū l-Hudhayl. 159 He denied that God's will to create a thing can be identified with His creation of it. 160 Rather, God's will of a thing together with the creative imperative "be" (kun) addressed to it constitute His creation. 161 God's will of the acts of others cannot be identified with His command of them. 162 This affirmation of a temporal divine attribute of will raised the question of its origin and locus.

157Maʿṣūrīj, 117r; see also Tāṣlīk; 52r-v.
158Nahj al-mustashhidīn, 218.
159For Abū l-Hudhayl's view on God's will, see generally Madelung, Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, 165; Frank, "Attributes," 494ff. It is noteworthy that later writers usually mention Abū l-Hudhayl among those theologians who denied that God's will has a specific reality of its own; see e.g. Ibn al-Malāhīmi, Muʿtāmad, 240; idem, Fā'id, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 202; al-Jurjānī, 57. Ibn al-Malāhīmi seems to be the first source which attributes this view to Abū l-Hudhayl.
160Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 189, 364.
161Ibid., 190, 363, 510; also ibid., 363, 366 where creation (khalq) is defined as gawl and irāda.
162Ibid., 510.
Abū l-Hudhayl maintained that God is willing through a will which is created in a metaphoric sense (fī l-majāz). By this he presumably meant that if it were created, its creation would require another will. This would lead to an endless regress. He further stipulated that this will is in no place (lā fī makān). With this, he attempted to avoid a conflict between his notion of God's temporal will and the common doctrine that nothing temporal may inhere in God. Abū l-Hudhayl's view was shared by Abū ʿAlī. Abū Hāshim followed Abū l-Hudhayl and Abū ʿAlī in holding that God wills in a manner comparable to man. Thus, His attribute of willing is a separate attribute of act. Since nothing may inhere in God he, like his predecessors, stipulated that His will subsists in no substrate (lā fī maḥall).

The assertion of accidents which do not inhere in a substrate was one of the peculiarities of the theology of the Basrans prior to Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī. The latter denied the possibility of this. Al-Ḥillī followed him in this regard.

In another respect, too, al-Ḥillī followed the doctrine of the school of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī concerning God's will. They identified God's will and disapproval with His motives and deterrents. His knowledge that an act is beneficial constitutes His motive to perform it and His knowledge that an act is harmful constitutes His deterrent from performing it.

163Ibid., 366, 189.
164Ibid., 190, 363; al-Baghdādī, Farg., 127; al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:51, 53; see also ʿAbd al-Jabbar, Muqānī, 6/2:4 where Ibn ʿAyyāsh is quoted asserting that Jaʿfar b. Habīb introduced this formula.
165Al-Ashtārī, Maqālāt, 510.
166Mānakdīn, 434.
167ʿAbd al-Jabbar, Muqānī, 6/2:140ff.
168Ibid., 6/2:149ff.
169Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muṭtamad, 133-4.
170Manāḥīj, 88v; Nahj al-mustashfīdīn, 91.
171Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muṭtamad, 240; Taqī al-Dīn, 203; al-Muḥallī, 150v; Mītham al-Bahrānī, 88.
In his presentation of the view of Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaḍī, and his school, al-Ḥillī correctly stated that they held that God's will in regard to man's acts consists in His command. Yet when he presented their view on God's will of His acts as virtually identical with the position of Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī, both reducing it to His knowledge of His acts, al-Ḥillī was mistaken. The Baghdadis rather reduced His will for His own acts to His creation of them. With this wrong presentation, al-Ḥillī followed the usage of a number of earlier writers who maintained that Abū l-Husayn followed al-Kaḍī in his notion of the nature of God's will.

The basis for the Baghdadi position was laid by al-Nazzām. In his doctrine, God's attribute of will virtually disappears as he identified it with three different meanings. With regard to His own acts, God's will is identical with their creation. With regard to the acts of His servants, His will is identical with His command (amr). God may also be said to will an event in the future such as

172 Mānākūmī, 434; al-Ashārī, Maqālāt, 191, 509; al-Baghdādī, Fatār, 181-2; al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:55, 78.
173 Taqī al-Dīn, 202; al-Jurjānī, 57; al-Rāzī, Arbaʿīn, 147; idem, Matālib, 3:179. In his article "L'attribut divin d'irāda (volonté) d'après une source inexploitée," Studia Islamica 31 (1970):257-268, G.Vajda offered a translation of a passage on God's will from an anonymous Ashārīte fragment, preserved as MS 1259 in the Bibliothèque Nationale (see Vajda and Sauvan, 3:131). This fragment is undoubtedly a portion of al-Rāzī's Matālib al-ʿalīyya; see Matālib, 3:173-182, for the text which corresponds to Vajda's translation.
174 Al-Shahrastānī, Milāl, 1:55. For his view on God's will, see generally al-Ashārī, Maqālāt, 190-1, 365, 509-10; Mānākūmī, 434; ʿAbd al-Jabbar, Mughni, 6/2, 3-4; also Madelung, Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, 165-6; J.van Ess, "Göttliche Allmacht im Zerrbild menschlicher Sprache," Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph 49 (1975-6):670-1.
175 It is noteworthy that al-Nazzām usually avoids the term irāda employing the term wasf bi-annahu murid instead; see e.g. al-Ashārī, Maqālāt, 190-1, 509-10.
176 Ibid., 190-1, 365, 509-10.
177 Ibid.
the day of resurrection. In this case, al-Nazzām identified His will with His deciding (ḥākim) the event and announcing it.178

Al-Hillī mentioned a disagreement among the Muʿtazilite theologians about man's will.179 Is it identical with his motives for the act or does it have a meaning beyond these? This question did not pose itself for the Bahshamiyya who upheld a separate attribute of will in man in the context of their theory of states. The followers of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, however, disagreed among themselves about this point. Abū l-Ḥusayn allowed the existence of a will in addition to the motive for the act in man.180 Once man has the motive for a certain act, he develops a wish (タルب/μυτάλαβα) for it. This wish, which is possible only for a corporeal being with appetites but not for God, is called by Abū l-Ḥusayn "will".181 Ibn al-Malāḥīnī disagreed with his master in rejecting the reality of will even in man. In his opinion, will and disinclination can be reduced with regard to both man and God to the motives for, and deterrents from, the act.182

Al-Hillī followed the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Once man has the motive for an act, he develops an inclination (مَيْل) toward the act which differs from his motive.183 Al-Rāzī developed a concept of man's will for his acts which bears great resemblance to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and al-Hillī's position.184

178Ibid.
179Mašrīji, 117r (quoted supra, p.202-3).
180Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muʿtāmad, 240; idem, Fā'iq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 203; al-Muḥallī, 150v.
181Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muʿtāmad, 240–1, 249.
182Ibid., 249; idem, Fāʿiq, 22r; see also al-Muḥallī, 150v.
183See supra, p.127-8.
184See supra, p.133.
CHAPTER VI
PASSING AWAY (FANĀ') AND RESTORATION (ĪJĀDA)

1. God's Obligation to Restore Man to Life

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī agreed that God will restore men after having caused their passing away. However, they disagreed whether God is obliged to do so or not.

In view of his notion of divine justice, al-Ḥillī supported the position that God is obliged to restore men. He comments on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's argumentation with which he fully agreed:

The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn] argued for the absolutely obligatory nature of the restoration from two aspects. First, God promised reward and threatened punishment, while the death of the morally obliged is witnessed. Thus, their return is necessary in order for His promise and threat to be fulfilled. Secondly, God has morally obliged [men] and inflicted pain and this requires reward (thawāb) and compensation (ṣiwād). Otherwise, God would be oppressive, but God is exalted far above this. We have already clarified His wisdom, and there is no doubt that reward and compensation will reach the morally obliged in the hereafter because of their negation in this world. ¹

He stipulated further that the restoration of the following groups is incumbent upon God:

The restoration of the morally obliged who deserve compensation (ṣiwād) either from God or from somebody else, or from whom another being deserves compensation, is known by reason to be obligatory. As for the first category, this is because of the negation of injustice on His part. As for the second, this is because God is obliged to establish justice (intīṣāf). As for the third, the same principle applies. The restoration of the

¹Kashf al-murād, 320; see also Manāḥīj, 103r; Nahj al-mustashhidīn, 407. For the identical Mu'ātazīle arguments that God is obliged to restore men to life, see Taqī al-Dīn, 322; Ābū Muhammad b. Mattawayh, al-Tadhkira fi ḥakām al-jawāhir wa-l-aṣcā' (edited by Sāmī Nasr Lutf and Faysal Badr), qawwāl, silsila nafā'is al-fikr al-islāmī, no.1. Cairo: Dār al-thaqāfa, 1975), 244-5; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:20ff.
infidels and of the children of the believers is obligatory [only] because of scriptural evidence since there is no disagreement among the Muslims [about this] while no rational proof points to their restoration. The restoration of someone who deserves reward is rationally obligatory because of the necessity that he receive what he deserves. Moreover, scriptural evidence also points to this. The restoration of living beings other than these is not obligatory.  

With this classification, al-Hillī was in agreement with his Mu'tazilite predecessors.  

Al-Rāzī, as an Ash'arite, denied in principle that God is subject to any obligation. However, when he argued that restoration will actually take place, he not only resorted to the traditional scriptural evidence and to consensus, but he also added two rational proofs based on principles which do not easily agree with his traditional Ash'arite position. In his first proof, he ascribed to man's life in this world the purpose of gaining reward in the hereafter. If this were not the case, life in this world would be futile (cabāth) and foolish (safah). He states:  

We see in this world people who obey, people who disobey, people who do good, and people who do evil. We moreover see that the obedient dies without any reward reaching him in this world, while the disobedient dies without any punishment. If there were no congregation (hashr) and restoration (nashr), when the good person receives his reward and the evil doer his punishment, this worldly life would be futile, nay folly.

This argument implies that God created the world for man's benefit and that He is obliged to bring about congregation and restoration. Both principles are in conflict.

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2Manāhij, 103v; see also Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 407; Taslīk, 77v-78r.
4Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:134; vol.9, pt.17:29, 32; vol.13, pt.26:113; vol.15, pt.29:22; Ishāra, 63v-64r. For earlier Ash'arite references to scriptural evidence, see Ibn Fūrak, 145; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 237.
5Ishāra, 63v-64r; see also al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 232, which equally referred to consensus.
6Arbaʿīn, 293-4.
with al-Rāzī's view of God's relation towards His creation. It also implies that the moral quality of man's acts is the cause for his fate in the hereafter. As will be seen in the discussion on reward and punishment, this principle also does not agree with al-Rāzī's Ash'arite position.

In his second argument, he argued further on the basis of non-Ash'arite principles. He stated that God created man for the purpose of his comfort (rāḥa) and pleasure (ladhdha). This purpose cannot be reached in this world since there exists no real pleasure. Pleasure in this world is only the repulsion of harm (daff al-darar). Therefore, he concluded, God will cause man's restoration in the hereafter so that he may experience real pleasure. If this were not the case, it would contradict God's description as beneficent (muḥsin), as compassionate (rahīm) and as self-sufficient (qāhīnī). He states:

God created creation either for comfort or hardship (taqāb) and pain or neither for comfort nor for hardship. It is not permissible that He created them for hardship and pain since this is not appropriate for the Beneficent, the Compassionate, the Self-sufficient who does not need the creation. Likewise it is not permissible to say that He created them neither for [their] comfort nor for hardship and pain because this was the case when they were non-existent. This indicates that He created them only for their comfort. Then we say that this comfort occurs either in this world, because what man assumes [to be] pleasure in this world is not pleasure but rather the repulsion of harm. Eating, for instance, is not really a pleasure but rather the repulsion of the pain of hunger.... Since it has been established that the living being has been created for the purpose of pleasure and comfort and that this does not occur in this world, it must inevitably be affirmed that there exists another world after this in which this purpose will be accomplished. This is the hereafter.

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7Ibid., 294-5.
Like in the first proof, al-Rāzī's assertion that God created men for their comfort and pleasure and that He is obliged to ensure that they will receive this, contradicts his Ashʿarite notion that God does not act for a purpose but by His arbitrary will.
2. The Nature of Passing Away and Restoration

Discussing the nature of passing away, al-Hilli presents two contrasting views and indicates his own choice:

Abū Hāshim and his followers affirmed that the passing away is an entitative determinant (ma'ṣūna). The remaining [theologians] denied this; and this is the truth. They [i.e. the Bahshamiyya] argued that the atoms endure while non-existence is possible for them. This is not possible except with the affirmation of the [accident of] passing away (fanā'). As for [the stipulation that] this requires the affirmation of [an accident of] passing away, [this is so] because the annihilation (iṭḍām) occurs either because of the essence [of the thing which passes away]. This is impossible. Or it is due to an agent. This is [likewise] impossible because the effectiveness (ta'ṣīr) [of an agent] is for production (iḥād) not for annihilation (iṭḍām), since effectiveness means the production of an effect (iḥād al-athar). Or it results from the occurrence of the opposite which is the [accident of] passing away.... As for the ancients (awā'īl), since they maintained that production and annihilation may equally be dependent on the effector, they are not bound by this impossibility [i.e. of non-existence being caused directly by an agent].... The truth is the position of the ancients.

As indicated in this passage, the position of the Bahshamiyya was an attempt to assert the possibility of passing away without infringing two other vital notions of the school.

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8 Manāhij, 88v.
One of these was that all atoms (jawāhir)\(^9\) and most accidents (a’rād)\(^10\) endure by themselves. Here they disagreed with the Baghdadis who maintained that accidents last only for one instance so that they always need to be recreated.\(^11\) Passing away simply consists, according to this latter view, in the failure of God to recreate the accidents.\(^12\) The Bahshamiyya had to find a different solution. The second notion which they had to take into consideration was that an agent may effect only production (‘Ijadi‘) but not annihilation (i‘dām). This also applies to God. Thus, He can undo something only through the creation of its opposite.\(^13\) The solution of the Bahshamiyya, therefore, was that God causes the passing away of the atoms through the creation of a single accident of passing away (fanā‘). This accident is the opposite of all atoms and, thus, is capable of annihilating

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\(^9\) Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212; idem, Majmū‘, 2:288ff; CAbd al-Jabbār, Muqni‘, 11:441ff.
\(^10\) The Basran Mu’tazilites considered the following types of accidents as stable: colours (alwān), tastes (tuqūm), smells (rawā‘ih), hotness (ḥārāra), coldness (burūda), wetness (rutūba), dryness (yubūsma), life (ḥayāt), and composition (ta‘līf); see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 41. The following accidents were not considered as enduring: pains (alām), joys (ladhhdāt) (ibid., 326-7), voices (ṣawā‘) (ibid., 335), and pressure (l‘timād) (ibid., 554-6).
\(^12\) Taqī al-Dīn, 289. Underlying this notion was the Baghdadi view that an atom must necessarily have an accident of every genus of accidents that it is capable of having (Frank, Beings, 94). When God therefore fails to recreate an accident, the atom necessarily passes away.
\(^13\) Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212, 215-6; idem, Majmū‘, 2:293ff; CAbd al-Jabbār, Muqni‘, 11:442-3.
any atom. It must itself be existent (mawjūd), but it cannot inhere in a substrate (lā fī maḥall). Furthermore it does not endure.

This theory provoked much criticism among opponents and later Mu'tazilites. The Ash'arites correctly objected that once God creates the accident of passing away all atoms are annihilated. He is therefore unable to cause the annihilation of only some of the atoms. The followers of the school of

14 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231ff; idem, Majmūʿ, 2:297-8; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:444; also al-Baghdādī, Farq, 197; idem, Uṣūl al-dīn, 231; al-Ghazālī, Tahfut, 86-7. Al-Hillī reports (Manāhib, 88v) that Shaykh al-Tūsī was undecided about this point. From al-Tūsī's available works, this can not be verified; see e.g. his "Muqaddima," 187-8.


16 Ibid., 218ff. This condition was introduced by Abū l-Hudhayl who described passing away (fanāʾ) as God's will of it together with His uttering of the command "pass away". Endurance and passing away, he held, do not subsist in a place (lā fī makān). For his position, see al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt, 366-7; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 217-8, 243; Taqī al-Dīn, 290.

17 Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 224-5. Most of the points of this concept had been introduced already by Abū ʿAlī. However, Abū Hāšim disagreed with his father on a number of points. In his earlier works, Abū ʿAlī is reported to have maintained that there are different types of passing away each of which causes the annihilation of only the corresponding type of atoms. In a later version of his Naqd al-tāj, he is reported to have revised his position, stating that only one passing away is required for all atoms (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231; also Gimaret, "Matériaux," 292). Abū ʿAlī further maintained that it is reason which indicates that the atoms will in fact pass away. Abū Hāšim and his followers disagreed. If it were not for scriptural evidence, there would be no indication that the passing away will actually occur (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 209; Taqī al-Dīn, 289). Abū ʿAlī further rejected on principle that anything which does not subsist in a substrate may be defined as an accident. Thus he refrained from classifying passing away as an accident. Abū Hāšim and his school admitted a category of accidents which do not inhere in a substrate (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 218). For the different categories of accidents in relation to the substrate according to the Bahshamiyya, see ibid., 36.

18 Abū l-Qāsim al-Ansārī, Sharh al-irshād (MS Princeton University Library, ELS 634), 131r; idem, al-Ghunyā fī usūl al-dīn (MS III Ahmet 1916), 94r; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 140; al-Kāmil fī ikhtisār al-shāmil (by an unknown author. MS III Ahmet 1322), 73v-74r. Before having revised his position that there are different types of passing away each of which causes the annihilation of only the corresponding type of
Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī and the Ash'arites also objected to the idea that the accident of passing away does not inhere in a substrate. It is one of the peculiarities of the Bahshamiyya that they allowed that certain accidents do not inhere in a substrate. 19

The second position mentioned by al-Ḥilli, which he approved, is founded on the philosophers' view that a contingent matter requires an effector because of its contingency and not merely for its occurrence. 20 It is defined as contingent by virtue of itself (mumkin li-dhātihi) regardless of whether it exists or not. Thus, having gained existence it is still essentially contingent by itself. No essentially contingent existent may endure by itself. Rather it depends on its effector even when it exists. 21 In relation to the capability of its effector, the choosing agent, existence and non-existence of the effect are equally possible. He may therefore choose either to undo the effect or to cause its endurance. 22 Since God is in al-Ḥilli's view a choosing agent, He may undo the world through a direct act if He wishes to do so. 23

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atoms (see supra, p.213 n.17), Abū ʿAlī held that God can choose to annihilate only some atoms; see Gimaret, "Matériaux," 292; Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231. 19 See e.g. Ibn al-Malāhimi, Mu'tamad, 133-4; al-Ḥilli, Manāḥij, 88v; idem, Nahj al-mustarshidin, 91; al-Baghdādi, Farg, 197. 20 E.g. Ibn Sīna, Najāt, 249-50.

21 Asrār, 205r, 212v; Manāḥij, 79r, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidin, 164; Niḥāyat al-maḥām, 48v. See also Ibn al-Malāhimi, Fāʾiq, 218r, 225r-226v, where the author attacked this view while defending the traditional Muʿtazilite position that existing things exist by virtue of themselves and do not require an effector. 22 Manāḥij, 84v.

23 Ibid., 88v; Maqāriṣ, 129r; Taṣlīk, 76r.
This possibility was rejected by most of his Mu'tazilite predecessors, who maintained that an effector is required only in order to produce things.\textsuperscript{24} Once it exists, it endures by itself.\textsuperscript{25}

Having adopted the philosophers' concept of endurance and annihilation, al-Hillî disagreed, however, with their doctrine of the eternity of the world. In their view, since God is a necessitating agent, it is impermissible that He may undo any of His effects. If He were to annihilate His creation, the motive to annihilate would be substituted for the motive to create. Yet God is eternal and acts only in accordance with His perfect essence which is not subject to any change. It is, thus, impossible that He may undo at some time what He effected at another time. Therefore, the world, like God, must be eternal.\textsuperscript{26} Al-Hillî envisaged God as a choosing agent who acts on the basis of His motives arising from His knowledge of the beneficial results of His acts for His creation. He therefore allowed that God may annihilate His creation if He has the motive for doing so.\textsuperscript{27}

However, when discussing the nature of restoration, he denied that the non-existent may be restored. He states:

\textsuperscript{24} An exception was Abû 1-Husayn al-Khayyât who maintained that the passing away of the world occurs through its direct nullification (iščdām) by God (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212; Ibn al-Malāhimî, Fā'iq, 217v; Taqī al-Dîn, 290; al-Râzî, Tafsîr, vol.15, pt.30:53). According to Ibn Mattawayh (Tadhkira, 212), the same position was held by Abû 1-Hafs al-Khallâl al-Bašrî (d. 377/987). Ibn al-Malāhimî 'in principle approved al-Khayyât's explanation but eventually rejected it since no scriptural or rational proof indicates that God would do so; see Fā'iq, 218v, 219v; see also Taqī al-Dîn, 290.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibn al-Malāhimî, Fā'iq, 218r, 226r.

\textsuperscript{26} Al-Ghazâlî, Tahâfut, 84ff; Ibn al-Malāhimî, Fā'iq, 225rff.

\textsuperscript{27} Manâhij, 103r; Ma'ârij, 129r; Taslîk, 76r-v; Nahj al-mustarshidîn, 396.
The second investigation about the restoration of the non-existent (išādat al-mašdūm). People disagreed about this. The critical investigators (muḥaqqiqūn) denied its possibility while others affirmed it. The former argued that of whatever passes into non-existence, no identity (huwiyya) remains. Thus, it is not possible to affirm its contingency. Moreover, if it were to be restored it would have to be restored together with its time [i.e. of the initial creation]. It therefore would be at the same time initiated and restored. Moreover, if it were to exist after its restoration, it could not be distinguished from its like if it existed...We investigated the arguments of both groups in the Kitāb al-nihāya. The reliable view is that the first position must be considered as necessary. 28

He shared these arguments with the philosophers and with Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who also denied that the non-existent may be restored. 29

Ibn al-Malāḥimī rejected the possibility of the restoration of the non-existent 30 because, following Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, he repudiated the position of the Bahshaniyya that a non-existent is a thing prior to its existence. The latter maintained that an essence (dhāt) together with the attribute of essence attached to it has a reality prior to existence. Thus, an essence which passed into non-existence is still real (thābit). 31 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, in contrast, held that if God let any bodies pass into non-existence their individual essences would likewise cease to be. In this case, it would be impossible for the individual bodies to be restored. 32 Any bodies which He would create at the restoration could merely be similar to the individual bodies of this world. 33 This, however, is inconceivable since the restored person who receives reward, compensation or punishment in the hereafter must be identical

28Ibid., 393; see also Tdāh al-mağāṣid, 23ff; Asrār, 173v-174r; Maṣā'ī, 103r-v.
29For the arguments of the philosophers, see al-Jurjānī, 246ff.
31Frank, "Non-Existence," 204-8.
32Fā'iq, 224r; also Taqī al-Dīn, 324-5.
33Fā'iq, 224r; also al-Hilli, Maṣā'ī, 129r.
with the person in this world who deserves them. Otherwise, restoration, punishment, compensation and reward would be unjust on the part of God.  

For the Bahshamiyya, this problem did not arise. When they asserted that by the accident of passing away the existence of the bodies will be nullified, it was still possible for God to restore the former individual bodies, since their essence together with the attribute of essence would not vanish with the passing away of their existence. Thus, they defined the restoration of the bodies as a second initial creation by God, comparable to His first one.  

Ibn al-Malāḥini's solution was that bodies do not really pass into non-existence. Rather, they die and their parts (a'zā') become dispersed (tafarrug). At the time of the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{34}}\text{Fā'iq, 224r-225v.}\]  
\[\text{\textsuperscript{35}}\text{Taqī al-Dīn presents the Basran position as follows (329-30): "Then they maintain that these atoms pass away into non-existence. Non-existence means for them only that [the atoms] are no longer characterized by the attribute of existence while the reality of [their] essence (haqīqat al-dhāt) remains since it [i.e. the atom] is described by its essential attribute. Then it is restored to existence. This restored existence is different from the existence it had before. Then it receives the recompense it deserves." See also Ibn al-Malāḥini, Fā'iq, 224v; al-Jurjānī, 244.}\]  
\[\text{\textsuperscript{36}}\text{Abd al-Jabbār, Muqīnī, 11:456ff; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 237. The Basrans maintained that a thing must fulfil certain conditions for its restoration to be possible. Ibn Mattawayh enumerates these conditions (Majmu', 2:305): "That for which it is proper to be restored must be [long to the category of the] enduring (bāqī'), it must be [the product of] an act of God to the exclusion of anybody else, and it must have been [produced by] an initial act (mubtada'). If these three conditions are fulfilled, the restoration of the entity is possible, regardless of whether it belongs to the type (jins) [of act] of which men are capable or it does not belong to that type but the Eternal one has specific power over it." In contrast, Abū Ālī had held that God may not restore anything which belongs to the category of what is subject to man's capacity (Ibn Mattawayh, Majmu', 2:305; idem, Tadhkira, 238, 238-4; Taqī al-Dīn, 322).}\]  
\[\text{\textsuperscript{37}}\text{Fā'iq, 217v, 220v, 221r, 224r; see also Taqī al-Dīn, 325, 333; al-Jurjānī, 244.}\]
restoration, God reunites these parts so that the individual bodies which existed before will again exist. This view, Ibn al-Malāḥimī states, was backed by al-Jāhiz. Confronted with objections of the philosophers that the physical parts of a living being are subject to constant change and therefore cannot constitute its individual personality, Ibn al-Malāḥimī defined his notion of a living being. It consists of basic parts which remain without modification during the whole life. These constitute the individual. Changes occur only in the additional parts which do not constitute the individual. The restoration applies therefore only to the basic parts.

Al-Hillī closely followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his view of passing away and restoration. He agreed with him that a living being consists of basic parts (ajzāʿ asliyya) which are not subject to change and additional parts which are. When it dies its parts are dispersed. At the time of its restoration, God reassembles only the basic parts of the living being. Having adopted Ibn al-Malāḥimī's concept of man, al-Hillī argued against the view of the philosophers and some theologians that man consists of a body and a rational soul (nafs nāṭiqa). This does not prevent him from dealing theoretically with restoration on the assumption that man consists of a soul and a body. In this case, the body would indeed pass into non-existence. After the restoration, the soul which did not pass into non-existence would be united with a different body. He states:

The author [i.e. al-Hillī] adheres to this position [i.e. of Ibn al-Malāḥimī]. And since the prophets consistently agreed upon restoration (iḥāda), which in literal meaning is applied to the production of something which was deprived of the attribute of existence and metaphorically is applied to something else, it is necessary to turn this word

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38 Faʿīq, 221r, 224r.
40 Faʿīq, 223r-224r.
41 Asrār, 154r; Maʿārij, 128r; Nahj al-mustashhidīn, 387; Taslīk, 45v.
to its metaphorical meaning. This means either the reassembling of the parts of the body after their dispersal if we adhere to the view that man consists of the basic parts in this body. Or it means the restoration of the soul to a different body after the passing away of the first body, on the assumption that we adhere to [the view that man consists of a body and] the rational soul. 42

Like al-'Iṣlāhī, al-Ṭālībī allowed that God may annihilate the world through a direct act. 43 He argued accordingly that a contingent requires an effector either to exist or not to exist; by virtue of itself, existence and non-existence of a contingent are equally possible. The effectiveness of an agent which is related to its contingency may thus either create or undo something. 44 Here, he was at variance with the position of the earlier Ash'arites who denied that an agent may undo something. 45 Like al-'Iṣlāhī, he also disagreed with

42 Maṭārija, 129f. 43 Arbaʾ Cif, 279; Maṭālim, 116-7. 44 Ḥāṣara, 38f; Arbaʾ Cif, 79. On the basis of the principle that a contingent always requires an effector for its existence or non-existence, al-Ṭālībī differed with his predecessors on the question of endurance. This also applies to his view on the endurance of accidents. While the Ash'arites traditionally maintained that accidents cannot endure by themselves (Ibn Fūrak, 230, 237, 337; al-Juwaynī, Iṣrād, 139), al-Ṭālībī affirmed this possibility. Accidents are contingent (mumkin al-wujūd). If they gain existence, they endure as long as their effector endures. Were they to vanish at every moment, this would mean that they turned from contingency to essential impossibility by virtue of themselves (al-imtāʿ al-dhātī). This is impossible according to the rules of contingency; see Maṭālim, 34.

45 Al-Ṭālībī, Sharḥ, 130vff; idem, Ghunwa, 92v; al-Kāmil fī ikhtisār al-shāmil, 74r-v. However, being forced by the arguments of his opponents, al-Bāqillānī is reported to have allowed that God may annihilate the bodies through a direct act; see al-Kāmil fī ikhtisār al-shāmil, 74r; al-Ṭālībī, Ghunwa, 37v; idem, Sharḥ, 103r; al-Ṭālībī, Tafsir, vol.15, pt.30:53; for his other explanations of passing away, see later. Al-Ghazālī in his Tahāfut (90-1) maintains that God as a capable agent may either produce or undo something in accordance with His will. On this basis he sought to defend the possibility of the annihilation of the world created by God against the philosophers.

Al-Ash'arī's notion of passing away was founded on the assumption that nothing may last for more than one instance. Thus, all atoms and bodies require for their endurance an accident of endurance (baghāʾ) inhering in them. This accident similarly lasts only for one instance and, thus, is
the philosophers who denied that God may undo His creation. It is very likely that al-Hillī was directly influenced by

constantly recreated by God. (Ibn Fūrak, 238) God endures similarly through an attribute of endurance which lasts. (ibid., 237). Passing away is caused by the failure of God to recreate the accident of endurance. (ibid., 230, 338; al-Baghdādī, Ugūl al-dīn, 230; al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 88).

Although al-Baqillānī initially agreed with al-Ashʿarī's notion of endurance (see F. Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxaniā (Recherches. Série 1: Pensée arabe et musulmane, vol.31. Beirut: Dar al-machreq, 1984), 105 n.6) he is reported to have rejected it later (see al-Kāmil fī ikhtisār al-shāmil, 74v; al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 92r). His doubts arose in regard to God's eternal attributes. Do they require an accident of endurance or not? If they require an accident of endurance this would contradict the view that no accident may inhere in God and His attributes (for the impossibility of this according to the Ashʿarites, see e.g. al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 44). Al-Ashʿarī is reported to have held that His attributes endure because of His endurance. (Ibn Fūrak, 43, 237, 326-7, 337) In al-Baqillānī's view, this would lead to the conclusion that on principle anything may endure by itself. (Al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 92r; al-Kāmil fī ikhtisār al-shāmil, 74v)

Holding on to the Ashʿarite principle that accidents do not endure, he apparently argued that atoms do not require an accident of endurance but exist as long as at least one representative of each genus of accidents inhere in it (al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 93v). Thus, he explained passing away as the withholding of any genus of accidents. (ibid.) In his argumentation he usually chose to say that an atom passes away when the genus kawn is removed in order to make his position valid for the Bāshshamiyya (al-Anṣārī, Sharḥ, 130r-v; idem, Ghunya, 93v; Taqī al-Dīn, 289; see also Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 88-9 where he reports this view as a position held by a 'group of Ashʿarites'). The latter maintained that an atom may exist without any accident attached to it, except for a kawn (see Frank, Beings, 94; also al-Hillī, Manāhij, 82r; see also Kholeif, Rāzī, 105 n.5ff where he expresses his doubts about the authenticity of the attribution of this modified view to al-Baqillānī by later authors. Especially on the basis of the evidence from al-Anṣārī's Sharḥ and his Ghunya, there does not remain serious justification for doubts). There are other reports that al-Baqillānī came to the conclusion that there is no reason why accidents should not endure by themselves. On that basis he put forth a second explanation of passing away defining it as the direct annihilation of bodies by God.

Although rejecting this last possibility, al-Juwaynī shared al-Baqillānī's modified view on endurance of atoms (Irshād, 140-1). Accordingly, he explained passing away as the withholding of any genus of accidents from the atom. In contrast to al-Baqillānī, he did not mention the akāwūn specifically. Al-Juwaynī's view may well be an elaboration of al-Baqillānī's position.
al-Rāzī in regard to these points.

Yet, al-Ḥillī clearly disagreed with al-Rāzī, when the latter affirmed that the non-existent may be restored by God. According to al-Rāzī, God is able to recreate individuals even though their specific essence (dhat makhsūsa) was annihilated when they passed into non-existence. On this point, he was in agreement with his Ashārite predecessors. They defined restoration as a totally new creation of beings which is comparable to their first creation. It is within God's omnipotence to create the individual beings a second time although their essence vanished during their non-existence.46

Al-Rāzī presents the view of his predecessors and states his own argument for it:

Our companions maintain that, when a thing passes into non-existence, its essence is void and it becomes pure negation and sheer non-existence. In the state of non-existence, no identity or specification remains of it. Despite this view they argued that it is not impossible in God's power to restore it identically. No group among the rational people affirm this view except our companions. The proof for its soundness is that when a thing becomes non-existent, it remains something feasible to exist (jā'iz al-wujūd), and God has power over all contingencies. From this follows by necessity that God has power to restore it identically after its non-existence.47

Evidently under the influence of Ibn al-Malāḥimi, al-Rāzī at the same time affirmed that God is able to reunite the parts of the bodies after their dispersal.48 In some of his works it is not clear which of the two views of the restoration he preferred. In his Ishāra,49 however, he expressed his preference for the position that God disperses the bodies rather than annihilates the world. Confronted with

46 Al-Ansārī, Ghunya, 213v-214r; Ibn Fūrak, 55, 111, 240, 242-3; al-Baghdādī, Usul al-dīn, 233-4; al-Rāzī, Muhassal, 338; idem, Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:32; al-Jurjānī, 244.
47 Arbaʿīn, 275; see also Ishāra, 63r; Maʿālim, 116; Muhassal, 338; Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:136; vol.13, pt.26:109.
49 Ishāra, 63v.
arguments of the philosophers that the parts of a living body are subject to infinite change and therefore cannot constitute its individual personality, he replied with the same answer as Ibn al-Malāhimī. A living being consists of basic parts (ajzā' asliyya) which are not subject to change and of additional parts (ajzā' zā'ida/ ajzā' faḍila) which may change. For the restoration, it is sufficient that God will reunite the basic parts of a being. Although mentioning some other possible answers to the philosophers' objection, he made clear that he preferred this one. It seems that he favoured Ibn al-Malāhimī's view that the human bodies are merely dispersed at death and will be reassembled at the restoration although, unlike him and al-Ḥillī, he did not exclude the possibility of their passing into non-existence prior to the restoration.

It is important to note here that al-Rāzī differed from al-Ḥillī in his concept of man. Man consists in his view of a body and a rational soul. While the body passes into non-existence the soul remains. Al-Rāzī did not mention the soul in his discussions of restoration. However, since he generally held that the soul does not pass away, his indecision about the nature of the passing away and restoration of the body is of minor significance.

51 Arba‘īn, 291; Ma‘ālim, 118.
52 Ma‘ālim, 106-8; Mulakhkhas, 311r.
53 Ma‘ālim, 112-3.
54 See also al-Jurjānī, 251 where he omits to list al-Rāzī among those theologians who asserted the restoration of the body and the soul.
CHAPTER VII
PROMISE AND THREAT (AL-WA\textsuperscript{c}D WA-L-WA\textsuperscript{c}ID)

1. Reward and Punishment

The views upheld by al-Hillī and al-Rāzī in regard to the relation between man's acts and his reward or punishment in the hereafter are closely linked to their opposing positions in the question of God's justice.

Al-Hillī maintained that man deserves reward and punishment by his acts of obedience and disobedience respectively. God is obliged to render to him all the reward and punishment he deserves for his actions unless He pardons him or the Prophet intercedes on his behalf. In this case he will not be punished.\footnote{Manāhij, 104r; Māqārij, 129v-130r.} This close link between acts of obedience and reward and between acts of disobedience and punishment is founded on the concept of man's moral obligation (taklīf) which al-Hillī shared with the Mu'tazilites. God puts man under such moral obligation that he is able to obey and to abstain from disobedience despite the hardship imposed by this obligation. The purpose of this imposition of moral obligation is to enable man to reach a higher degree of reward than he might otherwise achieve.\footnote{Kashf al-murād, 249.} On this basis al-Hillī argued for the indispensable link between the acts of obedience which man fulfils under moral obligation and the reward he deserves for this:

The proof that reward is deserved for an act of obedience is that it is a hardship which God has imposed upon the morally-obliged. If this were not for a purpose it would be oppressive and futile, and this is an evil which does not issue from the Wise. If it is for a purpose it is either for causing harm which would be oppression, or for a benefit \footnote{reading li-naf\textsuperscript{c} for al-naf\textsuperscript{c}. This benefit may either be granted initially or not. The first alternative is wrong, for otherwise the}
imposition of] moral obligation would be futile. The second alternative is what we sought to prove. That benefit is what is deserved by virtue of obedience accompanying [reading al-mugārin for al-mugārin] magnification (ta‘zīm) and glorification. It would be evil to render this benefit initially [i.e. without imposing moral obligation] since magnification of someone who does not deserve it is evil. 3

On account of their different understanding of God's justice, the Ash'arites basically disagreed with the view shared by the Imamites and the Mu'tazilites in this question. God, according to the Ash'arites, is rationally not obliged to render reward or punishment. They rejected the formulation that man deserves (yastahīqq) reward or punishment for his actions which God is obliged to render to him. 4 They preferred to say that it is generosity (fadāl/tafaddul) on the part of God to reward man for his acts of obedience and His just right (cadl/haqq) to punish him for his acts of disobedience. 5 On the basis of scriptural evidence, however, they affirmed that God has promised always to reward acts of obedience. 6 Since it is inconceivable that God would lie, this promise is a safe indication that God will not act otherwise. 7 With this they admit that God's arbitrariness cannot be absolute.

On the surface, the Ash'arite view appears to agree with the Mu'tazilite assertion of a necessary link between man's actions and divine reward and punishment. However, a second

3Kashf al-murād, 123; see also Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 411; Manāhij, 104r; Ma'ārij, 130r.
principle connected with theodicy was involved in the question of reward and punishment which set Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite thought on it fundamentally apart. The Mu'tazilite theory of moral obligation and of degrees of punishment and reward which man can achieve by acting under it was founded on the assumption that man is the author of his own acts. God does not predetermine whether a person will be a believer or an infidel, an obedient or a disobedient servant. Thus, man's own action is the only basis for the reward and punishment he will ultimately receive. The Ash'arites, in contrast, maintained that man is not truly the author of his acts but that his acts are rather created by God. Moreover, God preordains a person's fate in the hereafter. There is, therefore, no necessary link between man's acts and his final destiny as the Mu'tazilites understand it. At best, some Ash'arites allow the formulation that man's acts serve as an indication of the destiny which God has ordained for him. This indication, however, is not always reliable since God may wish to pardon all the sins of a sinner. It is similarly possible that the belief which a person displays during his lifetime

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8 Al-Migdād, 413; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol. 6, pt. 11:10, 16; idem, Arba'īn, 388. According to the Mu'tazilites, man is only entitled to reward and punishment when three conditions are fulfilled: that he has the capability for his act (mutamakkīn min fīṣlihi), that he is free to choose the act (mukhallā baynahu wa-baynahu), and that he does not act under compulsion (iljā'); see 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:308 and passim.


10 This Ash'arite principle finds its expression in their concept of muwāfāt, which according to them meant that God eternally loves or hates a person. If He loves him, he will die as a believer and has always during his lifetime been a believer even if this was not obvious to men (Ibn Fūrak, 161-2; al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 228v-229v). On the different interpretations of muwāfāt, see E. Kohlberg, "Muwāfāt Doctrines in Muslim Theology," Studia Islamica 57 (1983): 47-66; for the Ash'arite interpretation, ibid., 50ff.

11 Ibn Fūrak, 163; see also Gardet, Dieu, 300.

12 See al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 351; idem, Ṣanāf, 75; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

13 Ibn Fūrak, 163; Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 351; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol. 4, pt. 7:143.
may not be genuine and therefore be a false indication if he eventually dies as an unbeliever.\(^{14}\) Thus, neither indications for punishment nor for reward in the hereafter are in fact reliable signs for the ultimate fate of a person.

Al-Rāzī followed closely the traditional teaching of his school. Anyone obedient will eventually be rewarded by God. This is known not because man's actions are the reason for this reward, since nothing is incumbent upon God,\(^{15}\) but rather because He has notified mankind that He will reward obedience.\(^{16}\) Therefore, God's reward for man is nothing but generosity (tafaqqul) on His part.\(^{17}\) Since al-Rāzī clung firmly to the Ashârīte position that man is not the author of his acts and that it is God who creates his belief or disbelief,\(^{18}\) he also denied a necessary link between man's actions and his fate in the hereafter. On this basis, he argued that God is not obliged to render to man any reward for his actions. He states:

This is so because man's act depends upon will and this will is created by God. If God creates that will, he \[i.e. man\] obeys and if He creates the other kind of will, he disobeys. Thus, man's obedience is from God and his disobedience is also from God. However, an act of God does not oblige Him to \[do\] anything at all. Thus, neither does obedience make a reward obligatory, nor disobedience punishment. Everything rather comes from God by virtue of His divinity, His conquering force, and His power. Thus what we have asserted is sound; that if He wanted to punish all those who are near to him, this would be good on His part. And if He wanted to have mercy on all pharaohs this would \[likewise\] be good on His part.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{14}\) Ibn Fūrak, 161-2; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:140.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., vol.4, pt.8:241; see also ibid., vol.5, pt.10:78, 180; vol.8, pt.15:21-2, 63-4.
2. The Question of the Muslim Grave Sinner

While al-Ḥillī agreed with the Muʿtazilite position that reward and punishment are deserved by man because of his actions and owed by God by virtue of His justice, he disagreed with them, following the Imamite tradition, on the final destiny of some offenders. This led him to partial agreement with al-Rāzī.

While all parties agreed upon the eternal punishment of the infidel (kāfir), there was disagreement about the final state of the grave sinner (fāsiq) who affirmed his faith of Islam.

The Muʿtazilites held that a person's fate in the hereafter is founded on mutual cancellation (tahābut) of his acts of obedience and disobedience. If a person commits more acts of disobedience than of obedience the reward deserved for the latter is outweighed and, therefore, cancelled by the punishment deserved for his acts of disobedience. In this case he deserves eternal punishment. If his acts of obedience

outweigh his acts of disobedience the punishment deserved for
the latter will be cancelled\textsuperscript{21} and so he deserves eternal
reward.

These rules apply only when the acts of disobedience
belong to the category of minor sins (\textit{sagghā'īr}) and thus are
of equal weight as acts of obedience. If a person commits a
major sin (\textit{kabīra}) this cancels the reward deserved for all
of a person's acts of obedience\textsuperscript{22} and it is impossible for a
major sin to be outweighed by any number of acts of
obedience. One who commits a major sin can escape his
deserved punishment only by repentence (\textit{tawba})\textsuperscript{23} and unless he
repents he will inevitably be punished eternally.\textsuperscript{24} The
\textit{Mu'tazilites} thus draw a sharp line of distinction between
minor and major sins.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{21}Mānaḳīdī, 624ff; Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, \textit{Fā'iq}, 204r-v, 206rff; also
al-Rāzī, \textit{Tafsīr}, vol.4, pt.7:53-4; vol.4, pt.8:213-4; vol.8,
pt.16:91. Abū ǦAlī and Abū Ḥāṣim disagreed about how this
cancellation works. The former maintained that the smaller
amount of reward or punishment will simply be cancelled by
the larger amount, while Abū Ḥāṣim adhered to the principle
of \textit{muwāzana} which means that the smaller amount will be
deducted from the larger; see Mānaḳīdī, 627ff; al-Rāzī,
\textit{Tafsīr}, vol.3, pt.6:40; vol.4, pt.8:209; Abū Ḥāṣim's
position was usually preferred by later \textit{Mu'tazilites}. See
e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, \textit{Fā'iq}, 208r-v.
\item\textsuperscript{22}Al-Rāzī, \textit{Tafsīr}, vol.4, pt.7:50.
\item\textsuperscript{23}See later.
\item\textsuperscript{24}Cabd al-Jabbār, \textit{Fadl}, 211, 350; also al-Rāzī, \textit{Tafsīr}, vol.4,
pt.7:114, 197, 237-8; vol.5, pt.9:119; vol.5, pt.10:75, 244;
vol.6, pt.11:223; vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.8, pt.15:142; vol.15,
pt.29:293; vol.15, pt.30:165.
\item\textsuperscript{25}Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, \textit{Fā'iq}, 208r; also McDermott, 256ff. It
should be noted that despite this sharp distinction between
major and minor sins, man, according to the \textit{Mu'tazilites}, is
unable to know if a specific act of disobedience is a major
or a minor sin; see Cabd al-Jabbār, \textit{Mughnī}, 14:393; Mānaḳīdī,
635, 801; also McDermott, 257 n.2. This view was at variance
with the generally accepted view on major and minor sins in
Islam. Although there was no definite list of major sins, the
Qur'an clearly defines minor and major sins and offers
numerous examples for each class (see A.J. Wensinck and
L.Gardet, "Khāṭiba," \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam}, 4:1107). In the
\textit{ḥadīth} literature, further lists of major sins may be found.
Moreover, Abū ǦAlī composed a book entitled \textit{al-Ikfr
wa-l-tafsīq} (see Gimaret, "Matériaux," 282 no.6) which
apparently dealt with the question of when a person is to be
classified as an infidel or as a grave sinner. A book with
the same title was included in Cabd al-Jabbār's \textit{Mughnī} (this
part is not included in the edited text, see Gimaret,

The Mu'tazilite principle of mutual cancellation was based on the definition of faith (īmān) which included the performance of all religious duties (farā'īd). On this basis they maintained that performance of the religious duties, i.e. faith, deserves eternal reward while failure to perform them, i.e. deficiency in faith, deserves eternal punishment even if the grave sinner confesses his belief in the basic principles of Islam. Since they denied the possibility of temporary punishment they resorted to the principle of mutual cancellation (tahābut). Yet although they held that the grave sinner ceases to be a believer and deserves eternal punishment, he does not belong to the same category as the unbeliever. Rather, he is in a position between faith and infidelity (manzila bayn al-manzilatayn). By this they sought to avoid the position

"Matériaux," 282). The authors must have had a clear idea of what constitutes a grave sin. (A work entitled Kitāb al-baḥth ǧalā adillat al-takfīr wa-l-tafsīq by the Zaydite Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Bustī (a student of Ābd al-Jabbār) which is extant would presumably offer further information on this question. I did not have a chance to consult this work. For the author, see W. Madelung, "Bostī, Abū 'l-Qāsem," Encyclopaedia Iranica 4:388-9. Thus, Ābd al-Jabbār's claim that man is basically unable to know whether a certain sin is minor or major is strange. It may be that he put forward this claim in order to defend the doctrine of mutual cancellation. Thus he argued that if man knew a certain sin to be minor, he would recognize that because of mutual cancellation he would not be punished for committing this sin. This might encourage him to commit this sin. See Mānakdīm, 635. Mānakdīm, 707-8, 802; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 246r-v; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.29:336; Gardet, Dieu, 357-8. This was the position of Abū ǧAlī and Abū Ḥāsim. Abū 1-Hudhayl and Ābd al-Jabbār maintained that supererogatory works (nawāfil) are also included in faith. However, since they did not hold the person who fails to perform these to be deficient in his faith, the significance of this disagreement appears to be minor; see McDermott, 234. Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 207r, 244rff; al-Ash'ārī, Magālāt, 474; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:148-9, 236; vol.5, pt.10:75. Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 206r-v. Mānakdīm, 697; Ābd al-Jabbār, Fadl, 350.
of the Khārijites who considered the Muslim grave sinner an infidel (kāfir) as well as the position of the Murji'ites who affirmed that the Muslim grave sinner is a believer (mu'min). With regard to punishment, the Mu'tazila held that for the sinner (fāsiq) it would be eternal but lighter than for the infidel.

The Mu'tazilite position was contested by both al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī.

The Shi'ite tradition did not include the performance of religious duties in its definition of faith. Rather, it defined it as conviction (taṣdīq) of the heart consisting in the knowledge (ma'rifah) of the basic principles of religion. In order to be valid, this conviction must rest upon rational proofs leading the believer to knowledge of the basic principles. Al-Ḥillī fully adhered to this concept of faith. With this definition of faith, which stresses the element of knowledge (ma'rifah) to the exclusion of the performance of religious duties, the Shi'ites were close to the position which was commonly associated with the Murji'īa.

Al-Ḥillī further stipulated that faith is sufficient to merit reward only on condition that the knowledge of God is complete. This condition is fulfilled when the believer knows all other basic principles of religion as well. He states:

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30Mānakhīm, 701; Abd al-Jabbār, Fadl, 159ff; al-Ka'bī, 115. For the positions of the Khārijites and the Murji'ītes, see A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed. Its Genesis and Historical Development (London: Frank Cass & Co), 38ff; also McDermott, 233-5. For the origin of the Mu'tazilite concept of manzila bayn al-manzilatayn, see Madelung, Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, 1ff.

31Al-Bazdāwī, 131.

32Ajwība, 72-3.

33Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:54ff.

34See Shaykh al-Ṭusi, Iqtiṣād, 140; idem, Tamhīd, 293; Mītham al-Bahrānī, 170; Khulasat al-naẓar, 57v.

35Manāḥīj, 104r; Anwār, 180; Ajwība, 54.

36See al-As'arī, Maqālāt, 132-141; generally for the position of the Murji'ītes on faith, see McDermott, 234-5; Wensinck, 132ff.
It is permissible that reward is dependent upon a condition. If this were not the case, a person who knows God (القادر في الله تعالى) and ignores the Prophet would deserve reward since knowledge of God is an act of obedience independent in itself. 37

He stipulated further that the reward for an act of obedience depends upon the condition (شرط) of muwafat, that is that the person will die as a believer. 38 In his Maqarij, 39 he further clarifies what he means by this. Muwafat is the indication (إلا) for the continuity of faith (إلا عليه) during a person's lifetime. A believer who becomes an infidel, therefore, does not deserve any reward for his former belief. Thus, he stresses, it is not the muwafat that is the reason (سباب) for man's meriting of reward, but his continuity in faith.

Among his predecessors, al-Murtada, following his teacher Shaykh al-Mufid, 40 had adhered to a concept of muwafat which he defined as the impossibility for infidelity to follow upon belief. 41 Al-Hilli's concept of muwafat clearly differs. This is evident from his statement that al-Murtada did not consider muwafat a condition for man to deserve praise for his faith 42 although he was aware of al-Murtada's view that belief cannot be followed by unbelief. 43 He fails, however, to mention that al-Murtada called this principle muwafat.

In most of his works, al-Hilli does not indicate whether he considered it possible for a believer to become an infidel and he refrains from elucidating his own position in

37 Nahj al-mustashridin, 418; see also Kashf al-murad, 326; Masahij, 104r. See also Kohlberg, 64-5.
38 Nahj al-mustashridin, 419; Kashf al-murad, 346-7; Taslik, 79r.
39 Maqarij, 130r.
40 For al-Mufid's position on this question, see McDermott, 210-2; Kohlberg, 53ff.
41 See Kohlberg, 55 n.1 for references; see also al-Hilli, Ajwiba, 21-2. Al-Murtada's position was adopted also by his pupil Shaykh al-Tusi; see Kohlberg, 55 n.2 for references.
42 Ajwiba, 21-2; see also al-Majlisi, Biha'ir, 69:214-5ff.
43 Ajwiba, 22
the Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya\textsuperscript{44} where he reports al-Murtada's view. In his Mašaría\textsuperscript{45}, however, he implies that this is possible. Moreover, the fact that he maintained that muwāfāt, the state of being a believer at the point of death, is a condition for the reward of prior acts of obedience, suggests that he considered it possible for man to change from belief to unbelief.

In his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya\textsuperscript{46} al-Hillī states that an unspecified group of Imamite scholars considered it possible for unbelief to follow belief. They also upheld the principle of the cancellation of deserved reward by deserved punishment (iḥbāt) and of muwāfāt, presumably considering it a condition for the reward.\textsuperscript{47} It is possible that he associated himself with the view of these scholars rather than the position of al-Murtada in the question of whether unbelief may follow belief.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 21-2; here, he merely refers to a more extensive discussion in his Nihāyat al-marām. The manuscript of the Nihāya does not include this section.

\textsuperscript{45}Mašaría, 130r.

\textsuperscript{46}Ajwiba, 22.

\textsuperscript{47}The only Imamite group which is known to have held such views were the Banū Nawbakht. They upheld the Muštazilite thesis of mutual cancellation of acts of obedience and disobedience, and of reward and punishment. They further asserted that a believer may become an infidel; see McDermott, 24. It is not known whether they considered muwāfāt a condition for man's meriting reward. Since they allowed, however, that a believer may become infidel, they may well have considered it to be a condition. In his Masā'il al-Tarābulusiyya, al-Murtada refers to Imamites who consider it possible to follow unbelief as "those who do not believe in muwāfāt." I am indebted to Prof. Kohlberg for this reference.
Al-Rāzī did not include the performance of religious duties in his definition of belief.\(^{48}\) Like al-Hillī, he maintained that it is impossible for a true believer to believe in God but not in the Prophet. If this occurred, it would only show that the person's belief in God is also not true.\(^{49}\)

Al-Rāzī does not discuss his view of muwāfāt in his theological works. In various passages of his Qur'an commentary, however, he sometimes accepts and sometimes rejects the stricter Ash'arite position that belief displayed during a person's lifetime is not genuine if he does not die as a believer.

In the following passage, al-Rāzī deals with the problem that somebody who at first believed and subsequently became an infidel would theoretically deserve eternal reward and eternal punishment. After refuting at length the principle of mutual cancellation (tahābut),\(^{50}\) al-Rāzī concludes:

If this is established, two positions may be singled out as answers. First, the position of those who take [the principle of] muwāfāt into consideration. This means that the condition for the occurrence of faith is that he [i.e. the person] will not die as an unbeliever. If he died as an unbeliever, we would know that his previous conduct was unbelief. This position is obviously false. Second, man does not deserve reward for his obedience and punishment for his disobedience on the basis of rational necessity. This is the view of the people of tradition and \[it is\] our choice.\(^{51}\)

\(^{48}\)Ma'ālim, 127-8; Muḥassal, 347.

The tradition of the Ash'arite school was divided about the definition of faith. Al-Ash'arī himself in his Lumaç defined faith as conviction (tasādīq) without mentioning the performance of religious duties. In his Ibāna and the Maqālät, in contrast, he defined faith as consisting of speech and works. L.Gardet argues that al-Ash'arī's position gave rise to the later Ash'arite doctrine, that the act of conviction constitutes the "formal constituent" of faith, while the fulfilment of religious duties intervenes to perfect it; see L.Gardet "Imān," Encyclopedia of Islam, 3:1170-1; idem, Dieu, 371; see also Mc Dermott, 235-6.


\(^{50}\)Ibid., vol.1, pt.2:139-40.

\(^{51}\)Ibid., vol.1, pt.2:140.
Here he denies the relevance of the discussion concerning the muwafāt maintaining that man's obedience and disobedience are not the reason for God's reward and punishment. Elsewhere, however, he affirmed that the faith of a person which he displayed during his lifetime is genuine only when the condition of muwafāt is fulfilled, that is, when he dies as a believer.\(^\text{52}\) Here, he was in agreement with the stricter Ash'arite position.

The definition of faith as belief to the exclusion of acts upheld by both theologians meant that faith cannot be impaired by any act of disobedience. The reward for the faith of a person, in their view, cannot be outweighed by any sin. Thus, although a believer must expect punishment for his sins, either, as al-Hillî would say, because he deserves it, or, as al-Râzî would say, because he was told so by God, the punishment cannot be eternal. Both theologians, therefore, distinguished sharply between the destiny of a believing sinner and of an infidel. While the former, unless he repents or is pardoned, will be temporarily punished for his sins and then be eternally rewarded for his belief, the infidel will be eternally punished in hell.\(^\text{53}\)

\(^{52}\) He states (Ibid., vol.3, pt.6:38-9): "Thus it is established ...that if [someone] was a believer and then disbelieved, this former faith, even if we thought that it was faith, was no faith in the eyes of God. Therefore, it is clear that muwafāt is a condition for faith to be [genuine] faith and for the unbelief to be [genuine] unbelief." Further evidence that al-Râzî basically backed the stricter Ash'arite position is found in his Tafsîr (vol.8, pt.15:125-127) where he rejects the view that the istithnā' formula (if God wills) is unnecessary when someone says "I am a believer," since his belief at this moment is genuine (ibid., 127). Al-Râzî insists on the requirement of adding the istithnā' (ibid., 127) arguing that man cannot be sure that his present state of belief will last (ibid., 126). Generally for the significance of istithnā', see Kohlberg, 51-2.

\(^{53}\) For references to the views of al-Hillî and al-Râzî, see later. This view was shared by the earlier Imamite and Ash'arite theologians. For the Imamite position, see Khulâsat al-nazar, 52v, 58r. Shaykh al-Tûsî, Igtiṣâd, 117 (Shaykh al-Tûsî is reported to have at first upheld the Mu'tazilite position of the eternal punishment of the grave sinner before adopting the common Imamite position; see M.Nallino, "Abû Gâfar al-Tûsî e un nuovo manoscritto del suo 'Kitâb
Al-Hillī argues on the basis of reason against the eternal punishment of a believing sinner making the following points:

First, the doctrine of the eternal punishment of a sinner (fāsiq) implies injustice. Thus, it does not issue from God. The explanation of the minor premise is that the doctrine of cancellation is false, as we have shown. Thus, the sinner deserves reward for his obedience and for his belief and this must inevitably reach him. According to consensus, this cannot take place before the punishment. Thus it must happen after it, and this is what we sought to prove. Secondly, the doctrine of eternal punishment of the sinner leads to absurdity in so far as it would be equal to the state of the infidel despite the difference in the gravity of their sins and despite the fact that faith may be connected with sinfulness (fisq) and is incompatible with infidelity. Thirdly, it would be evil on the part of the Mighty (al-قازِم) that, if someone worshipped Him for a hundred years and then sinned once, He should cancel all those acts of obedience because of this. Fourthly, the sin of a sinner (fāsiq) is finite and so he does not deserve infinite punishment by it. This is not contradicted by the case of infidelity which is the gravest of sins, equalling infinite sinning.

Al-Rāzī argues for the same position:

Our doctrine is that even though God punishes the sinners from among the Muslims (ahl al-salāt) He will not leave them eternally in hell-fire but will take them out to paradise....What we rely upon in this question is that this sinner will either not deserve punishment, or he will deserve it while he is entitled to reward. If the matter is like this the punishment must necessarily not be permanent.


Naḥāj, 104v; see also Maʿārīj, 129v; Tāsīk; 80v-81r; Nahj al-mustārshidīn, 423; Kashf al-murād, 328-9.

Arbaʾīn, 413; also Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:197-8; vol.6, pt.11:56; vol.9, pt.18:64; vol.2, pt.3:155; "Masāʾil," 381-2; Maʿālim, 124ff; Muhassal, 343ff.
In accordance with their repudiation of the Mu'tazilite principle of mutual cancellation (tahābut), Ash'arites and Imamites denied the sharp distinction drawn by the Mu'tazilites between major and minor sins. They viewed all sins as major in so far as they constitute disobedience to God. There are degrees of gravity of sins in relation to each other but this does not affect their general status as major sins. Al-Hillî and al-Râzî approved this position.

On the basis of the difference between the fate of the Muslim sinner envisaged by the Mu'tazilites on the one hand and by al-Hillî and Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî on the other, further disagreement arose about other ways in which the sinner's punishment might be cancelled.

57 Kashf al-murâd, 328; Manâhij, 104; Ma'ârij, 129v.
3. Divine Forgiveness (Cafw)

One of these ways is God's forgiveness (Cafw) for a sinner who died without repenting. The Mu'tazilites denied the possibility of God forgiving an unrepentant sinner, arguing that since God has notified mankind that He will punish the sinner it would be inadmissible for Him not to carry out this threat. 59 Al-Hilli and al-Razi, each of them following his own school tradition, rejected the Mu'tazilite position.

Al-Hilli maintained that to pardon a sinner is certainly good on the part of God and nothing from the point of view of reason speaks against it. Furthermore, he referred to scriptural evidence as a proof that God actually forgives some sinners. 60 Al-Razi also admitted God's forgiveness for a sinner but he relied exclusively on consensus and scriptural evidence to support his position. 61

60 Macarij, 129v; Manahij, 104v; Nahj al-mustashidin, 427; Taslik, 80r. Generally for the Imamite position, see Khulasat al-nazar, 53r; al-Murtada, "Ushul," 81; Shaykh al-Tusi, Iqtisad, 126.
4. Intercession (Shafā'ī)

Closely related to the question of God's pardon is that of the Prophet's intercession (shafā'ī) on behalf of Muslims. The Mu'tazilites affirmed that intercession is permissible only on behalf of those who deserve reward in the hereafter so that the benefits to which they are entitled shall be increased. 62

Al-Hillī 63 and the Imamite tradition 64 denied this. They held that intercession was reasonable only in behalf of Muslim grave sinners so that their deserved punishment would be cancelled. In their view, it was inadmissible that the prophet would intercede for the purpose of increasing the benefits of those who already deserve reward. 65

In contrast to his Shi'ite predecessors, 66 al-Hillī did not expressly ascribe an intercessory function to the Imams but only to the prophets. It is, however, unlikely that he would have denied this cardinal Shi'ite belief.

The cancellation of punishment was also the principal purpose of intercession according to Ash'arite doctrine. 67 In opposition to the Imamites, however, some Ash'arites maintained that the Prophet might intercede either for the purpose of the cancellation of punishment of sinners or for the purpose of...

63 Ma'ārij, 129v; Manāhij, 105r; Nahj al-mustashfīn, 427.
65 Khulāṣat al-nazār, 54r.
66 For the general position of the Imamites, see Madelung, "Imāmism," 28.
increasing the benefits of those deserving reward. Al-Rāzī admitted both purposes in some of his works but rejected the second one in others.

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68 See Mitham al-Bahrānī, 166-7 who presents this as the usual Ash'arite doctrine. See also Ibn Furak, 167; he maintains that the prophet intercedes even for the repentant sinner so that his repentance will be accepted.

69 E.g. Arba'In, 419.

5. Repentance (Tawba)

The third way to escape deserved punishment is repentance (tawba). All schools agreed that repentance was the only way for an infidel to avoid eternal punishment in hell-fire.71 They differed, however, as to the degree of necessity for a Muslim grave sinner (fāsiq) to repent.

The Muʿtaṣazilites held that repentance is necessary for the grave sinner to free himself from eternal punishment and to gain salvation. If he fails to do so he will certainly be punished. The Imamites and Ashʿarites did not consider repentance as indispensable for the final salvation of a believer. If the sinner fails to repent, God may either punish him temporarily or He may pardon him. On account of his faith, however, the grave sinner will eventually be rewarded eternally.72

In regard to the elements of valid repentance, all schools agreed that it must consist of regret (nadam) for the sin committed and of the resolve (ṣuzm) to abstain from it in the future.73

Adhering to the traditional positions of their schools, al-Ḥillī and al-Ḥāzī disagreed with the Muʿtaṣazilites on a number of details.

With regard to the effectiveness of repentance, the Muʿtaṣazilite school of Basra affirmed that if man repents the punishment for his sin lapses automatically. They argued that

77Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.5:142; vol.4, pt.7:137; Gardet, Dieu, 311.
72See al-Murtadā, "Usūl," 81-2; Mītham al-Bahrānī, 165.
73Mītham al-Bahrānī, 166; al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-mūṣtarṣhidin, 430; Ṭanākdim, 791; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.8:239; vol.5, pt.10:3; vol.8, pt.16:180-1. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, on the other hand, maintained that repentance consists only of regret while the resolve for the future is neither a part nor a condition for its validity. If someone has the motives for regret these motives will induce him to abstain from the sin in the future. Thus, a separate resolve for the future is superfluous. (See Fā'iṣ, 209rff.)
if a sinner regrets his sin in a valid manner and is determined not to repeat it, it would be evil that he should still deserve punishment for it. Thus, God is obliged to cancel punishment for a sin for which the sinner is penitent. They further argued that if the remission of sins upon repentance were not incumbent upon God, it would be evil on His part to put a grave sinner (fāsiq) under moral obligation since he has no means left to him to gain reward.

The school of Baghdad agreed that the deserved punishment will lapse if the sinner repents. This, however, does not occur because of the act of repentance itself but it is rather due to God's generosity (tafaddul) by which He accepts the repentance and cancels the just punishment.

Like the school of Baghdad, the Imamites rejected the Basran doctrine that God is obliged to remit sins on repentance and held that God does so only out of generosity (tafaddul). Al-Hilli backed their doctrine:

Does the cancellation of punishment upon repentance follow necessarily or is it due to generosity? The Mu'tazilites hold the first position, while the Murji'ites and a group of people (jama'a) maintain the second opinion. And this [i.e. the second opinion] is the more likely (al-acrab).

Our proof is that if the cancellation were necessary this would be due either to the obligation to accept it [i.e. the repentance] or to the increase of reward through it. Both positions are false. As for the first section, it would necessarily follow that if someone did the greatest harm to another person and then apologized to him, the injured party would be obliged to accept his apologies. The conclusion is false by consensus and so is the premise. As for the second section, [this is false] because of what has previously been said about the falseness of the principle of mutual cancellation (taḥābut).

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74 Abd al-Jabbār, Muḥnī, 14:337ff; Mānakdīm, 790-1; Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Fā'iq, 214v.
76 Mānakdīm, 790.
77 Khulāsāt al-nazar, 53v; Shaykh al-Tūsī, Iqtīsād, 124-5; idem, Tambīd, 271; Mitham al-Bahrānī, 168.
78 Nahj al-mustashfīdīn, 431; see also Ma'ārij, 130r; Taslīk, 80r. In the manuscript of his Manāhij (105r), 241
The latter argument of al-Hilli is out of place since the Mu'tazilites did not hold that the principle of mutual cancellation is involved in the remission of sins upon repentance. His first argument, however, directly counters the common Mu'tazilite explanation of why God is obliged to accept man's repentance. The Basrans in fact asserted that an apology (i'tidhār) made in a proper way must inevitably result in a state where it would be evil to continue to blame the offender.

Both arguments of al-Hilli have been traditionally employed by Imamite and Ash'arite scholars to refute the Mu'tazilite position. Some writers even claimed, either by mistake or in order to buttress their argument, that the Mu'tazilites based their position on the principle of mutual cancellation (tahābūt).

Al-Rāzī, following the Ash'arite tradition, affirmed that God is not obliged to cancel the just punishment of a repentant sinner and He will do so only because of His promise. The argument of the Ash'arites was based on their dogma that nothing is incumbent upon God since He as the ruler of the universe is not subject to any obligation. Moreover, like the Imamites they rejected the principal Mu'tazilite argument that a proper apology (i'tidhār) must be accepted.

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al-Hilli appears to back the Mu'tazilite rather than the Murjī'ite position. Since this is highly unlikely, it may be presumed that the text is corrupt.

Ibn al-Malāhīmī, Fā'iq, 214v.
Abd al-Jabbar, Mughnī, 14:312ff, 319, 337.
Shaykh al-Tūsī, Igtiṣād, 125; idem, Tamhīd, 272; Khulāsah al-nazar, 53v.
Al-Mutawallī, 60-1.
For a Shi'ite example, see Khulāsah al-nazar, 53v.
For the general Ash'arite position, see al-Mutawallī, 60-1; Ibn Fūrak, 166; al-Bazdawī, 227; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 403-4; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.5:143, 198; vol.5, pt.10:3; vol.8, pt.15:15, 190, 225; Ibn Ḥazm, 4:107; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.
Al-Mutawallī, 61; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 403.
Al-Rāzī put forward a further argument basing it on the AshCarite doctrine that all acts of man are created by God. This being so, it would be meaningless to say that repentance, which is an act of God, obliges Him to perform another act, that is to accept it. He states:

Man's capability in relation to repentance and failure to repent is either equal or it is not. If it is equal, repentance will not preponderate over failure to repent without a preponderator (murajjih). If this preponderator occurred without a producer it would lead to the denial of the Creator. If it were produced by man, the former division would recur. If it is produced by God, man proceeds to repentance by God's help and strengthening. Thus, this repentance is an act of kindness from God to man. An act of kindness of the Lord to His subject does not make it incumbent upon Him [i.e. the Lord] to perform a further act of kindness to him. Thus, the occurrence of repentance in man does not make it obligatory for God to accept it. If man's capability were not suited for failure [to repent] and for the act [of it], it would even more necessarily lead to compulsion (jahār). In this case the assertion that it is obligatory [for God] to accept [repentance] is even more obviously false and wrong.

The opinion that repentance is created by God is in conflict with the view of al-Hillī for whom, as a Mu'tazilite, repentance is an act of man only.88

There was minor disagreement among the theologians whether, and on what grounds, repentance is incumbent upon man for all his sins. Abū CAlī is reported to have held that a sinner is always, by virtue of reason and scriptural evidence, obliged to repent for major and minor sins.89 Abū Hāshin, on the other hand, considered repentance as obligatory only for the grave sinner (ṣāhib al-kabīra). In respect to minor sins, he denied that repentance is

87 Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:3; see also ibid., vol.2, pt.3:22; vol.4, pt.8:239; vol.8, pt.16:180-1; Ma'ālīm, 130. For the general AshCarite position that repentance is created by God, see al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:69; vol.4, pt.8:239.
88 For the general Mu'tazilite position, see ibid., vol.5, pt.10:69.
89 Mānakdim, 789; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:393; Ibn al-Malāhīmī, Fāʾiq, 213r.
rationally obligatory \(^{90}\) and held that scriptural authority also does not definitely indicate this obligation.\(^{91}\) He compared repentance for a minor sin with a supererogatory act (\(nafa\ila\)) which is not obligatory in itself. It is, however, good to perform it since it helps man to perform his duties or, in this case, to repent for his major sins. \(^{92}\) \(^{92}\) Ibn al-Malāḥīmī adhered to the position of Abū \(^{93}\) Alī affirming that repentance is equally obligatory for every sin. He argued that repentance is due because of the evil of a certain sin. The characteristic of evil, however, applies to every act of disobedience, regardless of whether it constitutes a minor or a major sin.\(^{93}\)

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī maintained that man's obligation to repent for his sins equally applies to every sin.\(^{94}\) They differed, however, as to why man is obliged to repent.

Al-Ḥillī argued for man's obligation to repent principally with rational arguments which were also employed by the Mu'tazilites.\(^{95}\) In his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's Tajrīd al-Caqā'id he elaborates the arguments of the latter:

The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī] argued for the obligation to repent with two points. First, it [i.e. repentance] repels harm, namely the punishment or the fear [of it], and the repulsion of harm is obligatory. Secondly, we definitely know the obligation to repent of doing evil or of the failure to do what is obligatory. When you recognize this, we say that it [i.e. repentance] is obligatory with regard to every offence since it is obligatory for an act of disobedience because of

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\(^{92}\) Abū Ḥāshim, Muṣḥīn, 14:394. See, in contrast, Mānakdīm, 789, where Abū Ḥāshim is reported to have held that repentance for minor sins is obligatory because of scriptural evidence.

\(^{92}\) Abū Ḥāshim, Muṣḥīn, 14:393.

\(^{92}\) Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Fā'iq, 213r.

\(^{92}\) Al-Ḥillī, Manāhibīj, 105r; al-Rāzī, Maqālim, 131.

\(^{92}\) E.g.: Mānakdīm, 789.
its being an act of disobedience, and with regard to failure to do something obligatory because of its being such. This applies in general to every offence and to every failure to do that which is obligatory.\textsuperscript{96}

Al-Rāzī referred only to scriptural evidence.\textsuperscript{97} In this he was in agreement with the Ash'arite tradition.\textsuperscript{98}

Al-Hillī and al-Rāzī agreed in rejecting the position of Abū Hāshin that it is impossible to repent of some sins while still carrying on with others when the penitent is aware of the evil nature of the acts with which he is persisting. Abū Hāshin is reported to have argued\textsuperscript{99} that man repents because of the evil nature of the major sin in question. Since the characteristic of evil is shared by all major sins it would be inadmissible that one repents only of some major sins because of their evil while carrying on with others which are of the same gravity. With this position, which was also adopted by Ābū al-Jabbār,\textsuperscript{100} Abū Hāshim disagreed with Abū Ālī who admitted the possibility of repenting of some sins while carrying on with others.\textsuperscript{101} The only condition Abū Ālī made was that the sin repented and that which was continued must not be of the same kind (jins). It would, therefore, be impossible to repent of drinking wine from one pot while continuing to drink it from another, whereas it would be possible to repent of drinking wine while at the same time carrying on with adultery.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{96}Kashf al-murād, 331; see also Nahj al-mustarshidín, 430-1. In his Manāhīj (105r), al-Hillī, too, refers to scriptural evidence.
\textsuperscript{97}Māqālim, 131 (referring to Qur'an LXVI:8).
\textsuperscript{98}E.g. al-Mutawallī, 60 (referring to Qur'an XXIV:31); he also refers to consensus (ijmāʿ); al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 404; he refers only to consensus.
\textsuperscript{99}Ibn al-Malāhimi, Fāʿīq, 210v; Mānakdīm, 794-5; also Ibn Ḥazm, 5:69.
\textsuperscript{100}Mānakdīm, 794.
\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., 794-5; Ibn al-Malāhimi, Fāʿīq, 210v.
\textsuperscript{102}Mānakdīm, 794-5; Ibn al-Malāhimi, Fāʿīq, 210v.
Al-Ḥillî agreed with Abû Hâshim that penitence is only valid when it is done because of the evil nature (qubh) of the offence but he distinguished between general evil shared by all sins and specific evil which applies only to some. On this basis, he rejected Abû Hâshim's conclusion. He summarizes the dispute:

Is it possible to repent only of some evil? Abû ḍAlî allowed this and claimed consensus for his position. Abû Hâshim denied it. Abû Hâshim's argument is that evil is avoided (reading yutraku for turika) only because of its evil nature. The avoidance of everything which shares its cause is then obligatory. Just as (when) someone says "I do not eat this pomegranate because of its sourness," it follows necessarily that he does not eat any sour pomegranates. Abû ḍAlî argued that it is possible by consensus to do (reading ityân for ithbât) some obligatory thing to the exclusion of another, because (if) a person fasts but does not pray his fasting is valid. The clarification of the condition is that just as it is necessary to repent of anything evil because of its evil nature it is likewise necessary to do what is obligatory because of its obligatory nature. If, from the fact that evil matters share their cause it follows that repentance of some only is impossible, then since obligatory matters also share their cause it must follow that (to perform only) some of them is invalid. Abû Hâshim replied that there is a difference in the view of rational men between doing and failure to do something. The one who fails [to eat] the pomegranate because of its sourness avoids [eating] all [pomegranates], while the one who eats it because of its sourness will not eat [reading ʾakīlān for ʾakīl] all of them. This example is clear, because what prevents the eating in the case of failure to eat is the sourness and because of that it applies to all cases, while in the case of acting [i.e. eating] it is not the sourness, alone which entails the act but [that sourness] together with [other] motives. Thus, it does not apply to all cases.

Know that Abû Hâshim's argument is cogent (lāzin) and that one cannot escape it except by maintaining that repentance is obligatory for anything evil because of its evil nature [in general] and because of the [particular] aspect of its evil. There is no doubt that evils are not alike in the [specific] aspects of their nature even if they are alike in their [general] evil character. 103

103 Manāḥij, 105r.
Al-Ḥillī's discussion appears to be based directly on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's argument in the Fā'iq.\textsuperscript{104} The latter affirmed in principle the correctness of Abū Ḥāshim's position when arguing that the repentant sinner must abstain from all sins for which the motive for abstention is the same as for the sin actually repented. However, he goes on to explain that this applies only if there is no difference in any aspect of these sins. Moreover, even if the motives for abstention from some sins are the same there may in some cases be additional deterrents (sawārif) which are missing in others. On this basis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī concluded that repentance for only some sins is permissible while at the same time upholding the principle that repentance is obligatory in general because of the evil nature of every sin. Against Abū Ḥāshim's position as reported by al-Ḥillī, Ibn al-Malāḥimī also maintained that abstention and action are in fact comparable with respect to their lack of general application. The motives for evil do not apply equally to all sins but depend mainly on man's individual longing (shahwa) and pleasure (ladhāha) and the same is true of the deterrents which drive him to repent of certain sins more strongly than of others.\textsuperscript{105}

Al-Rāzī also rejected Abū Ḥāshim's position\textsuperscript{106} in agreement with Ash'arites tradition.\textsuperscript{107} The argument he employed to refute Abū Ḥāshim's view seems likewise to be based directly on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq.\textsuperscript{108} He states:

Most [theologians] maintain that repentance of some sins while persisting with others is valid. Abū Ḥāshim held that it is not valid. The proof of the former is that a Jew if he extorts a habba [i.e. 1/60 of a dīnār] and then repents of Judaism while persisting with the extortion of the habba, then people unanimously agree that this repentance is valid. The proof of Abū Ḥāshim is that if he repents for that evil [act] for its pure evil it is necessary that he repents for all evils. If he repents for it for a purpose other than its pure evil, his repentance is not valid. The answer [to this] is: Why is it not possible that he repents

\textsuperscript{104} Fa'iq, 211r-v.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 211v.
\textsuperscript{106} Māṣālim, 131-2.
\textsuperscript{107} Al-Mutawallī, 61; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 405ff.
\textsuperscript{108} Fa'iq, 211v.
for that evil because it is that particular evil, just as a man may have appetite for a specific food not because of the general characteristic of its being food but because it is that specific food.\textsuperscript{109}

Al-Ḥillī was asked by his disciple Muhanna' b. Simān\textsuperscript{110} whether the recurrence of a sin after repentance nullifies the validity of this repentance. Al-Ḥillī denied this in principle arguing that a valid repentance cannot be nullified under any circumstances. He states:\textsuperscript{111}

Repentance cancels all acts of disobedience which have preceded it. If he [i.e. the repentant sinner] returns to the act of disobedience that repentance is not annulled, nor do these previous acts return after they were cancelled by repentance.

It is likely that al-Ḥillī would apply this view to the related question whether repentance has to be renewed whenever the penitent remembers the sin of which he had repented. Al-Ḥillī’s following discussion of the different positions seems again to be directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s account in the Fā'iq:\textsuperscript{112}

People disagreed over the act of disobedience: if a person repents of it and remembers it later, is [renewed] repentance for it obligatory [reading tajīb for saḥha]? Abū Ḥāshim said that it is not obligatory while the others made this obligatory. Abū Ḥāshim argued that the person had performed what is obligatory. Thus, any restriction on it is void. The others argued that if the person remembers it, and if he then finds in himself the continuation of it, [he is then required to repent]. And this is possible only by a renewal [reading bi-tajdīd for tajdīd] of his repentance. Thus, its renewal is obligatory. If he does not find [reading yajīd for yajīb] in himself this continuation, it [still] is obligatory to renew the repentance because the repentant sinner does not know whether the punishment has been nullified by it. There is some weakness in this.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{109}Maṣālim, 131-2.
\textsuperscript{110}Al-Ḥillī, Ajwība, 29.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112}Fā'iq, 213v.
\textsuperscript{113}Manāḥij, 105r.
It is not entirely clear from the text whether al-Hillî considered the whole position of the opponents of Abû Hāshim weak or if this applies only to the second argument put forward by this group.\(^{114}\) Al-Hillî's answer in the Ajwibat al-nasā‘il al-muhanna‘iyya, which shows that he maintains the absolute effectiveness of repentance, suggests that he agreed with Abû Hāshim.

The argument of continuation, which backs the position that the renewal of repentance is obligatory, had been put forward by Ibn al-Malāhimî.\(^{115}\) With this, he seems to have agreed with Abû CAlî who likewise maintained that the renewal of the repentance is obligatory.\(^{116}\)

\(^{114}\) See also Kashf al-murād, 335-6, where al-Hillî merely reports the different positions without expressing any opinion of his own.

\(^{115}\) Fā‘iq, 213r.

\(^{116}\) Al-Hillî, Kashf al-murād, 335.
CONCLUSION

The impact of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī upon al-Ḥillī's theological views was formative and in all issues where they disagreed with the Bahshamiyya, al-Ḥillī followed them closely.

In the realm of justice, he adopted their view that a capable agent cannot commit an act without a motive and he therefore repudiated the Bahshamiyya tenet which held that simple actions can be performed by a capable agent without a motive. Having applied this mechanism of the occurrence of an act also to God, he further followed Ibn al-Malāḥimi's view that God is obliged to act for man's best interest in every respect, whenever He has the motive to do so. In respect to some minor points of disagreement regarding the issue of compensation, al-Ḥillī preferred the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimi to those of the Bahshamiyya.

In the question of divine attributes, he closely followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in rejecting the notion of states (ahwāl) as developed by the Bahshamiyya, upholding only the notion of the characteristics (ahkām) of the divine attributes. With regard to God's will, al-Ḥillī again followed Abū l-Ḥusayn who repudiated the view of the Bahshamiyya that God wills through a temporal will which inheres in no substrate insisting instead that God's will must be identified with His motives to act. Regarding the question whether God's knowledge is subject to change following the change in temporal things, al-Ḥillī adhered to the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his school that this change is restricted to the connection (taʿalluq) between His essence and the object of His knowledge. He also followed their view that God is powerful over all possible acts, including the specific actions of man.
He also followed Abū 1-Husayn in rejecting the position of the Bahshamiyya which asserted the reality of essences and attributes of essence in the state of non-existence. In his view, the non-existent (maḍūm) cannot be asserted to be a thing (shay'). On this basis, al-Ḥillī also adopted Ibn al-Malāḥimī's view on passing away (fana') and restoration (iqdada). Since things have no reality in the state of non-existence, God does not annihilate the body, except in a metaphorical sense when He disperses its parts. This dispersal occurs through a direct act on the part of God and restoration subsequently consists in the reassembling of these parts by God.

As for the issue of promise and threat, al-Ḥillī held on to the specific Imamite position which traditionally differed from the Muṣṭazilite view. On account of the Imamite concept of belief, he rejected the Muṣṭazilite notion of the intermediate position and eternal punishment of the grave sinner. He adhered to the Imamite doctrine of intercession (shafā'ca) and the possibility of divine forgiveness (Qafw) for a grave sinner. Yet in regard to the doctrine of repentance, of which at least some elements were shared by Muṣṭazilites and Imamites, al-Ḥillī preferred the opinion of Ibn al-Malāḥimī to those of Abū Hāshim whenever his Imamite perspective was not in basic conflict with the Muṣṭazilite view.

Al-Ḥillī also followed Abū 1-Husayn and his followers whenever they disagreed with the Bahshamiyya in regard to natural philosophy. He agreed with the former in his rejection of the notion of entitative determinants entailing states. While the Bahshamiyya, for instance, defined kawn as the entitative determinant which causes an atom to be in a certain position,1 al-Ḥillī explained kawn simply as the occurrence of the atom in a position.2 This difference of definition extended also to the four kinds of kawn, movement

1 Frank, Beings, 98.
2 Manṣūḥi, 82v; Nahj al-mustashhidīn, 69. For the view of the school of Abū 1-Husayn al-Baṣrī, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muṣṭamad, 86ff.
(ḥaraka), rest (sukūn), contiguity (iḥti̇māq) and separation (iftirāq). He further denied the possibility that an accident may subsist outside a substrate (lā fī maḥall) and the possibility that one accident may subsist in two substrates. Among the former category of accidents, the Bahshamiyya counted God's will, His disapproval and annihilation. In the latter category, they classified the accident of composition (ta'li̇f) which inheres in two adjacent atoms. By this inference it causes them to be conjoined as a single thing.

Apart from this formative impact of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-taşrī, the theology of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī had a significant influence on al-Hillī's theology. Such influence can be detected most often in technical details in the various fields where al-Rāzī developed original views, such as his proofs of the impeccability of the prophets, or his proofs for the veracity of the claimant of the prophetic office and other details. Al-Rāzī's views, however, were especially influential in shaping al-Hillī's thinking wherever parallels between al-Rāzī's positions and the positions of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-taşrī existed. It has been seen that al-Rāzī's theology developed under the major influence of the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers. Owing to the influence of philosophy on his thought, al-Rāzī further developed these views through freely mixing theological concepts with philosophical notions and terminology. This fusion was facilitated by the fact that quite a few of Abū l-Ḥusayn's views had affinities with philosophical views. Al-Rāzī's amalgamation of philosophical and theological concepts had a distinct impact on al-Hillī's thought. Some examples follow.

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3. Manāhīj, 83r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 69-70. For the view of the Bahshamiyya, see Frank, Beings, 98-9.
4. Manāhīj, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 91. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muḥtamad, 133-4.
5. Manāhīj, 88v; Nihāyat al-marām, 100r. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Malāḥīmī, Muḥtamad, 133-4.
6. Frank, Beings, 104.
Al-Rāzī agreed with Abū 1-Husayn that will is additional to the motive for an action in the visible world. He did not, however, use Abū 1-Husayn's terminology but rather drew upon that of the philosophers in stating that man's motive generates a longing (shawq/mayl) which is his will (irāda). Al-Hillī adopted this modified terminology.

When dealing with the connection (ta’calluq) between God's essence and the objects of His attributes, al-Rāzī substituted the philosophical terms of relation (idāfa/ nisba) for the theological term connection, without, however, modifying the meaning of the latter term as used by the theologians. Al-Rāzī's terminology is evident in al-Hillī's writings.

Al-Rāzī, moreover, also adopted a number of philosophical notions which had no direct parallel in the thought of Abū 1-Husayn al-Baṣrī. Here, he was also followed by al-Hillī. Al-Rāzī adopted, for instance, the philosophical notion of contingency. This led to a modified terminology in a wide range of issues which equally had direct parallels in al-Hillī's writings. On this basis, al-Rāzī, followed by al-Hillī, allowed that God may equally undo or create. This view, which led to direct disagreement with those earlier theologians who denied that God may undo something through a direct act, was also shared by al-Hillī. Regarding the passing away of the body, al-Rāzī and al-Hillī therefore maintained that God may simply undo it. This possibility had been rejected by earlier theologians who were forced to find a different explanation of the way in which God causes the body to pass away.

Yet despite the impact of al-Rāzī's concepts and terminology on al-Hillī's theology in a large number of details, the latter strictly repudiated al-Rāzī's Ashʿarite views whenever they were in conflict with his Muʿtazilite principles.

In sum, except for the issue of God's promise and thread to mankind where al-Hillī followed the Shiʿite tradition which differed here from the doctrine of the Muʿtazilites, his theology can be said to be primarily based on the
doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and to be secondarily influenced by the formulations of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī whenever these did not disagree with his basic theological views.

An exception was his treatment of essence (māhiyya) and existence (wujūd) where al-Ḥillī, independently from these two major influences on his thought, closely followed the Avicennan tradition.

These conclusions apply to al-Ḥillī's doctrine as set forth in his theological works. Since he was, however, equally well-trained in philosophy and wrote a number of philosophical works, it must be asked to what extent his theological works are representative of his personal convictions, and whether he held different views in his philosophical works. This question is of special interest since al-Ḥillī's teacher, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, was a philosopher rather than a theologian although he did write a few theological treatises in which he was, like al-Ḥillī, influenced by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and al-Rāzī's views. From Naṣīr al-Dīn's autobiographical report, it is known that he began with the study of traditional religious sciences and theology but soon became dissatisfied with the views and methods of the kalām theologians who, in his view, did not sincerely seek the truth. He then turned to the teaching of the philosophers and found that they sought the truth on the basis of reason alone without blindly following any authority. His deep commitment to the views of the philosophers is evident especially in his refutation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's critical commentaries on the works of Ibn Sīnā. Although Naṣīr al-Dīn joined for some time the

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8. These are especially his commentary on al-Rāzī's Sharḥ al-īshārāt, and his Talkhīs al-muḥassal.
Isma'Cilis he ultimately proved to be a true philosopher.\(^9\) His few concise theological treatises, therefore, cannot be considered as representative of his thought.

There are a number of safe indications that al-Hillî, in contrast to Na'ârî al-Dîn, was primarily a theologian who repudiated philosophical doctrine in both his theological and philosophical works whenever it disagreed with his theological views.

From his few extant works on philosophy, only two are relevant for an evaluation of the present question, the \textit{Asrâr al-khafîyya}, presumably written before 680/1281, and his commentary on al-Kâtibî al-Qazwînî's \textit{Hikmat al-\textit{C}ayn}, the \textit{\textit{I}dâh al-ma\textit{g}â\textit{s}îd fî sharh \textit{hikmat al-\textit{C}ayn}. In the third part of the \textit{Asrâr} which treats with theology, al-Hillî is severely critical of philosophical notions whenever they disagree with his theological views. This impression is supported by occasional remarks in the \textit{\textit{I}dâh} where he states his criticism of al-Kâtibî's view and usually refers the reader to more extensive discussions in his \textit{Asrâr}. In these two works he radically rejected the philosophical notion of emanation.\(^{10}\) God is not a necessitating cause (\textit{mujib}) from whom an effect inevitably emanates because of His self-reflection; rather, He is a choosing agent who acts whenever He has the motive to do so.\(^{11}\) Thus al-Hillî repudiated the philosophical view that God does not act for a purpose other than His self-reflection.\(^{12}\) He also held the philosophical view that God's knowledge does not include particulars to be false.\(^{13}\) He attacked the philosophical view that since God and His

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\(^{9}\) Evidence for this can be found in his \textit{Ma\textit{g}â\textit{r}î\textit{c} al-mu\textit{s}â\textit{r}î\textit{c}} which is a refutation of the \textit{Kitâb al-mu\textit{s}â\textit{r}â\textit{c}a} by al-Shahrastâni (d. 540/1153) in which he defends Ibn Sînâ's positions against the objections of al-Shahrastâni who argued from an Isma'Cilis point of view. For this work, which he evidently wrote after he left the Isma'Cilis, see Madelung, "Streitschrift," 250-259, esp.258-9.

\(^{10}\) \textit{Asrâr}, 216r, 219r; \textit{\textit{I}dâh al-ma\textit{g}â\textit{s}îd}, 113-4, 224.

\(^{11}\) \textit{Asrâr}, 210r; \textit{\textit{I}dâh al-ma\textit{g}â\textit{s}îd}, 83, 234; also \textit{Ajwîba}, 152.

\(^{12}\) \textit{Asrâr}, 215v; \textit{Ajwîba}, 152.

\(^{13}\) \textit{Asrâr}, 225r-v.
knowledge of the best order of things, which necessitates their emanation from Him, are eternal, and since change is inadmissible in Him, the world is a necessary concomitant of God and as such co-eternal with Him.\textsuperscript{14} He equally rejected the philosophers' view that the world cannot pass away into non-existence since God, who is the primary cause of the world, does not vanish.\textsuperscript{15} Having rejected the notion of emanation, al-Hillî maintained that God is capable of creating an infinite number of things. He does so through a direct act of creation.\textsuperscript{16} He further rejected the philosophical notion of divine attributes and defended the theological view that God's attributes have a reality in themselves. They are existential yet they have no separate existence except in the mind.\textsuperscript{17}

A further indication that al-Hillî considered himself primarily as theologian may be the fact that most of his remaining philosophical writings are lost. It is likely that he wrote them as teaching books for his students. They were therefore of little originality and not considered worth copying by later students and scholars.

In his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muḥanna'īyya, which contain his answers to questions by his student Muhanna b. Sinān covering a wide range of topics, al-Hillî clearly stated that he considered the upholders of the eternity of the world as infidels (kāfirūn).\textsuperscript{18} Since this collection of answers was written at a late stage of al-Hillî's life (between 719/1319-20 and 720/1320) and was not meant to be a specifically theological book, this further suggests that even during later life he firmly held on to his basic theological position.

This overall impression is corroborated by a comparison of al-Hillî's theological works with the theological treatises by Naṣîr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. It appears that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Asrār, 212v; Ḥadā' al-maqâṣid, 231-3.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 83.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 113-4; 222; Asrār, 216r.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 210r.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ajwiba, 88-9.
\end{itemize}
al-Ḥillī displayed in his kalām works a quite conservative attitude even in regard to questions which did not directly touch theological issues and in which Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī fully adopted the philosophical position. Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, left them either undecided, or tended to follow the traditional positions of the theologians.

Naṣīr al-Dīn adhered in his theological writings to the philosophical notion of man consisting of a soul (nafs) which is attached to a body (badan). Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, seems to have been undecided between the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who defined man as consisting of basic parts (ajzāʾ āṣliyya) and the position originating with the philosophers. Although in most of his theological and philosophical works he put forward arguments against the concept of the existence of a soul in addition to these basic parts, he usually hesitated to reject it outright. In his Maʾārij, he concludes his discussion by stating that both positions, that of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and that of the philosophers, are strong. He expresses similar views in his Asrār. In his Taslīk, he states that although the proofs for the existence of the soul must be rejected, equally there are no proofs for the impossibility of its existence. Therefore it must be considered as possible. An indication that he tended rather to the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī is found in his discussion on passing away and restoration. Holding on to the view that man consists of basic parts without a soul attached, he maintains that God does not annihilate the body but only disperses its parts. Only in his Maʾārij, he explains passing away and restoration on the assumption that man consists of body and soul. In this case, the body only would pass away into non-existence. When God wished to restore man, another body

\[\text{Reference numbers:}\]
\[19 \text{Tajrīd, 138ff; Fuṣūl, 21-2; see also al-Miqdād, 389.}\]
\[20 \text{Asrār, 154rff; Maʾārij, 128r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 387; Taslīk, 45v.}\]
\[21 \text{Maʾārij, 128r. In his Manāhij (89r-v), he offers objections to both without indicating his preference; he concludes, however, saying that both views are very close to the truth.}\]
\[22 \text{Asrār, 153r-v.}\]
\[23 \text{Taslīk, 46r-v.}\]
would be attached to the soul which did not pass away. Al-Hillī offered this explanation, however, on the theoretical assumption that man consists of body and soul without expressing his approval of this view. In some of his refutations of the philosophers' objections to the theological dogma of the annihilation of the world and restoration of the human body, he expressly denied that man consists of a soul and a body. 24

In regard to atomism al-Hillī preferred in most of his theological works the theological concepts of jawhar and ḍaraq, defining the former as an atom occupying space (mutahayyiz) and the latter as an accident inhering in a body occupying space (ḥall fi 1-mutahayyiz). 25 He also favoured the theological definition of a body (jism) as a compound of atoms. 26 He does, however, not take sides in the discussion of the theologians as to how many atoms constitute a body. 27 In his philosophical works he rather adopted the philosophical concepts of jawhar and ḍaraq, defining jawhar as substance, i.e. that which does not exist in a subject (mawjud lā fi mawdū), and ḍaraq as that which exists in a subject (mawjud fi mawdū). 28 He, therefore, differed from Naṣīr

24 Ibid., 77v.
25 Maʿārīj, 110r; Manāhij, 80v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 25. In his Tasālik (9v-10v), he only reports the positions of the theologians and the philosophers without indicating his own position.
26 Maʿārīj, 128r; Manāhij, 81r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 29; Tasālik, 12r.
27 Manāhij, 80v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 29.
28 Asrār, 175v; Kashf al-khafāʾ, 16r, 58r. The philosophical views on accidents had nevertheless some influence on al-Hillī; this can be found in both his theological and philosophical works. Examples of this influence are his view that an accident may subsist in an accident (qiyan al-ḍaraq bi-l-ḍaraq) which was unanimously rejected by the theologians with the exception of the early Muʿtazilite Muʿīn al-mīmār b. Ābād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830), but which was generally accepted among the philosophers. (Manāhij, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 130; Maʿārīj, 115v; for the view of the Bahshamīyya, Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 274-5; for the position of the philosophers, Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 1:58.) Having accepted this principle, al-Hillī was able to define a letter (harf) like the philosophers as an accident which subsists in the accident of voice (gawt) (Manāhij, 84r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 85) while the earlier theologians defined a
al-Dīn al-Tūsī who adopted the philosophical concepts of jawhar and garaḍ both in his philosophical and theological writings. 29

The different approaches of al-Hillî and Naṣīr al-Dīn are also apparent in regard to the question of whether God may be said to experience pure intellectual pleasure. The theologians traditionally denied that God could be described as experiencing either pain (alam) or pleasure (ladhâh), arguing that this is possible only for corporeal beings. The philosophers, in contrast, asserted that God does experience a kind of pure intellectual pleasure. They argued that, since He perceives through self-reflection the most perfect being, that is His own essence, He experiences delight. 30 While Naṣīr al-Dīn admitted this possibility in his Tajrīd, al-Hillî expressed doubts. The application of the expression "enjoying" (multadhīh) to God would only be justifiable if there were permission by revelation (idhn shārī). 31

It seems, therefore, safe to conclude that whereas Naṣīr al-Dīn's importance was as a philosopher, al-Hillî was primarily a theologian who was only marginally influenced by philosophical concepts and terminology. As such, he displayed considerable conservativism in issues where he could have adopted the philosophical position without contradicting any of his theological views. Naṣīr al-Dīn

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letter usually as a kind (jins) or part (juz') of voice. (Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 362ff) In regard to the accident of colour (lawn), al-Hillî did not follow the Bahshamiyya that there are five simple pure kinds of colours, namely black, white, red, green and yellow. Rather he followed in his Nahj al-mustarshidīn (74–5) the position of the majority of the philosophers that the only real, pure colours are white and black while all other colours occur because of different mixtures of these two colours. In his Manāhij (83v), he refrains from taking a position about this question. When he discussed the accident of pressure (i'timād), he usually pointed out that it corresponded to the accident of inclination (mawla) in the usage of the philosophers. (Taṣliḥ, 17r; Manāhij, 84r).

Tajrīd, 100.

31 Kashf al-murād, 229; see also Asrār, 211v; Manāhij, 94v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 233.
al-Tūsī was therefore of greater importance than al-Ḥillī for the subsequent fusion of theology and philosophy in Imami thought, which was moreover mixed with elements of the philosophy of illumination of al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190) and the Sufi thought developed by Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). The first major representative of this tendency was Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-ʿAḥsāʾī (d. after 904/1499).\textsuperscript{32} At a later stage, a far-reaching substitution of philosophy for Imami theology was achieved by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Lāḥījī (d. 1092/1661).\textsuperscript{33} This current of thought, however, had only a limited impact upon the Shiʿism.\textsuperscript{34} In the long run, traditional theology as represented by al-Ḥillī was more important.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 367.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 367.
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